"Am I doing it right?": a discursive analysis of cancer narratives by Rosemary Chapman (7189943)
 
 
 
This item is held in Loughborough University’s Institutional Repository 
(https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/) and was harvested from the British Library’s 
EThOS service (http://www.ethos.bl.uk/). It is made available under the 
following Creative Commons Licence conditions. 
 
 
 
 
 
For the full text of this licence, please go to: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ 
 
"Am I doing it right? ": 
A Discursive Analysis 
of Cancer Narratives 
by 
Rosemary Chapman 
A Doctoral Thesis 
Submitted in partial fulfilment of the 
i 
requirements for the award 
of Doctor of Philosophy of Loughborough University 
December, 2001 
Rosemary Chapman, 2001 
Dedication 
This thesis began because Charles Cohen, one of my dearest and finest friends, 
received a terminal cancer diagnosis. In the time he had left to live we shared a lot about 
what we both felt about cancer. One of the most poignant things he said to me was "Am I 
doing it right? " 
We talked openly and endlessly about his illness and coping with life. We became 
acutely aware of the expectations of the medical profession and of the difficulties all of 
us, including Charles, his friends and family had in talking to him; knowing. what to say, 
how to give him the support he needed, when he needed it, and knowing when to step 
back when he did not. We all wanted to help in whatever way we could to support him in 
living life to the full, for each and every moment. 
When he asked John, our mutual friend and me to 'take care of his death and be there for 
him at the end', we both said yes, but I had no way of knowing what I was about to 
embark upon. This experience was both extremely painful and full of wonderful moments 
that have enriched my life and it was certainly a momentous life-changing event for me. 
Before he died on 12 March 1994, Charles made me promise to try to increase 
awareness of the problems we had all experienced. Fulfilling this promise is the 
motivation and driving force for my thesis. I hope it helps anyone who finds themselves in 
a similar situation, and provides an understanding of the difficulties that are usually not 
talked about. 
Soon after I moved to Loughborough from London to begin my studying, my only brother 
Mike King was also diagnosed with terminal cancer. Mike was a quiet and private man 
who found it difficult to talk about his illness but he told me that he could trust and talk to 
me because he felt, because of Charles, I was able to understand some of what he was 
going through. The loss and sadness of Charles' death enabled Mike and I to share a 
special closeness and trust which I am eternally thankful for. This was both a gift from 
Charles and a gift from Mike. We talked for houXýs. sharlng memories of our past lives, our 
present and the future. I was with Mike when he died on 7 November 1997. 
This thesis is dedicated to you Charles, my most treasured friend in life and in death and 
to you Mike, my dearest and beloved brother. ' You have both taught me so much and I 
miss you so. Bless you. 
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Abstract 
This thesis explores the difficulties of talking about cancer. Conversational 
interviews with 17 people diagnosed with cancer are analysed from the 
perspective of discursive psychology which treats accounts and the description of 
events as discourse practices and categories. Cancer is considered a mysterious 
and frightening disease associated with myths and taboos. It is a sensitive topic 
and talking about it can be a delicate and difficult thing to do for all concerned. If 
a person with cancer (PWC) is not seen or heard to be 'being positive' or 
'adopting a fighting spirit, they could be left with a sense of blame, guilt or failure. 
It is proposed that not only do they have to contend with managing to live with a 
life threatening illness but the metaphorical descriptions attributed to cancer, the 
'heroic model' and its accompanying discourses and expectations construct the ill 
person as being morally accountable. Narrative themes of discovery, diagnosis, 
doctors and delay, social relationships, the indignities of treatment and talk of 
death and dying are analysed. The analysis reveals some of the problems and 
interactional difficulties that participants have to manage, and it considers some 
of the dilemmas and problems produced in cancer narratives and how discursive 
Practices, such as laughter, are displayed. It considers the way participants 
discursively construct notions such asdoing being responsible, 'complaining and 
blaming' and 'doing being positive' and it reveals how participants' concerns of 
identity and moral accountability are rhetorically accomplished and managed. 
The findings of this thesis emphasise how PWC work to maintain the identity of 
someone who is bearing their illness 'patiently", without complaining and are 
seen to be a 'good patient'. The analysis reveals that participants construct their 
identity as someone who is being positive and that they not only have to manage 
the interactional problems that their illness poses for others and their 
inadequacies to cope with people with cancer, but additionally they have to 
manage the moral restrictions on not being able to admit that they are not coping. 
It is suggested that an increased awareness of the psychological burdens and 
interactional difficulties people with cancer report in their accounts can contribute 
to a better understanding of what and how people with cancer manage these 
additional burdens in their social lives. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction: 'Being patient I 
This first chapter introduces the motivation and evolution of the final analysis and 
presents an overview of the contents of the thesis. 
My topic of research emerged from personal experience that began some years 
ago when my closest friend Charles was diagnosed with cancer and I discovered 
how difficult it became for us to talk about his illness. Sometime after he was 
given a terminal diagnosis, in one of the many conversations we had talking 
about doctors, life, death and dying and how to cope, he asked me "Am I doing it 
right? " implying that there was a 'right' or a 'wrong' way to have cancer. At the 
time, I found the moral expectations and burden of this question staggering. This 
question, then and since, has had a profound effect on me and it was the catalyst 
for my research. From my personal experience of being close to family and 
friends with a life threatening illness and through my subsequent interviews, I 
discovered our experiences were not unique. I have heard countless stories 
revealing a diversity of problems and moral dilemmas. Accompanying this 
experience was the discovery that talking about cancer, whether it was with the 
medical profession, family or friends, was full of difficulties for all concerned. The 
recognition of these difficulties with such a highly charged and sensitive topic is 
the starting point of this thesis. 
Once a person is diagnosed with an illness, the medical profession refers to them 
asa'patient'. Under the influence of the red uctionist medical model, a 'patient' is 
diminished to being an object and an individual's agency is limited to compliance. 
The medical professional becomes the active agent in the illness process and the 
patients' experience of the illness itself is cast off (Frank, 1997). 
A discussion with Derek Edwards, my supervisor, about my reticence to refer to 
my participants as 'patients' prompted us to look in the Oxford English Dictionary 
I 
(1994)1 to review the meaning of the word. The essence of the definitions given 
construct not only what labelling someone as a patient is, a sufferer, but how 
they are expected to be, someone who suffers patiently. Throughout my analysis 
participants display both their resistance and acceptance of being labelled as a 
patient which denotes that they should bear or endure pain, affliction, trouble or 
evil of any kind with composure, without discontent or complaint, and exercise or 
possess patience. I have found these definitions somewhat contradictory in that 
in reviewing the literature and listening to my participants' accounts, the loss of 
agency, passivity and compliance of 'being a patient' is only deemed appropriate 
in the medical encounter. In contrast, outside the confines of the medical 
institution, the patient is expected to play an active role in their recovery and is 
held morally accountable for doing so. The notion of this passive/active stance is 
full of contradictions and dilemmas and as my analysis reveals, it becomes a 
participants' concern. 
Consequently, I have chosen to resist using the category of 'patient' throughout 
my own analysis. Instead I refer to my participants as people (or persons) with 
cancer (PWC) thus giving them the agency and recognition of being actively 
involved in their illness, in stark contrast to the passivity of being a patient, which 
is how they are normatively expected to manage their illness. I also refer to 
participants' 'narrative accounts' or 'stories' of living with a cancer diagnosis 
rather than talk about the 'experience of cancee or 'the illness experience'. 
These two choices were made because the definition of patient itself dis- 
empowers and objectifies the person who is ill and the word 'experience' is too 
"'Patient 
- A. Adj. 1. a. Bearing or enduring (pain, affliction. trouble. or evil of any kind) with 
composure. without discontent or coml2laint, having the guality or cgRaci! y of so bearing. 
exercising or ]possessing patience. 
b. Longsuffering, forbearing; with to, towards, lenient towards, bearing with (others, their 
infirmities, etc. ) 
c. Calmly expectant; not hasty or impetuous; guietly awaiting the course or issue of events etc. 
d. Continuing or able to continue a course of action without being daunted by difficulties o 
hindrances, persistent. constant. diligent. unwearied 
B. n. La. A sufferer, one who suffers 12atientl . Now rare. 
2. One who is under medical treatment for the cure of some disease or wound; one of the sick 
persons whom a medical man attends; an image of an infirmary or hospital 
3. A Rerson subjected to the suRervision. care. treatment or correction of some one. 
4. A person or thing that undergoes some action, or to whom or which something is done; 'that 
which receives impressions from external agents" (OED, 1994). (Underlining added for emphasis) 
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broad a term that carries with it multiple conceptual meanings and cultural 
baggage of what 'experience' is. 
When I began my literature review, I found that the volume of research and 
publishing in the field of health and illness, particularly cancer, was extensive and 
the choice was infinite. My starting point was to follow the trajectory from the 
initial medical encounter through diagnosis, treatment, coping strategies and the 
experience of the illness. Much of this literature, 'the voice of medicine' (Mishler, 
1984) was rooted in the positivist paradigm, which views illness from outside the 
experience of illness itself and minimises or ignores the subjective reality of the 
suffering. In other words, this 'outsider perspective' (Conrad, 1990) views the 
6 patient', and the disease or illness as an object or as something to be affected. 
I also reviewed the extensive literature on illness narratives and the 'experience 
of illness, the 'insider' perspective (Conrad) or 'the patient's view', (Armstrong, 
1984) which claims to focus directly and explicitly on the subjective experience of 
living with illness. The chosen methodology consists principally of qualitative 
analysis of biographical interview material and aims to explore the patients' view 
of how they adapt to their changing social world. 
Social scientists, including anthropologists, medical sociologists, health 
psychologists and psychosocial oncologists, have proposed and developed a 
diversity of prescriptive ways of defining how to 'cope with cancer' and what the 
I meaning' and 'experience of illness' is for the patient. However, few have 
considered the problems PWC might encounter or how and what they have to 
actively manage in social interaction. 
I discovered a vast collection of personal published accounts of illness, or illness 
narratives (e. g. Broyard, 1992; Caine, 1990; Diamond, 1998; DiGiacomo, 1995; 
Frank, 1991,1995; Lorde, 1980; Paget, 1993; Picardie, 1999; Rollason, 2000; 
Tilberis, 1998 and Stacey, 1967) which also have a particular influence, in that 
they effect how others tell their stories, creating a social rhetoric of illness (Frank, 
1995). In addition, television companies regularly produce documentary accounts 
of people's cancer stories (e. g. Diamond, Rollason, 'Living with Leslie') and 
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several journalists published accounts in newspapers (Diamond, Harris, 
Picardie). 
I originally thought that these accounts would form part of the data for my thesis, 
but the authors were writing rather than talking about their illnesses (and 
narratives do not talk back) while my growing concern was with face-to-face 
interaction. In the final analysis my own data was so rich that there was 
insufficient room to include these sources, but I did carry out a preliminary 
analysis on some of the accounts and found that the concerns they raised and 
the moral dilemmas they faced, had many similarities with my interview data. 
My extensive reading produced many interesting topics that I would like to have 
explored, both in the literature and my own data. However, in the final analysis, 
much of this earlier reading was not very relevant to my theoretical approach and 
analytic topic and consequently much as been left out. 
Accounts of cancer always include stories. Many people will not have personally 
encountered these stories in their lives, but what they serve to highlight is the 
importance of how everyday conversations, and what we might say to someone 
with cancer, could be adding to PWC's problems. My analytical interest is in what 
and how people talk about this culturally taboo topic, and I examine some of the 
problems and dilemmas a person with cancer might face. 
I have chosen the most appropriate method to examine this phenomenon, 
namely discursive psychology (Edwards and Potter, 1992) and discourse 
analysis (Potter and Wetherell, 1987). Discourse analysis is the ideal approach 
to look at the difficulties of talking about a delicate and sensitive topic. It looks at 
the discourse as a performative domain of action in itself, and keeping in mind 
the title of this thesis, "Am I doing it right? " this approach does not impose 
positivist paradigms such as cognitivist and behavioural interpretations and 
expectations onto the participant. By focusing on what issues are of expressed 
concern to the person with cancer, discourse analysis provides a way of 
revealing and understanding how the difficulties of talking about cancer are 
managed. 
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My analysis focuses on how people talk about their illness and treatment 
experiences, and more particularly on the topics that are the participants' own 
expressed concerns. There are various ways in which the order of presentation 
through successive chapters could have been organised, but I have chosen to 
follow the illness trajectory itself, from initial discovery, diagnosis, and reports of 
subsequent social relationships, to talk about death and dying. 
Thesis Overview 
The participants are people who had been given a cancer diagnosis and 
volunteered to talk to me about their illness. The integrating theme is 
encapsulated in the title of this thesis "Am I doing it right? " and the title of this 
introduction, 'Being patient'. 
Cancer occurs within a particular culture that fundamentally shapes and 
influences the way the illness is experienced. Chapter 2 reviews the main 
literature relevant to my thesis and looks at how what I term the culture of cancer 
has been constructed in medical and social science research. I discuss one of 
the key constructs in the psychosocial oncology literature, namely 'coping with 
cancer, and focus on two key elements, attitude of mind and social support, both 
of which are considered to be highly influential factors in successful coping with 
illness. Additionally I provide an account of how the language of cancer 
dominates the culture of cancer by describing how someone is expected to cope 
with their illness. Historically cancer has been constructed as a dreaded illness 
that equates with a 'death sentence'. Consequently, it is difficult for people to 
talk about, even when they are directly affected. So, this chapter also reviews 
how researchers have studied 'troubles talk' and talk about sensitive issues. 
Chapter 3 introduces my chosen theoretical and analytical approach, discursive 
psychology (DP) and discourse analysis (DA), and highlights some of the key 
analytical features that inform the analysis. This chapter also describes the 
complex process of finding participants and how I selected and prepared the data 
for analysis. 
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The data analysis begins in Chapter 4. This chapter identifies a number of key 
concepts and devices that participants employ in talking about cancer, 
considered as a species of 'troubles talk', which are then referred to throughout 
the subsequent analyses of data extracts. The analysis in Chapter 4 is divided 
into two parts: firstly participants' discovery accounts, and secondly accounts of 
going to the doctors. The route to diagnosis can be complex and long and, as a 
background to the specific analysis of this chapter, I provide a brief account of 
the literature concerned with the issue of who is responsible for diagnostic delay, 
patient or provider. People delaying reporting suspicious symptoms to their 
doctor is a concern for the medical profession, and the research focus for 
Psychosocial oncologists is why 'patients' might delay reporting their symptoms. 
My analysis reveals that the notion of diagnostic delay is also a PWC's concern, 
and Presents a different story. I show how PWC attend to issues of doing being 
responsible and account for any notion of diagnostic delay in their own terms. 
Chapter 5 builds on the diagnostic delay theme, and focuses on how participants 
received the news of their cancer diagnosis. 'Patients' are expected to quietly 
await the course of events, without complaint. An interesting feature of the 
analysis is how participants talk about the medical profession, and I examine how 
accounts of diagnostic delay, and of receiving the news of their diagnosis, are 
rhetorically constructed as complainable matters. 
In Chapter 6, the topic is the problems that PWC describe in their stories of 
everyday conversations with family, friends and colleagues. The analysis 
examines what kinds of things they report people say to them, and how they 
respond. In particular I look at how the language of cancer, and the cultural 
expectations and difficulties of knowing what to say, can produce a number of 
dilemmas and problems for the PWC to manage. 
Chapter 7 is in two parts and addresses how the prescription of being positive 
Places PWC in a position of being morally accountable for how they manage their 
illness. Part I of the chapter looks at how doing being positive is managed as a 
Participants' concern, and how this is rhetorically constructed in stodes, where a 
key factor is the importance of 'doing being ordinary' (Sacks 1984a) and being 
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able to do normal everyday activities. Part 2 examines how participants use 
laughter and humour as a device for doing being positive and for managing 
stories about treatment and interactions with the medical profession that, without 
it, could be heard as serious complaints, or indeed as evidence that the speaker 
is not adopting a positive attitude. 
In Chapter 8, the final analytical chapter, the topic is talk about death and dying. 
Again, the notions of doing being positive, and the uses of laughter and humour, 
are examined as accounting devices. This time they are used to resist 'doom 
and gloom', and we find that in various ways the talk is about living (and its 
limitations), rather than dying per se. 
Chapter 9 summarises the findings of the analytical chapters. I discuss how 
these can contribute to our understanding of some of the problems PWC face, 
and draw together what is involved in managing to be a good cancer patient, 
along with the expectations of how they are expected to 'cope'. I suggest that 
such expectations produce moral dilemmas and additional burdens for the PWC. 
Finally, I will discuss how a discourse analytical approach to talk about illness 
can reveal different ways of understanding that are beneficial, not only to people 
with cancer, but for those who are involved in their care. 
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Chapter 2 
The Social Construction of the 
Culture of Cancer: Knowledge and Talk 
As a main focus of attention talk is unique ... for talk creates for the participant a 
world and a reality that has other participants in it. 
Erving Goffman, Interaction Ritual (1967). 
Introduction 
This thesis examines what and how someone who has been given a cancer 
diagnosis talks about their life. Cancer is not an easy topic of conversation and 
participants' accounts display the difficulties and dilemmas of talking with others 
about their illness. Their accounts are informed by the language of cancer which 
has been derived from medical, social and cultural knowledge. 
The aims of Chapter 2 are firstly to review how our social and cultural knowledge 
of cancer has been socially constructed. I will present a brief account of the 
development of research on disease and illness, as constructed by the scientific 
world (the medical model) and the social scientific world (including the 
biopsychosocial model, health psychology, the 'illness experience' perspective 
and psychosocial oncology. 1 In particular, I will address how what I term the 
culture of cancer constructs a series of concerns and moral dilemmas for a 
person with cancer (PWC) and will indicate how these concerns form the basis of 
my analytical focus. 
I will present a commentary on the significance of the change in doctor-patient 
communication and its impact on research into clinical and institutional practices. 
Finally, I will present an account of the construction of the language of cancer 
that informs our cultural knowledge and I will show how researchers have studied 
talking about'troubles talk' and delicate and sensitive issues. 
1 The term oncology is derived from oncogenes, the prefix onco refers to cancer and oncology 
refers to the study of cancer. Oncogenes are a viral gene held to be responsible for transforming a 
host cell into a tumour cell. 
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2: 1 Cultural psychology, social construction and the culture of 
cancer 
I firstly want to provide a context for my review of the literature and its relevance 
to my analysis. It is appropriate to clarify and distinguish what is meant by the 
categories of traditional cultural psychology, social constructionism (SC), and my 
definition of the culture of cancer as viewed by discursive psychology which 
informs the analytical approach of this theSiS. 2 
A part of this chapters concern is to present the authors description of how the 
discourse of cultural knowledge, in this instance the culture of cancer, is relevant 
and how participants orient to pragmatic intersubjectivity, and shared knowledge. 
Pragmatic intersubjectivity involves the dialogical interactions of daily life and 
shared knowledge is defined as something that is practically managed in talk, 
rather than a series of actual mental states that precede it and result from it 
(Edwards, 1997: 20). It is also a participant's practical concern, as to how and 
when their talk is treated as shared, and as Edwards proposes the study of 
pragmatic intersubjectivity overrides and subsumes the other two senses of 
shared knowledge, i. e. cultural and mutual knowledge. 
Discursive and cultural psychologies are related enterprises (Edwards, 1997). 
Discourse is primarily what we produce, as academics, researchers, and writers 
of cultural and other psychologies. This discourse is made up of descriptions, 
theories and versions. The point made by anthropological writers such as 
Clifford Geertz (1983), sociologists of science (Mulkay, 1985, Ashmore, 1989) 
and philosophers (Rorty, 1980) is that it is not easy to make a distinction between 
our own texts and the objects of our investigations. Edwards proposes that "it is 
our texts, our discourses, and our descriptive practises that bring their 'objects' 
into being. At least they bring them into being as the objects of our 
understanding: the objects of a 'cultural psychology' for example. These 
versions are descriptions that rhetorically convince us of the world 'as it is', as if it 
2 Discursive psychology and discourse analysis will be discussed more fully in Chapter 3. 
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possessed the described nature independently of those descriptions" (Edwards, 
1997: 45). 
This chapter raises the concern of how this cultural knowledge of cancer, which it 
is suggested raises a number of dilemmas for the PWC, is managed in everyday 
life. In traditional health psychology or psychosocial oncology terms, this culture 
is brought into being by the description of 'coping with cancer'. 'Coping', like any 
other object of academic study, is brought into being as soon as we start to 
define its nature and scope (Edwards, 1996). The construction of the 
constituents of 'coping' and its social and moral implications for someone with 
cancer will be discussed later in this chapter. 
Another classic term employed in health and illness research is 'making sense of 
illness'. Making sense of illness events is fundamentally a linguistic phenomenon 
that integrates two levels of socially constructed contents. Cultural knowledge 
(the collective level) is defined as things that people generally know about the 
world, and is associated with the circulation of ideas and socially instituted 
practices. In much of cultural psychology, mind is 'socially constructed' 
ontologically, in the same sense as, for Piaget, it is constructed through the 
internalisation of actions. The analytic task is to explain how mind is built with a 
real world of cultural settings and practices; that mind is real for theorists and 
analysts. However, the major sense of 'social constructionism' in discursive 
psychology is epistemic in that it is about the constructive nature of descriptions, 
rather than of the entities that (according to descriptions) exist beyond them. 
"Mind and reality are treated analytically as discourse's topics and business and 
the analytic task is to examine how participants descriptively construct them" 
(ibid: 48). As Edwards notes, there is an important related distinction between 
those for whom social constructionism is primarily an ontological position and 
those who take it as primarily an epistemological claim. 
In recent years, it has become common practice to make a distinction between 
these positions and the different styles of discourse analysis (See Antaki, 1994; 
Burman and Parker, 1993; Parker, 1992; Widdicombe and Wooffift, 1995). Edley 
and Wetherell (1997) define these distinctive styles as 'top-down' and 'boftom-uP' 
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approaches. The 'top down' discursive approach is defined as being concerned 
with issues of power, ideological practice and social process (e. g. Hollway, 1984; 
Parker, 1992; Wetherell and Potter 1992) and take this lead from the work of 
Foucault who defines discourses as being "practices that systematically form the 
objects of which they speak" (Foucault, 1972: 49). Investigations typically draw 
upon "analytical concepts of discursive regimes, interpretative repertoires, 
cultural narratives and subject positions in order to highlight the ways in which 
people are spoken through or by discourses" (Edley and Wetherell, 1997: 205). 
They study the way people are positioned by and effected through discourse and 
emphasise the social constitution of mind, taking mind and the social as (more or 
less) real and conventionally describable entities. 
In the contrasting 'bottom-up' approach (influenced by Sacks) researchers locate 
their concerns within the traditions of ethnomethodology and conversation 
analysis (CA) and their primary interest is in social interaction (e. g. Antaki, 1988; 
Edwards, 1997; Edwards and Potter, 1992; Widdicombe and Wooffift; 1995). 
The emphasis here is on the action orientation (Heritage, 1984a) of people's 
discourse, in other words the kinds of things that are accomplished through talk, 
such as accusation, criticism and blame. The analytical focus is on "the 
constructed and relative nature of talk and studies how versions of events, 
including analysts' versions, are built and worked up to become factual, 
persuasive and presented as 'just the way the world is'" (Edley and Wetherell, 
1997: 206). 
2: 2 Social constructionism: Disease, health and illness 
The social constructionist argument underlies many of the theoretical approaches 
to understanding the 'illness experience' and as Radley (1994) suggests the 
examination of these constructions provides a way of "freeing ourselves from the 
everyday assumptions (reifications) of medicine" (ibid: 33) and can lead to a 
different understanding of the influences of health and illness. Shotter (1992) 
proposed that rather than attempting to supplant traditional approaches and set 
up a fresh hegemony of perspective, social constructionism can open up a 
dialogue with alternative views. In this way, "without the need to privilege itself 
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over competing perspectives, it can function as a new analytic device to reveal 
aspects of human conduct 'obscured' by other forms of talk" (Shotter, 1992: 9). 
But, whatever knowledge claims social constructionists produce, like this thesis, 
they are a social construction themselves. 
Berger and Luckmann (1966) state that all scientific work involves the social 
construction of facts and interpretative schemes. 
"Scientific paradigms are frameworks of formal knowledge that members of a 
given scientific community share, mainly due to having undergone similar 
educations and professional initiations: to sharing common professional 
language, rules of evidence and conceptual schemas and to relying on the same 
professional literature and communication of the same scientific community. ' 
(Kuhn, 1970: 1976). 
The social constructionist approach is informed by the work of Berger and 
Luckmann (1966) who argued that 'reality' is constructed by a range of social 
processes and consequently knowledge cannot be seen as the product of 
discovering objective, natural phenomena that exist independently of our 
constructive practices. Additionally, it is not the isolated individual's imagination 
that is looked to for this mechanism of construction but it is believed that that 
construction arises out of the social, cultural and historical interaction between 
people (cf. Gergen 1985; Shweder and Miller, 1985). So, the idea that there is 
any distinction between things that are 'real' and 'out there in the world' and 
things that are the product of cultures and societies, is itself reduced to the level 
of a social artefact. That is, from this perspective, our only access to the world in 
which we live and breathe occurs via the medium of culture, and as a result 
anything we might take to be 'real' and 'out there' has already been shaped or 
'constructed' by social forces (Gergen and Davis, 1985). The problem here is that 
when social scientists analyse the constructive processes of others, they are 
themselves engaging in the business of constructing their own version of reality 
(Ashmore, 1989; Clifford, 1988; Geertz, 1983; Horton-Salway, 1998; Mulkay, 
1979; Woolgar, 1988). 
Social constructionism is particularly amenable to methodological diversity and 
having abandoned the limitations of a search for 'objective truth' analysis using 
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qualitative methods has become as acceptable as the vast sweeps of 
quantitative research. It embraces fields as diverse as psychology, rhetoric, 
literary theory, philosophy and medical sociology. 
Medical knowledge is treated as problematic and as a central issue in analysis. 
Medical and social scientists' ideas about disease and illness, regardless of their 
scientific claims, are still the product of social processes and are continually 
3 changing. Freidson (1970) challenged medicine's claim to have access to the 
natural world and language of disease and stated that "While illness as a 
biophysical state exists independently of human knowledge and evaluation, 
illness as a social state is created and shaped by human knowledge and 
evaluation" (Freidson, 1970: 212). 
Social constructionists in medical sociology claim that "medical knowledge, no 
less than medical practice is socially constructed" (Bury, 1986: 137) and deals 
mainly with the origins of professional beliefs and with diagnosis. Its ways of 
'knowing' are grounded in the medical framework, contemporary moral and 
ethical views, the socialisation of medical providers (especially physicians), the 
professional and institutional practices of the health care system and the larger 
social structures of the society (Bury, 1986). It is also argued that medical 
knowledge contributes to the shaping of social relations. 
Bury also states, "the objects of medical science are not what they appear to be; 
the stable realties of the human body and disease are in fact 'fabrications' or 
'inventions' rather than discoveries" (ibid: 137). 
I Latour (1987) argues that the production of scientific facts is the result of mutually conceived 
actions by scientists in everyday life in the laboratory, combined with scientist's efforts to promote 
their work in public and official venues. 
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However, in the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK)4 and discursive 
psychology, there is no equation between 'constructed', 'false' or Tabricated' and 
it is proposed that reality, like 'appearance' is also a construction. 
The power of modern medicine is that it has defined the 'reality' of disease and 
the physical body (Bury, 1986). As Radley suggests, "bodily growth, decay and 
death can be considered organismic process, but they are also something 
else ... society penetrates the organism by defining, regulating and valuing 
its 
functions" (Radley, 1994: 33). Whilst I am not refuting that disease and illness do 
exist as 'realities', how they are constructed, labelled, treated and responded to 
in medical and psychological knowledge also permeates our social knowledge 
and understanding about them. 
For the purposes of this thesis, I am looking at how cancer is socially constructed 
in the medical and social sciences literature and how models of illness behaviour 
and psychological responses have been constructed to produce what I term the 
culture of cancer. I propose that this culture provides a context for a 'specialised' 
descriptive language of cancer, which is full of attributions and issues of moral 
accountability. 
One of my aims is to examine how the cultural knowledge of cancer influences, 
permeates and shapes not only the language and understanding of the person 
with the diagnosis but also those people they interact with, including the medical 
profession, family, friends and colleagues. 
4 The sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) which'emerged in Britain in the 1970s (Mulkay, 
1979; Ashmore, 1989; Collins, 1983) rejected the "standard view" dominating science until then. 
The "standard view" entails an evaluation of science as humanity's uniquely successful mode of 
knowing. Its success consists of an ever more complete description and explanation of the way 
the world is, as attested to ("proved") by its predictive and technological utility. its success is 
predicated on its mastery of The Scientific Method. SSK sought to radically extend the role of 
"the social" in knowledge production (and the role of sociology in its description and explanation). 
SSK was influenced by the work of Garfinkel (1967), Kuhn, (1970) and Wittgenstein, (1953) and 
seeks to demonstrate that the very content of science, the knowledge product, is thoroughly 
socially constructed (Ashmore, 1989). 
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2: 3 Labels and definitions: 
2: 3.1 Disease and illness 
Psycholinguistic perspectives of word meaning assume that language is merely 
an abstract idealised system of categories and rules (Chomsky, 1965,1966, 
1968). Words merely represent things that already exist in the world 
independently of the way people describe them. So, the phenomena of disease 
and illness, such as AIDS/HIV, heart disease and cancer are seen as pre- 
existing the label. This realist assumption implies that disease and illness are a 
natural set of things that are already 'out there' waiting to be discovered by 
scientists and to be given appropriately descriptive names. 
The radical relativist position argues that the relationship between language and 
reality is that in naming things we constitute their essence (Edwards, 1997, 
Edwards, Ashmore and Potter, 1995; Edwards and Potter, 1992; Woolgar, 1985). 
Another view of naming and labelling is that a diagnostic label can also be 
viewed as a matter of social definition. As noted in Chapter 1, being labelled as 
a 'patient' carries its own definitions and expectations. The labels and definitions 
of disease and illness are accompanied by social definitions that have become 
part of the culture and language of cancer. The discursive label of illness, 
especially if the disease has specific moral connotations surrounding it, can have 
considerable consequences for the patient and their social identity. George and 
Davis propose that the "clinical label becomes a master status, one that swamps 
all other identities and compresses the identity of the person into a narrow and 
constricting mould" (George and Davis, 1998: 266). 
Cancer is labelled as both a physical disease and an illness. A clear distinction 
has been made between these two terms which also characterises the course of 
the different theoretical approaches adopted by medical and social scientists. 
According to the traditional 'realist' perspective, the phenomenon of 'disease' is 
an undesirable physiological process or state potentially discoverable by the 
scientific techniques of medicine and the medical model. 
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"Disease is something that physicians diagnose and treat. Examples include 
influenza, cancer and tuberculosis. [ ... ] it can be said that disease refers to 
pathological changes in the body so that a main symptom of each of the 
diseases mentioned might include fever, a growth, and extreme coughing" 
(Eisenberg, 1977 in Radley, 1994: 3) 
Helman defines diseases as being "the named pathological entities that make up 
the medical model of ill health" (Helman, 1981: 548). The transformation of 
physiological symptoms becomes a diagnosis or illness description, and this is 
accompanied by socially constructed appropriate illness behavlout, 5 and heroic 
and stigmatised social statuses (Lorber, 1997). 
The definition of illness fits more readily into the domain of the social sciences 
where it is primarily treated as a discoverable phenomenon available to the social 
scientist through the accounts of the sufferers. 
"patients suffer 'illnesses'... illness is defined to mean the experience of disease, 
including the feelings relating to changes in bodily states and the consequence of 
having to bear that ailment; illness, therefore, relates to the way of being for the 
individual concerned" 
(Eisenberg, 1977 in Radley, 1994: 3) 
Illness refers to the subjective response of the patient to being unwell (Heiman, 
1981: 548) and "how the sick person and members of the family or Wider social 
network perceive, live with and respond to symptoms and disability" (Kleinman, 
1988: 3). The experiential aspects of illness are also "shaped by cultural factors 
governing perception, labelling, explanations of the discomforting experience" 
(ibid: 3) and individuals interpret their experience using cultural categories and 
the influences of social relations (Kleinman, 1995; Young, 1982). Disease and 
illness are seen as products of cultural contexts and the social processes of 
constructing knowledge and the 'experience' of illness is to some extent 
dependent on such cultural and social definitions (Horton-Salway, 1998: 5). 
5 Mechanic (1977) gave the name illness behaviour to the ways in which symptoms may be 
differentially perceived, evaluated and acted upon. He saw it as having a place in what might be 
termed the states of sickness falling 'logically and chronologically' between the appearance of 
signs of disease and subsequent medical treatment. 
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2: 3.2 Chronic Illness 
"Having a chronic illness is in some ways similar to being held prisoner with no 
definite release date" 
(Greenhut, 1995 in Cotler, 1996: 647). 
Cancer has another dimension, it is not only a disease and an illness but it is also 
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categorised as a chronic illness. By definition, chronic illnesses are ongoing, 
recurrent and often degenerative. They are slow developing diseases that 
people may have to live with for a long time and in many cases, they are 
incurable. For people with a chronic condition, illness becomes a part of life, and 
will "affect our lives, our selves, our ability to function, our family, our work, our 
recreation, and our use of formal health care systems and folk remedies" (Cotler, 
1996: 647). ' 
Chronic illness has a socio-cultural course as well as a biological one and has far 
reaching social, emotional, psychological, moral and spiritual implications 
(Kleinman, 1978,1988,1995). A chronic illness such as cancer and the 
disabilities that may accompany it require the management of many elements 
over long periods of time. It is not only the disease condition that has to be 
contained by medication and therapies, it is also likely that the PWC's lifestyle 
must also be modified and in certain cases, the management of the disease and 
illness becomes a daily regime (Brooks and Matson, 1982,1987; Strauss, 
1979). In addition, many symptoms such as fatigue and pain come and go and 
are invisible to others. 
The diseases' potential impact and effects are extraordinarily variable. Radley 
(1993) suggests that the chronically ill are subject to cultural expectations and 
that an expression of public morality is expressed in the evaluation of the 
personal and social status of the afflicted. For the PWC, illness not only becomes 
a part of life but it also carries additional burdens of prescriptive, expected 
responses and behaviour that can threaten a person's sense of self and identity. 
6 Today, chronic illnesses, especially heart disease, cancer and diabetes, are the main contributors 
to disability and death. 
7 Different types of chronic illnesses have their own social implications, "lived-with" illness, such 
as asthma and diabetes; "at risk" illnesses which include inherited "environmental" or "personal" 
behaviour risks; and "mortal" illness such as some cancers and HIV/AIDS (Conrad, 1987). 
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Someone with a chronic illness such as cancer has to confront a number of day 
to day problems, the organisation of their social and working environments, 
managing the attitudes of others and maintaining their sense of self and identity 
(Freund and McGuire, 1999). How a PWC manages these social and moral 
dilemmas against the cultural and normative backdrop of the demands of illness 
is of analytical interest throughout this thesis. 
2: 4 Theories of disease, health and illness 
Radley (1994) claims that the distinction between disease and illness has been 
used to justify the different interests of social science as compared with 
medicine. Medicine is concerned with classification in order to produce 
knowledge which will be effective in the course of healing (Kleinman, 1973) whilst 
U social science is concerned with the meanings and behaviours that organise the 
experience of illness for the individuals involved" (Idler, 1979 in Radley, 1994: 5). 
Radley makes the point that disease, illness and sickness do not stand in some 
kind of practical or theoretical vacuum, but that they have independent meanings 
and are spoken about within different theoretical perspectives. The distinction 
between the three has been constructed to "justify the different interests of social 
science as compared with medicine" (ibid: 5). 1 will now present an overview of 
the main theories including the medical model, the biopsychosocial model, health 
psychology and psychosocial oncology. 
2: 4.1 Medicine, disease and the biochemical machine: 
The medical model 
"Biomedicine was founded on a Cartesian division of man into a soulless mortal 
machine capable of mechanistic explanation and manipulation and a bodyless 
soul, immortal, immaterial, and properly subject to religious authority, but largely 
unnecessary to account for physical disease and healing" 
(Kirmayer, 1988: 57) 
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This perspective, often referred to as 'the biomedical model'8, has dominated the 
thinking of most health practitioners for the last 300 years. In Western, 
individualistic societies, the culture and language of health, illness and medicine 
originates from science, medical science. It has greatly influenced the patients' 
role as being passive, and provides the framework for the way we talk about 
what we expect doctors to do and what we expect them to know. In turn, this 
model's dominating ideological influence has permeated the health care system 
and the health professionals whose training is primarily located in the disciplines 
and doctrines of medical science and consequently, the style of doctor-patient 
communication. According to Mishler (1984) the 'voice of medicine' dominates 
the comings and goings of diagnosis and treatment and creates a distance 
between the medical practitioner and the 'patient', which enables them to deal 
with the disease and the disease alone. 
The model asserts that all diseases and physical disorders can be explained by 
disturbances in physiological processes and that the body is separate from 
psychological and social processes of the mind. Disease and illness are 
understood exclusively as bodily processes and the body is typically constructed 
as a 'biochemical machine' (Kirmayer, 1988: 57). 9 
The medical model poses a number of problems, especially for the person who is 
ill. It is a reductionistic single factor model that explains illness in terms of a 
biological malfunction rather than recognising that a variety of factors, only some 
of which are biological, may be responsible for the development of illness. It 
assumes a mind-body dualism, that is, there is a clear dichotomy between the 
mind and the body; physical diseases are presumed to be located solely within 
the body. The social, psychological and behavioural dimensions of illness are 
excluded and thus prevent any conception of how aspects of an individual's 
8 Mishler (1984) presents this model as maintaining that disease is a deviation from normal 
biological functioning, that diseases have specific causes that can be located in the ill person' s 
body, that they have the same symptoms and outcome in any social situation and that medicine is 
a socially neutral science. It is assumed that all illness can be explained on the basis of aberrant 
somatic processes such as biochemical imbalances or neuro-physiological abnormalities and 
assumes that psychological and social processes are largely independent of the disease process. 
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social or emotional life might affect their physical health. Social conditions that 
may contribute to the illness or to promoting healing are mostly ignored (Freund 
and McGuire, 1999). In other words, the body is understood and treated in 
isolation. 
One of the oldest Western images for understanding the body is the metaphor of 
comparing the body with the functioning of a machine. This machine metaphor is 
reinforced by viewing disease as the malfunction of some constituent mechanism 
(such as the breakdown of the heart)10 and encourages the notion that 
physicians can "repair" one part of the body in isolation from the rest (Berliner, 
1975). 
Partly as a product of the machine metaphor and the quest for mastery, the 
medical model also conceptualises the body as the proper object of regimen and 
control (Foucault, 1979). This accentuates the moral responsibility placed upon 
the individual to exercise control in order to maintain or restore their health. " 
Such expectations present moral dilemmas for anyone who becomes ill. 
The problem with this model for someone with a chronic illness such as cancer or 
HlV/AlDs is that they are not just diseases of the body, whereby the symptoms 
and pathological processes can be managed and treated by medical processes 
alone. Such diseases can result in social and psychological problems, which the 
paradigm of the medical model does not and can not address. This thesis 
explores how participants attend to these prescriptions of responsibility and how 
they manage issues of moral accountability. 
9 Linn, Linn and Stein, (1982) suggested that the person without cancer can afford to be more 
dogmatic about cancer and likely to think in stereotypes. The closer they come to dealing with the 
disease, the less clear-cut and more complex the explanations may become 10 Modem medicine has not only retained the metaphor of the machine but also extended it by 
developing specialisations along the lines of machine parts, emphasising individuals' systems or 
organs to the exclusion of an image of the totality of the body. "This moral assumption meshes with other values, represented by the medical and social 
emphasis on standardised body disciplines such as diets, exercise programmes, non-smoking, 
routines of hygiene and even sexual activity (Turner, 1984: 157-203) which are also the concerns 
of health psychologists. 
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2: 5 Social Science and its approach to disease and illness 
2: 5.1 The Blopsychosocial model 
Engel, (1977) a psychiatrist, questioned the inadequacies and the restrictive 
boundaries of the dominating medical model. He challenged both the 
reductionist and the exclusionist positions, that disease does not exist as such 
unless some biochemical evidence can be identified to explain the phenomenon 
in terms of cause and effect. Engel proposed the 'biopsychosocial model', which 
was based on a systems theory. 12 As the model's name implies, its fundamental 
assumption is that health and illness are consequences of the interplay of 
biological, psychological and social factors (Engel, 1977; 1980). The model 
maintains that multiple factors produce multiple effects and that mind and body 
cannot be distinguished in matters of health and illness because they both 
influence an individual's well being. The model also emphasises health and 
illness rather than regarding illness as a deviation from some steady state 
(Taylor, 1999). 
Although Engel's model went someway to addressing the inadequacies of the 
medical model, it is still rooted in the essentially medical perspective of the 
positivist paradigm (and therefore restricted by its limitations). However, it did 
make explicit the significance of the relationship between patient and practitioner 
by clearly implying that the medical practitioner must understand the social and 
psychological factors that contribute to an illness in order to treat it appropriately. 
2: 5.2 Health psychology and the biopsychosocial model 
In a social climate that was beginning to challenge many deep-rooted notions of 
approaches to health and illness, psychologists became more concerned with 
other issues surrounding health and illness. Cognitive-emotional processes 
Systems theory maintains that all levels of organisation in any entity are linked to each other 
hierarchically and that change in any one level will effect change in all the other levels. This 
means that the micro-level process (such as cellular changes) are nested within the macro-level 
processes (such as societal values) and that change on the micro-level can have macro-level effects 
(and vice versa). Consequently, health, illness and medical care are all interrelated processes 
involving interacting changes within the individual and on these various levels. (Schwartz, 1982). 
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involved in 'coping' with illness attracted comparatively little attention until the 
development of the new discipline of health psychology in the late 1970s, 
coincidental with an intense debate about the nature of psychology as a science. 
Drawing on Engel's blopsychosocial model, health psychologists readily 
endorsed the idea that in matters concerning health and illness it was logical to 
study the mind and the body together. This has resulted in a growing interest in 
how people cope with the psychological problems of living with chronic illness 
and the accompanying disabilities, both in terms of the best strategies to 
ameliorate the streSS13 of illness, and the mechanisms whereby 'coping 
behaviour might influence the development of illness. 
Health psychology's mission is a broad one involving most branches of 
psychology in almost all aspects of the health enterprise (Taylor, 1999) and today 
it is a clearly recognised designated field of study. 
Conrad (1990) has suggested social scientists researching health and illness 
have adopted two overriding research orientations which he has termed the 
'outsider' and 'insider' approaches. 14 
From the 'outsider orientation, health psychology's primary focus is based on 
I outcomes' as measures of successful treatments, mortality and morbidity, and 
psychological adjustment to illness. The measured outcomes are deemed as 
I expert' representations derived from a system of psychological knowledge 
reproduction which ensures their objectivity, and where discourse is taken as the 
13 Stress has been labelled the 20th century disease, as there is a widespread concern of stress being 
a factor in ill health. 
"' This description is drawn from a distinction made by Pike (1954), and is derived from the 
linguistic categories 'phonetic' and 'phonemic. An 'etic' approach attempts to describe cultural 
objects and activities in generalised, objective terms that are applicable to any culture. 'Etic' 
categories are in principle universal; they can be formulated prior to any particular analysis and be 
applied afterwards to cases at hand (the outside approach). Pike suggests etic descriptions or 
analyses are an 'alien view' with criteria that are external to the system. An 'emic' approach 
describes cultural practices in terms that are internal to that culture and in relation to other parts of 
the culture rather than to generalised, cross-cultural criteria. Hence 'emic' categories focus on one 
particular and they are 'discovered' during the investigation into that particular culture (a 
distinction often made by anthropologists). Edwards (1997) suggests that although they are useful 
distinctions, they are somewhat idealised. 
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means through which various aspects of the reality of health and illness are 
represented. The ownership of expertise is taken away from the lay person, the 
person who is ill, and the idea that they are 'experts' on their own illness is 
disregarded and devalued (Williams and Popay, 1994). 
Quantitative methods of 'objective' measurement and the identification of 
statistical associations between (so-called) psychological variables have 
dominated research in an attempt to provide a respectability and status within the 
wider scientific community. Complex psychological, social and behavioural 
phenomena are conceptualised as separate and often isolated variables. These 
variables are then "measured, manipulated, and analysed to reveal some 
generalisable 'truth'" (Zyzanski, McWhinney, Blake, Crabtree and Miller 
1992: 244). However, the theories and research methods have tended to focus 
on the individual as a rational decision-maker who is often stripped of social 
context. 1,5 As in the biopsychosocial model, the standard view of psychology 
prevails where people are treated as objects of study. 
In contrast, the 'insider' approach breaks away from the dominating biomedical 
model. Instead of measuring outcomes and identifying problems such as 
adjustment, acceptance, temporary disruption and 'coping' behaviours, the 
'insider approach has shown that the way in which symptoms are regarded and 
reported, and the actions taken to manage them, are profoundly social 
phenomena (Conrad, 1990; Yardley, 1996). Researchers focus on the cultural 
and communicative aspects of illness (often treating it as a phenomenon 
seemingly isolated from the biological processes labelled disease) and in what is 
referred to as the 'experience of illness framework' (Conrad, 1990) and patients 
are recognised as "expedenced subjects who can contribute knowledge and 
take an active part in decisions" (Hardey, 1998: 84). 
This approach examines the 'illness experience' in what it claims to be a more 
enlightened manner where 'meaning' and 'making sense of the illness 
" This is most apparent in a range of cognitive models which have been developed, for example 
locus of control (Rotter, 1966), models of health behaviour, such as the health belief model 
(Rosenstock, 1974) and the theory of reasoned action (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975). 
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experience' are central in providing a greater role for approaches encompassing 
'subjectivity' and 'reflexivity (Crossley, 2000). By integrating the mind-body 
dichotomy into the social context and acknowledging that people are more than 
physiological entities it also ensures that patients are treated as people, not 
objects, and that they are seen holistically (See Charmaz, 1983,1990; Kleinman, 
1988; Morse and Johnson, 1991). 
Social constructionist ideas have made a major contribution to the study of the 
'illness experience' and have provided the basis for some new methods recently 
adopted within health psychology including grounded theory (Charmaz, 1983), 
phenomenology (Smith, Flowers and Osborn, 1997), and the discursive 
approach (for example Brown, 1999; Horton-Salway, 1998; Paris Spink; 1999; 
Stainton Rogers, 1996; Yardley, 1997). 
Methods of analysis are extensive and vary from straightforward sampling and 
reporting of illustrative segments from interview transcripts to more sophisticated 
and formalised techniques (e. g. 'grounded theory, Strauss and Corbin, 1990; 
Charmaz, 1987; 1990; 1991). A recent method of analysis for understanding the 
self, identity and the 'experience of illness' is narrative analysis (Crossley, 2000; 
Garro, 1994; Gordon and Paci, 1994; Hunt, 1994; Kleinman, 1988; Murray, 1997; 
Riessman, 1990; 1993). Central to a narrative psychological approach is the 
development of a phenomenological understanding of the unique 'order of 
meaning' constitutive of human consciousness (see Crossley, 2000; 
Polkinghorne, 1988). 
However, "the analysis of narratives in the human and social sciences has mostly 
ignored the interactional business that people might be doing in telling 
them ... and studies of narrative have tended to pursue generalized types and 
categories of narrative structure, rather than dealing with how the specific story 
content, produced on and for occasions of talk, may perform social actions in- 
the-telling" (Edwards 1997: 265-266). A discursive analysis of narrative sees the 
events and the 'reality of the illness', 'making sense' and 'identity' as something 
participants must manage and deal with. When telling a story, people do not just 
turn their understandings and perceptions, their sense making and meaning 
making into 'best sense stories'. Storytelling is a discursive action; it is 
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constructive rather than merely descriptive, and in providing narrative accounts of 
their illness, participants employ discursive devices to accomplish for example a 
particular identity (see Chapters 5 and 7). 
Although health psychologists have endeavoured to include the individual and 
the social in the health equation, and to advocate the blopsychosocial model of 
health and illness, in practice, they have given very little attention to the 
integration of the social, psychological and biological factors (Chamberlain, 
Stephens and Lyons, 1996). The search for'meaning' in cancer is the attempt to 
place it in its physical, psychological, social and spiritual context (Cunningham, 
1993). Researchers claim that the construction of meaning takes place in social 
interaction and is influenced by language, family and culture (Bruner, 1990; 
Freeman, 1993), yet few studies have analysed this interaction. Meaning is still 
studied in isolation and viewed as something that participants reveal in an 
appropriately labelled package in their interviews. Additionally, relatively little 
research has considered the way in which the social environment can influence 
how people cope. More significantly, they have not reflected on the social origins 
and implications of the concept of 'coping' and its impact on the individual 
(Yardley, 1997) or how social relationships and how cultural knowledge informs 
and shapes our lives, which are analytical concerns throughout this thesis. 
The basic difference between the traditional approaches to health and illness 
referred to above and discursive psychology is that traditionalists treat language 
as an expression of something psychological (meaning, sense of self, loss, etc). 
In discursive psychology and discourse analysis, (discourse) is analysed itself, 
so the notions such as 'experience' and 'meaning' are examined to see how they 
are deployed in ways that are, for instance, rhetorical, variable, and/or manage 
accountability. In a discursive analysis, 'experience' and 'meanings' are 
considered as a feature of social interaction, rather than speakers' intentions. 
They are interactionally accomplished and "intentions, goals, mental contents 
and their intersubjective 'sharing' are analysed as kinds of business that talk 
attends to, rather than being the analyst's stock assumption concerning what is 
actually going on" (Edwards, 1997: 107). 
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"Distinctions between what is intentional or not, and meant or not, are deployed 
and at stake in talk, and are thereby analytically available. That is not the same 
thing as eschewing meaning and intention altogether as the behaviourists do, nor 
of trying to discover for ourselves as 'explanations' what real intentions lurk 
behind, explain or precede the things people say (as cognitivists do)" (Edwards, 
1997: 108). 
So, although this turn towards the individual's experience and narratives of their 
illness provides another insight into meaning, that meaning is produced for the 
most part in interaction, and the analytical details of how this is accomplished are 
not examined. 
2: 5.3 Psychosocial oncology and 'coping with cancer' 
Since the late 1970s there has been an increased awareness of the role of 
psychosocial factors in the onset, development, treatment and management of 
cancer (Beckman, 1989; Somerfield and Curbow, 1992; Watson and Morris, 
1985). Along with the advances in medical science and technology that have 
dramatically altered the prognosis for PWC, there has been a shift from the 
concern with issues of death and dying to an emphasis on the psychological 
processes of successful recovery and survival. " Understanding how people 
cope with cancer has led to the emergence of another new discipline, 
psychosocial oncology (a sub-discipline in oncology) which has evolved 
alongside health psychology, and, as its name implies, focuses on the 
psychosocial issues encountered by someone diagnosed with cancer. 
2: 5.3.1 'Coping with cancer' 
'Coping with cancer' has become a much used term, both within institutional 
health organisations, academic research and the public domain. The topic of 
scoping' is considered as being one of the most widely studied psychosocial 
16 Oncology was one of the first areas in medicine to include quality of life on the treatment 
agenda. Quality of life emerged as a central oncologic topic in the late 1970s and 1980s in part because of an explosion of growth in medical technology aimed at treating cancer, and the increasingly complex treatment decisions that have ensued (Maguire and Selby, 1989). 
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factors, (Somerfield and Curbow, 1992) especially as it is perceived as being a 
possible mediator of the psychological impact of cancer (Parle, Jones and 
Maguire, 1996). 
'Coping', classically defined in Lazarus and Folkman's seminal work, is the 
uongoing and changing cognitive and behavioural efforts to manage specific 
external and/or internal demands that are appraised as taxing or exceeding the 
resources of the person" (Lazarus and Folkman, 1984: 141). They claim 'coping' 
is determined by the relationship between the person and the environment, and 
that it is a transactional process with problem-focussed and emotion-focussed 
functions. Accordingly, they propose that the appraisal of a chronic disease as 
threatening or challenging leads to the initiation of 'coping' efforts'. The medical 
and psychological literature implies that people with cancer are expected to cope 
with their illness, and according to psychological theory, there are certain 
normative rules of 'coping behaviour. 
The impetus for research is based on the clinical and empirical evidence that 
PWC (given similar levels of disease and toxicity of treatment) have different 
levels of physical, psychological and social responses to their diagnosis and 
illness. Researchers have identified a number of psychological problems that a 
PWC might face after receiving a diagnosis of cancer including: significant 
anxiety, depression or suicidal thoughts; dysfunctions in the central nervous 
system produced by the illness and treatment, such as the inability to 
concentrate; specific problems that have arisen as a consequence of the illness 
and its management and/or social dynamics; and previously existing 
psychological problems that have been exacerbated by cancer (Holland, 1973). 
It is argued that if a patients' psychological problems can be identified at an early 
stage, then more effective psychosocial interventions can be devised and 
implemented for the benefit of the patient. " consequently, psychosocial 
oncologists are concerned with developing models that will detect people who 
17 Intervention is a key action in psychosocial oncology and psychotherapeutic interventions based 
on cognitive-behavioural techniques have been developed to help manage a number of cancer 
related problems - including individual psychotherapy, group therapy, family therapy and cancer 
support groups, in an attempt to meet the psychosocial and informational needs of cancer patients. 
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may be at risk for what is termed 'adverse outcomes', beyond what would 
normally be expected. 
'Coping with cancer research focuses on how individuals cope with their illness 
and the relationship between defined 'coping' strategies and what is known as 
psychological adjustment (Burgess, Morris and Pettingale, 1988; Cooper and 
Watson, 1991; Dunkel-Schetter, Feinstein, Feifel, Strack and Nagy, 1987; Taylor 
and Falke, 1992; Weisman and Worden, 1976-77). Studies are mostly based on 
the medical model and on cognitive theories which are predetermined by the 
expectations of the psychological knowledge of what 'coping' means. In order to 
measure coping responses and psychological outcomes, cancer patients are 
invited to provide answers to numerous questionnaires constructed to establish 
this 'reality or 'truth' about their beliefs, feelings and attitudes to their illness and 
treatment. The subsequent analysis of this data then categorises and labels the 
PWC as being either a 'coper ornon-copee. This information is then used as a 
guide for health professionals in providing the appropriate support interventions. 
The psychosocial oncology literature continues to provide 'normative' and 
statistical data on the 'problems of cancer patients'. However, even traditional 
researchers have challenged the accuracy of the information collected and the 
appropriateness of methods for measuring the complex and varying states that 
accompany cancer (Temoshok and Heller, 1984). One of the problems 
associated with these methods of data collection is that the information is 
invariably derived from self-report questionnaires that have been constructed as 
being objective representations of a number of expected norms of behaviour and 
reactions. These 'objective' results can only demonstrate 'coping strategies' 
measured against a wide range of sometimes conflicting variables already 
predefined and categorised by the social scientist. Underlying these methods of 
measuring coping attitudes is the assumption that there is something enduring 
within people which the scale is measuring, i. e. the attitude (also see 2: 5.3.2, this 
chapter). 
Discursive psychology highlights the difficulties with this approach to attitudes 
and raises a number of questions. When people are completing an attitude 
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scale, are they "performing a neutral act of describing or expressing an internal 
mental state, their attitude, or are they engaged in producing a specific linguistic 
formulation appropriated for the situation at hand? " (Potter and Wetherell, 
1987: 45). From the DP perspective, if a PWC expresses a particular attitude on 
one occasion this does not imply that they will express this same attitude when 
asked on another occasion. People say things differently at different times so 
there is likely to be some variability in what is said on a particular occasion which 
casts doubt on the enduring homogenous nature of the supposed internal mental 
attitude (ibid). 
For discourse analysts the phenomenon of variability is recognised as a feature 
of discourse whereas the theoretical approach in standard social science is to 
search for consistency and general laws. Consequently, any sign of variability is 
viewed as problematic; it is a nuisance factor and is considered an error. But for 
the discourse analyst, variability is something to be understood, including the 
way in which participants use variability to construct their talk for different 
occasions, for different audiences and for different purposes, and the aim is to 
understand this variability and to employ it for analytical purposes (ibid). 
Secondly, whilst the negative connotation of not 'coping' (maladaptive coping) 
prompts the introduction of intervention measures, there is a potential for further 
problems for the PWC. They may not wish to talk about or disclose any 
information about themselves in ways that would result in them being categorised 
as depressed, anxious or needing help as they are likely to be categorised as not 
'coping' with their illness. At the same time any such categorisation could 
produce further negative feelings or guilt for the PWC, creating additional 
burdens of having to 'adjust' and manage coming to terms with their inability to 
cope (See Chapter 7,7: 1). 
Although the 'discovery, that someone is failing to cope can provide beneficial 
information for intervention measures, Pollock (1993) suggests that patients may 
also be condemned as either weak, defective or culpably lacking in motivation or 
effort. Encouragement to cope, therefore, may be experienced as a pressure to 
conform to society's ideal of normality, either by concealing and overcoming 
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physical disabilities (Ville, Ravaud, Diard and Paicheter 1994) or by stoically 
enduring pain (Jackson, 1992). 
Evidence suggests that PWC who adjust and cope successfully are likely to have 
increased survival rates, (Greer, Morris and Pettingale, 1979; Morris, Pettingale 
and Haybittle, 1992; Pettingale, Mars, Green and Haybittle, 1985; Spiegel, Bloom 
Kraemer and Gottheil, 1994) therefore, there is an implication that 'bad coping' or 
'maladaptive coping' will have the opposite affect on their survival. However, this 
expected norm can create problems for PWC. If they are expected to cope, they 
may find it more difficult to proffer information that they gre experiencing 
Problems. An anecdotal account given to the author by a PWC who sought 
informational support from a health professional later discovered that her case 
file indicated that she had been categorised as a 'non-coper. She claimed this 
knowledge made her angry and had a detrimental effect on her because she felt 
she could no longer seek help or support if this resulted in being categorised in 
this way. 
Conversely, for the psycho-oncologist failing to discover someone is not 'coping' 
is also problematic. lbbotson, Maguire, Selby, Priestman, and Wallace, (1994) 
reported a major concern in that only 20-50% of patients experiencing problems 
are actually identified and treated appropriately. They also found that a 
contributing problem is that patients are reluctant to disclose their mood disorder, 
while doctors and nurses are hesitant to enquire about it. 
This highlights the issue of how PWC talk about the sensitive nature of their 
illness. It also emphasises that traditional methods of identifying such dilemmas 
cannot provide any beneficial understanding of how a PWC attends to and 
manages these dilemmas in their everyday accounting practices. In discursive 
psychology, subjective dimensions and theoretical artefacts of an individual's 
approach to illness e. g. asking questions such as "how well do you cope? " are 
viewed as discursive accomplishments which become participants' concerns and 
issues of accountability. Chapters 6 and 7 identify some of the discursive 
practices that participants display in attending to such dilemmas. 
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Like cancer, the literature is complex and sometimes variable in its trajectory, but 
for the purposes of this thesis, I have selected two key 'coping' constructs 
relevant to my analysis. Firstly, the PWC's psychological response to their 
illness in relation to how they adjust or adapt, with particular reference to the 
ficoping' strategies of a 'fighting spirit' and a 'positive attitude' and secondly, how 
6social support' is an integral part of successful 'coping'. 
2: 5.3.2 Attitude of mind: To cope or not to cope 
One of the most prolific and promoted strategies of 'coping' with a cancer 
diagnosis in Western culture, and frequently quoted in the literature, is adopting 
a certain 'attitude of mind'. This is clearly articulated in the commonly referenced 
metaphor of 'fighting' illness (Blaxter and Paterson, 1982; Crawford, 1984; Doan, 
and Gray 1992; Doan, Gray and Davis, 1993; 1992; Herzlich, 1973,1985; Pill 
and Stott, 1982,1985; Williams, 1983). People are advised to 'beat it', to adopt a 
I positive attitude' and to 'think positively' (Greer, et al, 1979, Greer and Watson, 
1987; Morris, Greer and White, 1977; Pettingale, et al, 1985; Watson, Greer, 
Young, Inayat, Burgess, and Robertson, 1988). Adopting such attitudes as 
psychological responses to cancer, or adopting an attitude of helplessness and 
hopelessness towards the disease have been suggested as prognostic factors 
which can have an influence on survival (Watson, Haviland, Greer, Davidson 
and Bliss, 1999). 
This recommendation to adopt a 'positive attitude' or a 'fighting spirit' has been 
determined by researchers employing a highly used and influential measure 
developed to assess 'adjustment' or responses to the diagnosis of cancer, known 
as the Mental Adjustment to Cancer Scale" (MAC), a self-report questionnaire 
with a 40-item scale, incorporating five sub-scales including fighting spirit; 
helpless/hopeless; anxious preoccupation; fatalism; and avoidance (Watson et 
al, 1988). A number of studies using this scale have reported that the coping 
styles of 'fighting sprit' and 'denial' tend to be associated with better outcomes in 
terms of psychological morbidity and, slightly more tentatively, overall survival 
"The MAC Scale is now one of a handfid of questionnaire measures of cancer coping styles that 
are currently available and extensively used. 
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and recurrence-free survival (Greer et al, 1979; Maguire, 1985a, 1985b; Morris et 
al, 1992; Pettingale et al, 1985). The statements about positive thinking are taken 
as evidence of a 'fighting spirit'. Likert attitude scale response alternatives such 
as 'applies to me' or 'does not apply to me' to a statement such as I try to fight 
my illness' are typically treated as if they were a literal description of an internal 
mental entity or response disposition. Evidence that someone is 'thinking 
positive' is derived, un problem atica Ily, from self-report, which is generally treated 
as offering (more or less accurate) depictions of the participants' psychological 
states. 19 Responses are treated as if in a vacuum, as providing a transparent 
window on underlying cognitive processes of 'the attitude' rather than being seen 
as variable, complex linguistic acts in themselves (Potter and Wetherell, 1988). 
Consequently, patients are expected to 'beat it', 'fight it', 'deny it, 'to be anxious' 
and to need support to help them cope. Interventions are directed towards 
helping PWC to cope better with their illness because it can both improve their 
quality of life and may even influence the progress of the disease process 
(Steptoe and Wardle, 1994). However, as Antaki and Rapley suggest in a study 
looking at the Quality of Life, "although psychologists are committed to assessing 
the well-being of their clients, their theorisation of quality of life and their 
diagnostic interview procedures cordon off its official definition from ordinary 
usages" (1996: 294). 
Another problem and a contradictory one is that despite the importance placed 
on the use of surveys and questionnaires in measuring attitudes, researchers are 
aware that minor alterations in wording often lead to variability of responses, 
which in turn affects the response patterns. As highlighted earlier, in standard 
traditional approaches, variability is considered as problematic and indicates 
some form of error, whereas for discourse analysts, variability is more than this 
and provides an opportunity to discover the phenomena of how versions of 
accounts may be produced on and for the occasion. 
19 Despite Follanan, Lazarus, Dunkel-Schetter, DeLongis and Green (1986) and Greer, Moorey 
and Watson's (1989) cautions and provisos regarding the reliability and validity of self report data, 
this evidence is essentially read off as unproblematic from either what someone might say in a 
semi-structured interview or what item they might tick to the effect that they are 'thinking 
positively', regardless of the constructs or categories. 
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The continued emphasis on the use of idioms such as 'coping with cancer, 
adopting a 'fighting spirit' and a 'positive attitude' have become part of the 
repertoire and canonical script in the language of cancer. The construction of the 
language of cancer is discussed later in this chapter. How 'coping' gets done 
and how participants manage these prescriptive coping styles in their accounts 
will be discussed in Chapters 6 and 7.1 will show how rather than accurate 
reports of internal cognitive states, these idioms are moral prescriptions that 
PWC attend to in their accounts. 
2: 5.3.3 Social support 
The second coping construct is 'social support', a general term for the many 
different resources that aid people in times of crisis and help them 'cope with life' 
(Freund and McGuire, 1999). Social support is another multi-dimensional 
construct and has been formulated as a highly valued and recommended coping 
resource strategy. 
In Helgeson and Cohen's (1996) review of the literature they identified three main 
types of supportive social interactions linked to the psychological adjustment to 
cancer, namely emotional support, which involves providing empathy, caring, 
love and/or trust to another; informational support which provides a person with 
information that can be used to help cope with personal and environmental 
problems and instrumental support which is when someone assists with practical 
problems, such as paying bills (House, 1981; House and Kahn, 1985; Kahn and 
Antonucci, 1980; Thoits, 1985). 
The impact of being given a cancer diagnosis inevitably results in life and identity 
changes. 'Coping' with treatment, pain, family stresses, occupational disruption 
and the threat of death is liable to challenge a person's social identity and 
because of the negative connotations surrounding cancer, is likely to put them at 
risk of social exclusion. These changes not only impact on the quality of the life 
of the PWC, but family, friends and colleagues who may be engaged in providing 
support are also affected. Emotional and social support from the family is said to 
promote good psychological adjustment (Helgeson and Cohen, 1996; Mesters, 
van den Borne, McCormick, Pruyn, de Boer and Imbos, 1997). Social support is 
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also associated with less adverse reactions to stressful events, such as serious 
illness (Cohen and Syme, 1985; House, Landis and Umberson, 1988; Pistrang, 
Barker and Rutter, 1997). A positive relationship between social and emotional 
support is often attributed as being a critical factor to adaptation, adjustment and 
'coping'with cancer (Hegelson and Cohen, 1996; Wortman, 1984). 
Freund and McGuire (1999) suggest that social relationships function as mirrors 
that help reflect messages of self-affirmation back to us. The corollary is that if 
the support is perceived as 'negative' this could have detrimental psychological 
effects (see Chapters 6 and 7). Emphasising the beneficial aspects of social 
support can create a number of dilemmas, especially as a lack of social support 
is associated with 'coping' strategies that are, in the long run, less adaptive. 
If a PWC does not have a readily available resource network to provide the much 
credited attributes of social support, or finds that supportive relationships are not 
available at the time when they are most needed, coping is likely to be more 
stressful. So, by implication, the lack of such support could contribute to a PWC 
feeling more vulnerable and less able to cope in an 'adaptive' manner. If social 
support is said to provide the promotion of stability, predictability and self worth, 
in contrast, social isolation is likely to have detrimental effects on health, self- 
esteem and recovery (Bell, LeRoy and Stevenson, 1982). A further problem is 
that if coping is seen to be successful, by implication, non-coping is failure. 
An added complication is that PWC frequently report that some of their friends 
disappeared after their cancer was diagnosed. Early explanations of this 
indicated that people felt uncomfortable in the presence of someone with cancer 
due to its stigma (Cobb, 1976; Cobb and Erbe, 1978). Stigma holds that illness is 
a socially or culturally devalued condition that sets people apart and discredits or 
disqualifies them from full social participation (Goffman, 1963). Rather than see 
stigma in Goffman's terms, as a description of an existing state with a predictable 
reaction, what is of interest in my analysis is how the topic of stigma becomes a 
device for PWC in accounting for identity and managing certain dilemmas when 
giving descriptions of their social relationships (See Chapter 6). 
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In order to receive 'appropriate' support, PWC need to find a balance between 
being able to ask for help and not being seen as helpless. How participants 
account for the roles of their family and friends and in particular the rhetorical 
nature of these accounts in relation to their identity as someone who is coping, 
forms part of the analysis in Chapter 6. 
The literature has consistently indicated that social support is beneficial to cancer 
patients in adjusting to the stress of their disease (e. g. Bloom, 1982; Dunkel- 
Schetter, 1984; Funch and Mettlin, 1982). But, as Atkinson, Liem and Liem 
(1986) note, social support should not be treated as stable; levels and 
appropriateness of social support do not remain constant over time, and stressful 
events and social support are not independent factors, they interact with each 
other. However, there is a noticeable absence of research examining how social 
support functions interactionally. 
In discursive analytical terms, social support is in itself a discursive phenomenon 
which is produced by participants in their accounting practices. My analysis 
highlights that participants often provide accounts of a role reversal in their 
claims that it is Lhgy who are having to provide reassurance and support to their 
significant others and that not everyone in a support network provides what they 
consider as 'positive' and appropriate support. In Chapter 6,1 look at how talking 
about social relationships does identity work and is often a resource for PWC to 
display and account for doing being normal. The concept of what is 
characterised as a positive attitude and the ascriptions of being positive or doing 
being positive will also be proffered and discussed (See also Chapter 7). 
The methodology and theories presented in this chapter are disciplines that 
have, to an extent, produced particular images of what the 'normal' and 'adaptive' 
psychological response to cancer should be (Frank, 1991,1992,1997). Rather 
than viewing the 'patient' holistically, the PWC is fragmented into manageable 
psychological states that can be measured and quantified during the course of 
clinical trials. The research focus is primarily driven by the needs of the medical 
professionals, to ascertain how someone responds or copes with their illness. 
This results in an emphasis on producing individualistic theoretical models Of 
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illness behaviour for the purposes of managing the patients' illness. There is 
also an implication that illness is a stable entity, when palpably it is not (Radley, 
1999). 
Additionally, the language used by medical sociologists and psychologists to 
label and categorise people objectifies the ill. Williams (1993) states that we 
have to recognise: 
0 ... that the expressive terms people use cannot be reduced to instrumental terms 
of 'adjustment' and 'adaptation'. These concepts, staple components of the 
rehabilitation literature, tend to be ethically judgmental because they are 
unrelated to the context of the moral life of the person concerned. In order to 
avoid the pitfalls of judgement, we need to see coping strategies as moral 
practices... " 
(Williams, 1993: 105). 
The approaches described above, although intentionally for the benefit of the 
patient, are a series of prescriptive designs constructed to meet the needs of 
medical practitioners and health professionals. They do not examine how these 
prescriptions and constructions are worked up as a potential burden that 
participants have to manage and are held accountable for, both inside and 
outside the confines of the medical institution and the analyst's concerns. 
In discursive psychology, formulations such as 'coping', social factors and 
influences are treated as being discursive accomplishments. My analysis will 
examine how participants invoke 'cultural knowledge', 'coping' and 'social 
relationships' as topics of business to be managed in their narratives and I will 
examine the rhetorical constructions and variability in these accounts. 
How people account for and talk about their social relationships is a domain 
which has remained unexplored in the 'coping with cancee research. Those 
involved in the medical profession and social support network will have been 
exposed to the culture and language of cancer, it is an available resource for 
them to draw upon and is likely to influence the nature of the interaction. 
Throughout this thesis, I will show how the categorisations of coping strategies 
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are social and moral concerns that PWC orient to in their accounts and 
descriptions of their changing social worlds. 
2: 6 Cancer Talk: The culture and language of cancer: 
Earlier in this chapter, I gave an account of the language that informs medical 
knowledge, that the PWC is categorised as a 'patient', that cancer is a disease 
and the body is regarded as a machine. I also discussed how social scientists 
produce prescriptive constructions of coping with the illness problems of cancer 
that are constituted in analysts' categories such as 'adjustment', 'coping', a 
8 Positive attitude' and 'meaning'. 
The discourses of medicine and social science permeate the public arena and 
are parodied and reinforced in the media. Together they have produced a range 
of categories, concepts and descriptions which form what I describe as the 
culture and language of cancer, but, more importantly, they have influenced the 
discursive practices of how cancer is talked about today. 
Burr (1995) suggests that "by placing everyday interactions between people 
centre stage, and seeing these interactions as actively producing the forms of 
knowledge we take for granted and their associated social phenomena" then "it 
follows that language has to be more than simply a way of expressing ourselves. 
When people talk to each other, the world gets constructed" (Burr, 1995: 7). 
This section focuses on the construction of the culture and language of cancer 
which is an available resource for people to draw on to jointly create and inform 
their worlds. I will firstly present a brief account of cancer's history and reveal 
why it is difficult to talk about. Secondly I will present an account of how talking 
about cancer was avoided in the doctor-patient relationship, and how a change in 
policy, telling people of their cancer diagnosis, has led to a new topic of research 
into doctor-patient communication and delivering bad news. Finally, I will refer to 
some studies of 'troubles talk', an area of research that is closely linked to the 
concerns of this thesis. 
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2: 6.1 What is cancer? 
Nobody knows what the cause is, 
Though some pretend that they do; 
It's like some hidden assassin 
Waiting to strike at you. 
W. H. Auden 
Cancer and its aetiology have a long and descriptive history within competing 
scientific theories of disease (Rather, 1978). Although today there may be 
alarmingly high rates of increase in the occurrence of cancer, it is not an 
exclusively modern disease, "tumours have been found in Egyptian mummies 
dating from 2000 to 3000 B. C. and physicians ... knew of and treated patients 
for 
cancer of several sites" (Benedek and Kiple, 1994: 102). 
In ancient Greece Hippocrates is credited with having named the disease cancer 
from karcinos, the Greek word for crab, perhaps because some cancers of the 
breast have a crab-like appearance or perhaps because the pain that cancer can 
produce resembles the pinching of a crab. Similarly, neoplasm, meaning 'new 
formation' and oncology, literally, 'the study of masses' are derived from the 
Greek, as is the word tumourýo (ibid: 102). The word 'cancer' in Latin or its old 
spelling 'canker', is used "to describe anything which erodes, sloughs, rots, 
corrupts and so on ... the word thus 
implies destruction, eating away, a spreading 
of evil or corruption" (Deeley, 1979: 3). 
For centuries, from Ancient Greece and Rome to the latter part of the twentieth 
century there was little treatment to offer victims of the disease and cancer was 
seen as carrying the "knell of doom to the victim" (Kelly and Frieson, 1950: 822). 
20 In Hippocratic medicine, turnours were seen to be caused by abnormal accretion of 1humours' 
and were, overall, thought best left untreated. In general however, cancers were not distinguished 
from other kinds of benign or inflammatory turnours, all of which were accounted for a humoral 
theory of disease (Rather, 1978). Galen, a Roman physician, made a scientific connection which 
today would be both highly controversial and politically incorrect that there was a possible link 
between psychological factors and cancer, and he is reputed to have noted that 'melancholic' 
women were at a greater risk than women with a more 'sanguine' temperament. This model of 
disease became canonical within medicine up until the seventeenth century. Even today, clinicians 
have described certain personality attributes seemingly characteristic of cancer patients as well as 
the occurrence of life crises immediately preceding the appearance of cancer (Mettler and Mettler 
1947). Some researchers claim that there is a cancer-prone personality (categorised as Type Q, 
but there is little evidence to support this (Greer and Watson, 1985). 
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Some people perceived it to be a rather unclean disease which evokes 
responses of disgust, revulsion and fear. 
There are over two hundred medically differentiated types of cancer. What they 
have in common is the way they develop. According to contemporary oncology 
textbooks, cancer is a disease of the cells of the body, characterised by: 
"uncontrolled growth, and the ability to infiltrate surrounding tissues and spread 
to distant sites ... most cancers arise from a mutation in a single cell and therefore 
represent a monoclonal population, but some growths are polyclonal, indicating 
that they have developed following more than one mutation" 
(Rees, Goodman and Bullimore, 1993: 3) 
In lay terms, cancer is a loss of control and occurs when one group of cells grows 
and multiplies in a disorderly and uncontrolled way. By various means, one type 
of cell becomes able to disobey or escape from the control mechanisms that 
keep cells growing in their normal orderly Way. 21 However, despite its antiquity, 
the disease itself is viewed as largely a twentieth-century phenomenon (Benedek 
and Kiple, 1994). 
Today's estimates are that one in three people will develop cancer at sometime 
in their liveS22 and as the risk of cancer increases with age, the longer we live, 
there is a higher risk of developing and possibly dying from cancer. In the United 
Kingdom, cancer is a major cause of morbidity and there are more than 300,00 
new cases of cancer every year. 23 165,000 people die of the disease per year, 
accounting for about a quarter of all deaths in the UK (Pitts and Phillips, 1998). 
In 1985, the American Cancer Society reported that although cancer was still a 
2'Normally cells divide to produce more cells only when the body requires them and at a relatively 
slow rate; cells that are cancerous multiply very rapidly. If they divide without regulation, a mass 
of excess tissue is formed which is called a tumour. Tumours can be benign or malignant 
(cancerous). Cells in malignant turnours invade and destroy nearby tissue, or they can break away 
from the turnour and travel via the bloodstream or the lymphatic system through the body and 
form new turnours in different sites. The spread of cancer in this way is known as metastasis. 
Cancer can be classified into two broad types: haematological (malignancies of the blood) and 
solid tumours. The name of a cancer describes the type of tissue or location of the site wherever it 
develops. A sarcoma describes a cancer developing in bone, muscle or connective tissue; 
carcinoma describes cancers arising in the cells of glands, organs and other similar locations (Buckmann, 1996). 
22 The Cancer Research Campaign (2001) featured an advertisement depicting this statistic. 
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leading cause of death, with the availability of improved treatments and 
diagnosis, approximately one of every two cancer patients would survive beyond 
five years from the time of diagnosis. 
2: 6.2 Why Is cancer difficult to talk about? 
In the 1920s George Groddeck, a psychoanalyst, wrote: 
*Of all the theories put forward In connection with cancer, only one has in my 
opinion survived the passage of time, namely, that cancer leads through definite 
stages to death. I mean by that that what is not fatal is not cancer. From that 
you may conclude that I hold out no hope of a new method of curing 
cancer ... (only] the many cases of so-called cancer... N 
(George Groddeck, The Book of the It, 1923). 
Despite the progress in treating cancer and increased survival rates, many 
people still subscribe to Groddeck's equation, a cancer diagnosis equals death. 24 
In the 19th century, a TB diagnosis was tantamount to hearing a sentence of 
death. It was common practice to conceal the identity of the disease from 
tuberculars and even when patients were informed about their disease, doctors 
and family were reluctant to talk freely (Sontag, 1978,1989). "Verbally I don't 
learn anything definite, " Kafka wrote to a friend in April 1924 from the sanatorium 
where he died two months later, "since in discussing tuberculosis ... everybody 
drops into a shy, evasive, glassy-eyed manner of speech" (Kafka, 1924 in 
Sontag, 1978: 7). Today, in the popular imagination, cancer and HIV/AIDS are 
equated with death and are considered to provoke the deepest dread. The word 
cancer with all its cultural baggage has become difficult to talk about. 
23 In the UK everyday another 850 people are diagnosed as having cancer (Cancerbacup, 2001) 
24 Psychoanalysts like Groddeck and Reich sought to investigate the cultural meaning of cancer, 
rather than accepting its 'organic' presentation as a purely biological phenomenon. Reich sought 
to explain Freud's own cancer of the jaw, in terms of 'his unhappy personal life and his repression 
of emotion' (Turner, 1984: 238). Reich believed that Freud smoked heavily because "he wanted to 
say something that never came out of his lips" (Reich, in Turner, 1984: 238). Reich argued that 
Freud's bitten-back emotions found an outlet in the cancer through which he 'chose' to express 
them. Groddeck also saw cancer as a symbol of repressed emotions and desires. In this context, 
the body is read as the cultural map of the psyche. Bodily memories are seen to threaten the health 
of the person by holding trauma or tension within the body. Thus, disease is the bodily expression 
of the distress that could not be fully forgotten (Stacey, 1997: 117). Psychodynamic theories have 
been influential in the construction of meaning and self help approaches to cancer (see Hay, 1988; 
Siegel, 1988; Simonton et al, 1978). 
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Heart attacks can be equally life threatening and when someone has one attack 
they are vulnerable and likely to have another. However, this 'truth telling' is not 
concealed from a cardiac patient; there is nothing shameful about a heart attack. 
The medical model can provide an adequate explanation for this difference. 
Cardiac disease implies a weakness, a mechanical failure, so there is no 
disgrace attached to a heart attack. The metaphors associated with heart 
disease are 'heart-break', or 'heart-ache', 'the blues' or 'the jitters', rather than 
the military and heroic metaphors of cancer. They are not adorned with the 
cultural baggage of stigma, shame and dread, nor do they carry the taboos that 
once surrounded people with TB and now surround those with cancer and 
HIWAIDS. 
Cancer is also universally known to have emotive connotations which can evoke 
psychologically disabling trauma and social dilemmas. In her classic and 
influential book, Illness as a Metaphor, Susan Sontag describes some of the 
problems the disease can evoke: 
"... cancer arouses thoroughly old fashioned kinds of dread. Any disease that is 
treated as a mystery and acutely enough feared will be felt to be morally if not 
literally, contagious. Thus a surprisingly large number of people with cancer find 
themselves being shunned by relatives and friends and are the object of 
practices of decontamination by members of their household, as if cancer, like 
TB, were an infectious disease. " 
(Sontag, 1978: 6 emphases added). 
Sontag raises a powerful notion in that cancer "will be felt to be morally if not 
literally, contagious" which could result in isolation and PWC may be 'shunned, 
posing a threat of exclusion from social life. One commonly held view of avoiding 
moral contagion and isolation is not to say the word itself. 
"Whatever you do, don't say 'cancer'. The unspoken word, written on everyone's 
lips, must not be voiced" 
(Stacey, 1997: 66). 25 
Karl Menninger wrote, "The very word 'cancer' is said to kill some patients who 
would not have succumbed (so quickly) to the malignancy from which they suffer" 
25 Sontag (novelist and essayist) and Stacey (sociologist) are writing from the knowledge of their 
own experiences of living with a cancer diagnosis. 
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(Menninger in Sontag, 1978: 6). The word arouses thoroughly old-fashioned 
kinds of dread synonymous with an inevitable, slow, painful and undignified 
death and it is said that hope and cancer are mutually exclusive (Fallowfield, 
1990). There can be no doubt that it is a dramatic disease. The utterance of the 
name of 'cancer (as was the case with tuberculosis in the 1 gth century) amounts 
to condemning the sufferer to a whole mythology that has been constructed 
around it (Herzlich and Pierret, 1987). 
So, to compensate, all kinds of euphemisms are used to avoid actually saying 
the word. Metaphors employed to describe the experience, treatment and 
management of the illness have become integral to the culture and language of 
cancer. 
Doctors often avoid using the word too. When discussing a diagnosis with a 
patient, they also draw on euphemisms such as growth, lump, wart or polyp, 
which may not pose such a great threat or stigma or evoke the emotional charge 
in either the patient or the doctor. In diagnostic accounts, (see Chapter 5) PWC 
often report that it was left for them to name the disease for themselves. In 
writing about her own experiences of cancer, Stacey (1997) reported that when 
she was in hospital the medical staff were unable to say the word cancer in front 
of her. She concluded that their not speaking the word conveyed to her a sense 
of embarrassment which added a feeling of shame to the already intense 
emotional charge of having the disease. 
It could be argued that some of the medical profession might consider that these 
euphemisms protect the patient from all the accompanying dilemmas of the 
disease (see 2: 6.4). In some cases this may be so but there is rarely any 
attempt to explore how the PWC might manage the burden of not knowing about 
their illness or respond to their communication with doctors (see Chapter 5). 
In the public domain, the group of diseases known as cancer are often reduced 
to a single disease, 'the Big C'. The word remains so unspeakable that another 
word, phrase or reference is often employed to make the speaker and the 
listener feel more comfortable: 'something nasty, 'a lump, 'the big C', 'the cruel 
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C'. On occasions, these euphemisms are whispered softly, with head hung low 
or with sideways glances. 
According to Zipf s law 26 euphemisms and abbreviations are employed because 
this requires less effort to explain the apparent equilibrium between diversity and 
uniformity. But the euphemisms and abbreviations invoked in cancer talk do 
more than this: they are a way to manage talking about a sensitive and taboo 
topic and a way of avoiding the 'unmentionable' and the accompanying cultural 
associations. 
2: 6.3 The discourse of heroes 
Because of all its negative connotations, a new style of language has been 
formulated to counter the fear and dread of cancer to provide PWC with optimism 
and hope for survival. From being condemned as 'victims', or 'sufferers, PWC 
are now identified as 'heroes', 'survivors', 'victors', and 'exceptional patients' 
(Siegel, 1988). 
The slogan 'Cancer can be beaten' was originally introduced in the United States 
as a rallying cry designed to encourage the public to contribute funds to support 
research. Today it has become a call for the individual with cancer to become a 
hero in the tradition of the archetypal hero myth (Doan and Gray, 1992). 
According to Becker, (1973) the heroic urge is our most common defence against 
death. So, language becomes a representation of a moral and mental attitude to 
the disease. The underlying morality implies that only those who fight hard 
against their cancer survive it or deserve to survive it. More and more the illness 
26Zipf S law, in simplest terms, states that there exists equilibrium between uniformity and 
diversity, which shows that there is an inverse relationship between the length of a word and its 
frequency. In English, for example, the majority of the commonly used words are monosyllables. 
This effect seems to account for our tendency to abbreviate words when their frequency of use 
rises, e. g. the routine reduction of microphone to mic by radio broadcasters. It would also seem to 
be an efficient communicative principle to have the popular words short and the rare words long. 
Factors such as efficiency and ease of communications appealed strongly to Zipf, who argued for a 
principle of 'least effort! to explain the apparent equilibrium between diversity and uniformity in 
our use of sounds and words. The simpler the sound and the shorter the word, the more often 
human beings will want to use it. (Crystal, 1987). 
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is being confronted as a personal challenge and PWC are now expected to treat 
their illness as an enemy to 'fight' and 'beat'. 
In an attempt to 'combat' the negativity associated with cancer, the concept of 
adopting a 'fighting spirit' has been incorporated into what has become known as 
the 'heroic model' (Doan and Gray, 1992). This model is defined as a disposition 
towards cancer (and other chronic illnesses including HIV/AIDs) that is 
characterised by the belief that positive thoughts and feelings, a 'fighting spirit' 
and an optimistic outlook will promote cancer recovery and/or remission. 27 
How people talk about life with cancer is informed by the machine metaphor of 
the medical model and the psychosocial military metaphors (first revealed in 
Sontag's classic work on metaphor). People with cancer are told to 'fight it' and 
when describing themselves as a fighter they are drawing on the cultural 
discourse of the heroic response to threat. The resulting language is one of 
warfare. Whereas other diseases are described as being infecting, cancer cells 
are said to invade; they colonise the body by setting up 'outposts'far distant from 
the primary site. No matter how determined the patient is to 'fight' the cancer, 
invariably the body'defences' are breached and the patient is overwhelmed. 
Having set up the context of a battleground, media headlines report of people 
'fighting the big C' or of 'beating breast cancer. The usage of terms like 'battle', 
'brave', 'crusade', 'victims', 'victory' and the 'war against cancer are currently 
prevalent in the language of cancer (Clarke, 1986; 1992; Seale 2001). When 
reporting a cancer death, the headlines describe this as 'having lost the battle 
against cancer or that'they put up a brave fight'. In contrast, newspapers do not 
report 'after a lengthy battle with schizophrenia' (read killed self) or 'a lengthy 
battle with life' (read died of old age). Throughout the course of writing this thesis 
I have regularly read The Saturday Times obituary columns and noticed an 
27jn the public domain, the influence of the heroic model is perhaps best exemplified in the 
writings of the psycho-spiritual approach to illness, including Simonton's Getting Well Again 
(1978), Louise Hay, You can Heat Your Life (1988) and Dr. Bernie Siegel's Love, Medicine and 
Miracle (1988) and its sequel Peace, Love and Healing (1989). Doan and Gray report that in their 
clinical practice, they have seen very few patients who have not read one or other of these one- 
sided arguments in support of psychological and spiritual influence on illness (Doan and Gray 
1992: 33). 
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interesting characteristic. If someone 'died of cancer this would be stated, 
however, if someone died of some other cause, this was rarely mentioned. This 
practice reinforces the equation that for many, cancer equals death and a 
diagnosis of cancer is equal to "death notified" (Ellis and Abrams, 1994: 8). 
Today, cancer continues to be a high profile topic in the media where the heroic 
model and the language of cancer are headlined and reinforced. Television 
companies produce documentary accounts of the experiences of 'cancer 
celebrities' and members of the public where the messages of 'think positive', 
'fight it' and 'beat it' are reinforced to encourage audiences to develop a 
particular mental attitude to the disease. Media 'celebrities' write about it in the 
broadsheets and tabloid press (Diamond, The Times; Picardie, The Observer; 
Harris, The Spectator) or publish books on their experiences of living with cancer 
(Diamond, 1998; 1991,1995; Lorde 1980; Picardie, 1999; Rollason 2000; 
Stacey, 1997): the list is endless. Radio regularly broadcasts news of the latest 
and often controversial issues surrounding the disease and cancer stories are a 
regular feature in television 'soaps'. 
The psychosocial oncology literature endorses the 'heroic model' with the added 
dimension that 'thinking positive' is connected and by extension, causally 
implicated, in the mental health, morbidity and mortality rate of the individual with 
cancer (see Watson et al, 1988, cited earlier in this chapter). Again, the research 
literature constructs and reinforces a prescriptive and moral order in that in the 
Western world, individualisation is favoured. Displays of 'coping' represented in 
'rising above adversity' and a 'stiff upper lip' are seen and received favourably. 
But, if someone does not subscribe to the 'heroic model', they do not 'fight' or 
are not 'brave', they are likely to be thought of as cowardly, defeatist, or to be 
surrendering to their illness. 
One of many issues at stake for the PWC is that "negative ideas are drawn from 
other areas of life and are imported into the illness experience and create an 
unnecessary burden for the ill" (Radley, 1994: 113). Equally, I would suggest that 
'positive' ideas could also become an imposition and an additional burden. 
Whichever approach a PWC adapts, it is likely to produce a moral dilemma. 
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The warfare of the 'heroic model' coupled with the discourses on a 'positive 
attitude' have become integral components of the everyday language of 'coping 
with cancee. The cultural metaphors of cancer and the shifting identities that 
illnesses bring in their trajectory are not simply 'there'; they are learned and 
deployed in social interaction (Antaki, 1996). They are defining features of 
cancer's interpretative repertoires, and their usage in how participants 
accomplish accountability and manage issues of stake and interest will be 
discussed in Chapters 3,6,7 and 8. My particular analytical interest in the 
coping strategies of the 'heroic! and 'positive attitude' repertories is how 'being a 
hero' or being positive actually gets done in talk and how cancer patients do 
coping and attend to these prescriptive coping styles (see Chapter 7). 
2: 6.4 Doctor-Patient Interaction: Is Ignorance really bliss? 
Up until about fifty years ago, doctors did not disclose a cancer diagnosis. It was 
considered to be in the best interest of the patient to leave them unaware of the 
nature of their illness and therefore unable to make a link with the associated 
problems and difficulties of their illness. 
The complex problem of whether 'to tell or not to tell' a patient that they have 
cancer underwent significant changes in the 20th century. A number of surveys 
conducted from 1950 to 1970, when treatment prospects were bleak, revealed 
that most doctors did not disclose the 'bad news' of a cancer diagnoSiS. 28 It was 
considered inhumane and damaging to the patient (Friedman, 1970; Glaser and 
Strauss, 1965; Oken, 1961). It was also assumed that people with cancer would 
prefer not to be told their diagnosis and that silence or reassurance was the best 
solution to avoid both the patient's and doctors anxiety. 
The non-disclosure policy was first challenged in the late 1950s when Aitken- 
Swan and Easson (1959) asked cancer patients whether they would prefer to be 
told about their illness diagnosis. (This in itself was quite unusual at a time when 
28 The term 'bad news' is generally applied in "situations where there is either a feeling of no hope, a threat to a person's mental or physical well-being, a risk of upsetting an established life 
style, or where a message is given which conveys to an individual fewer choices in his or her life" (Bor, Miller, Goldman and Scher, 1993: 96). 
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patients were seen but not heard). Having studied the reactions of 231 cancer 
patients they concluded and recommended that someone with cancer should be 
told about their diagnosis. This recommendation is further supported by more 
recent research suggesting that withholding information from patients denies 
them autonomy and contributes to the depersonalisation of patient care resulting 
in negative consequences for the patient's psychological state (Field, 1989). 29 
Twenty years later it was reported that there had been a major shift in the 
medical profession's attitudes to delivering a cancer diagnosis. 97% of American 
physicians said they routinely disclosed the diagnosis of cancer (Novack, Plumer, 
Smith, Ochitill, Morrow and Bennett, 1979). Today, most patients are informed of 
their diagnosis and the consensus is that patients should not only be told their 
diagnosis but also given information about their illness. 
Not surprisingly, it has been reported that medical practitioners do vary in their 
notions of when and what should be disclosed to a patient, in part because they 
perceive their mission to be one of instilling hope for the future (Good, Good, 
Schaffer and Lind, 1990). Many oncologists embrace this mission, not because 
they believe, as some do, that the mind can really influence disease, but rather 
because they believe that hope helps patients adopt a 'positive attitude' which 
helps with forging a 'partnership' with them in the essential healing process 
(Matthews, Lanin and Mitchell, 1994). 
Telling patients their diagnosis is now common practice and is recommended as 
a beneficial factor in aiding the provision of emotional and informational support 
(Helgeson and Cohen, 1996). Studies also indicate that well-informed patients 
tend to experience less anxiety and cope with their treatment better than those 
who have been inadequately briefed or left uninformed (Fallowfield, 1990). 
Throughout history, views held about cancer and survival have been pessimistic 
so it is not so surprising that the medical profession withheld disclosing the bad 
news of a cancer diagnosis and hedged around such absolutes in their 
29 This interesting contrast resonates with the differences in the medical and psychosocial 
approaches. As highlighted earlier, the introduction of psychological approaches to studying 
health and illness found that provision or lack of provision of informational support influences 
how people are likely to adjust to their illness (Mtchell and Glicksman, 1977). 
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conversations with patients. Until recently, the only treatment available for cancer 
was surgery. The success rate was very low because there were usually tiny bits 
of the tumour or secondary tumours left behind. Current treatment advances 
have changed the course of cancer; cure rates have improved, remissions have 
led to a five-year survival rate and today, not all cancers are fata130 so now it is 
possible to offer patients hope when disclosing the diagnosis. Medical and 
health care professionals are now faced with a new challenge: helping people 
live with cancer or live with having had cancer (Scott and Eisdendrath, 1986). 
Up to this time of change, delivering the bad news of a cancer diagnosis was not 
Part of a doctors training or practice; patients were talked about but not talked to. 
Doctors themselves were neither skilled in delivering such potentially bad news, 
nor were they insulated from the cultural knowledge and experience on which the 
fear of cancer is based. 
New developments have created a need for medical professionals to acquire 
communication skills in delivering bad news, including news about the recurrence 
or spread of the disease, or the presence of irreversible side effects, or raising 
the issue of hospice care. Consequently, a new research topic has emerged, 
doctor-patient communication. The literature is full of papers examining this 
complex relationship but they are mostly written from the institutional perspective 
of the medical profession, with little or no direct inclusion of the patient's 
perspective (Falvo and Smith, 1983; Peteet, Abrams, Ros and Stem 1991; 
Ptacek and Eberhardt, 1996). Usually the traditional research paradigms of 
cognitive and behavioural psychology frames the studies. A key focus has been 
on the mechanics of communication and how to facilitate what was termed as 
'open awareness' in the institutional and medical setting. (See Faulkner, 1993; 
Salway, 1992; Timmermans, 1994). 
The majority of studies looking at the delivery of bad news comprise of 
institutional data obtained from doctor-patient communications and counselling 
sessions. For the most part, the studies focus on how the delivery of bad news 
30 Despite this improvement in treatment and survival, few cancers are considered completely 
curable. 
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or death announcements are organised and produced by medical and 
counselling professionals. Much of this research was rooted in the improvement 
of the doctor's skills in delivering bad news to the patient, rather than looking at 
how patients responded and managed the news, and how they then talked about 
it to others. Analysts have also introduced a certain bias to their assessment of 
patient's talk, which has mainly been viewed in terms of responses to doctor's 
questions, rather than to the patient's perspective. Drew (2001) makes an 
interesting observation about this research by pointing out the paradox that in 
censuring medical practice for silencing the voice of the patient, this research has 
itself largely ignored the role of patients in their interactions with the doctor. 
Although much research shows that disclosing bad news of a cancer diagnosis is 
now a recommended policy, it will be shown that participants' accounts report 
that even trained medical and health professionals still struggle to manage this 
action and gv6d talking about cancer. Participants' accounts of the delivery of 
their diagnosis, what is termed 'bad news', will be presented and analysed in 
Chapter 5. 
2: 6.5 'Troubles Talk' 
Fifty years ago, cancer was not only a disease that was rarely talked about, but 
the word cancer was rarely mentioned. It is a different story today, but 
regardless of cancer being more in the public eye and talked about more openly, 
the cultural knowledge appears to be embedded. Whenever the word cancer is 
invoked, it comes laden with negative connotations. Consequently a commonly 
held view is that regardless of who is talking about cancer, (whether it is a health 
or medical professional, a family member, a friend, the person with a cancer 
diagnosis, or a social science researcher) it is a difficult, sensitive and delicate 
topic. Not only are metaphors a feature of cancer talk but also the word cancer 
has acquired an excess of meaning and has become a pervasive metaphor for 
describing any insidious assault on organisational integrity. Cancer is 
synonymous with uncontrollable destruction, unseen and unheard; it represents 
the ultimate alien invasion and complete loss of autonomy and control. it is a 
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disease that has long been associated with certain death, and usually a 
protracted, painful death (Faithful, 1994; Robinson, 1992). 
A cancer diagnosis is informed by culturally constructed and socially reproduced 
structures of metaphor and meaning. Stacey states that "it is impossible to have 
cancer and not be seduced by the power of such compelling cultural narratives" 
(Stacey, 1997: 13). Consequently, any form of interaction is burdened with a wide 
range of problems and sensitivities to be managed. 
Against the background of 'open awareness', social scientists have pursued 
another field of study, how people talk about difficult and sensitive topics such as 
death and dying in the medical arena (see Clark and LaBeff, 1982; Ellis; 1993; 
Glaser and Strauss, 1965,1968; Langley-Evans and Payne, 1997; Maguire and 
Faulkner, 1988a, 1988b, 1988c, 1993; Sudnow, 1967). 
Conversation analysts have studied the delivery of bad news, 'troubles talk', and 
talk about dreaded and sensitive issues in institutional settings. The analytical 
focus has looked at how the institutionally specific properties and organisational 
rules of the institutional practice of the doctor-patient relationship are constituted 
in the talk (see Freese and Maynard, 1998; Gill, 1998; Gill and Maynard, 1995; 
Heath, 1981; Haakana, 2001; Lutfey and Maynard 1998; Maynard 1991 a, 1991 b; 
1992; 1996, ten Have, 1991; West, 1984a, 1984b). Other studies have looked at 
the role of the counsellor in HIV/AIDS counselling (see Per5kyl5,1989,1991, 
1993,1995 1998; Per5kyl5 and Silverman, 1991a, 1991b; Silverman 1994,1997; 
Silverman and PerAkyl5,1990). 
Additional CA studies have looked more generally at how 'troubles talk' and talk 
about sensitive issues gets done, but not necessarily in the context of illness. 
'Troubles talk' consists of portraying (and interaction about) aspects of peoples' 
lives as undesired and perhaps warranting a change in behaviour and 
perspective. It can range from portrayals of peoples' life experiences as serious 
problems that necessitate professional intervention, to portrayals of undesired 
circumstances as mildly irksome, to denials of the existence of any trouble 
(Silverman, 1997). 
so 
Jefferson (1988) reports that 'troubles talk' in ordinary conversation is complex, 
varied, and even 'disordered'. CA studies have primarily focused on the 
sequential properties of 'troubles talW across a variety of speakers and social 
environments, in order to identify generic practices such as telling and receiving 
troubles stories, initiating repair, marking a 'change of state', closure of prior and 
movement toward next topics (see Anderson, Beach and Dixson, 2001; Beach, 
1996; Beach and Dixson, 2001; Heritage, 1984b; Holt, 1993; Jefferson, 1981, 
1984a, 1984b, 1988, Jefferson and Lee, 1981,1992; Miller and Silverman, 1995; 
Sacks, 1992; Schegloff, 1986,1987,1992a). 
Harvey Sacks (1976, in Jefferson, 1984a) proposes that some topics, such as 
"embarrassing" and "controversial" topics pose a particular sort of problem for 
conversation and Jefferson noted that a troubles telling is tantamount to getting 
out of the conversation itself. "To get off them and to go anywhere else from 
them, one has specifically to do "getting off of them"". (Jefferson, 1984a: 191). 
How participants manage to talk about cancer, a species of 'troubles talk', is an 
analytical feature throughout this thesis. 
Conversations between AIDS counsellors and their clients bring delicate and 
potentially threatening issues into play. A number of CA studies have explored 
HIV counselling and questioning techniques as social interaction and 'troubles 
talk' is treated as a major socially organised aspect of their work (Gubrium, 1989, 
1992; Miller, 1986; 1990). The institutional interaction and clinical practice of 
AIDS counselling has received a considerable amount of attention from 
conversation analysts (e. g. Per5kyld and Silverman). But interactional studies of 
'troubles talk' for a PWC either in the institutional environment or the home 
environment is relatively unexplored. 
However, there has been a noticeable breakthrough in the recognition that we 
need to understand talking about cancer outside of the institutional setting and to 
look at how families and carers manage social relationships with someone with a 
cancer diagnosis. Beach (2001a) is currently conducting some groundbreaking 
research, (the first of this kind), a longitudinal project, which he refers to as the 
$malignancy calls'. This comprises of a corpus of fifty-four recorded and 
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transcribed phone conversations occurring between family members whose wife 
(mother, sister, daughter-in-law) have been diagnosed with lung cancer, 
(eventuating in complications and death nearly 12 months later). Beach's study 
represents the first natural history (i. e. from initial diagnosis to death) of a family's 
ongoing interactional attempts, (conducted via local and long-distance telephone 
calls) and aims to understand and deal with cancer and its developmental 
consequences in a family interactional context. 
Surprisingly little is known about how PWC talk about cancer to others, and 
Beach (2001 a) notes that examples of communication per se in the psychosocial 
oncology literature are anecdotal, self descriptive and expressive, reported 
about, and or/hypothetical. Investigations of 'uncertainty 'decision making', 
and/or'hope optimism', for example, have been rooted in individuals' perceptual 
orientations (ibid: 242). In a review of the communication literature Beach and 
Anderson, (2001) did not find any studies addressing the interactional 
achievements through what Beach terms the "cancer journey'. This discovery 
also highlights another omission from the literature, namely how cancer gets 
talked about in the social research interview. 
Talking about cancer is a species of 'troubles talk' and my concerns in this thesis 
are to analyse how PWC account for their various 'troubles'. Whilst not 
addressing the omission stated by Beach directly, my analysis looks at how 
these accounts are provided in the context of the social research interview, an 
important and fundamental element of how the knowledge and culture of cancer 
are reported and constructed academically. 
Summary 
Cancer is no ordinary disease and it appears that to be categorised as a person 
with cancer or a cancer 'patient' is to be made exceptional. Despite the 
popularity of the counselling and therapy culture of the late twentieth-century 
Western world, in which the cure-all for everything is apparently to talk about it 
openly, talk about cancer prevails as a ubiquitous presence in everyday culture 
(Stacey, 1997). For many, the topic of cancer remains something that is difficult, 
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if not impossible to discuss and to respond to. Once a person is diagnosed with 
cancer, they enter what Stacey refers to as 'stigmatised territory. 
Negative associations with myths3l and misconceptions are, sadly, still 
widespread (Eardley, 1986). Some people fear contagion and contamination; 
others feel embarrassment in not knowing what to say. Corner (1988) reported 
that the general public viewed cancer very negatively and unfortunately there is 
little or no evidence to date that suggests that the feelings of the general public 
have substantially altered (Whyte and Smith, 1997). Today there is a very real 
possibility of a PWC being refused a mortgage, health and life insurance or even 
a job. A PWC is invariably constructed as being different and they have become 
categorised as deviant in that they are no longer 'ord i nary' or'normal'. 
It is therefore not surprising that people find talking about cancer difficult. How do 
the medical profession tell someone that they have a potential death sentence? 
How does someone tell their family and friends this devastating news? Life after 
a cancer diagnosis for the person diagnosed and those around them inevitably 
changes and is problematic. 
In contrast to the silences and avoidance of talking about it, today cancer 
receives a great deal of attention, not only in the medical world and academic 
circles, but also in the public arena through the media including television, radio, 
newspapers, the Internet and in the book publishing world. It has become a 
familiar, much talked about disease, but for the most part the negative myths, 
and difficulties prevail. 
Whenever people meet and talk, whether in institutional encounters or in their 
private everyday life, communication is not simply a matter of the efficient and 
rational transfer of information. People often tell their troubles to others and 
invariably follow a rationality informed by moral choices. "All verbal behaviour is 
governed by social norms specifying participant roles, rights and duties vis 6 vis 
31 Myth is used here in an anthropological sense in that it is not something false or erroneous, but 
as a set of beliefs adopted by individuals and societies that give meaning and direction, and the 
beliefs influence and shape how people manage 'reality' and form the cultural knowledge drawn 
upon in social interaction. 
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each other, permissible topics, appropriate ways of speaking and ways of 
introducing information" (Gumperz, 1982: 165). Collectively the discourses of 
medicine, social scientists and the media have created a set of rules and norms 
and appropriate illness behaviour responses which equate to the culture of 
cancer. 
This thesis suggests that the metaphorical descriptions attributed to cancer, the 
'heroic model' and its accompanying discourse construct the ill person as being 
morally accountable, adding additional burdens for them to cope with apart from 
their illness. This discourse translates into everyday talk and although many 
problems have been identified and researched in relation to the psychosocial 
aspects of living with cancer, few have looked at how, when talking about their 
illness, this available discourse is brought into being in social interaction. 
As much as is known about cancer, in all its abominable and as yet uncured 
manifestations, there exists only a myopic grasp of how people talk about the 
aftershocks of a cancer diagnosis and treatment, and how people manage the 
diverse demands and problems in social interaction. Comparatively little is 
understood about interactional involvement addressing medical concerns in the 
family and home environment (Beach 1996). Although the data for this thesis 
comprises of interview data, it is hoped to contribute to the understanding of 
interactional involvement in addressing concerns about cancer outside of the 
institution of medicine. 
This thesis examines how, in the construction of this cultural backdrop of social 
influence and normative and abnormal responses to illness, participants orient to 
and take up the moral ground. Talking about cancer is an interactionally sensitive 
and delicate topic and it is proposed that participants manage to bring off, 
describe and account for their actions with regard to certain rules and normS32' 
rather than simply following or breaking them. 
32 Nonns as an explanation of actions are not favoured by experimental social psychologists because it sharpens the contrast between norms as explanations of actions, and norms as resources 
that participants use in explaining actions (Edwards, 1997). 
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The concerns of this thesis are how people manage what they determine as the 
problematics of a cancer diagnosis in social interaction and how they talk about a 
difficult, taboo topic. The following chapter provides the background and 
methods of my chosen theoretical approach, discursive psychology, and the 
method of analysis, discourse analysis, together with a brief outline of the topics 
that will be the focus of analysis throughout. 
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Chapter 3 
Discourse Analysis: Theory and Method 
"consider language as a series of tools which acquire their purpose and function 
from the social and cultural milieux in which they are used" 
(Wiftgenstein, 1953: 555). 
Introduction 
In Chapter 2,1 gave an account of how the topic of cancer and the identity of 
someone with a cancer diagnosis has been constructed by medical and social 
scientists, clinical practitioners and the media and I highlighted some of the 
psychological and psychosocial problems associated with the illness. I also 
emphasised that despite cancer being talked about more openly, it remains a 
topic surrounded by myths of fear and avoidance. Consequently, talk about 
cancer endures as an acutely sensitive and delicate topic, not only for the person 
with cancer (PWC) but also for the listener. 
The traditional literature outlined in Chapter 2 treated peoples' talk in their 
responses to questionnaires and interviews as reflecting some kind of cognitive 
reality rather than analysing what else might be going on and what participants 
were doing and accomplishing in their talk. I noted that social support (which is 
conducted through social interaction with others) is considered an important 
aspect of how people cope with their illness. However, researchers have 
generally omitted to examine what resources participants draw on to construct 
and/or contest versions of reality or how they manage and overcome the 
difficulties of talking about cancer. The result is a lack of focus on the problems 
of social interaction. 
The aim of this chapter is to introduce the chosen theoretical and analytical 
approach of this thesis, discursive psychology (DP) and discourse analysis (DA) 
and to highlight some of the key analytical features that inform my data analysis. 
The final section of this chapter describes how the data was collected and 
prepared for analysis. 
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Before presenting the discursive analytical themes which frame my analysis I will 
present a brief account of three relevant theoretical influences that inform 
discursive psychology which will be applied throughout this thesis, namely, 
ethnomethodology, conversation analysis and the study of scientists' discursive 
practices in the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK). 
Secondly I will introduce the key features of discursive psychology and discourse 
analysis based on the three categories contained in the Discursive Action Model, 
(DAM) action, fact and interest and accountability (Edwards and Potter, 1992). 1 
will present the elements of this model that will be drawn on throughout the 
analysis including talk as social action, fact construction, stake and interest, 
rhetoric, accountability and ideological dilemmas. 
Finally, I will provide details of how the data was collected, including finding the 
participants, ethical considerations, the style of interview, tape-recording and 
transcription, the process of selecting the data for analysis and finally, the coding 
themes for the analysis. 
3: 1 Ethnomethodology 
The first influence of DP is rooted in ethnomethodology and as its name 
suggests, ethnomethodology is concerned with the study of (ology) ordinary 
people's (ethno) methods. The methods studied are the mundane practices, or 
the common sense methods we use to make sense of our everyday experiences 
that constitute social realities (Garfinkel, 1967). Garfinkel termed his approach 
as 'the documentary method of interpretation' where the goals and aims of 
ordinary people are treated as similar to the goals and aims of the social 
researcher. In other words, people, like scientists, are continually endeavouring 
to understand what is going on in any situation and these understandings are 
then utilised to produce appropriate behaviour of their own. 
Two key notions of the ethnomethod are to treat the appearance of an individual 
as the 'document of an underlying pattern' and secondly, that an individual's 
appearance is interpreted by members on the basis of what is known about the 
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'underlying pattern'. The fundamental idea of ethnomethodology is that the 
sense of social action is accomplished through the participants' use of tacit, 
practical reasoning skills and competencies. Much of social life is mediated 
through spoken and written communication, so this placed the study of language 
at the very heart of ethnomethodologys sociological enterprise (Holstein and 
Gubrium, 1995). 
This notion is of particular interest in this thesis because it provides a good 
example of how language is used in everyday situations and how members 
socially construct, interact and display issues of accountability with the 
'underlying patterns' of the discourse of cancer. 
Whilst Garfinkel subscribes to the notion that members' demonstrations of 
context-bound activities are 'normative' or obvious phenomena, this thesis 
considers how the cultural discourses of cancer, that have been socially 
constructed, prescribed and reinforced by the 'other', are replayed and displayed 
by people talking about cancer. How participants account for and sometimes 
reject the normative notions and prescriptive actions and 'attitudes' of the 
language of cancer in their talk is a feature of the analysis. It will be shown how 
participants' own accounts are 'indexical" and 'reflexive' and attend to what I 
suggest has become cancees canonical script. 
A feature of interest here is the ethnomethodological stance taken by Dorothy 
Smith (1978) in her analysis of how people are assigned to mental illness 
2 
categories by way of 'contrast structures'. Contrast structures are a discursive 
organisation which both describe the activity and provide cues to understand 
something as abnormal or bizarre? The following brief extract, where Angela is 
1 Indexicality is a feature of discourse in which the meaning of an utterance depends on its context 
of use. "Descriptions ... are not to be regarded as disembodied commentaries on states of affairs. Rather, in the ways in which they (1) make reference to states of affairs and (2) occur in particular 
interactional and situational contexts, they will unavoidably be understood as actions which are 
chosen and consequential. Like other actions, descriptions are "indexical" and are to be 
understood by reference to where and when etc. they occue, (Heritage, 1984a: 140). 2 The term 'contrast structures' was coined by Dorothy Smith (1978) (cf. Atkinson, 1984a), in her 
celebrated article 'K is mentally 111' and are featured in Chapter 7. 3 Smith noted how, in descriptions constructing K's behaviour as anomalous, 'a description of K's 
behaviour is preceded by a statement which supplies the instructions for how to see that behaviour 
58 
making a statement about K, highlights four aspects of ethnomethodological 
analysis and illustrates how people attend to the category of mental illness. 
Angela We would go to the beach or pool on a hot day, 
I would sort of dip in and just lie in the sun 
While K insisted that she had to swim 30 laps 
("K is mentally III", Smith, 1978: 43). 
Firstly, Angela's claims are expressed as straightforward, declarative statements 
that could be treated as descriptive of her own and K's behaviour and as dealing 
with matters of fact rather than evaluation. However, for ethnomethodologists 
such descriptive practices are reality-creating activities through which 
behaviours, circumstances and people are cast as representations of cultural 
categories where moral and political significance can be assigned. Secondly, 
whilst Angela does not make it specific, her description and contrast involve 
several assumptions (or background expectancies) about mental illness. Two 
significant assumptions are that mental illness is a departure from what might be 
called a normal state of mind, and that signs of mental health and illness may be 
ascertained from someone's behaviour. A third aspect of Angela's account is 
that it involves reflexivity and localness. As previously mentioned, Angela's 
description creates the social reality of mental illness by treating K's behaviour as 
an instance of this cultural category. But the reflexivity of the account involves 
more than this. It also constructs a social world in which Angela and K are 
assigned distinct contrastive and hierarchical positions and identities. In this 
world, Angela is positively positioned as normal and K as mentally ill. The 
as anomalous' (ibid: 39). Further examples include: (1) when asked casually to help in a friend's 
garden, she went at it for hours, never stopping, barely looking up (2) she would take baths 
religiously every night and pin up her hair, but she would leave the bath dirty (3) when something 
had gone radically wrong, obviously her doing, she would blandly deny all knowledge. Examples 
2 and 3 are what Edwards (1997) terms 'script formulations'. The first example is constructed as a 
one-off, but it is also provided as an instance of what K would generally do. In these examples, 
the pathologising work is done by presenting them contrastively against an implied norm. Smith's 
examples show that the discursive practice of formulating things into contrasts and oppositions is 
not just a matter of deploying ready-made conceptual resources that are built into semantic 
categories, but something people can do flexibly and inventively, forjust about any set of objects 
or events. It is not difficult to imagine K's gardening activities being described non-anomalously, 
or even contrastively as a sign of diligence and selflessness. Edwards "suggests that the presence 
in languages of more conventional or even semantically ready-made contrast sets may be a 
function of the rhetorical uses of discourse and that conceptual categories are designed in this way 
for talk, for performing talk's business" (Edwards, 1997: 23). 
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account is local because its meaning is inextricably linked to the practical 
circumstances in which it was voiced and interpreted by others. These 
circumstances might be analysed as the contingencies that Angela orients to in 
offering the account and which others orient to in their interpretation of it. 
In ethnomethodology, all constructions of social reality are potentially open to 
contest and change. So, Angela's description might not always be treated as 
evidence of K's mental illness. If for instance we assume that K is an Olympic 
swimmer in training then the contrast between Angela's and Ks orientations to 
swimming might be taken as evidence of K's dedication and commitment to 
athletic excellence. So, ethnomethodologists ask two principal questions, firstly 
what are the circumstances and secondly how socially constructed realities 
change. Both questions point to the potential instability of meaning in everyday 
life, and the practical moral and/or political implications those different social 
realities might have for individuals and groups. 
Garfinkel's position is that 'situational context' is best approached as what 
participants treat as such, and make relevant to their activities as part of their 
activities. These questions are of specific interest because the participants in this 
study are already categodsed as people with a cancer diagnosis and such a 
descriptive category cardes certain socially constructed 'realities' and moral 
implications. Contrast structures are a pervasive feature in the rhetodcal 
construction of participants' accounts and will be discussed throughout the 
analytical chapters. 
Ethnomethodology's contribution to discursive psychology is that it has 
elucidated how the ordinary and pervasive ways in which everyday descriptions 
and psychological attributions perform normative, real ity-defi ni ng 
intersubjectivity-oriented work when they are viewed in the contexts of their 
occurrence as discourse (Edwards, 1997). 
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3: 2 Conversation Analysis 
Conversation analysis (CA) developed simultaneously with ethnomethodology 
and focuses on the ways in which social realties and relationships are constituted 
through people's talk-in-interaction (Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson 1974). The 
term "conversation analysis" is now used almost exclusively to refer to the 
pioneering researches of Harvey Sacks into the social organisation of talk-in- 
interaction, the interactional and interpretative competencies of the interactants, 
and how they collaborate to construct social realities. 
In the 1960s, Harvey Sacks and Emanuel Schegloff were graduate students in 
the Sociology Department of the University of California at Berkeley, where 
Erving Goffman was teaching. Goffman had developed a rather distinctive 
personal style of sociological analyses, based on observations of people in 
interaction, but ultimately oriented to the construction of a system of conceptual 
distinctions. Goffman's example opened up an interesting area of research for his 
students, the area of direct, face-to-face interaction, what he later called 'the 
interaction order (1983). Goffman was interested in documenting the ritual 
procedures which inform the orderly conduct of everyday life. When he studied 
talk he maintained a strict distinction between its 'system' properties (the features 
ensuring basic intelligibility, such as orderly turn taking) and its 'ritual' properties 
(which had to do with such things as the protection of 'face', the ways in which 
we tend to avoid giving offence to others, politeness and the many other 
sceremonial' aspects of interaction). For Goffman, these were two theoretically 
distinct modes of the interaction order. He established that social interaction 
embodies a distinct moral and institutional order that can be treated like other 
social institutions such as education, religion and the family (Goffman, 1955, 
1983). 
Although Sacks undoubtedly drew from Goffman's interest in the orderly 
properties of face-to-face interaction, for Sacks, there is no meaningful difference 
between 'system' and 'ritual' aspects of talk-in-interaction. In his paper'Everyone 
has to lie' (Sacks, 1975) he shows that the 'polite' answer to a "How are you? " 
enquiry, that is, "Fine" has as much to do with what Goffman called system 
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requirement as it does with ritual requirements. This is because the question 
itself sets up a particular sequential trajectory. Normally, we do not expect 
someone to respond to "How are you? " (HAY) with a literal account of their state 
of health. But if for instance someone wanted to 'tell the truth' about how he or 
she actually was, they might need to indicate that special circumstances were 
being brought into play. Similarly to respond with anything other than a neutral 
'fine' or 'okay', such as 'awful' or 'fantastic! would set up its own sequential 
trajectory and the onus would then be on the original inquirer to invite the 
speaker to provide a further explanation of this. So, Sacks' interest in the ritual 
or ceremonial order differed fundamentally from Goffman's, in that it began from 
the sequential order of talk-interaction itself (Hutchby and Wooffift, 1998: 28-29). 
The relevance of category membership (e. g. a person with cancer) in being 
asked a simple everyday question such as "How are you? " will be analysed in 
Chapter 6. 
The fundamental questions for the conversation analyst are: 'What do we 
actually do when we talk? ' 'How is talk organised and co-ordinated in 
interaction? ' and What role does talk play in the wider scheme of social 
processes? ' CA shares ethnomethodologists' interest in interpretative methods, 
but they treat these methods as emerging from the distinctive structure and 
processes of talk-in interaction. In other words, at its most basic CA is the 
systematic analysis of talk in interaction, that is, talk produced in everyday 
situations of human interaction. Communication and interaction are seen as 
inherently social processes, deeply embedded in the production and 
maintenance of all kinds of institutional settings, from everyday intersubjectivity, 
to the family, to the nation state (Hutchby and Wooffift, 1998). 
Hutchby and Wooffift provide a very clear account of the focus of CA: 
"Conversation analysis is characterized by the view that how talk is produced and 
how the meanings of that talk are determined are the practical, social and 
interactional accomplishments of members of a culture. Talk is not seen simply 
as the product of two 'speakers-hearers' who attempt to exchange information or 
convey messages to each other. Rather, participants in conversation are seen 
as mutually orienting to, and collaborating in order to achieve, orderly and 
meaningful communication. The aim of CA is thus to reveal the tacit, organized 
reasoning procedures which inform the production of naturally occurring talk. 
The way in which utterances are designed is informed by the organized 
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procedures, methods and resources which are tied to the contexts in why they 
are produced, and which are available to participants by virtue of their 
membership in a natural language community". 
(Hutchby and Wooffitt, 1998: 1) 
Historically, the tendency of conversation analytic investigations has been to 
focus on social actions which comprise of the organisation of 'episodic! moments 
of ordinary and institutional interactions (e. g. see Atkinson and Heritage, 1984; 
Drew and Heritage, 1992). 
Both conversation analysts and discourse analysts treat talk as action, and these 
actions are performed using a diversity of devices. Using a tool kit metaphor, the 
idea is that different tools, for example, active voicing (Wooffitt, 1992) extreme 
case formulations (Pomerantz, 1986, Edwards, 2000) and footing (Clayman, 
1992) can be drawn upon to accomplish and do particular business. Whilst I am 
not applying CA as a systematic form of analysis, the use of some of these 
devices, how they are deployed and what they accomplish in talk will be 
commented on throughout my analysis. 
3: 2.1 Category entitlement and category membership 
CA is of particular relevance in this thesis to the extent that it provides many 
useful tools for analysis. Of specific interest is one of Sacks' key notions, of 
category entitlement and entitlement to experience, together with the relationship 
of category membership and social identity4 (See also Potter, 1996). 
Categories are often deployed in talk. What is of value in Sacks' approach is that 
the categories of interest are those that are made relevant in and constructed by 
participants in interaction, rather than either the analyst's categories, or the 
category produced by, for example, the medical practitioner or health 
professional. 
Certain categories of people, in certain contexts, are treated as knowledgeable. 
In practice, category entitlement eliminates the need to ask someone how they 
know something; simply 'being a member' of some category, for example, a 
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doctor, a social researcher, or a person with cancer, is treated as providing 
sufficient information to account for and warrant their knowledge of a specific 
domain. But, 'being a member is not quite that simple. Membership can be 
achieved or worked up and people can fail to be treated as having certain 
memberships. The nature, boundaries and implication of both categories and 
their entitlements can be reworked in a whole range of ways (Gilbert and Mulkay, 
1984: Ch. 6; Potter, 1988). Jayyusi (1984) notes that whilst some categories are 
visible, or given official credentials, others are highly localised and negotiable. 
Throughout this thesis, attention will be given to the membership category of a 
person with cancer and how this is either worked up or down-played (see 
Chapters 6 and 7). 
Category membership is another endemic feature of discourse and indicates that 
there is generally something at issue. How social categories are handled in use 
are a particular feature of Harvey Sacks's (1979,1992) 'hotrodder study which 
focused on a group of 1960s 'teenagers' and how they talked around issues of 
who they were and what they did in group therapy sessions. The term 'hotrodder 
was used by the participants and is a word derived from ownership and activities 
with customised cars (hotrods). Sacks showed how the "deployment of the term 
'hotroddee as a description of people, was an effective way of drawing 
boundaries around who did and did not count (for a current speaker, in the 
current talk) as a legitimate member of that category. " (Edwards, 1998: 115). 
Sacks highlighted a number of features of how the use of this word functioned, 
for example "how it was aligned with various other terms (e. g., descriptions of 
cars and activities) and how it contrasted with alternatives (e. g. 'teenager, which 
was an adult's, outsiders description)" (ibid: 15). 
The analysis throughout this thesis emphasises how outsiders, including the 
medical profession, friends, family and colleagues (i. e. those without a cancer 
diagnosis) make use of category descriptions. Sacks's general concern was with 
how conversational participants use descriptive categories of this kind, and apply 
membership criteria, as a way of performing various kinds of discursive actions. 
His approach contrasts with how such categories figure in other kinds of social 
4 DP's approach to the study of social identity will be discussed later in this chapter. 
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science, as analysts' categories of people, according to which the analyst offers 
explanations of what they do, what they say, and how they think. This shift, 
towards treating categorisations of that kind as topics under investigation 
(participants' resources for doing descriptions and explanations) rather than as 
analysts' explanatory resources, is not only a key feature of ethnomethodological 
work (Wieder, 1988) but is also a feature in discourse analytic studies of group 
identity (Wetherell and Potter, 1992). 
According to Sacks, categories are not neutral descriptions, they are 'Inference 
rich' which means they are linked to particular activities (category-bound 
activities) and consequently, there are strong expectations and conventions 
associated with them. In interaction participants display their orientations to the 
kinds of inferences which may warrantably be drawn about them by virtue of their 
membership of a category. (See also Hester and Eglin, 1997a; Jayyusi, 1984; 
Widdicombe and Wooffitt, 1995). Sacks provided a classic illustration of 
category bound activities in his lectures. He noticed the following story opening 
in a book of stories by children: "The baby cried. The mommy picked it up" 
(Sacks, 1992). Most people reading or hearing this will have made the 
assumption that 'the mommy who picks up the baby is the mommy of the baby; 
similarly, the reason for mommy to pick it up will be associated with the baby's 
crying. This precise detail is not contained in the extract itself, but each 
reader/hearer is likely to arrive at the same interpretation because of the 
common-sense expectations associated with categories like mommy (e. g. that 
they care for babies and children when they are in distress) and the way in which 
categories are grouped in relation to other categories (Sacks, 1972). 
Watson and Weinberg, (1982: 60) suggest that "Membership categories may 
conventionally be seen as having category-bound predicates ... they are loci for 
the imputation of conventional expectations, rights and obligations concerning 
activities (for instance) which is expectable or proper for an incumbent of a given 
category to perform. " In other words, when we assign a person to a category this 
ensures that the conventional knowledge about the behaviour of people 
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categorised in this way can then be cited, or invoked to explain or interpret the 
actions of that person. 5 
Discursive analysis is concerned with how, when and why categories are 
constructed and mobilised in talk, and it is suggested that categories are 
constructed and made relevant to talk in the routine business of negotiating one's 
own accountability. So, a category may be constructed in order to ascribe a 
particular identity to the self, or alternatively may be deployed to construct the 
identity of 'others' with whom the self can then be rhetorically compared, 
contrasted and evaluated against. 
Category-bound predicates are of particular relevance for anyone who is 
categorised as a person with cancer. In their accounts to me as a social 
researcher and in their accounts of their everyday social interaction, it is common 
to find sequences in which they report 'others' sensitivity to the inferential 
implications of the category ascription (See Chapters 5- 8). 
3: 2.2 Identity 
Categories provide us with convenient labels so the category of 'a person with 
cancer', or a 'patient', provides an identity with a set of inferential resources 
(culturally available) which can be used by others to understand and interpret the 
behaviour of the categorised person. The analytic task is to find out if, when and 
for what, these categories have such relevance (Schegloff, 1992b). 
The notions of social identity and category membership are crucially linked. 
When we refer to a person's social identity, we are also indexing their 
membership of a specific category. Social identity is a description which is 
available for people to invoke and deploy in mundane interactions. Antaki, 
Condor and Levine (1996) explored social identity as a resource deployed in 
conversational texts. They claimed that speakers' identities are much subtler 
than simple pre-given category labels suggest, and that they change rapidly as a 
Baker (1997) notes that membership categorisation devices are a key to treating interview data 
differently. The significance of this will be noted in the Data section of this chapter. 
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function of the ephemeral (but socially consequential) demands of the situation 
(Antaki et al 1996: 473). 
In DA, when someone claims an identity for themselves or an 'other, categories 
are deployed as a cultural resource for warranting, explaining and justifying 
behaviour (Widdicombe, 1998). In turn, this provides the basis for the "legitimate 
(that is, conventional and warranted) imputation of motives, expectations and 
rights associated with that category and its incumbents" (ibid: 52-53). 
Edwards suggests that identity is also a locally managed concern for participants 
in that "they are potentially available for doing discursive 'business'. Categories 
such as gender, age, parental and marital status, nationality etc., are not merely 
factual, or even value-laden observations that have an automatic relevance to 
people's conversational activities; they are culturally available resources in our 
language that identify and describe people, which allow us to make reference to 
other people or to ourselves" (Edwards, 1998: 20). The relevance and concerns 
of identity and how this is managed by a PWC Vill be discussed further in 
Chapters 5,6 and 7. 
3: 3 Scientists' discursive practices In the sociology of scientific 
knowledge (SSK) 
Although I will not be doing an explicit repertoire analysis, Gilbert and Mulkay's 
work is a key feature informing discourse analysis and is presented here as part 
of the construction of DP and DA. Gilbert and Mulkays Opening Pandora's Box 
(1984) is regarded by many as 'the classic discourse analysis study and 
provides an insight to how scientists construct their versions of accounts in such 
a way as to be believable, factual and 'true'. They examined the ways in which 
scientists' discourse reproduces the independent and objective status of the 
objects or processes they study. Gilbert and Mulkays work contrasts markedly 
with most studies of scientific knowledge. Unlike empirical relativists and social 
interest researchers, their aim was not to provide an account of what science is 
really like, but to see how scientists constructed accounts of theory and choice 
and in particular, in the variations between such accounts. They noted that 
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scientists typically offered one version of theory choice when describing their own 
theory selections, but a rather different one when criticising as misguided the 
theory choices of competing scientists (Mulkay, 1991: ch. 10, Potter, 1984). 
They defined how scientists employ two functionally distinctive and contrasting 
vocabularies or 'interpretative repertoires' when accounting for their actions and 
beliefs in different social situations, namely the empiricist repertoire (formal) and 
the contingent repertoire (informal) (Gilbert and Mulkay's terms) and found that 
scientists used these repertoires to construct asymmetrical accounts of truth and 
error. The empiricist repertoire, applied to scientific papers, has a coherent and 
distinctive set of linguistic and rhetorical features, which are clustered around 
three broad themes. Firstly, scientists use an impersonal style of language using 
constructions such as 'the hypothesis proposed', 'results suggest' which helps 
minimise subjectivity. Secondly, the data are treated as primary and generally 
the theory is developed from the empirical data, rather than preceding it. 
Constructions such as 'these data suggest... ' and 'the findings point to... ' are 
prevalent in scientific reports. 
Finally, laboratory work is characterised in a strongly conventional manner as 
being constrained by rules that have a clear-cut and universal application (Gilbert 
and Mulkay, 1984). The empiricist repertoire provides for descriptions of 
scientists' actions and beliefs, which minimise the involvement of the scientist in 
constructing and interpreting what is studied. The scientist becomes passive, the 
data takes on a life of its own, and Potter (1996) suggests that the empiricist 
repertoire is a standard device for constructing the out-there-ness of scientific 
phenomena. 6 Gilbert and Mulkay claim that it "portrays scientists' actions and 
beliefs as following un problematically and inescapably from the empirical 
characteristics of an impersonal natural world" (Gilbert and Mulkay, 1984: 56). 
But there has to be some way of accounting and managing for error even though 
in science methodology, errors should not occur. Gilbert and Mulkay identified 
6 Another approach to producing out-there-ness involves constructing consensus and corroboration by presenting a description as shared across different producers, rather than being unique to one (Potter, 1996). 
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that in more informal settings, in interview talk and where appeals to the personal 
context-motive bias, speculation and intuition, and the social context of research 
(that are normally excluded from scientific reports) the 'contingent repertoire'was 
deployed to account for mistakes and discredited findings. 
The empiricist repertoire alone is inadequate for science in practice and some 
contingent form of accounting is required. Error accounts are essential to the 
credibility of factual accounts, so despite their absence from formal reports "in 
much informal talk among scientists such things are discussed, are taken to be 
an essential part of science and are depicted as influencing the course of 
scientific development" (ibid: 110). In order to achieve this, scientists made use 
of a 'Truth will out device' (TWOD), which is a discursive way of rescuing the 
empiricist repertoire when a scientist's own position is under threat from a 
contingency account. The TWOD reinforces the idea that the disagreements, 
glitches and setbacks that are attributable to human error will be overcome and 
the scientific empiricism will eventually prevail as'truth'. 
The empiricist repertoire is not confined to the scientific community, particularly 
where the factual grounds of reports and the objectivity of claims are important 
participants' concerns. Potter (1996) proposed that constructions of impersonality 
in news reports, (e. g. 'it is believed that') and fact agency (e. g. 'the facts show 
that') are commonly used. Potter notes that in situations of conflict in both 
scientific and everyday settings people will increasingly provide technical support 
for positions and be increasingly concerned with giving a basis to their claims 
(Latour, 1987; Pomerantz, 1984b). Potter suggests that this form of empiricist 
discourse can be understood as an extension of this process. "The support is 
built up by constructing the facts, the record, and the evidence, as having its own 
agency. Such constructions obscure the work of interpretation and construction 
done by the description's producer: 'the facts' are, first not being constructed as 
facts, and second, their significance is not being generated by their producer, it is 
provided by the facts themselves" (Potter, 1996: 158). 
This phenomenon is relevant here because despite the contradictory findings of 
scientific reports on the benefits of social support, adopting the 'heroic model' 
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and how having a 'positive attitude' can contribute to a more successful 
prognosis; the empiricist repertoire maintains its influence. The findings of these 
scientific studies are taken up and portrayed in the media, in all its various forms, 
and have become part of the repertoire of medical and health professionals, 
family, Mends, carers and colleagues. 
But interestingly, many headlines also subscribe to the uncertainty about cancer. 
The contingent repertoire is often headlined in cancer support literature relating 
to treatments and cures, where the facts are contingently constructed (for 
example, 'Aspirin and ibuprofen may protect against some cancers'; 'new drug 
for prostate cancer may have few side effects'; 'complementary therapies can 
help combat cancer pain'). 
The contingent repertoire can be drawn on to make relevant the subjective and 
constructed nature of people's claims and accounts in a way that undermines 
their factual basis (Horton-Salway, 1998). Edwards (1997) states that 
interpretative repertoires are fundamental in discourse analysis because they are 
categories that participants themselves treat as meaningful concerns. 
3: 4 Discursive Psychology and Discourse Analysis 
3: 4.1 Discursive psychology and Its origins 
Discursive psychology (Edwards and Potter, 1992) is an approach that draws on 
ethnomethodology, conversation analysis, rhetorical analysis and discourse 
analysis. 
Discursive psychology (DP) focuses on the action orientation of talk and writing 
and studies the relationship between psychological states and the external world 
as common sense discourse practices and categories. 
Edwards and Pofter define DP as follows: 
"For both participants and analysts, the primary issue is the social actions, or 
interactional work, being done In the discourse. But rather than focusing on the 
usual concerns of social Interactional analyses, such as the way social and 
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intergroup relationships are conducted (through forms of address, speech 
accommodation and so on), or how 'speech acts' might be identified, the major 
concern is epistemological. We are concerned with the nature of knowledge, 
cognition and reality: with how events are described and explained, how factual 
reports are constructed, how cognitive states are attributed. These are defined as 
discursive topics, things people topicalize or orientate themselves to or imply in 
their discourse. And rather than seeing such discursive constructions as 
expressions of speakers' underlying cognitive states, they are examined in the 
context of their occurrence as situated and occasioned constructions whose 
precise nature makes sense, to participants and analysts alike, in terms of the 
social actions those descriptions accomplish. * 
(Edwards and Potter, 1992: 2). 
A key feature of discursive psychology is as Edwards states "the lack of a clear 
distinction between theory, phenomena and method. The same features of 
discourse that are the topic or focus of analysis also seem to feature as 
theoretical positions and as analyst's tools" (Edwards, 1994: 17), in other words, 
theory, topic and method are closely linked. 
It is therefore not a simple task to separate the theoretical position of DID and the 
analytical tools of discourse analysis. An appropriate beginning is to outline 
some of the elements of the Discursive Action Model (DAM), a conceptual 
framework devised by Edwards and Potter which captures some of the features 
of participants' discursive practices and illustrates some of the relationships 
between them (Edwards and Potter, 1992: 155). This model forms the basis of 
discourse analysis and is divided into 3 sections: action, fact and interest and 
accountability (see figure 1). It was devised with the purpose of preventing 
discourse analysis being treated as a psychological 'method'; "there is more than 
a methodological shift at work; there is some fairly radical theoretical rethinking" 
(ibid: 11). In other words, discourse analysis reflects a theoretical position as 
well as a mode of analysis. Edwards and Potter also note that their model 
should not be understood in the traditional cognitive psychological sense of a 
'model'. Rather than "specify mental processes", it is "a set of policies and 
recommendations for discursive enquiry... "(ibid: 155). The relevance of these 
sections and their relationship to the analysis that follows will be discussed 
briefly. 
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Figure I 
The Discursive Action Model 
Action 
1. The research focus is on action rather than cognition or behaviour 
2. As action is predominantly, and most clearly, performed through 
discourse, traditional psychological concepts (memory, attribution, 
categorisation) etc. are reconceptualised in discursive terms. 
3. Actions done in discourse are overwhelmingly situated in broader activity 
sequences of various kinds 
Fact and Interest 
4. In the case of many actions, there is a dilemma of stake or interest, which 
is often managed by doing attribution via factual reports and descriptions. 
5. Reports and descriptions are therefore constituted/displayed as factual by 
a variety of discursive devices. 
I 
16. Factual versions are rhetorically organised to undermine alternatives. 
lAccountability 
7. Factual versions attend to agency and accountability in the reported 
events. 
I 
Factual versions attend to agency and accountability in the current 
speakers actions, including those done in the reporting. 
I 
9. Concerns 7 and 8 are often related, such that 7 is deployed for 8, and 8 is 
deployed for 7.1 
I From Edwards and Potter, 1992: 154. 
3: 4.2 Talk as social action 
The term 'discourse' refers to all forms of talk and texts, whether it be interview 
data, naturally occurring conversations, or written texts of any kind. DA treats 
talk and texts as being active. The emphasis is on action rather than cognition. 
Accounts of memories and attributions are redefined as "reportings (and 
accounts, descriptions, formulations, versions and so on) and the inferences that 
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they make available" (ibid: 154). DA also concerns itself with the variability of 
accounts which points to the situated and functional character of versions (Potter 
and Wetherell, 1987). 
Discourse is viewed not just as an object but as a way of treating language. 
Jonathan Potter defines discourse analysis as: 
0 ... an analytic commitment to studying discourse as texts and talk in social 
practices. That is, the focus Is not on language as an abstract entity such as a 
lexicon and set of grammatical rules (in linguistics), a system of differences (in 
structuralism), a set of rules for transforming statements (in Foucauldian 
genealogies). Instead, it is the medium for interaction; analysis of discourse 
becomes the analysis of what people do" 
(Potter, 1997: 146) 
In other words, language is not just a tool for description and a medium of 
communication (the conventional view), but it is a social practice and a way of 
doing things. DA "is concerned with what people do with their talk (and writing) 
and with the kinds of resources they draw on in the course of their discourse 
practices (e. g. the devices, category systems, narrative characters and 
interpretative repertoires) which provide a perspective on social life that is both 
methodological and conceptual" (Potter and Wetherell 1995: 81). It is not simply 
an alternative to conventional methodologies; it is an alternative to the 
perspectives in which those methodologies are embedded. Its aim is to 
contribute "to our understanding of issues of identity, the nature of mind, 
constructions of self, other and the world and the conceptual ization of social 
action and interaction" (Potter and Wetherell, 1995: 81). 
A major assumption is that the phenomena of interest in social and psychological 
research are constituted in and through discourse. Talk does not simply reflect 
or mirror what is assumed to be already there, it creates the social world in an 
ongoing and continuous way (Edwards, 1997, Potter, 1996). "The metaphor of a 
mirror image or a photograph makes descriptions passive" (Potter, 1996: 97) but 
the DA approach, contrary to traditional approaches in social psychology, 
stresses that the language of descriptions and accounts construct the world, in 
other words, language is constructive. 
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3: 4.3 Fact construction 
The term construction is linked to the principles of social constructionism 
(Gergen, 1985a), but in DA, construction has a strong analytic focus. Social 
construction is treated as epistemic, meaning that "it is about the constructive 
nature of descriptions, rather than of the entities that (according to descriptions) 
exist beyond them" (Edwards, 1997: 47-8). This kind of detailed study of 
participants' talk is concerned with "how events are described and explained, 
how factual reports are constructed, how cognitive states are 'attributed" 
(Edwards and Potter, 1992: 2). These phenomena are analysed as discursive 
practices and constructions rather than as cognitive-perceptual processes. 
Edwards and Potter state that construction and description are at the heart of DA 
and that the analytic concern is with how discourse is constructed to perform 
social actions. In interaction, the assembly of an account (or a version) of the 
world involves choosing or selecting from a number of different possible versions. 
Even the simplest of phenomena can be described in a variety of different ways 
and the resources that DA studies employ can be seen as the building blocks of 
convincing or at least rhetorically sustainable versions (ibid). Any particular 
description will depend upon the orientation of the speaker or writer (Potter and 
Wetherell, 1987, Potter and Edwards 1990). 7 
In discursive terms, descriptions are not viewed as disembodied commentaries 
on states of affairs. Instead they are seen as ways in which they make reference 
to states of affairs and occur in particular interactional and situational contexts, 
that will unavoidably be understood as actions which are chosen and 
consequential. Descriptions, like other actions, are 'indexical' and should be 
understood in relation to when and where they occur. They are also 'reflexive' in 
maintaining or altering the sense of the activities and unfolding circumstances in 
which they occur (Heritage, 1984a). 
7 The orientation of the writer of Us thesis is as a social science researcher, someone who has 
personal experience of the difficulties of talking about cancer and a participant. 
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So, descriptions 'do things'for the speaker; they can blame, or make excuses, or 
they can present the speaker or the 'actor' in a positive light. We are all social 
'actors' and continually orient to the interpretative context in which we find 
ourselves, and construct our discourse to fit that context. How we orient to an 
encounter with a medical professional presenting a diagnosis, a family member 
asking "how are you today? " or a social science researcher asking someone to 
talk about life with cancer, will vary in accordance with the context and situation 
of the nature of the interaction. They may attend to what they think the 
researcher wants to hear and the account they give to me as a social researcher 
in an interview setting is likely to be different to an account given to a family 
member or to a medical professional. For example, someone who has been 
burnt by their radiotherapy treatment might give a hearably complaining account 
to a friend, (or in an interview, see Chapter 7, extract 7: 2.3) but might present a 
different account to the radiographer when receiving treatment. The issue in DA 
is that any account will vary, even within a research interview, according to the 
particular action that the talk is performing at that point. 
3: 4.4 Stake and Interest 
The analytic concern for DA is with the methods of description and how versions 
can become established as real and independent of the speaker. An important 
issue in the construction of versions is the management of stake or interest. 
Issues of stake and interest can become important resources for working-up and 
undermining the credibility of particular 'versions' of reality. In providing 
descriptions of events, people routinely attend to issues of agency and personal 
accountability. Speakers have something to gain or lose; they are not 
disinterested. "They have a stake in some course of actions, which the 
description relates to, or there are personal, financial or power considerations 
that come into play" (Potter, 1996: 124). One of the concerns that participants 
attend to in the construction of their version of events is that their description 
might be contested on the grounds that they may have an 'axe to grind'. 
Whenever there is some difficulty or widespread issue to be managed, there are 
likely to be some well-developed procedures for dealing with it, such as stake 
inoculation (Potter, 1996). . Interestingly, Potter aligns this with a medical 
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analogy. In order to avoid catching a disease such as tuberculosis people can 
be inoculated against it. Similarly, conversationalists and writers can limit the 
ease with which their talk and texts can be undermined by doing a stake 
inoculation. An injection can prevent a disease, so perhaps as Potter suggests, it 
is possible to inject a piece of discourse to prevent being undermined. What is at 
stake for many PWC is how they present themselves as someone who is 
managing or 'coping' with their illness in accordance with the prescriptive cultural 
norm of being positive. This topic is a pervasive feature of analytical interest 
throughout this thesis. 
3: 4.5 Rhetoric 
Another central theme in DA is the rhetorical or argumentative organisation of 
talk and texts, and how claims and versions are constructed to undermine 
alternatives (Billig, 1987,1991,1996). A concern with rhetoric turns the research 
focus to a world of social conflict and undermines the common social 
psychological assumption that people exist as naturally disinterested information 
processors. Unlike conversational analysis, discourse analysis views social life 
as being characterised by various kinds of conflicts and much of discourse is 
involved in establishing one version of the world in the face of competing 
versions. Billig (1991) suggests that in order to understand the nature and 
function of any versions of events, we need to consider whatever real or potential 
alternative versions it may be designed to counter. Rhetoric should not be 
confined to obviously argumentative or explicitly persuasive communication, but 
should be seen as a pervasive feature of the way people interact and arrive at 
understanding (Billig, 1987,1996). For example, what traditional social 
psychologists or psychosocial oncologists might treat as an individual's 'attitude' 
might through a rhetorical analysis reveal a view that is designed to counter a 
dominant but established alternative (Billig, 1991). 
In traditional psychology, attitudes have been treated as individuals' isolated 
cognitive evaluations of parts of the world. Billig argues that they should be seen 
as public positions that are inseparable from current controversy; indeed there is 
no role for attitudes except in issues where there is conflict and dispute. The 
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implication of this is that "every attitude in favour of a position is also, implicitly 
but more often explicitly, also a stance against the counter position. Because 
attitudes are stances on matters of controversy, we can expect attitude holders to 
justify their position and to criticise the counter position" (Billig, 1991: 143). (See 
Chapters 6 and 7). The reason for emphasising rhetoric here is that when 
descriptions are analysed, part of the interest will be in what alternative claims or 
arguments are being undermined. Through the use of rhetoric, one can change 
topics of conversation, or even remove certain matters from the dialogic agenda 
(Billig, 1991). A feature of any description is that it counters, actually or 
potentially, a range of competing alternative descriptions. (Potter, 1996). 
The rhetorical nature or argumentative organisation of talk and text directs 
attention to the way in which accounts are designed and organised to be 
persuasive, which leads into a concern with ideological dilemmas (Billig, Condor, 
Edwards, Gane, Middleton and Radley, 1988). Narrative accounts can be 
rhetorically constructed to rework, manage or reframe possible alternative 
descriptions (cf. offensive rhetoric, Potter, 1996). For example, PWC who 
organise their accounts to persuade someone that they are not blaming anyone 
for their delayed diagnosis, or they are not complaining, (see Chapter 5) or they 
are being positive (see Chapters 6 and 7) will employ a number of devices to 
accomplish their aims. 
My analysis looks at how a range of techniques, including contrast structures 
(Smith, 1978), three-part lists (Heritage and Greatbatch, 1986) and extreme case 
formulations (ECFs, Pomerantz, 1986) are drawn on when claims are being 
bolstered against doubt or disagreement (Edwards, 1997). Of particular interest 
is how participants rhetorically construct their narratives to manage the normative 
cultural expectations and moral dilemmas accompanying cancer by displaying 
themselves as being accountable and being positive. 
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3: 4.6 Ideological dilemmas 
The importance of rhetoric in DA also has implications for ideological dilemmas. 
The term ideological dilemmas has been devised to explain speakers' 
orientations to attending to and solving contradictory issues. 
Billig (1995) suggests that rather than conceive of ideologies as existing 
independently of individuals they should be viewed as "lived ideologies" which 
are negotiated in everyday mundane talk and that 'ideologies' also provide 
speakers with contradictory ways of talking. 
Discursive theorists suggest that ideology provides the dilemmatic elements of 
common sense which speakers puzzle and argue over in their everyday talk. 
Rather than regard it as something that inhibits thought, it is treated as a social 
action, available in talk and therefore analysis. Billig et al state that: 
"Many words are not mere labels which neutrally package up the world. They 
also express moral evaluations and such terms frequently come In antithetical 
opposites which enable opposing moral judgements to be made". 
(Billig et al, 1988: 16) 
Common sense notions of health and illness reflect ideological values and 
representations and do so in ways that appear both dilemmatic and natural 
(Radley and Billig, 1996). When people have a chronic or life threatening illness 
they are likely to 'suffer and Charmaz (1999) states this suffering is not just a 
physical experience, it has a profoundly moral status. The dilemma for the 
person who is ill is how to accede to this moral order of illness and suffering and 
not been seen as someone who is self-pitying, pitiful or not coping, but as 
someone who is active, 'fighting' it and being positive. The moral implications of 
illness have already been noted in Chapter 2. How participants manage their 
accountability and orient to the moral and dilemmatic elements of illness is a 
feature examined throughout the analytical chapters. 
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3: 4.7 Accountability 
The final theme in discursive psychology is accountability. Our accounting 
practices are deeply embedded in our everyday activities and Garfinkel states 
that: 
apeople's everyday activities are such that they reflexively contain within 
themselves methods for making those same activities visible-rational-and- 
reportable-for-all-practical purposes, in other words, 'accountable, ' as 
organizations of commonplace everyday activities. ' 
(Garfinkel, 1967: vii). 
Simply, in everyday social life, people do not just passively happen to act in an 
accountable manner and to perceive events in accountable terms; their 
procedures of talking, listening, looking and acting are methodical. They act so 
as to make their behaviour (and talk-in-interaction) accountable; it is, says 
Garfinkel (ibid: 10) "an endless, ongoing contingent accomplishment"; and it is 
achieved by the use of certain methods and procedures that, he says, are 
experienced as "unproblematic ... and are known only in the doing which is done 
skilfully, reliably, uniformly, with enormous standardization and as an 
unaccountable matter" (ibid: 10). 
As previously mentioned, discursive psychology emphasises description as a 
resource for constructing particular versions of events, people, objects and 
places. In offering their accounts, people treat each other as having either 
something at stake or a particular interest in their accounts and actions; they 
routinely deal with matters of agency and responsibility (Edwards and Potter, 
1992), and treat themselves as accountable for producing a particular version or 
description of reality. For example, an account that performs part of a complaint 
will have the potential requirements of accountability of that act. "The act of 
complaining could be Inspected for its partial or motivated nature, for instance, or 
for its adequacy vis-6-vis some version of 'the facts" (ibid: 166). 
It is argued that a speakers talk is structured to attend to these issues of 
accountability and Edwards claims: 
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"... when people describe events, they attend to accountability. That is to say, 
they attend to events in terms of what is normal, expectable, and proper; they 
attend to their own responsibility in events and in the reporting of events" 
(Edwards, 1997: 7). 
Issues of accountability are also situated rhetorical concerns. However, in 
accounting for oneself, speakers must do more than talk about themselves 
(Radley and Billig, 1996). Accountability only arises in the first place because 
there are general concerns of value and morality. 8 
For the discourse analyst, the task is to consider how this accountability is 
constructed, challenged and defended in interaction and to examine the social 
actions that are accomplished through its management. 
Shotter (1991,1993) argues that psychology is a moral" science and claimed 
that: 
"One of the most significant features of human actions in everyday life is not only 
their situated, contexted, occasioned nature, but also their normative 
accountability. That is, in some sense they are not only made but judged in their 
making, by both those who perform them and those around them, as to both their 
social and moral appropriateness to the circumstances of their performance" 
(Shotter, 1991: 62) 
Frank (1992) also argues that social science is a moral discourse which presents 
claims not only about the nature of suffering but also about the proper response 
to suffering and that research needs to recognise this moral dimension when 
evaluating others' lives. One of the concerns of this thesis is how the moral 
issues and categories that are attributed to and surround the disease of cancer 
and the accompanying illness are handled in social interaction. It is suggested 
that when participants attend to issues of moral accountability in their accounts 
8 Talking about one's own illness (or health) is to locate oneself within an ideological debate that requires 
what Hall (1981) once called a 'double signification'. This means that the statements ill (or healthy) people 
make to interviewers not only provide information but speakers also claim to depict, or represent a wider 
shared reality (Radley and Billig, 1996). 9 The meaning of moral in this context is reflected in the following definition taken from The New Shorter 
Oxford English Dictionary (Brown, 1993). "moral -adj. Ia concern with goodness or badness of human 
character or behaviour, or with the distinction between right and wrong. b concerned with accepted rules and 
standards of human behaviour. 2a virtuous in general conduct. Be capable of moral action. 3 (of rights or 
duties etc. ) founded on moral not actual law. 4 associated with the psychological rather than the physical 
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this poses ideological dilemmas for the person who is ill. Therefore, managing 
one's own accountability involves references to 'dilemmas' and the positioning of 
both speaker and 'other' in relation to such dilemmas. Speakers also manage 
their own accountability for particular events through the construction and 
positioning of their own identity and that of others within a moral order. Moral 
accountability will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 7. 
This section has provided an overview of the main themes of the theoretical and 
analytical approach applied in this thesis. These include treating talk as action, 
fact construction, stake and interest, descriptions, category entitlement, identity, 
rhetoric, ideological dilemmas and finally, accountability. 
It is proposed that analysing interviews with PWC using a discursive 
psychological approach and discourse analysis provides a different insight into to 
our understanding of the social world of people living with a life threatening 
illness. DA offers an opportunity to discover patterns of talk and moral and social 
concerns that are more difficult to discover if traditional theoretical models and 
analytical methods (with their accompanying predefined categories and 
expectations) are used to analyse the data 
The cultural knowledge of cancer influences, permeates and shapes not only the 
language and understanding of the person with a cancer diagnosis but also those 
people they interact with, including the medical profession, family, friends and 
colleagues. The language of cancer and the cultural expectations and difficulties 
of knowing what to say can produce a number of dilemmas and problems for the 
PWC to manage. This thesis aims to show how participant's accounts 
discursively attend to: 
9 the social interactional difficulties of talking about cancer and how talking 
about cancer is avoided 
how PWC attend to prescriptions of responsibility and how they manage 
issues of moral accountability 
(moral courage; moral support). -n. I moral lesson of a fable, story, event, etc. 2 (in pl. ) moral behaviour, e. g. in sexual conduct. " 
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" how PWC attend to issues of doing being responsible and account for any 
notion of diagnostic delay 
" how accounts of diagnostic delay, receiving the news of their diagnosis and 
receiving treatment are rhetorically constructed as complainable matters 
" how doing being positive is managed as a participant's concern 
" how laughter and humour are employed as a device for doing being positive 
3: 5 The Method of Data Collection 
The following section details how participants became involved in my research, 
the nature and style of the interview, tape-recording, the process of transcription, 
the criteria of how I selected my data for analysis and finally how the coding 
themes for analysis were developed. 
3: 5.1 Data sources: Finding the participants 
16 females and 1 male who had been diagnosed with various forms of cancer 
including breast, ovarian, throat and lung cancer, volunteered to participate in 
this research and their ages ranged from 35 to 70 years old. 
Firstly, I will outline the process of finding people to talk to me. The sensitive 
nature of talking about cancer is reflected in this process. One of the most 
difficult practical problems in conducting research is obtaining access to people, 
particularly if the topic is a sensitive one. Although there has been a 
considerable amount of CA research in clinical and counselling settings, (e. g. see 
Maynard, 1991,1997,1998; Per5kyld 1989,1995,1998 and Silverman, 1990; 
1997), and more recently Beach's longitudinal 'malignancy calls' study (2000; 
2001) very little CA or discourse research has looked at face to face interaction 
with individuals with a cancer diagnosis outside of the clinical setting and the 
doctor-patient or counsellor-patient relationship. 
My 17 participants were found through 3 different sources, two cancer support 
groups (Group 1 and Group 2) in Leicestershire (overall membership of 
approximately 350) and through personal contact. Because my primary concern 
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was to research what anyone who had been given a cancer diagnosis would talk 
about, my criteria for selecting participants was unrestricted by categories and 
demographics. 
Categories, such as the type of cancer they had been diagnosed with, (e. g. 
breast cancer, prostate cancer) the stage of their illness, (or stage of remission) 
age, gender or status were not factors of selection and are not the basis of 
theoretical generalisations of any kind. I will however provide brief demographic 
information about each participant when an extract is analysed for the first time. 
The traditional assumption behind providing this information is that it is in 
someway relevant to our understanding of what is going on; that certain 
demographic information (e. g. age, class, gender and occupation) is the kind of 
information we need to know. However, in DA, it is argued that demographic 
categories are used, made relevant and are constructed as significant concerns 
by the participants' themselves and contribute to how their identities are 
managed and constructed in talk (and text). 
Edwards (1993,1997) suggests that this rather neutral and routine looking 
'information' is potentially available for doing discursive 'business'. Categories 
such as gender, age, parental and marital status, nationality etc., are not merely 
factual or even value-laden observations, they are automatically relevant to 
people's conversational activities. By providing this information it is possible to 
analyse how these category descriptions are actually drawn upon and actively 
used as resources in producing accounts and descriptions relevant to the 
participants' identity. They are not merely inactive labels and categories and 
such demographics will only be considered in the analysis if the participants 
make these relevant themselves. 
Also not at issue was how they found out that they had cancer. The interview 
data includes people who went to the doctor's because they had some physical 
sign, such as stomach ache, bleeding or they had found a lump and may or may 
not have suspected that they may have cancer, those who went, unsuspectingly, 
for a routine mammogram; and others, who were suffering some pain but had no 
idea what was causing it. The data is rich in variability. 
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Group I 
Firstly I telephoned the manager of support Group I and explained that I was 
researching and writing a Ph. D. based on people's experience of living with 
cancer and that I would like to make contact with PWC who would be willing to 
talk to me about their experiences. In support of my request, I also explained 
something about my personal experience of being closely involved with friends 
and family who had cancer, elucidating that this was the principal motivating 
force behind my research. Because of the sensitive nature of the talk, it became 
clear that it was necessary firstly to gain the trust and acceptance from the 
manager in order for me to be introduced to members of the group. This initial 
conversation resulted in my being invited to the Group's offices for a face-to-face 
interview with the manager to explore the possibility of being introduced to the 
Group's members. When we met I outlined my concerns and interests in more 
detail and we talked more about my personal experience. 
I was then invited to attend one of the group's regular informal coffee mornings 
so that I could be introduced to some of the support group members. This mostly 
involved them 'interviewing' me to establish if they felt comfortable in talking to 
me. 
The coffee mornings are primarily a social and supportive occasion for people to 
get together and talk about all kinds of things, not necessarily about their illness. 
In order to build up a relationship and rapport with the members I attended 
several coffee mornings over several months. After a few weeks I was asked if I 
would like to become a member of the group as a volunteer 'befriender', which I 
willingly accepted. This enabled me to become a more active member in the 
group and whilst the meetings and interactions with other group members were 
not tape-recorded, occasionally I will draw on some of this ethnographic material 
as a secondary source of knowledge. 
In addition to my active participation and the coffee morning meetings, I also 
placed a notice in the support group's quarterly magazine and received a number 
of telephone responses. Although I was approached by and talked to 
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approximately thirty people, eight people agreed to participate in my research 
and I was invited to visit them in their homes to talk about their experiences. 
Some of the people I talked to although initially agreeing to talk, found that they 
were either not feeling well, or were about to commence treatment and therefore 
decided not to proceed, or had decided that they wanted to put the experience 
into the past and no longer wanted to talk about it. 
Group 2 
I was given a personal introduction to a member of Group 2 (a breast cancer 
support group) and after an initial telephone conversation, she visited me at my 
home. Again, I was 'interviewed' to assess whether or not I could be given 
permission to contact members of the group. At the end of the meeting she not 
only agreed to participate in my research but also agreed to talk about my 
research and me at the next meeting of the group. This introduction resulted in a 
further seven people contacting me and sometimes lengthy and detailed 
telephone calls ensued. I again explained my motivation and research interests. 
Interviews were held either at the participants' homes or they came to my home. 
Again, as with Group 1,1 talked to a number of people who initially agreed to talk 
to me but then withdrew at a later stage. Some people were happy to talk to me 
but did not wish to be recorded or formally participate. 
The remaining two participants were people I knew personally who were 
interviewed in their homes. 
Twelve of the seventeen participants were interviewed on their own, but two 
groups of friends wanted to be interviewed together and one of my personal 
contacts wanted to be interviewed with his family present. There was only one 
male participant. Although membership of Group 1 was open to both men and 
women, men rarely attended the coffee mornings and did not show any interest 
in talking to me other than in the context of the social setting. Although I 
personally knew men with cancer, again, although they would talk to me about 
their illness, they did not wish to participate in a recorded interview. 
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As already discussed in Chapter 2, talking about cancer is a delicate and 
sensitive topic and finding the participants for this study reflected the 
complexities and sensitivities of this process. It became clear that people did not 
want to talk freely to just anyone, they needed time to establish a sense of trust 
and rapport. 
The primary data sources for analysis are constituted from a corpus of 
conversational 'active' interviews conducted with seventeen people with cancer 
over a two year period and consist of approximately 39 hours of tape-recorded 
talk. 
3: 5.2 Ethics 
As previously mentioned, I had either met face to face or spoken to participants 
on the telephone prior to the interview. Each participant was advised of the 
nature of the research, and asked for their agreement for the interview to be 
tape-recorded. Participants were advised that they could withdraw from the 
interview or the research at anytime. Because of the sensitive nature of the 
topic, if participants became upset or distraught during the course of the 
interview, the interviewer's (RC) previous training in counselling skills and 
techniques was available as a resource to manage any such situation. 
Additionally the counsellors resident at the two support groups could be 
contacted if needed. In accordance with the British Psychological Society ethical 
procedures, participants were asked to sign a consent form (see Appendix A) 
and because of the sensitive nature of the interview, a list of contact Helpline 
numbers (see Appendix B) was provided. At the end of the interview I ensured 
that participants were feeling comfortable before leaving. On many occasions, 
participants thanked me for the opportunity of being able to talk to someone 
about having cancer and that it had been very helpful for them. 
3: 5.3 Interviewing 
As I have already argued (Chapter 2) constructing categories and structured 
questionnaires places predetermined categories and concerns upon the 
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participant. My interest was in what people would tell me if I asked them to talk 
to about their experiences since receiving their cancer diagnosis. As explained 
in my introduction, personal experience provided the impetus for this research, 
and my interest was to explore the issues and concerns that were relevant to the 
PWC rather than those imposed by existing theoretical models. 
Interviewing provides a way of producing empirical data about a particular social 
world by asking people to talk about their lives. I therefore chose to conduct what 
is termed 'active' interviews (Holstein and Gubrium, 1997). In discourse analysis, 
interviews are viewed and carded out as conversational encounters. Interviewing 
in discourse analysis is similar to interviewing in other forms of qualitative 
research in that both types are relatively unstructured; in other words, questions 
are generally open-ended and are not specified in advance. They also use a 
variety of probes or follow-up questions. There are some differences, however, 
in that participants are encouraged to speak as much as they would like, without 
interruption, which has an affect of encouraging them to display the sort of 
variability that is a major feature of discourse and an analytical tool. Interviewing 
in this way also encourages story telling or narratives, "it allows participants to 
develop long turns and tell things 'in their own way'" (Edwards, 1997: 280). 
The interviews were divided into two sections. The first part of the interview was 
unstructured and having either had an initial meeting or spoken to participants on 
the phone, participants were aware of my background and interest in hearing 
them talk about their experiences of cancer. Throughout the process I interacted 
with participants and sometimes asked for more detailed explanations of what 
they were talking about. A key factor in their agreement to talk to me was based 
on my personal involvement with cancer. Consequently, because participants 
were aware of my personal circumstances on many occasions, I was asked to 
talk about my own experiences of being a carer, thus my involvement is as both 
interviewer and active participant. The interviews were therefore interactive, 
collaborative, and more characteristic of an exploratory conversation. 
My primary interest in the interviews was how people with cancer would talk 
about it, what they would talk about and what their concerns were. However, in 
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the second part of the interview I did explore a number of topics that I was 
interested in hearing more about and I drew up a schedule of questions (see 
Appendix C) to ensure that each topic was taken up by each participant, if it was 
appropriate. If they did not respond, I allowed the conversation to be directed by 
the participants and followed up interesting topics as they occurred. 
3: 5.4 Tape-recording 
Tape-recordings are an important feature of CA and DA. Heritage (1984a) 
states: 
uthe use of recorded data is an essential corrective to the limitations of intuition 
and recollection. In enabling repeated and detailed examination of the events of 
interaction, the use of recordings extends the range and precision of the 
observations which can be made. It permits other researchers to have direct 
access to the data about which claims are being made, thus making analysis 
subject to detailed public scrutiny and helping to minimise the influence of 
personal preconceptions or analytical biases. Finally, it may be noted that 
because the data are available in 'raw' form, they can be re-used in a variety of 
investigations and can be re-examined in the context of new findings" 
(Heritage, 1984a: 238). 
All interviews were tape-recorded. Because of the sometimes extremely 
sensitive nature of the talk, voice levels were extremely variable and at times, it 
was not possible to decipher everything that was said. It is important to point out 
that this was not through a technical problem and, when relevant, the 
phenomenon of voice levels will be addressed as a performative feature of 
sensitive talk in the analysis. Sometimes there were tears, but mostly there was 
laughter. 
3: 5.5 Transcription 
Producing a high-quality transcript is an important prerequisite for discourse 
research and one of the benefits of a detailed transcript is that it provides a 
permanent and accessible record of the interview data. Transcription itself is a 
constructive, interpretative process. In the process of transcribing it is possible 
that attention will be paid to different aspects of talking, depending on the 
interests of the transcriber. Often, words and sentences are only fully understood 
88 
by the researcher, who generally has some background and cultural knowledge 
of the data. This means that the transcript itself is already an interpretation of the 
event it is recording. However, a transcript can only provide a partial record 
because it cannot faithfully reproduce every aspect of talk and of course, non- 
verbal responses are not documented. However, wherever possible, some non- 
verbal responses were noted. 
The tape-recorded interviews were transcribed verbatim. For the 'first pass' of 
transcription basic transcription notations were used. Once an extract was found 
appropriate for a particular theme of analysis it was then transcribed in detail 
adapting Jefferson's (1985b) transcription procedures and notational symbols 
which convey features of vocal delivery that have been shown to be interactively 
important to participants (see Appendix D). This involved continually listening to 
the tapes in conjunction with the first pass transcripts in order to capture all the 
subtleties discernible in the tone of voice, the pauses and any additional 
comments on intonation were added into the transcript for analysis. Interviewees 
have been given pseudonyms. Each interview was numbered and line numbers 
were added to the typed transcripts and subsequently categorised into theme 
headings. 
3: 5.6 Criteria for selecting extracts for analysis 
"What one 'sees' in a text, what one regards as worth describing, and what one 
chooses to emphasise in a description are all dependent on how one interprets a 
text. There is a positivist tendency to regard language texts as objects; whose 
formal properties can be mechanically described Without interpretation. But try 
as they may, analysts cannot prevent themselves [from] engaging with human 
products in a human, and therefore interpretative way" 
(Fairclough, 1989: 27). 
The combination of the style of active conversational interviews and the 
knowledge that I would be using discourse analysis, provided me with an 'open 
book' when it came to discovering the emerging analytical categories. Although 
my initial interests outlined in my interview schedule had been on the topics of 
communication, change and quality of life, what has emerged is quite different. 
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George Psathas, amongst others, stated that the task is not to look for expected 
kinds of phenomena, but to engage in what is termed 'unmotivated looking': 
"Data may be obtained from any available source, the only requirement being 
that these should be naturally occurring, rather than produced for the purpose of 
study, as in the case of laboratory experiments or controlled observations. In 
practice, this has meant interactional phenomena that would have occurred 
regardless of whether the researcher had come upon the scene; therefore 
conversations, news interviews, therapy sessions, telephone calls, dinner table 
talk, police calls, as well as all manner of interactional phenomena that a 
researcher may be able to come upon and record are potential data sources" 
(Psathas, 1995: 45). 
Although Psathas' comment would seem to eliminate interview data, Edwards 
proposes that *any interactional phenomenon can be naturalized by treating it as 
natural" (Edwards, 1997: 89). Interview data can therefore be treated as a 
"species of talk-in-interaction, as 'interview', rather than treating the questioner as 
researcher, the question schedule as 'method' and only the responses as 'data'" 
(ibid: 89) (cf. Wetherell and Potter, 1992; Widdicombe and Wooffift, 1995; 
Wooffift, 1992). 
The notion of 'unmotivated looking' encapsulates an important analytical 
principle, that is to avoid 'reading into' the data a set of ready-made analytical 
categories. So, rather than start with a ready-made issue, such as 'how do 
people with cancer cope with stigma? ' it is preferable to follow Sacks' advice that 
"the first rule is to learn to be interested in what you've got. I take it that what you 
want to do is pose those problems that the data bears" (Sacks, 1992: 471). 
The results can be quite surprising and as Sacks's own analysis has 
demonstrated, "it is precisely what opens up, rather than prevents, the possibility 
of empirical work on participants' categories of the ostensibly non-discursive, 
including everything from group membership to personal identity, institutional 
settings, matters of belief, cognition, and constructions of what is routine and 
exceptional in life" (Edwards, 1997: 89). 
Although transcribing interview data using Jefferson's guidelines is a time 
consuming and demanding process, it does provide the opportunity to become 
very familiar with the content. So, whilst transcribing, thoughts about patterns, 
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themes and topics emerged and so I made notes as I went along, noting possible 
topics or extracts that held particular interest. This produced a very long list ot 
interesting topics, which initially seemed disparate but in the course of analysis, 
eventually merged together. 
Potter and Wetherell (1992) proposed a ten-stage process of discourse analysis. 
They suggest that these should not be taken as sequential steps but as phases 
which have a tendency to merge together. I will give a brief summary of each 
stage. 
Stage 1: The research question(s). Participants' discourses are approached in 
their own right and not as a secondary route to things 'beyond' the text, such as 
attitudes or cognitive processes. Research questions are broadly concerned with 
the construction and function of discourse, of how it is put together and what is 
gained by this construction. My primary research questions are: "What would 
people tell me when asked to talk about their illness", "How do people talk about 
the sensitive topic of cancer? " "How do people 'do coping' in their talk? " and 
"What functions are being managed, constructed and accomplished? " 
Stage 2: Sample selection. Because DA concerns itself with the use of 
language, the success of a study is not dependent on the size of the sample, so 
small samples or a few interviews are quite adequate for investigating interesting 
phenomena. What is important is to provide a clear and detailed description of 
the nature of the material. 
Stage 3: The collection of records and documents. The primary records for my 
analysis are transcripts of tape-recorded interviews. Secondary sources from the 
social science literature, the media and published literary accounts provide 
additional documents. 
Stage 4: The interview. Potter and Wetherell suggest that naturalistic records of 
conversations do have a number of advantages and that, "interviews have the 
virtue of allowing the researcher room for active intervention" (Potter and 
Wetherell, 1992: 163). The interview schedule provided the continuity throughout 
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the interviews whereby, if appropriate, I was able to explore the same issues with 
each participant. DA Interviews differ from conventional interviews in three ways. 
"First, variation in response is as important as consistency. Techniques which 
allow diversity rather than those which eliminate it are emphasised, resulting in 
more informal conversational exchanges and finally, interviewers are seen as 
active participants rather than speaking questionnaires" (ibid: 165). 
Stage 5: Transcription. A good transcHpt is essential for DA. The transcription 
process itself helps the researcher become familiar with the data, and the 
process is in itself a constructive and conventional activity. 
Stage 6: Codings. Once the transcripts have been completed, it is time to 
consider coding. The purpose of coding is to break the discourse into 
manageable chunks, quite distinct from the analysis itself. My initial coding 
categories fell comfortably into the trajectory of the illness, from discovering 
something wrong, to the diagnosis phase, social relationships, treatment and talk 
about recovery, death and dying. During the coding process, pages of 
transcripts containing relevant extracts were reproduced, cross referenced where 
appropriate and put into their own document file, ready for the analysis stage. 
Stage 7: The analysis. "There is no mechanical procedure for producing findings 
from an archive of transcripts" (ibid: 168). There are two closely related phases 
in analysis. Firstly, the search for patterns in the data. "Patterns will be in the 
form of both variability: differences in either the content or form of accounts, and 
consistency: the identification of features shared by accounts" (ibid: 168). 
People's talk fulfils a number of functions and has varying effects so the second 
concern is with function and consequence. This second phase involves forming 
hypotheses about the functions and effects and searching for the linguistic 
evidence. 
Stage 8: Validation. There are four main analytical techniques that can be used 
to validate the findings of DA: (1) coherence (2) participants' orientation (3) new 
problems and (4) fruiffulness. 
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Coherence: Analysis should show how the discourse fits together and how 
discursive structure produces effects and functions. When a regular pattern of 
accounting is discovered, then it is also necessary to search for'deviant' cases. 
"Cases that lie outside the explanatory framework of a theory are almost always 
more informative than those that lie within" (ibid: 170). 
Participants' orientation. It is not sufficient for the analyst to say that there is 
variability and consistency. For discourse analysts "the important thing is the 
orientation of the participants, what they see as consistent and different" (ibid: 
170) and what they make distinctive in their interactions. 
New problems. One of DA's primary aims is to explain how linguistic resources 
are used to make certain things happen. Not only will these resources solve 
problems but they will also create new ones. "The existence of new problems 
and solutions, provides further confirmation that linguistic resources are being 
used as hypothesised" (ibid: 171). 
Fruiffulness. "This refers to the scope of an analytic scheme to make sense of 
new kinds of discourse and to generate novel explanations. This is of course a 
general criterion of validity for scientific explanations and theories; if they can be 
used to generate fresh solutions to the problems in a field of research then we 
accord them more respect" (ibid: 171). 
Stage 9: The thesis itself. The final thesis constitutes part of the confirmation and 
validation procedures. The goal is to present the analysis and its conclusions in 
a way that enables the reader to assess the researchers interpretations. A 
representative set of examples needs to be included along with a detailed 
interpretation which links analytic claims to specific parts or aspects of the 
extracts. The analytical section is considerably longer and more detailed than in 
the traditional style of reports. In summary, the stages leading up to the final 
presentation "involves fluid movement between the different stages, with coding, 
analysis, validation and writing, each leading back to earlier phases and 
ultimately to the talk and writing which were the original point of departure" (ibid: 
174). 
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Stage 10: Application. Potter and Wetherell recommend that researchers should 
pay more attention to how their work can be used in practice. There are many 
critics of the lack of a practical application for DA work. The raison d'6tre of my 
thesis is that the knowledge and understanding revealed about the dilemmas 
faced by a person with cancer will have some practical use not only for them, but 
my findings will also specifically provide a different understanding of some of 
these problems for the medical professionals, friends, family and carers who 
come into contact with someone with cancer. 
3: 5.7 Coding themes and Analysis 
I will now provide an account of how the coding themes emerged. In my 
repeated listening, transcribing and reading through the transcripts, some 
noticeable features became apparent. One of the initial discoveries in my own 
data was the number of long narrative accounts of events and secondly, the 
amount of irony and laughter present in the talk. Some very clear themes of talk 
were soon apparent and interestingly the structures of the narratives often 
followed the trajectory of the disease, from diagnosis, treatment, and managing 
social relationships to finally, talk about death and dying. 
The first general theme is framed in the interactions with the medical profession. 
Participants invariably talked of how they discovered something wrong, 
prompting a visit to the doctor, or went for a routine mammogram, which led into 
stories of how the bad news of a cancer diagnosis was received. 
Another major theme was how they then passed on the news to family and 
friends. This involved accounts of other people's reactions and their difficulties in 
responding to the news. 
A dominant theme was how participants described their lives now, with particular 
attention to being normal and carrying on doing ordinary things. Others talked of 
major, life changing decisions. 
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Inevitably with a cancer diagnosis that many equate with a death sentence, some 
participants talked about death and dying and contrasted this with talk about 
living. 
Because of the structure of the interview schedule, issues relating to what they 
thought caused their illness rarely arose. There was very little talk of pain and 
discomfort, and when this did arise, this was reflected in narrative accounts of the 
treatment and procedures, which were often told with irony, humour and imbued 
with laughter. Although I raised the topic of the quality of life, participants did not 
particularly engage with this as a topic. 
Other features included stories of the endless waiting in hospitals, taking 
responsibility for their actions, not denying something was wrong, telling their 
family and friends, the lack of or amount of support from family and friends or the 
medical profession; the notion of the treatment process as being like a 
'production line', other people with cancer, death and dying, spiritual beliefs, 
change and continuity, before and after stories, what sort of person they were, or 
were not, what other people said or thought, not being a burden and being 
normal. 
So, there were many interesting topics to analyse, and as stated earlier, some 
seemed disparate at first. After looking for similarities, variability and deviant 
cases the process of analysis produced the following analytical chapters: 
Chapter 4, Discovery, Diagnosis and Delay: Who is accountable? Chapter 5, 
Further Accounts of Diagnosis and Delay: Receiving the bad news; Chapter 6, 
Dilemmas of Talking about Troubles: The things people say; Chapter 7, Moral 
Accountability: Doing being positive; Chapter 8, Death and Dying: Whose 
Dilemma? 
My analysis treats participants' accounts as discourse practices, in which 
accounts themselves, their construction and function, are the analysable 
activities, the phenomena under investigation. The analysis focuses on how 
participants' accounts are constructed, how they construct the nature of the 
events described and what kinds of discourse activities these accounts perform 
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in the context of their production. The analysis does not seek to find the world 
behind or beyond these accounts, whether the world of external events or the 
mental states of the people speaking. When people invoke their thoughts and 
feelings, or describe things that have happened to them, their discourse is not 
treated analytically as a window upon, nor as an expression of those feelings and 
events. Rather, thoughts, feelings, and events are approached as the talk's 
topics and concerns and analysed as such. 
The extracts selected provide a representative sample of the discursive 
phenomena discovered in the overall corpus of data. In addition to the 
transcribed data, the analysis was also guided by a reflexive ethnography 
(Atkinson, 1990) of my involvement with Group I and my personal relationships 
with people with cancer. 
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Chapter 4 
Discovery, Diagnosis and Delay: 
Accounting for diagnostic delay 
Introduction 
The principal analytical focus in this thesis is how and what people talk about 
when asked to relate their experiences since receiving a cancer diagnosis, where 
a key orientation in their talk is how they 'cope' with their diagnosis. The stories 
participants tell are of course (re)constructed for the occasion of the interview, 
some time after the events of their initial cancer diagnosis. The purpose of the 
analysis is to show what participants make relevant in their accounts of what 
happened, and what functions these descriptions perform. 
This first analytical chapter identifies a number of key concepts and devices 
participants employ in talking about cancer (considered as a species of 'troubles 
talk') including accountability, rhetorical construction, script formulation, active 
voicing, active thinking, the XY phenomenon and laughter. These will be referred 
to throughout this and the next four analytical chapters. 
In Chapter 2,1 presented some of the issues that have been constructed in the 
psychosocial oncology literature, with specific reference to the emphasis placed 
on 'coping' and the recommended 'coping' strategies including the 'heroic model', 
a 'positive attitude, and the benefits of social support. Although they are not the 
key themes of analytical interest in this chapter, which focuses on participants' 
own talk, these concepts will inevitably overlap and be relevant in various ways 
throughout the thesis. In Chapter 2,1 also drew attention to the culture and 
language that surrounds cancer. Participants are producing their accounts' of 
'The term account will be referred to throughout and most broadly refers to a person's version of 
events in the world, of the self and of others. It may also refer to a particular version directed 
toward making events both interpretable and warrantable, that is, understandable and justifiable (cf. Antaki, 1994) and toward promoting the presentation of self as a rational and worthy being (cf. Harr6,1978). 
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what happened at the time of discovery and at the time of diagnosis, after those 
events took place. Therefore, they are likely to be drawing on the culture and 
language of cancer that they have become aware of, and somewhat drawn into, 
through the day to day management of their illness. In other words, throughout 
the interview, they are invariably attending to their identity as someone who is 
normatively categorised as a person with cancer, and accounting for their actions 
within a somewhat ready-made framework of accountability. 
Chapter 2 also briefly introduced some of the literature on the change in doctor- 
patient relationships and studies concerning the delivery of 'bad news'. Finally, I 
introduced some studies that have looked at a range of 'troubles talk' and 
established that talking about cancer equates with talking about troubles; it is a 
sensitive and often dreaded topic of talk. Those literatures also have a normative 
relevance to how participants recount their experiences. 
One of the first noticeable (and dominating) topics produced throughout the 
interviews were long, elaborate and descriptive narratives about interactions with 
a range of medical professionals. These often involve accounts of the difficulties 
of diagnosis, and of delays in receiving a confirmed and accurate diagnosis and 
these accounts are the analytical focus of this chapter. 
Before presenting the analysis, I will provide a brief account of the issues 
surrounding 'diagnostic delay' that have been reported in the psychosocial 
oncology literature. 
Who is accountable: patient or provider? 
There is no denying that cancer is a complex and enigmatic disease and one of 
its many associated problems is that it is not always possible to detect it from 
early presentation of symptoms. Symptoms are variable and sometimes people 
report that they have a specific pain, that they are bleeding, that they have 
noticed an abnormality in their nipple, or a lump in their breast or groin that 
prompts them to go to the doctor's. But not everyone has an obvious sign that 
something is wrong. They may have discovered their cancer through going for a 
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routine screening or mammogram, which in itself also becomes an issue of 
accountability. ' 
According to the literature, patient delay is quite prevalent. Common sense 
(informed by cultural knowledge) tells us that any form of delay in reporting 
symptoms is likely to have implications for cure, recurrence and survival of 
cancer. The longer cancer remains undetected, the more problematic and life 
threatening it becomes. Not only may the individual be placed under the 
additional stress of managing the uncertainty of what is wrong, but a delayed 
diagnosis can often result in increased morbidity and mortality (Andersen, 
Cacioppo and Roberts, 1995). 
The theory informing and linking the delay/diagnosis literature is that the earlier a 
(correct) cancer diagnosis can be given, the sooner the most appropriate action 
and treatment can be given. If cancer can be diagnosed in the early stages it is 
more likely that the disease will be less advanced and the likelihood of cure may 
be increased, or at least the interval between initial treatment and recurrence 
(disease-free interval) may be lengthened (Robinson, Mohilever, Zidan and 
Sapir, 1984). So, minimising 'diagnostic delay' in the reporting of symptoms (by 
the patient) and minimising the delay in reaching a diagnosis at an earlier stage 
of the disease (by the medical provider) can often provide a better prognosis. 
Research undertaken by psychosocial oncologists focuses on trying to 
understand what causal factors might influence someone delaying in reporting 
their symptoms to the doctor. Their emphasis is located on the individual who is 
attributed as being morally responsible and accountable for reporting their 
symptoms, and accordingly, any delays that occur in receiving a diagnosis. 
When people initially consult their doctor with some physical problem they do not 
necessarily experience 'symptoms' of cancer per se, or view their illness as 
particularly serious or life threatening. Nevertheless, a considerable amount of 
research has looked at how health and illness behaviours can be influenced, and 
how attitudes can be changed. As a result health promotional campaigns have 
been introduced with the purpose of encouraging and supporting people not only 
99 
in taking an active part in their health and well being, but also to encourage them 
to be proactive and take the appropriate action when suspecting some possible 
illness symptom. 
The biomedical and psychosocial oncology literature is replete with research 
pointing to the patient as being responsible for a delayed diagnosis. The focus is 
on discovering and attributing causes to delay, and on the medical profession's 
concern with people delaying in presenting and reporting symptoms. People who 
discover symptoms of cancer are not supposed to delay their diagnosis and 
treatment; they are expected to take an active role in their health, immediately 
take the appropriate action and report their symptoms to the doctor. People 
classified as delaying reporting symptoms to their doctor are considered to be 
taking risks with their lives and those risks remain as an increased chance of 
recurrence or lack of cure (Frank, 1995). However, what length of time 
constitutes 'delay' is variable, whether it is three days, three weeks or three 
months, and the marking point of when delay is measured is often contested 
(Facione, 1993). 2 
The literature reveals from the very outset that any thoughts that the symptoms 
could result in cancer can have a traumatic impact on the individual concerned. 
When the word cancer, with all it's accompanying baggage of cultural knowledge, 
is either thought or spoken aloud, it has a tendency to conjure up fear and dread 
(Fallowfield, 1991). Consequently, the likelihood of someone, patient or medic, 
putting off confirmation of this dreaded news is, they claim, likely to invoke a 
number of reactions such as avoidance, denial or delay (Cameron and Hinton, 
1968, Eardley and Wakefield, 1976; Watson, Greer, Young, Inayat, Burgess and 
Robertson, 1988). 
By looking at how delay has been constructed and attended to in research it is 
clear that it is a complex term to define because it can be interpreted in a number 
of ways, and research findings appear to be variable and contradictory. 
2 In the UK, the Government has now announced plans to ensure that any patient with suspected 
cancer will be able to see a specialist within two weeks of their GP deciding they need to be seen 
urgently. The Advocate Spring, (2000). UK Breast Cancer Coalition. 
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However, I will not engage in the arguments about identifying and attributing 
causal factors and behaviour or how much time constitutes delay by social 
scientists. Although concerns about people delaying visiting the doctor and 
seeking a diagnosis for their symptoms is acknowledged as an important 
problem, it is the impact of 'diagnostic delay, from the patient or sufferer's 
perspective, that is of interest here, a perspective invariably missing from most 
accounts in the relevant literature. My analysis will show how participants attend 
to the notion of any form of delay in their diagnostic stories. 
Fallowfield (1991) stated that retrospective accounts of reporting delay could be 
managing feelings of guilt, the need to rationalise, embarrassment at having 
behaved 'stupidly or the fear that delay in reporting their symptoms may have 
caused a poorer prognosis. In other words, such accounts may be biased and 
factually unreliable. This worry about the accuracy of accounts is reflected in 
Facione's (1993) suggestion that many studies examining delay deal with 
retrospective accounts, and therefore represent the individual's schema for the 
symptom episode, where the emotional crisis which surrounds diagnosis may 
also impact on the accuracy of recall. It is also likely that the trauma of the events 
at the time might prevent people from talking about the dilemmas they face for a 
number of reasons, such as a fear of worrying or burdening others. (See Chapter 
6, extracts 6: 3.1 and 6: 3.3). 
As outlined in Chapter 2, participants themselves are likely to draw on cultural 
knowledge and expectations about events, including these kinds of concerns with 
accuracy and culpability, to inform their accounts. However, in discourse 
analysis, such accounts are viewed as providing a valuable insight and source of 
knowledge about how people with cancer manage and talk about such difficulties 
which can provide a valuable addition to our understanding of how people 'cope' 
with and manage the traumatic events of cancer. Rather than making an 
analytical issue of such notions as accuracy or bias in reporting, which would 
lead towards a rejection of retrospective accounts as interesting, the stance 
taken by DA is to examine how those very concerns are oriented to and 
managed by participants as an integral part of how they rhetorically construct 
their accounts. 
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What is termed provider delay has not received a great deal of research attention 
and information on this is limited. Back in 1938 Pack and Gallo declared that one 
month was an "adequate time for physicians to take appropriate action", implying 
that at the time, this was the standard typically met by physicians. They did not 
however completely dismiss any provider component to delay and did find in 
some cases (approximately 15% of their sample) that patients had received what 
they described as "poor advice", which took the form of mis-diagnosis or false 
reassurance that the lesion was benign. This "poor advice" resulted in treatment 
delay, often to the point where the cancers were termed "not survivable" (Pack 
and Gallo, 1938). 
Over 60 years later it is a different story. Current studies (media reports and 
participants' accounts) show that delays in diagnosis attributable to the provider 
are considerably longer than estimated by Pack and Gallo. In a recent survey 
(1998), the UK Breast Cancer Coalition found that a total of 31% women had 
waited from between one and four months before being diagnosed. ' However, 
these statistics do not take into account the crucial difference between patient 
delay and GP delay, that is, how long it took for the patient to be referred to a 
cancer specialist. Research generally considers the consultant/physician 
diagnosis rather than the delay between GP visit and referral. 
Facione's (1993) review of the literature reports that no studies gave primary 
focus to the time period beginning with a woman's seeking an evaluation of a 
self-discovered breast symptom to the ending, the initiation of treatment, the 
period she classes as 'provider delay'. Although several studies did offer 
observations on provider delay (see Facione, 1993) little attention has been paid 
to the relative contributions of the patient and medical profession (the provider). 
It is a feature of these studies that they construct delay in standard statistical 
terms, and do not actually analyse the patients' perspective. 
3 47% of NHS patients were diagnosed within a fortnight and 12% within 3 weeks. Only 13% of 
women aged 50-64 were diagnosed via the National Screening Programme. Test results within the 
NHS were given to 65% of women within a week compared with 87% of private patients. 17% of 
the respondents were treated privately and indicated that they had joined the UKBCC to campaign 
for all women to have the standard of care they had received (UKBCC, 1988). 
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In contrast to the limited view of provider delay presented in the literature, my 
concern in this chapter is to highlight the problems that the PWC has to manage, 
regardless of how delay is defined in previous research. Whilst is it not denied 
that people may delay reporting their symptoms, a feature of my analysis 
highlights that when accounting for their diagnosis (and sometimes 
misdiagnosis), whilst not attributing direct blame, PWC construct themselves as 
being responsible and accountable, and it is the medical profession who are 
hearably responsible for the delay. 
A feature of personal event narratives is that participants routinely attend to 
issues of responsibility, causality, agency and accountability for those events, as 
well as managing accountability for the current action being done in the reporting 
(Edwards and Potter, 1993). The following analysis examines how 'diagnostic 
delay' features as an issue of concern for participants, and looks at the way they 
describe the events that construct the 'diagnostic delay story. 
The Analysis 
The analysis throughout identifies the cultural scripts that PWC draw upon and 
the devices they employ to manage the difficulties of talking about the taboos 
and troubles associated with having cancer. Of particular concern in this chapter 
(see also Chapter 5) is the management of moral responsibility and identity when 
talking about the discovery of symptoms and their encounters with the medical 
profession. Several analytical themes, including moral accountability, issues of 
identity and accounting for being positive have been identified that will emerge 
throughout the thesis. 
In this first analytical chapter the narrative follows the trajectory of what I term the 
'diagnostic account' and is composed of two related parts. The first part relates to 
the issues participants have to cope with and manage in producing accounts of 
their own discovery of an abnormal symptom or a sign indicating some kind of 
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health problem. Secondly, having made the discovery, how they account for 
their decision as to what they should do about it. 4 
A further feature of the analysis concerns how participants manage their stories 
in such a way as to present them as what I term, 'diagnostic delay accounts' 
(they could also be categorised as misdiagnosis, or even seen as medical 
malpractice). What is of interest here is how participants present these stories, 
and what issues are at stake in the telling. A particular feature of the analysis 
focuses on how participants rhetorically construct their 'diagnostic accounts' in 
terms of accountability and identity. Delay becomes a participants' concern of 
'doing being responsible' and as such, is a matter of accountability. 
Accountability of actions and social settings is a persistent feature of social life, 
where to be 'accountable' means to be "available to members as situated 
practices of looking and telling" (Garfinkel, 1967: 1). 5 In Chapter 5,1 will show how 
such 'diagnostic delay accounts' could also be constructed as a hearably serious 
complaint (see also Chapters 5 and 7). 
The analysis is divided into how paqicipants attend to the issues at stake in 
relation to the following events in the 'diagnostic account': 
4 Some participants were only aware of their illness because they had attended a routine 
mammogram. or screening and these accounts will appear in Chapter 5. The analytical focus is 
on participants' descriptions of encounters with medical professionals and includes their accounts 
of receiving the 'bad news' of their cancer diagnosis. 5 As Heritage (1984a: 182) points out, "accountability has a "double edged character. " On one 
hand, "incarnate" accountability involves routine observability and intelligibility; social activities 
and settings are routinely produced and recognised as observable and as making sense without the 
producers or observers focusing their attention on that production. The other aspect of 
accountability involves "accounting" as a distinct activity. When routine production or 
recognition of activities or settings is breached, the actors are held explicitly answerable for their 
actions. That is, they are expected to be able to give reasons for whatever they are doing" (See 
also Buttny, 1993; Scott and Lyman 1968). Garfinkel's (1967: 116-85) famous case study of 
"Agnes" who changed his sex from male to female encapsulates both aspects of accountability. 
"In the process of adopting the female identity, Agnes adopted innumerable practical actions that 
make up the incarnate accountability of being a woman: Dressing, talking and walking like a 
woman are only the most obvious. In her interactions with those who knew her "secref 'however, 
Agnes also needed to give explicit reasons for her claim of being female. For example, she 
described her biography in ways indicating that she had always "really" been female" (Heritage 
1984a: 180-98). 
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4: 1 Initial Discovery and Reactions: from the mundane to the 
extraordinary 
4: 2 Doing being responsible: doing the fight thing 
4: 3 'Knowing' or'not knowing' 
4: 4 Diagnostic Delay: I went to the doctors ... but" 
The extracts chosen are representative of the findings in my corpus of data, but 
should be recognised as only small fragments of what are mostly long, detailed 
narrative accounts of events. 
4.1 Initial Discovery and Reactions 
One response when discovering some ailment or symptom of potential illness 
might be to push it aside, play down its significance or ignore it. However, if the 
symptoms persist or present themselves in such a way that a simple explanation 
does not suffice, then a doctor's expertise may be sought. However, in the case 
of finding a lump in the breast, given the current climate of understanding and 
concern, most women realise the possible implications of their symptoms straight 
away. In the first three extracts (4: 1.1,4: 2.1,4: 3.1) 1 analyse how Sara and Jo 
account for the discovery of a lump in their breast. 
Extract 4: 1.1 is taken from the beginning of Sara's virtually uninterrupted 
'diagnostic delay account', from discovery, to action, to receiving her diagnosis. I 
will make plenty of use of this full and very rich account (lasting for over ten 
minutes) in this chapter (see extracts 4: 1.1,4: 2.1, and Chapter 5, extracts 5: 1.1- 
5: 1.8). 1 interviewed Sara at her home with her friend Chloe. Sara was born in the 
West Indies fifty years ago and has been living in England for more than half of 
her life. At the time of being interviewed, she was living with her teenage son 
Jason, who suffers with asthma, and was working as a nurse at a local hospital. 
At the time of the interview Sara had been given a breast cancer diagnosis and 
had already received a series of radiotherapy treatments (see Chapter 7, extract 
7: 2.1-7: 2.3). 
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Extract 4: 1.1 Sara 15/l/1.36 "I was er having a bath this morning" 
1 RC I just want to listen to what your experiences were 
2 -+ Sara I mean er (. ) I was er (1.0) having a bath this morning 
3 and it's something that always brings back memories 
4 to me (. ) because that's where I found it (. ) hh 
5 -+ as I was soaping my bo(hh)dy (. ). hh ha ha ha y'know 
6 my fingers just went over this little th(hh)ing (. ) 
7 just sli(hh)pped off of it and I thought (. ) oh (1.0) 
8 there's something the:: re (. ) yknow (. ) 
9 So I rubbed again and as I did- which- this is- er this is- 
10 1 think you can find out (. ) if you've got things on you 
11 when you've got a so: apy bo: dy 
12 RC Uh huh 
13 Sara because your hand goes over it so smo: oth 
14 you can just feel every little (. ) y'know (. ) and then I did 
15 -4 and thought oh >yes there is and it was just about the size 
16 of a pe: a (1.0)< at at er the- at the root of the breast (. ) 
17 and er umh and I got out the bath (. ) dried myself (. ) and 
18 what have you (. ) and I went to the bath- bedroom (. ) 
19 and >1 was fee: (hh)ling hh everywh(hh)ere no(hh)w 
20 you see< hh ha ha ha I am looking and I thought 
21 hh (. ) yes *there is a little thing the(hh)re" 
The first point of interest in extract 4: 1.1 is that Sara begins the interview with a 
'discovery account'. Sara's response to FýC's request (line 1), to listen to Sara's 
experiences is to begin by describing an event that happened to her on the 
morning of the interview. She says that she was "having a bath this morning" 
(line 2). Normally, there is nothing extraordinary about having a bath. For most 
people bathing is a routine daily activity, but Sara diverts this mundane activity 
into something else, a descriptive and accountable story of discovery. She does 
this by saying that it is an activity "that always brings back memories to me" 
(lines 3-4). 
Her inclusion of always, an extreme case formulation (ECF), (Pomerantz, 1986) 
is a device used in legitimising claims that deploys extreme expressions, (e. g. 
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always, absolutely, everyone, every time, never). Pomerantz claims that ECFs 
are ways of referring to an object or an event which invoke its maximal or 
minimal properties. ' They are frequently used in the rhetoric of factual 
descriptions and normative accountability (Edwards and Potter, 1992; Hutchby 
and Wooffitt, 1998; Potter, 1996) and they can also be used to defend positions 
against refutation, to make complaints and to justify factual claims (Edwards, 
2000). 
So for Sara, the use of always here helps to emphasise the importance of the 
event being described and that having a bath now "always brings back memories 
to me". Additionally it is quite a dramatic way to indicate that it is something she 
is not likely to forget but at the same time, she constructs the event as being 
normal. Her reference to bringing back 'memories' is a way of grounding and 
setting up her story. She does this by working up her 'memories' in descriptive 
detail, which provides a basis for displaying accuracy and reliability of the event. 
Sara's introduction of her account as rooted in repeated, reliable, experientially 
rich memory, performs one of the discourse functions that I mentioned earlier in 
the review of traditional literature (Facione, 1993; Fallowfield, 1991); it attends to, 
and counters, any notion of her retrospective recall of being weak or unreliable. 
The mundane activity of bathing acts (in Sara's account) as a trigger to the 
experiential memory of the time of her discovery, and sets up her story as a 
discovery of something out of the ordinary "because thafs where I found it" (line 
4). Note how the 'it' is not defined until lines 15-16; there is a narrative sense 
here of a significant discovery in the offing. Before that, she builds her description 
of events by justifying her actions of "soaping her body y'know" (lines 5-16). 
'Y'knoW, 7 is a common marker in talk (Schiffrin, 1987) and in script formulation 
6 Pomerantz (1986) proposes that ECFs tend to be used to do one of three kinds of work: (1) to 
defend against or to counter challenges to the legitimacy of complaints, accusations, justifications 
and defences a speaker is making (2) to produce a phenomenon whereby a speaker attributes a 
cause to an object or person and (3) they may be used to propose the 'rightness' or 'wrongness' of 
an action or a state of affairs by virtue of its status as frequently occurring or common. 7 Schiffrin (1987: 268) suggests two discourse functions of y'know: (1) "as a marker of meta- 
knowledge about what speaker and hearer share and (2) as a marker of meta-knowledge about 
what is generally known". 
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(Edwards, 1994). 8 "Script formulations are descriptions of actions and events 
that characterise them as having a recurring, predictable, sequential pattern" 
(Edwards, 1995: 319). In other words, they formulate the event being described 
as a member of a recognisable class of things that usually happen. Sara 
constructs the description of what she was doing as normal routine, and the use 
of 'yknow' helps to locate her actions in a normative frame; it normalises what 
Sara is doing; it is something people, in this case, women do. 'Y'know also 
orients to Sara seeking a consensus that she is doing something normal, that 
anyone else would do the same, or recognise it as normal. 
However, it is notable that Sara does not claim to have been performing the kind 
of systematic self-examination for lumps in the breast, that have been widely 
recommended for women to do in order to avoid diagnostic delays. Rather, her 
discovery is constructed as accidental and un-looked for, merely the result of 
having a routine bath (lines 5-6). Note particularly the word "just" in "my fingers 
just went over this little th(hh)ing", which is a way of showing that the discovery 
was casual and serendipitous. One thing that this account accomplishes is a 
sense that Sara was not looking for what she found, not motivated to find it, and 
therefore unlikely to jump to prejudiced or premature conclusions about it. 
Indeed, this is a robust feature of claims for unmotivated 'discoveries' even in 
science (Woolgar, 1988), and of accounts designed to fend off any accusation of 
prejudice or bias (Edwards, in press). Again, we see how careful analysis can 
show how participants themselves attend to issues of accuracy and bias, in the 
course of producing their accounts. 
8 "One way that scripted versions of events work is that formulating events as regular makes them 
both factually robust, and also somewhat knowable in advance without having to wait and see for 
any specific instance. Script formulations are presented as if based on lots of instances, and 
perhaps lots of people's repeated (consensual) experiences of instances. There are two features 
here, with regard to mind-world relations. First, events are offered as falling into a regular pattern, 
and therefore an empirically robust one. Second, being a regular pattern, it is therefore indicative 
of dispositional tendencies that can be attributed to the actors (cf. Smith, 1978). These are very 
general and pervasive features of script and disposition talk, and we find them in lots of discourse 
settings. Person-characterising formulations, such as racial characteristics, or the speaker's own 
balanced point of view, can be descriptively built as script and disposition formulations" 
(Edwards, in press). 
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Talking about such an intimate activity as soaping her body can be a rather 
delicate and potentially embarrassing topic of talk. Sara manages this by 
introducing (line 5) laughter particles and open laughter. The laughter could be 
viewed from the traditional notion that laughter is a discharge mechanism for the 
release of 'nervous energy' or emotions, (Freud, 1905,1966) possibly signalling 
some form of embarrassment. Koestler's (1964) influential theory claims that 
laughter is a reflex action and occurs as an involuntary, automatic response to 
external stimuli of an amusing kind. But because the nature of the talk here is on 
a 'troubles' topic, which is difficult to talk about, I suggest that laughter performs 
other functions. It is an interactional device rather than merely a psychological 
expression, and specifically it can signal a 'bright side' (Holt, 1993) to a sensitive 
or sad story. 9 
Jefferson (1979) pioneered the study of the organisation of laughter in interaction 
and she demonstrated the value of close attention to exactly how and where 
laughter occurs. Jefferson has also looked at the organisation of laughter in 
'troubles talk' and found a recurrent phenomenon, that when the person talking 
about the trouble laughs, the listener does not laugh (i. e., withholds the kind of 
affiliative co-laughter that occurs in other contexts), but often produces a serious 
response. Note however that the recipients' response of appropriate or 
inappropriate laughter will also depend on their category membership and 
$entitlement' to laugh. Here the laughter is contained in a narrative account and 
by laughing at her own troubles, Sara is displaying that she is taking her trouble 
lightly, exhibiting what Jefferson (1984b) defines as a stance of 'troubles 
resistance'. This also displays something about how Sara is managing her 
identity in this interaction with regard to the sensitive topic and how she is coping 
with her troubles. She looks on the 'bright side. In Chapter 7,1 will discuss how 
laughter is also an interactional device used to present a positive attitude, to 
disguise complaints or blame or can be used to avoid any overly sympathetic 
responses. 
9 Laughter is a common feature in talking about sensitive and delicate issues and is recognised as 
an interactional device (see Chapman, 1996; Glenn, 1989,1995; Jefferson 1985b; Jefferson, Sacks 
and Schegloff, 1987). Laughter will be a feature of the analysis in Chapter 7. 
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Sara is building up to an announcement of what she found, and produces 'active 
thinking' by saying "I thought (. ) oh (1.0)" (line 7). '1 thought' followed by'oh' is a 
recurrent phrase in this corpus of data (this extract plus see 4: 3.1 and 4: 3.3) and 
this will be referred to as 'active thinking, a device for disclosing as participants' 
internal dialogues, what they were actively thinking at the time. As with 'active 
voicing"O (Wooffift, 1992), this kind of quotative talk generally functions alongside 
graphic, moment-to-moment narrative descriptions in building a sense of fresh, 
direct witnessing, of 'being there'. So, Sara accomplishes two things here, she is 
talking about what she 'thought' at the time, and this is punctuated with "oh", a 
change of state token (Heritage, 1984b). 11 This signifies a sudden change of 
awareness, the act of discovery itself, in that what follows in line 8 is, "there's 
something the:: re yknow". So, the mundane activity of taking a bath has now 
become something out of the ordinary. 
Sara does various kinds of accountability to establish the credibility of her 
discovery. She shows that she was not just imagining things, nor looking for 
things, but just found what was actually there (lines 9-16). She also counters any 
likelihood of Chloe or RC misconstruing her actions, by appealing to cultural 
knowledge about finding lumps in the breast (lines 10-14). By using the 
generalised 'you' in "you can find out (. ) if you've got things on you". She aligns 
her soapy body with being able to feel "every little (. ) yknow". The ECF 'every' 
helps warrant her claim that there was something significant there, even though 
it was "just about the size of a pe: a". 
Having moved herself from the bathroom to the bedroom (lines 18-19) she 
systematically verifies her discovery, rather like any good scientist would; she 
"was fee(hh)ling hh everywh(hh)ere no(hh)w. " Again, laughter particles are 
10 Active voicing can be used in a variety of ways in order to warrant the factual status of claims 
and to undermine the possibility of any sceptical responses (Hutchby and Wooffitt, 1998). 
Speakers may formulate information so that it can be heard as reported talký when in fact it is 
unlikely, or in some cases impossible, that the words as reported were actually said in that way 
(Wooffitt, 1992). 
11 The use of the particle 'oh' is often used to acknowledge new information and in contexts where 
'oh' is produced as a response to information of some kind it functions as a 'change of state token' 
(Heritage, 1984b; Schiffrin, 1987). It also functions as a way of registering a change in the 
speaker's state of knowledge and can register a change in orientation or awareness (Heritage 
1984b; James, 1972; Jefferson, 1978; Schiffrin 1987). 
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introduced inside the word 'everywh(hh)ere', orienting to the possible extremity of 
her described actions, and she begins to laugh again (line 20). Having carded 
out a further investigation of her body, Sara again does 'active thinking'in "and I 
thought oh". But this time, she follows this with a softly spoken confirmation 
"*there is a little thing the(hh)re*"(Iine 21); justifying that she did not only feel it 
when her body was 'soapy' but even when she was looking, there was something 
there. The softened, quieter enunciation marks out the dramatic significance of 
her discovery; in the context of the interview and its known topic, this was now 
something serious. The descriptive detail and rhetorical construction of how Sara 
is able to "find out (. ) if you've got things on you when you've a so: apy bo: dy" 
(lines 10-11) becomes particularly relevant later in this narrative when she 
describes her meeting with the doctor. (see Chapter 5, extract 5: 1.1). 
One interesting characteristic of this extract is how Sara begins her discovery 
story. It is typical of those found not only in my own data but is reflected 
elsewhere in the literature. Wooffift (1992) who examined entirely different types 
of data revealed that speakers regularly report mundane circumstances prior to 
talking about traumatic or unusual events. In analysing people talking about 
paranormal phenomena, he found that speakers employed a two-part format 
when accounting for the first experience of their respective phenomena and 
identified this as "I was just doing X ... when Y". The X component is the 
speakers description of the mundane activities at the time, and the Y 
component reports the speaker's first awareness of the extraordinary 
phenomenon. These observations are not just restricted to paranormal events, 
but are often located in other accounts of unusual experiences. Interestingly, to 
support his formula, Wooffitt cites an extract from an interview with a woman who 
is describing the moment that she realised that she had breast cancer, which has 
many similarities to Sara's account. 
(x) I was turning over in bed 
(y) and I thought oh no -I knew exactly what it was. I woke up my husband and I said to him 'I've got cancer. 
(Fallowfield, 1991: 34) 
In Sara's account, the activities introduced in the first part of the format (X), "I 
was er (1.0) having a bath this morning" and "as I was soaping my bo(hh)dy" are 
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the mundane circumstances prior to the onset of the 'discovery' experience (Y), 
amy fingers just went over this little th(hh)ing (. )". Having a bath is a type of 
routine, everyday activity, which is not normally memorable or notable but this 
ordinary everyday event, is used to set up something extraordinary and now has 
an added meaning for Sara. Again, the interactional function of such accounts is 
to build them as factually reliable, against any possibility that they may be taken 
as inaccurate, biased, or the product of prejudicial assumptions. 
The emphasis on 'unmotivated discovery' here is that something out of the 
ordinary has been found, that it was not there before (and therefore should 
accountably have been discovered earlier), and that its discovery was 
unexpected. 
4: 2 Doing being responsible: Doing the right thing 
The discovery of a lump in the breast, or anywhere else in the body, represents 
something alien or foreign. It was not there before and by implication, should not 
be there now. It is possible that someone discovering a lump will draw on 
culturally available knowledge and might think that it is cancerous, but, thankfully, 
not all lumps are malignant, though they do need to be investigated. So, finding 
a lump, or any other illness symptom, may trigger two (accounts of) reactions; it 
may prompt someone to take the appropriate action, to 'do the right thing', to 'be 
responsible', and go to see their doctor. Or, alternatively, they may ignore it or 
delay taking any immediate action (See extracts 4: 3.1-4: 3.3). 
In extract 4: 2.1, Sara continues her story and the analysis looks at how Sara 
manages the discovery of a lump in her breast and how she attends to her 
identity as being someone who is responsible and morally accountable. This is 
typical, in its main features, of other accounts of discovery and consequent action 
throughout my data corpus. 
Extract 4: 2.1 Sara/15/02 "I made my appointment for the same week" 
22 -> Sara and so I thought straight away (. ) I couldn't care less 
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23 whether it was beni: gn or ma: lignant (. ) 
24 1 am going straight to the doctor because (. ) I know from 
25 experience hhh that you don't put these things off () y'know- 
26 and er I'm not going to be sort of bashful or shy 
27 say well () I'm hh not going to the doctor with this )(know 
28 I'll- I'll wait and see what happens (. ) I didn't 
29 In the same we: ek I made an appointment 
30 as a matter of fact my husband came Into the bed- 
31 walked into the bedroom (. ) and he says what are you doing? 
32 (. ) he says have you got something there y'know and I said 
33 yes it feels like a little lump so he says (. ) 
34 well you'd better get to see the doctor then so 
35 and I says oh well I had thought y'know 
36 that's what I'd do anyway. 
37 RC umh 
38 Sara and I made my appointment for the same we: ek 
39 to go and see: my doctor 
Sara displays her awareness of finding a lump and asserts her control and 
counters any hearing of her being fearful of finding a lump "I couldn't care less 
whether it's beni: gn or malignant" (lines 22-23) whilst at the same time she 
attends to the possibility of it being cancer. Sara presents a forceful personalised 
account of what she 'actively' thought, and does this by presenting and 
discounting a possible alternative course of action. She displays taking control 
by making contrasts. Her immediacy of action, directly countering any notion of 
delay, is expressed by the ECFs "straight away" and "going straight to the doctor" 
(lines 22 and 24). Speculating that one might have some form of cancer and 
receiving such confirmation could instil fear and anxiety. However, Sara says 
that she was not going to put off finding out whether it was benign or malignant, 
that "you don't put these things off" (line 25). She qualifies and emphasises this, 
"I know from experience" (lines 24-28) what you should do. She mixes her 
personalised knowledge with the generalised you, formulated as a rule for 
anybodj, r "you don't put these things off". She constructs a sense of herself 
acting as she should, with regard to how anybody should act, and as being in 
control and decisive. This is strengthened by its contrast with the alternative line 
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of action available, which she presents in the form of a three-part list (lines 26- 
28) (Jefferson, 1990)12, which is an effective way of making specific points that 
can strengthen or affirm a broader, overarching position or argument. In Sara's 
case, it characterises what she was not going to do on the basis of what kind of 
person she is; she was "not going to be sort of bashful or shy" and "say well (. ) 
I'm not going to the doctor with this y'know", "I'll- I'll wait and see what happens 
(. )" (lines 26-28). 
Instead, Sara claims that "in the same we: ek I made an appointment" (line 29). In 
accounting for her reactions to her discovery in this way, she is also able to 
announce that she is doing being responsible and is accountable for her actions. 
Not only did she act responsibly and not delay seeking medical diagnosis, but 
the credibility of that reported action is rooted in how she is not the sort of person 
who would do that (cf. Edwards, 1995, on scripts and dispositions). 
What Sara says next is interesting because she draws her husband into the 
story. The use of 'active voicing' (lines 31-34) acts as a confirmation that she 
was 'doing the right thing'. She reports that he says "well you'd better get to see 
the doctor then" (line 34), which formulates it as good advice ("you'd better"), and 
as a consequence of what she had told him ("then"). Sara cites her husband's 
advice, but formulates her actions as not merely compliance with it, but as merely 
confirming what she herself had already decided to do (lines 35-36). So Sara's 
thoughts and actions are reported in graphic narrative detail and articulated 
against a rejected alternative, such that they emerge as decisive and immediate 
(undelayed), and warranted by independent corroboration from her husband. 
The fact that Sara's account is retrospective, and that there is no way of knowing 
what might have actually occurred at the time, may be a cause of concern for 
12 Gail Jefferson (1990) noted that it was very common for lists to be delivered with three parts or 
items. There are various features of the delivery of lists that indicate that three-partedness may 
often have a conventional or normative status. For example, people are rarely interrupted after 
the second part of such a list, even where there is plenty of opportunity presented by their groping 
for a suitable term for the third part and often draw on 'generalised list completers' such as 
dctcetera' or 'that kind of thing' (Potter 1996). Jefferson's point is not that lists of all Idnds are not 
properly formed unless they have three parts, after all, shopping lists, lists of items to take on 
holiday, and so on appropriately have widely varying numbers. Her point is that specifically, 
three part lists are frequently used to summarise some general class of things. 
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traditional research users of interview materials. But I think that what is important 
here is how, in presenting this story, Sara produces an account of someone who 
is not a 'delayer, that despite the knowledge that it could be cancer, she does 
the right thing, she acts sensibly. Sara produces the details of finding her lump 
and going to the doctors as rationally accountable in common sense terms (see 
also Wynne, 1988). It is also the first step to formally identifying and resolving 
the problem. Consulting the doctor can be considered a problem solving 
measure with the objective of obtaining a diagnosis, treatment, reassurance or 
information, and to legitimate illness (Locker, 1981). In this context, consulting 
the doctor serves both as a possible mode of coping and as an affirmation of 
illness. 
Throughout extracts 4: 1.1 and 4: 2.1, Sara has employed a number of rhetorical 
devices that add credibility to her account, managing the unmotivated discovery 
of something out of the ordinary, while attending to alternative, rejected ways of 
thinking and acting. Through the details of her accounts, including specific word 
selections, quotative talk, contrasts and laughter particles, she displays herself 
with regard to a range of normative considerations as rational, competent, 
'coping', and doing the right thing. 
4: 3 Accounting for delay: 'Knowing' and 'not knowing' 
Another reaction to discovering some kind of lump or alien thing in the body is in 
fact to delay doing anything about it. Extract 4: 3.1 is taken from an interview with 
Jo, who was the only participant who reported that she had actually delayed 
going to the doctor. Jo is a single mother in her early forties and was initially 
diagnosed with breast cancer. 13 In this extract, Jo gives an account (and of 
course, thus treats it as accountable) of why she delayed reporting the discovery 
of a lump in her breast for five months. She does not talk about fear or anxiety of 
what she has found, but instead she presents a series of practical reasons and 
circumstances for the delay, resulting in her account being full of warrants and 
justifications. 
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Extract 4: 3.1 Jo 02/1 "1 knew It was malignant" 
1 RC Why did you go for the mammograrn (. ) 
2 what made you go for the mammogram? 
3 Jo Because I'd had the lump, I knew I'd had the lump 
4 and I'd had it for about 5 months hh but er () 
5 through you know other things going on in my life and er 
6 hh I'd just started a job and I er (. ) 
7 it was er not the ri(hh)ght time to er. hh be hh huh huh 
8 to be de(hh)aling with (. ) I mean er I knew (. ) 
9 you just know it's the same way when you know you're pregnant 
10 hh or you know your partner's having an affair 
11 1 knew it was a malignant lump 
12 RC But you delayed going to 
13 Jo I left it for 5 months but [[coughs]] but at the same time 
14 you know I checked it every day (. ) and I er 
15 towards the end of this 5 month period it was noticeable 
16 that it had got bigger. I wasn't in any pain or there was no 
17 discomfort in fact it was just that this lump was there it was hard 
18 -> and I thought well oh ok I've got to deal with this now 
19 I'd put it off for long enough and I went off to my GP initially 
Jo has indicated that she went for a mammogram, which prompts RC's question 
(lines 1-2). What follows is interesting in that Jo provides an account of why she 
delayed going to her doctor's, despite finding a lump. She states that "I knew I'd 
had the lump and I'd had it for about 5 months" (lines 3-4). In contrast to Sara in 
extract 4: 1.1, Jo's reaction to finding a lump was not one of going "straight to the 
doctor". Instead, she works up an account of her delay as something normatively 
understandable, attributing it (lines 5-6) to various external factors and 
considerations. Despite not having three distinct items, Jo constructs this in the 
form of a personalised three part list consisting of "other things going on", she 
had "just started a job" and how it was "not the 0(hh)ght time to be de(hh)aling 
with" it. 
13 Jo was later given a tenninal diagnosis and sadly died on 20th July 1998. 
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The production of a three-part list effectively strengthens her reasons. She is 
busy with living, and then alludes to instinct and intuition as her way of 'knowing'. 
She frames her actions using the generalising 'you', as being what anyone else 
might normatively do under the circumstances, and compares her knowing to 
other important, potentially life-changing events: "when you know you are 
pregnant" or "your partner's having an affair (. )" (line 10). The first could be 
either good or bad news but in any case disruptive (particularly for someone who 
has just started a new job and for whom it was not planned); the second, 
presumably is bad news, but it is also a dramatic event that is likely to be life 
changing. 
What is interesting is the issue of how Jo is able to make this claim that she 
"knew it was a malignant lump" (line 11), despite this not being medically known 
at the time of her discovery. How did she 'know' that the lump was malignant? 
Again, rather than this being a researchers worry about the accuracy or 
rationality of a retrospective account, it can be approached as something 
produced and attended to by Jo herself, within the interactional setting of the 
interview. Although such confirmation might require technical medical tests, 
accounts of 'knowing' can be worked up by participants in ways that they attend 
to their grounds or plausibility. Although Jo does not give what would be a 
medically satisfactory or other evidentially grounded explanation of her 'knowing' 
that the lump was malignant, what she does is attend to that absence by invoking 
another kind of 'knowing' that is culturally recognisable. She provides for it as a 
category of 'knowing' alongside two other instances of the category, when a 
person knows something important in subtle personal ways, when they may not 
be able, or inclined, to point to objective evidence, such as being pregnant, or 
becoming aware of relationship problems. 
Of course, the participants now know that they have cancer, so saying, I knew" 
is additionally warranted and made plausible by this retrospective fact. These 
accounts are not factual reports but it is interesting to see how they are 
constructed as such (see extract 4: 4.5). This is particularly relevant in extracts 
4: 4.1-4: 4.4) analysing 'diagnostic delay accounts' where knowing it all along 
becomes part of a story that confers blame onto the medical profession for a 
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delayed diagnosis. If the participants knew all along, and of course it turns out on 
medical grounds that they were correct, then the category 'knew' (not just 
suspected or feared) becomes an accountable Issue for the medics, because 
they have no excuse for getting It wrong or delaying. 
RC effectively challenges Jo's account, orienting to It as insufficient to account 
for her delay In going to the doctors, "But you delayed going" (line 12). RC's use 
of "but" marks an upcoming contrast (Schiffrin, 1987). Jo Is then prompted to 
provide a further explanation, attending to her status as someone who was being 
responsible about It because she nevertheless *checked it every day* (line 14), 
another ECF strengthening an account under scrutiny. Jo reports that, by the 
end of the five month period of delay, the lump was noticeably bigger (lines 15- 
17), and this is the point at which she sought medical help. Even then, the fact 
that she was not *in any pain" and "there was no discomfort" provides a basis for 
non-urgency, but action was now, at this point required because, the *lump was 
there and it was hard*. Note how Jo, in her narrative, actively thinks that she has 
reached a change In awareness, 01 thought, well oh ok I've got to deal with this 
now" (line 18) and now acknowledges her delay as accountable that she has *put 
It off for long enough" (line 19) and announces that she went to see her GP. 
Note how the expression *long enough* formulates her delay as delay, but also 
as having reached a reasonable length of time, and as now ending at an 
understandable, accountable point. Again, what Is interesting In this extract Is 
how Jo handles or manages the issue of delay herself, In reporting her lump to 
her doctor. 
Despite Jo's account being somewhat exceptional, as a confession of delay In 
spite of 'knowing' she had a malignant lump, my analysis shows how the details 
of her account nevertheless attend to her normative, rational accountability. 
Extracts 4: 3.2 and 4: 3.3 are also accounts of delay In reporting symptoms and In 
both cases, the accounts are clearly produced as understandable and rational. 
However, both these accounts differ from Jo's, who 'knev/ she had a lump In her 
breast. Both tell how, at the time of discovery, they had not thought about 
cancer. 
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At the time of the Interview at Andys home, he was retired and In his early 
seventies. He is married to Pam who participated In the Interview and their niece 
Mary was also present. Uke most of the accounts In this thesis they are extracted 
from long, descriptive event narratives. ýI will only highlight the key points of 
Interest to show how Andy and Pam manage the notion of delay and doing being 
responsible. Immediately before extract 4: 3.2 begins, Andy has explained that he 
had had an ulcer In his mouth, so Initially he went to his dentist, prefacing that 
story with "well it all happened in er early 91, just after I'd retired actuallyn. 14 
Extract 4: 3.2 Andy 17101 "It dldn't really hurt" 
25 Andy after about two month was It, three months (0.5) 
26 1 found I was still having, not so much problems but 
27 there, there seemed to be something Lh. Q_r2 
28 RC umh 
29 Andy in my mouth all the time and er (. ) when we looked closely, 
30 I'd got er an ulcer under me tongue (. ) and umh 
31 Pam at the first start didn't think much to it did you y'know 
32 Pam no because It was only small= 
33 Andy =only very small (. ) and umh (1.0) It didn't really worry me then 
34 although with hindsight Yknow, It didn't hurt, It wasn't painful or 
35 anything 
36 RC umhumh 
37 Andy I mean mouth ulcers are usually fairly painful so, so at that stage 
38 It didn't really hurt, but anyway (. ) a few weeks later, when would 
39 It be umh umh ((makes boom boom boom sounds)) 
40 [February, March, April, May 
41 Pam [oh It was, It was when we were on 
42 Andy May 
43 Pam yes when we were on holiday In Wales 
44 Andy yeah 
45 Pam and er you kept saying there's something there and It's getting 
46 bigger I'm sure It Is umh and when I looked again, 
47 it was definitely, It had grown from hhh [shall we say er from a 
14 Andy died in 1998. 
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48 Andy [a little pimple 
49 Pam little pimple to very nearly a two penny piece 
50 RC umh 
51 Pam It had grown quite rapidly and It was quite large and er we said 
52 well I think you'd better go (. ) we'd better go and get, go and see 
53 the doctor (1.0) 
The first point of Interest in this 'discovery account' is how In line 25 Andy makes 
time a relevant Issue by announcing that having been to the dentist "two month 
was it, three months% he was "still having, not so much problems but there, there 
seemed to be something there In my mouth all the time' (lines 27-28). Andy's 
previous account of it being perceived as a dental problem has already done 
some of the accounting work for his delay in seeking medical diagnosis, but three 
months later, he discovers that he had "got er an ulcer' (line 30). However, he 
does not categorise this as particularly problematic, and Pam Is attributed with 
not thinking there was "much to it* (line 31). As we saw In extract 4: 2.1, the 
rationality of actors and narrators can be grounded In corroboration of 
judgements by spouses. Pam provides a rational account for this 'because It 
was only small% which Andy immediately upgrades to *very small" (see 
Pomerantz, 1984a, on how upgrades perform confirmatory second 
assessments). 
Note Andy's appeal to hindsight (line 34) as a way of acknowledging mistakes in 
his thinking back then, while at the same time providing an account for them. 
Hindsight is a conventional basis for knowing now what one might have, but 
understandably did not, know then. A symptom that back then may have led to 
underestimating the problem (the lack of pain) Is retrospectively available, but 
only In hindsight, as a significant danger signal. 
A further delay ensues *a few weeks later* (line 38), when they are on holiday. 
Pam reports Andy as saying that "there's something there and it's getting bigger 
I'm sure it Is' (line 45). Along with the active voicing (direct quotation) of Andy's 
words, the expression Trn sure it is' helps to convey something other than mere 
certainty, but more a sense of someone coming to conclusions, a sense of 
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thought processes at work, Inferences going on and conclusions being reached. 
During this time, they report noticing that "it had grown ... from a little pimple to 
very nearly a two penny piece' (line 47-49). And It Is Pam who accounts for what 
Is to be done saying "I think you'd better go (. ) we'd better go and get, go and see 
the doctor" (lines 52-53). The repair of 'you'd' to 'we'd' (line 52) denotes that this 
Is a decision reached jointly, but it has been preceded by rational accounts of 
justifiable reasons for not previously doing anything about It. 
Throughout this extract Andy and Pam are constructing the story and 
collaborating with each other on the changing significance of the ulcer and its 
growth, over almost five months. They do this by providing rational explanations 
and justifications until the growth has become so significant that they decide to 
go to the doctor. The Issue here Is not one of them not being responsible for not 
going to the doctor, but Is accounted for by describing a series of events and 
developments as warranting their not taking action earlier. Whatever grounds 
there might have been for acting earlier, are acknowledged now as being 
available only with hindsight, which is surely a nice general device for retaining 
accountability for not doing what one maybe had grounds for doing (or vice 
versa). 
In the final extract concerning delay In reporting symptoms, Jan also provides an 
account of delay whereby, although acknowledging there Is something wrong, 
she works it up as rational and understandable. As with Andy and Pam, it Is 
produced as a collaborative account, but here, as with both Jo and Sara, Jan's 
collaborative accounting Is produced via the device of 'active voicing. 
Extract 4: 3.3 follows an exchange between Jan and Bee. Jan and Bee are 
friends and were Interviewed together in Jan's home. Jan Is In her mid sixties 
and was diagnosed with breast cancer. She lives alone but has an extensive 
family and friends, one of whom Is Bee. They met at support Group I and 
became close friends. Bee has just announced that she has another 
appointment at the hospital. 
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Extract 4: 3.3 Jan 14/01 "1 had never seen the nurse" 
I Jan Do you want anyone to go with you? 
2 Bee No, no it's all right. 
3 Jan Are you ok? 
4 Bee I always go on me own, yes 
5 Jan I'm a bit like that I must admit. hh [ha ha 
6 Bee (. hh ha ha ha ha, 
7 RC So you go on your own too? 
8 Jan Yes, yes 
9 Bee yes yes 
10 RC Even the first time you went (. ) when you were 
II Jan Yes (. ) well (. ) no actually I'd didn't go on my own the first 
12 time I went, I was working and umh It was through 
13 this particular person, the technician, like Paul, who was the 
14 technician In our school at the Poly and I er 
15 1 just said to her (. ) umh my nipples Inverting 
16 and she said why don't you go and see the nurse 
17 and I had had er a fall (. ) on er this particular spot 
18 about six weeks previously and It was extremely painful 
19 for about a month and umh I put it down to that 
20 but I thought oh It's not getting better (-) 
21 my nipples Inverting now (. ) so I'd better go and see 
22 1 didn't think of cancer I must confess (. ) 
23 not until they gave me the leaf(hh)let ha ha ha er 
24 and she said why don't you go and see the nurse so 
25 and I had never seen the nurse in all the years I'd been 
26 at the Poly so I tripped over to see the nurse and umh 
27 she couldn't feel anything but she suggested that I went to 
28 see my do:: ctor (. ) 
What I find interesting about this extract is how Jan attends to RC's question (line 
10). Asking Jan whether she went on her own the first time produces an 
agreement from Jan, but then she shifts her orientation away from this particular 
Issue and produces an unsolicited account. She marks this (line 11) with 'well* 
and produces an account of the circumstances that preceded her first visit to the 
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doctoes. She establishes that at the time she was working and describes an 
encounter with 'the technician' (line 12). It is unlikely that Jan (line 15) actually 
started the conversation with the direct announcement "my nipples Inverting' but 
delivering this statement In such a matter of fact way helps discount any kind of 
Implication that she Is making any undue fuss, something she alludes to later 
(line 25) and again later In her story. Again, as we have seen In other extracts, 
the word "just* (line 15, "1 just said to her') is used to play down any special 
significance that Jan was giving to this announcement. She Is merely providing a 
simple, matter of fact description of her problem. 
Jan's use of active voicing of what the technician said and change In footing" 
ashe said why don't you go and see the nurse* (line 16), helps to display a sense 
of objective distance, giving credibility to Jan's later claim, that she Is not 
someone who normally rushes off to the nurse or the doctoes. It Is the 
suggestion of the 'technician' to go and see the nurse that she acts upon. 
Jan then provides further warranting for why she has delayed doing anything 
about her discovery by attributing it to something more benign than cancer. "a fall 
(. ) on er this particular spot about six weeks previously', (lines 17-18) so that the 
notion of delay In her doing anything about it Is made accountable. It Is about a 
month later when she narrates a change of awareness, saying *1 thought oh (. ) 
it's not getting better* because her nipple Is inverting and she says Oso I'd better 
go and see" (lines 20-21). The active voicing of her thoughts, together with the 
"Goffman (1981) introduced the term footing in his explorations of the nature of involvement and 
participation in social interaction. "Footing highlights the basis upon which an account is offered: 
does it come from direct experience and involvement, or is it a report based upon the testimony of 
a reliable witness, or is it a disinterested passing on of possibly contentious information" (Edwards 
and Potter, 1992: 168). For example, people may make their own claims, or they may report 
claims of others; and when they report claims, they can display various degrees of distance from 
what they arc reporting. In discursive psychology footing plays a central part in accountability 
(ibid: 168) by providing a set of distinctions that guide the assignment, of for example, blame or a 
compliment, or scepticism (Potter, 1996). Footing is usually studied in relation to speakers' 
concerns with dilemmas of stake or interest and features in the analysis of complaining and 
blaming accounts in chapter 5. 
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sudden change of state token "oh", mark this as the precise point at which she 
was starting to think there might be something else wrong. She then offers a 
Oconfession", that *she didn't think of cancer" (line 22), which provides a sense of 
herself as not someone who recognised her discovery as being something to 
worry about or threatening at the time. Jan has managed to construct an account 
whereby she has accounted for her delay for understandable reasons, and on 
the discovery of a further symptom Is doing being responsible. Indeed, she has 
been responsible all along, having had good reasons for the delay, along with a 
self-characterisation as not a person disposed towards rushing for medical help 
on the slightest pretext. Additional expression of this is In lines 25-26: "1 had 
never seen the nurse In all the years I'd been at the Poly". 
This account could potentially be classified as Jan delaying doing the right thing, 
that Is going to see the doctor as soon as she notices some form of symptom. 
But instead, what Jan does Is manage her Identity and any notion of her delay as 
rational, and normatively understandable. At the same time she displays herself 
as not the kind of person who rushes to the doctor all the time (again, a script- 
and-disposition kind of reasoning: Edwards, 1995). 
In extracts 4: 1.1-4: 3.3, the participants are managing issues of being responsible 
and accountable for their actions by providing justifiable reasons for any delay 
that ensued from their initial discovery of something wrong. In the following 
extracts, the element of delay takes on another form. The participants all report 
going to their doctor when they had a symptom, but what Is revealed Is that there 
are further Issues to be managed and that further delays may ensue, such that 
arriving at a correct diagnosis can take some considerable time. 
4: 4 Diagnostic Delay: N went to the doctor's ... butl" 
Once a symptom is discovered, the next normative stage Is 'action', and usually 
the first stage of action Is contacting the doctor. Delay becomes an issue of 
accountability again. But again the notion of delay resides In Issues of concern 
made relevant by participants, such as being believed, being told not to worry 
despite their suffering; of being dismissed, of not being taken seriously, or of 
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being treated only as a body that needs repair, or as being treated as an object 
without any regard to their Identity or for the consequences of living with a 
potentially life threatening illness. 
One of the significant themes emerging out of extracts 4: 4.1-4: 4.5 Is that there is 
often a considerable 'delay' from the time of the Initial visit to the doctor to the 
time that a cancer diagnosis Is given. The route to diagnosis Is far from 
straightforward. A number of concerns emerge through these retrospective 
accounts which are presented through the narration of elaborate and detailed 
stories of a series of meetings and consultations with doctors. Note that these 
stories provide a notion of agency different from that generally found In the 
medical and psychological literature concerning who Is responsible and 
accountable for delay. In the following extracts the notion of delay, rather than 
being an Issue of personal accountability for participants, Is now constructed as 
emanating from the medical professionals. 
Extracts 4: 4.1-4: 4.5 are from very early In the Interviews. RC asks a different 
question In each case and the participants produce 'diagnostic delay accounts'. 
What these extracts have In common, along with extract 4: 4.1, Is that participants 
deal with the Issue of personal accountability In reporting that they 'did the right 
thing'. They went to the doctor as soon as they discovered something wrong, but 
from then on, In their encounters with the medical profession, it Is a different kind 
of story. The continuation of Sara and Angle's 'diagnostic delay accounts'will be 
referred to again later in the analysis of accounts of receiving bad news (see 
Chapter 5). 
The Interview with Amy (extract 4: 4.1) was carried out at the offices of Coping 
with Cancer where she was working part time. Amy Is 35, marded and lives with 
her husband and two small children. She was diagnosed with ovarian cancer In 
1995 and at that time, was Informed that her cancer was terminal. She Is alive 
today (October 2001). 
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Extract 4: 4.1 Amy 4101: "it started two years ago at Easter" 
1 RC Well umh actually I need to ask you about your diagnosis 
2 and when that was so lets see when that was umh, 
3 when did you have your first diagnosis? 
4 Amy Well It started two years ago at Easter, 
5 1 started getting stomach-ache and my GP said 
6 it was appendicitis (. ) go away ItIl get better or worse 
7 and then umh, it didn't get. go away, and It didn't 
8 get better so I went back to see a younger chap, 
9 a younger doctor, a new doctor and he said er, 
10 1 think it's something to do with your ovaries, yknow, 
11 something to do with your reproductive system. 
12 1 think It's hormonal, well get you In for a scan, 
13 so that was the end of June, but before then 
14 1 ended up being rushed In with really bad stomach pain at night 
In lines 1-3, RC asks Amy about when she first received her diagnosis. As the 
analysis throughout this thesis reveals, there Is rarely a simple or straightforward 
answer to any of RC's questions. Indeed, RC Is perhaps projecting the potential 
difficulty of the question In how she approaches asking It Vell umh actually I 
need to ask you about ... * (line 1). Rather than providing a simple answer, such 
as a specific date of her diagnosis, which Is an expectable response to such a 
standard-looking Information-eliciting question at the beginning of an Interview, 
Amy begins a descriptive and detailed story indicating that her diagnosis was 
something that happened over a period of time: 'Well, It started two years ago 
at Easter' (line 4). 
Well' Is a response marker (Schiffrin, 1987) and often, in the form here called 
'well-prefacing', begins turns (Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson, 1974) and can 
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project a contrast with what might be normatively expected. 16 In this Instance, it 
is marking the beginning of a story. Amy does not just start at the point when she 
was diagnosed with cancer, it Is going to be a more complex story than that. She 
builds a series of events that culminate In her eventually being given a cancer 
diagnosis. She then produces a time perspective 'two years ago at Easter' and 
reveals how it all started (line 5) she was *getting stomach ache'. 
What Is of interest Is that at the time of Interviewing the participants, I was not 
expecting that my participants' responses would often produce stories of delay 
and mis-diagnosis, and I had not planned an Interview schedule to ask about it. 
Amy's initial response, (lines 4-5) Introduces the process of 'diagnostic delay as 
a participant's rather than an analyst's concern. She goes on to describe the 
complexity and difficulties she experienced that construct the delay (lines 6-14), 
which will be referred to later In this chapter, (see extract 4: 4.3) but are included 
here to show how participants Initially attend to the notion of delay. (See also 
Chapter 5, extracts 5: 1.1-5: 1.7). 
Extract 4: 4.2 Is from an Interview with Angie, which took place at her home. She 
Is In her mid fifties and has two teenage sons. Before her illness, she had held a 
senior management job. Prior to the Interview RC was unaware that it had taken 
eighteen months for Angle's illness to be correctly diagnosed; all that was known 
was that Angie had received a cancer diagnosis. 
At the beginning of the Interview, RC asks Angie (line 1) what made her go to 
CWC. 11 Angie's response again raises the Issue of time and 'diagnostic dela)(. 
16 Sacks, Schcgloff and Jefferson, (1974) observed that 'well' often also figures in particular 
conversational moves. Schiffrin (1987) notes that the use of well displays a speaker's aliveness to 
the conversational demands for an answer and provides speakers with increased flexibility and a 
certain measure of looseness in complying with conversational demands. In other words, because 
beginning an answer with well anchors a speaker in the conversational exchange by displaying an 
aliveness to conversational demands, it actually allows a temporal suspension of other 
conversational expectations, especially the expectation for propositional completion of the answer 
through an inunediately forthcoming answer. 
" Certain times throughout the cancer trajectory are more difficult to cope with than others and 
organisations such as Coping with Cancer (CWC) a self- help support group, provide a support 
network where people can meet and talk to others who arc in a similar situation or can provide 
practical and pragmatic assistance and or counselling. 
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Extract 4: 4.2 Angle 1211: "it was ages before they diagnosed what was wrong" 
I RC What made you go to CWC? 
2 Angie oh well It was when (1.0) 1 was trying to remember actually 
3 but It was when I was umh (2.0) having treatment, cherno umh, 
41 think it was one of the Macmillan nurses suggested it 
5 RC [oh right 
6 Angie [umh (2.0) because It was umh (3.0) very sort of, 
7 It was ages before they diagnosed what was wrong and 
8 and then I had, well it was when I had the operation 
9 they found it was lymphoma 
10 and then I had to have six months cherno 
11 to make sure everything was clear 
An Interesting feature of this extract Is that, when RC asks Angie (line 1) what 
made her go to CWC, Angie reveals that it was when she was having treatment 
and it was (line 4) at *one of the Macmillan nurses" suggestion. She does not 
continue with talking about CWC, the question's topic, but Instead Introduces the 
lateness of her diagnosis, " and Is a little hesitant about it: *it was umh (3.0) it 
was ages before they diagnosed what was wrong' (lines 6-7). The use of 'they 
diverts the agency from Angie and sets up the 'other, the medical profession, as 
being the agents responsible for the delay. As we saw with other participants, 
this provides (implicitly, at least) for Angle's Identity as not the kind of person to 
delay going to the doctor's (see extract 4: 3.3 and 4: 4.3 below). The Implication Is 
that she has taken the appropriate action and gone to see her doctor on the 
discovery of something wrong, such that any subsequent delay was due to them. 
Angie provides an account for the medic's late diagnosis, by revealing that the 
sequence of events (lines 8-9) was that Oit was when I had the operation they 
found it was lymphoma. "'g She further alludes to the lengthy process of 
11 71iroughout Angie's account there are a number of long pauses, which arc not taken up as an 
indication of a next turn by RC. A feature of Angie's style of talking was slow, deliberate and 
'thoughtful'; the silences are representative of what she says (line 2) "1 was trying to remember 
actually" 
19 The lymphomas are a group of more than two dozen types of cancer of the lymphocytes, the 
most important cells of the immune system. If they are localiscd to one or two lymph nodes only, 
they may be curable with radiotherapy. If they are more widespread, however, which they usually 
are - they arc usually controllable for many years with mild chemotherapy, but arc almost always 
incurable. (Buckman, 1996). 
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discovery, diagnosis and treatment (line 10) by saying she still had to have "six 
months chemo" (chemotherapy"). 
In Angie's story, the trajectory Is one of misdiagnosis, delay and disruption to her 
life. In extract 4: 4.3 (following on from 4: 4.2), she tells RC about when she first 
went to the doctors. 
Extract 4: 4.3 Angle 1212: 'it was or January, February, 1992' 
I RC so er how, when did you first think that there was something 
2 wrong, what made you go to the doctor's In the first place? (3.0) 
3 -+ Angie well umh (3.0) it was er January, February (1.0) 1992 
41 started having dreadful pains sort of h, = 
5 RC your stomach? 
6 -* Angie yes (11.0) and I went to my doctor who said it was irritable bowel 
7 syndrome and gave me tablets 
8 and I kept going and I kept getting tablets (. ) 
9 and I'd been made redundant so he said It was the stress 
10 being out of work and umh (1.0) then the August of that year, 
11 1 got another job (. ) but the pains were still very bad 
12 so then It was the stress of the new job (1.0) 
13 RC uh huh 
14 Angle and (. ) 
15 RC how often were you going (. ) to the doctoes? 
16 Angle oh I can't remember now, but fairly frequently 
17 RC yeah (1) 
In response to RC trying to establish when it all began, (lines 1-2) Angie takes 
some time before responding. Angie's initial problems (lines 3-4) are being dated 
here to a point in time which adds emphasis to her revelation that there was a 
considerable delay before she was diagnosed with what was causing her 
Odreadful pains! which prompted her (lines 6-7) to go to the doctoes. She does 
not give any detail of this encounter or how she presented her symptoms, but 
20 Chemotherapy is the use of anti-cancer (cytotoxic) drugs to destroy cancer cclls. It can be just 
one drug or taken from a choice of about 40 different drugs available. It can be used alone or used 
with surgery or radiotherapy, or both (Buckman, 1996). 
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she says that the doctor provided her with a diagnosis "it was irritable bowel 
syndrome and gave me tablets". Angle's dreadful pain has been identified and 
given a label. But this is narrated as a straightforward, cut and dried definitive 
diagnosis. There is no sense of the doctor acknowledging any kind of difficulty or 
ambiguity; and as it is now known, they got it wrong, but the delivery is reported 
as being given in a confident and rather abrupt manner. In extract 4: 4.2, Angle 
reported two diagnoses, from her GP and a "younger chap" which were hearably 
delivered with abruptness (and were the wrong diagnosis). So not only is this 
account a 'diagnostic delay story but it is also a delicately voiced and hearable 
complaint. (For a more detailed analysis of how complaints are produced, see 
Chapters 5 and 7). 
In extract 4: 4.3 the doctor persists in delivering these simple, confident 
misdiagnoses, one after another. They are reported by Angie in the same way, 
as confident, simple, abrupt and what are beginning to sound like 'knee-jerk 
reactions'. Angie presents a three-part list which strengthens her account "I kept 
going and I kept getting tablets (. ) and I'd been made redundant" (lines 8-9). 
"Kept" is reiterated implying that Angie's continued pain is not being taken as a 
serious illness problem. She reinforces this difficulty in being taken seriously by 
reporting (line 9-10) that on one occasion, the doctor relates Angle's condition to 
being made redundant and "he said it was the stress being out of work". There 
is a sense of irony here in that the doctor's diagnosis is presented rather 
unsym pathetically, as automatic, routine, rather than being thoughtful or carefully 
considered. 
By describing the series of misdiagnoses in this way, as automatic, over-certain, 
abrupt and lacking any detail (in her account) without addressing any kind of 
difficulty, concern, or ambiguity, Angle's account rhetorically constructs a 
hearable non-explicit complaint against the doctors. 
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In addition to the "dreadful" pain 21 (which, in contrast to the doctors' under- 
estimations of her problems, maximises it from Angie's own perspective, and of 
course, "dreadful" turns out to be right all along), IBS and stress, she has 
introduced yet another problem she has to manage. When she says that "the 
August of that year I got another job (. ) but the pains were still very bad" (lines 
10-11) the implication is that the doctor now (six months later) attributes the pain 
to the stress of the new job. 
Now knowing that it was "ages" (extract 4: 4.2) before Angle received a diagnosis, 
RC asks how often she was visiting the doctor (extract 4: 4.3, line 15). Angie's 
reply indicates that the visits were too numerous to remember, but they were 
"fairly frequently" (line 16). The length of time involved from her initial visit to the 
doctor's and the delay that ensued before receiving a diagnosis has had an effect 
on her recall of events. This working up of frequent visits to the doctor contributes 
to the construction of this being a 'diagnostic delay accounf, and also to the 
complaint-relevant nature of the story, given the implication that the doctor had 
plenty of opportunities to get it right. Receiving and accepting a doctor's 
diagnosis normally ends the search for explanation, but Angie's story continues 
to reveal numerous visits to the doctor. 
Extract 4: 4.4 Angie 12/03 "and she was so dismissive" 
16 Angie umh (1) and then in the September, the pain was so bad that 
17 when I went to, actually I didn't see my regular doctor 
18 1 saw er another one (. ) and she was so dismissive that I 
19 became somewhat hysterical (hh) and demanded that I should 
20 see a specialist and have a second opinion (0.2) and er that was 
21 arranged and I saw the specialist (. ) and he said *oh yes well 
22 you've definitely got irritable bo(hh)wel syndro(hh)me hhh" (2.0) 
23 and umh 
24 RC what sort of tests did they give you? 
25 Angie I can't remember him doing anything (1.0) oh I think (1.0) 
21 Chronic pain exists in the absence of identifiable organic pathology and is considered to be one 
of the more perplexing and even frustrating conditions doctors confront in their practice (Grace, 
1995). 
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26 he- he did, I did- he did arrange for me to have an xray umh 
27 RC umh 
28 Angie and then I went back to him and there was nothing on the xray, 
29 yes it's irritable bowel syndrome, I'll see you again in (. ) x months 
30 time (1.0) and by this time I was having difficulty eating and I was 
31 losing weight and I was feeling dreadful (1.0) and it went on 
32 RC did you have any suspicions about it? 
33 Angie no, I just couldn't understand why I was in such pain when 
34 everyone was telling me it was nothing to worry about (3.0) umh 
35 and I lost that job, I was made redundant again (2.0) [and 
36 RC [oh my 
37 goodness 
By September, "the pain was so bad" (line 16) that she goes back to the doctor 
again but this time she presents a different account and takes an active rather 
than a passive stance to the way she is being treated. This coincides in the 
narrative with a move towards more explicit blaming. She claims (line 18) that the 
doctor was "so dismissive" (line 18). This time, in response to her worries being 
dismissed, and along with her more explicit blaming of the doctor, Angie 
produces a strong emotional statement (line 19) that she became "somewhat 
hysterical". She is no longer prepared to accept the doctor's explanation and 
treatment and "demanded thaf (line 19) she should see a specialist. Yet, the 
(mis)diagnosis remains stubbornly the same, irritable bowel syndrome (line 22). 
The use of 'so' (lines 18) both exaggerates Angie's problem and the doctor's 
dismissiveness which help to set up the laughed-through irony of the specialist 
saying "oh yes well you've definitely got irritable bo(hh)wel syndro(hh)me" (lines 
21-22). Note again how the sense of stubbornness and abruptness is brought off 
by Angie's simple description of what the doctor says, where the use of "yes" 
nicely signals an orientation to agreeing with the prior diagnosis of IBS. The 
message that the doctor indirectly transmits to Angie is that her view does not 
really matter much, with the "dismissive" delivery implying that the doctor knows 
best. 
RC asks (line 24) about the sort of tests given. At first, Angie "can't remember 
him doing anything" (line 25). This reference to the medics not doing anything 
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adds substance to the 'diagnostic delay account. She then recalls (lines 25-26) 
that they did arrange for an X-ray after which another visit was made to the 
specialist but "there was nothing on the xray" (line 28). 
Line 29 further enoapsulates the 'diagnostio delay aooount' in that she is 
dismissed by the dootor saying: "I'll see you again in (. ) x months time". The 
'dismissive' oharaoter is again aooomplished by the brevity and abruptness of the 
quote and by its oontrast with her physioal oondition (lines 30-31). The sense of 
an elongated narrative of a suooession of delays and dismissals is oontrasted 
against her oondition. The oontrast between the dootor's view, and what was 
really happening to Angie is provided in what she says next (lines 30-31) "and by 
this time" Angie is having additional symptoms and again she formulates this 
using a three part list I was having difficulty eating and I was losing weight and I 
was feeling dreadful" and that "it went on". The implication is that again, her 
claims of being ill are not acted upon. Nothing further is done. 
In response to RC's question (line 32) about any suspicions, Angle's reply is one 
of confusion. She sets up a contrast of her condition. She does not understand 
why she is in such pain and enhances this contrast by saying that "everyone" (an 
ECF) was telling her it was nothing to worry about. At the same time, the 
absence of any clear solution to her illness is producing further problems in that 
she was made redundant again. 
She works up an account of frequent visits to the doctors, of being persistent 
and trying to convince the doctors to do something about it. This is a story not 
only of 'diagnostic delay', but also of culpable delay. Angie's version of events 
works up a final outcome that she is 'right' and that the doctor's original diagnosis 
of irritable bowel syndrome was not only 'wrong', but in various ways stubbornly 
wrong. Reflexively, Angie's version of events implies of herself, that she did 
everything she could, in a responsible and accountable manner. 
In extract 4: 4.5, Dee provides a different kind of 'diagnostic delay account', at a 
different stage of the diagnostic trajectory. What is interesting is how she 
displays her insistence and demands from the medical profession that they do 
133 
something about her lump, which is based on her providing the knowledge that 
she 'knew' she had breast cancer. This is a contrast to Angie's account (extract 
4: 4.4) where Angie was not aware that she had cancer. 
Dee is in her mid forties, and lives at home with her husband. She has an 
extended family and circle of friends. At the time of the interview she had a 
high-powered management post and was actively involved in voluntary work for 
people with cancer. She was initially diagnosed with breast cancer and later with 
secondary cancer. 
Extract 4: 4.5 Dee 8/01: "but I knew" 
1 --+ Dee (( ... ))but if you have a lump anywhere it's much better to have 
2 it on er (. ) a slab to have a look what it is than leave it 
3 umh and I had this pronounced lump which grew, 
4 it doubled in size in twelve days (. ) and er he said 
5 well I'm going to South Africa for a month in a month Dee 
6 so I said well I want this lump out before you go (. ) 
7 he said yes I agree and umh I was in surgery the following 
8 Tuesday so I was about twelve days between seeing my GP and 
9 having my surgery which is very good because my GP said 
10 I'd have to wait six weeks to see an NHS consultant (.. ) and I 
11 said, Jane, I can't wait six weeks, I will be mental by six weeks 
12 RC yeah 
13 Dee I'd already waited over the Easter period because- it was our 
14 twenty fifth wedding anniversary and my son's birthday that 
15 weekend so we had a lot of family here and 
16 we were going out to dinner when I found my lump (.. ). hhhh 
17 so that weekend was Easter, Easter Monday and Easter 
18 Tuesday (. ) no doctors, so I saw my doctor on the Wednesday 
19 (1.0) 1 got to the stage where if theyd said >there wasn't a spare 
20 appointment on the Wednesday I was going to camp outside 
21 -4 because I was beside myself, > because everybody said, 
22 oh it'll be nothing Dee, just a harmless little cyst, 
23 but I knew, RC, don't ask me how, I knew 
24 RC umh 
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25 Dee that I had breast cancer (1) and it was my (. ) I think 
26 it was my worse fear fulfilled because I'd had a hysterectomy 
27 three years- nearly three years before 
Prior to extract 4: 4.5, Dee has been talking about already having attended for a 
routine MaMMograM22 and that she is a private patient. She is reporting on a 
meeting with her consultant. Dee prefaces her story with a generalised principle 
or lesson, to which the story is then hearably relevant: "if you have a lump 
anywhere it's much better to have it on er (. ) a slab". This provides a principled 
basis for what follows, which is her insistence on immediate treatment. She 
emphasises the urgency of this: "I had this pronounced lump which grew, it 
doubled in size in twelve days" (lines 3-4). This displays Dee as responsibly 
checking the lump regularly, and noticing the rapidity of its growth. She then 
introduces the notion of delay. Delay is a relevant term given how Dee quotes 
her consultant saying "well I'm gong to South Africa for a month in a month", (line 
5) followed by Dee's orientation to that as problematic: I want this lump out 
before you go" (line 6). Her status as a private patient is made delay-relevant in 
lines 7-9, where she mentions the briefness of the time between visiting her GP 
and the surgery. She describes it as "very good" in contrast to how, as an NHS 
patient, her GP said she would have "to wait six weeks to see an NHS 
consultant" (line 10). 
Dee provides us with how even a six week wait would be problematic for her: 01 
will be mental by six weeks" (line 11). The next detail is interesting, in that it 
attends straight away to any notion that Dee might be being over-insistent or 
over-anxious: the delay would effectively be longer, given that she had "already 
waited over the Easter period" (line 13), which itself is accounted for in terms of 
pressing family engagements. Throughout the extract, Dee displays her own 
understanding about the right thing to do, which includes avoiding delay as much 
as possible, together with her own agency in minimising delay in the face of both 
normal NHS medical practice, and the imminent disappearance to South Africa of 
her private consultant. 
22 Attending a routine mammogram also displays Dee as doing being responsible. 
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Dee makes relevant her identity as a wife, married for 25 years, and a mother, 
with a son and a "lot of family". This is part of the account for the Easter period 
delay, but also for the lump's initial discovery: "we were going out to dinner when 
I found my lump" (line 16). Dee is constructing herself as leading a normal family 
life, doing normal family things, when she discovers something out of the 
ordinary (cf. extract 4: 1.1). 
Once the lump was found, Dee acted with all possible speed (lines 18-20), 
including a determination to brook no delays by the hospital. In the face of any 
such difficulty, she would "camp outside". And in the face of what other people 
were saying, she somehow "knew" it was cancer. The use of extreme terms 
"everybody said" and "oh it'll be nothing" (lines 21-22), emphasises the contrast 
between what she knew, and what others were telling her. 
Dee's claim (line 23) "1 knew" (cf. extract 4: 1.1) is assertive, while "don't ask me 
how" attends to her difficult epistemic ground for making such a claim. She also 
appeals to RC personally (line 23), which asks RC to take Dee's story as credible 
on just such a personal basis, on trust between persons, rather than, say, as 
something founded in objective evidence and subject to potential cross- 
examination. But Dee also provides some plausibility about her claim to know it 
was breast cancer and some understandable grounds for her concerns about 
delay, by supplying information about a previous medical problem, implying some 
relevant experience (lines 26), 
In Dee's account, any delay in getting a definitive diagnosis was due to no blame 
on her part. Indeed, she creates a contrasting identity as someone strong and 
certain about her claims, and insistent upon proper and immediate attention. 
Summary 
This chapter has looked firstly at how PWC cope with the early signs of their 
illness. The analysis began with the diagnostic trajectory, the time when their 
identity as a healthy individual is transformed to a PWC. The analysis showed 
firstly how, in accounts of discovering their symptoms, the concern for 
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participants is to display their personal accountability for doing being responsible 
and doing the right thing by going to the doctors. Secondly, the analysis showed 
how the delays or inadequacies on the part of the medical profession become 
salient features of how participants account for their experiences of what 
occurred and what they did at the time. 
What is interesting across all these accounts is who is constructed as being 
accountable for 'diagnostic delay. Participants for the most part avoid directly 
undermining or criticising the medical profession, or expressing any failure of 
confidence in it (see extracts 4: 4.1-4: 4.2; 4: 4.5). There is, however, a pattern of 
rhetorically powerful moves in these accounts that effectively recruit the hearer's 
agreement, as stories of culpable 'diagnostic delay'. A notable feature of the 
accounts is how the descriptions are constructed in ways that provide resources 
for the hearer to draw these inferences and conclusions for themselves, rather 
than the participants actually voicing them directly. A rhetorical advantage of that 
'evidential' way of talking is that it recruits the reader into those same inferences, 
while avoiding displaying the narrator as having some kind of axe to grind. 
The extracts in Chapter 5 relate to participants' accounts of receiving the news 
that they have cancer. Many of these accounts overlap with stories of delay and 
complications but the analysis focuses on the main feature of interest, how 
participants construct their accounts of receiving the 'bad news' and how they 
manage potentially complainable matters. 
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Chapter 5 
Further accounts of diagnosis and delay: 
Receiving the bad news 
"I wouldn't demand a lot of my doctors time: I just wish he would brood on my 
situation for perhaps five minutes, that he would give me his whole mind just 
once, be bonded with me for a brief space, survey my soul as well as my flesh, to 
get at my illness, for each man is ill in his own way" 
Anatole Broyard (1993) http: //cancershock. com/html/quotes. html 
Introduction 
It was noted in Chapter 2 that a number of studies have looked at how people 
talk about various kinds of troubles (Brenneis, 1988; Jefferson 1981; 1984a, 
1984b; Miller and Silverman, 1995). But again, the perspective of the person 
with cancer talking about how they received their diagnosis, their concerns and 
how they manage such problematic talk is mostly overlooked. The element of 
'troubles talk' in this chapter looks at how a PWC talks about the events leading 
up to the 'bad news' delivery of a cancer diagnosis. Bad news can vary in how 
serious it is; a cancer diagnosis is at the severe end of the scale, and it can be a 
particularly sensitive and delicate topic for both teller and recipient. 
Chapter 2 also noted that a considerable amount of research has looked at 
doctor-patient communication and, in particular, the delivery of 'bad news'. 
However, the primary concern of that work was to understand institutional 
interaction and asymmetry (Maynard, 1991a, Pilnick, 1998), of how the news is 
delivered in terms of sequences and organisation (Maynard 1991b, 1992,1996, 
1997,1998), and sometimes to improve the communication skills of medical 
professionals (Fallowfield, 1993; Maguire and Faulkner, 1988a). These studies 
have resulted in a better understanding of this relationship, and have made 
recommendations on how the news should be delivered, for example in a 
comfortable location offering privacy and relative peace and dignity, or having 
someone present during the bad news transaction (Ptacek and Eberhardt, 1996). 
However, they have not looked at the patients' perspective and how they talk 
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about how this news was delivered or the problems that are managed in the 
process of telling. Also, breaking bad news in the cancer diagnostic trajectory is 
complex and far from straightforward. A diagnosis of cancer is typically not 
something that a person does not know about and then suddenly does. The 
person experiencing the symptoms has to have a series of tests resulting in 
meetings with various members of the medical profession, and possibly surgery, 
until, eventually, a diagnosis is reached. 
In extracts 4: 4.1-4: 4.5 it was noted that on occasions participants introduce the 
idea that arriving at their diagnosis took place over an extended period of time; in 
other words, that there was some delay. The following analysis is formulated 
from two closely linked and analysable events of interest in the trajectory of 
diagnostic accounts: the notion of delay, and the account of how PWC received 
the news of their cancer diagnosis. 
Complaining and Blaming 
The analysis makes a link between participants' accounts of 'diagnostic delay', 
analysed in Chapter 4, and the construction of potentially complainable matters. 
There is a close relationship between 'troubles talk' and complaints, whether they 
are described as 'indirect' or'direct' complaints. ' Drew and Holt (1988) identified 
a number of issues about complaints, which they proposed required empirical 
analySiS, 2 particularly how they are managed and organised in social activities. 
Emerson and Messinger (1977) suggest that complaints play a crucial part in the 
negotiated construction of versions of what exactly the trouble may be. Making a 
complaint is the point at which some vague perception of something being wrong 
1 According to Boxer, 'indirect complaints' are expressions of dissatisfaction "about oneself or 
someone/something that is not present" (Boxer, 1993: 280) and that indirect complaints can be 
distinguished from 'direct complaints' because "the addressee is neither held responsible nor 
capable of remedying the perceived offence" (ibid: 280). 
2 They proposed that that analysis of how complaints are managed should attend to: "how the 
troubles they report are formulated, how the recipient's response might shape the formulation of 
trouble which emerges from the interaction; how complainants seek to persuade recipients of the 
validity of their accounts and hence of the justice of their complaints and how the extent of a 
recipients affiliation may have consequences for the organisation of the activity of complaining" 
(Drew and Holt, 1988: 400). 
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is cast into the public domain, in an effort to mobilise help in remedying the 
trouble. 
GOnthner noted that complaint stories occur when "speakers complain about the 
behaviour of one or several absent third persons" (GOnthner, 1997: 180). Making 
explicit complaints, or blaming doctors and the medical profession for any delay, 
can be a delicate or awkward topic to address. It is unlikely a PWC would want to 
upset or anger the medical professional at the time of diagnosis and treatment; 
after all their life is in their hands, and they might not want to put themselves at 
any risk (although there are exceptions as Dee extract 5: 2.3 reports). 
Furthermore, PWC may understand, and orient to, the position of medical 
practitioners as experts in a technical field, so that complaints may appear unfair 
or naYve. 
The Analysis 
My analysis is based on participants' retrospective accounts of events, rather 
than on their conversations with medical practitioners. What actually happened 
and what was said at the time in question is not known, but interestingly my 
analysis reveals that in the rhetorical construction of their (sometimes long) 
'diagnostic delay accounts', although not explicit, there is hearable complaining 
and blaming being done. 
The troubles reported here are those PWC produce in relation to the complex 
route to diagnosis and how the news was delivered and received. Ganthner 
notes that in telling complaint stories "participants actively constitute social 
closeness and bonding, common rejection of the portrayed behaviour and the 
constitution of common identity" (GOnthner, 1997: 213) and that complaint stories 
act to increase "solidarity among the complaining parties" and are "produced in 
contexts of social intimacy" (ibid: 213). What is also interesting in these accounts 
is how participants attend to the presence of others. 
The analysis is divided into two parts: 
5: 1 "The Comedy of Errors": "it's only cancer" 
5: 2. Companionable matters: Whose fault is it anyway? 
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5: 1 "The Comedy of Errors": "It's only cancer" 
The first group of extracts, 5: 1.1-5: 1.8 are taken from what I have termed "The 
Comedy of Errors "3 narrative. The 'troubles talk' and the implications of 
complaint and blame are subtly managed in Sara's description of the course of 
events before she was eventually told she had breast cancer (see also extract 
5: 2.6). 
Extract 5: 1.1 Sara 15/03 "he just couldn't find where It was" 
40 Sara and as I got there umh (1.0) he had a 
41 look at me (. ) and he couldn't find it (. ) 
42 1 mean it was that little 
43 RC umh 
44 Sara that he just couldn't find where it was and I had to take 
45 his finger and more or less guide it on to the spotyknow 
46 hh wh(hh)ere this li(hh)ftle th(hh)ing was and er 
47 he says oh yes there Is there is a little thing there 
48 he says er but er (. ) I don't think it's anything to worry 
49 -+ about but I'll still send you to see the er specialist 
50 RC umh 
51 Sara I'll make an appointment for you (. ) so I says (. ) ri:: ght. 
52 RC umh. hh 
53 Sara so er, (. ) eventually an appointment was made and er a 
54 letter came through the door (. ) a few months after 
When she first discovered the lump in her breast (extract 4: 2.1) Sara reported 
that she made an appointment to go to see her GP. What now becomes relevant 
in extract 5: 1.1, is Sara's earlier detailed description of how she found her lump 
in the first place (see extract 4: 1.1), because she is now accounting for the 
doctors difficulty in finding it. It is not that Sara is wrong about the lump being 
there, or that the doctor was being incompetent; it's because "it was that little" 
(line 42). In order for any further action to be taken, the doctor has to 
independently make his own discovery and confirm Sara's claim. But initially 
3 Sara's "The Comedy of Errors" is reproduced in full in Appendix E. 
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there is a problem (line 44), "he just couldn't find it" and Sara has "to take his 
finger and more or less guide it on to the spot y'know" (lines 44-45). If the doctor 
cannot find it, then there is a problem for Sara's credibility and being taken 
seriously, but (line 48) the actively voiced change of state token, "oh yes" 
displays the doctor finding it for himself. 
Sara then reports the doctor giving her reassurance by saying I don't think it's 
anything to worry about" (line 48). This reassurance works as the rhetorical 
opposite to there being anything to worry about. What is interesting here is that 
the rhetoric invokes what is not being said, that the lump could be a sign of 
breast cancer. Not saying what it could be is also reflected in the expression, 
that he will send her to "er a specialist" (line 49); no explicit mention is made of 
what kind of specialist that might be, such as oncology or gynaecology. The 
notion here is that the doctor avoids, but hearably avoids, making any reference 
to cancer. Yet note the detail in line 51 "so I says (. ) ri:: ght. " Sara voices her 
response as this minimal receipt, with a falling, drawn out intonation on "ri:: ght" 
that leaves the 'rightness' in some doubt. RC orients to that feature in immediate 
next turn ("umh hh", line 53). This sets up what follows, which is Sara's 
description of an appointment being made "eventually" and "a few months after" 
(lines 53-54). Without elaborating or making an explicit issue of it, Sara has 
started to introduce grounds for complaint. It is a long extract, and only parts will 
be analysed here, but I am reproducing most of it to show how the narrative is 
constructed as a continuing series of potentially complainable 'errors'. 
Extract 5: 1.2 Sara 15/04 "the wrong department" 
55 er, (. ) knowing me, I'm usually so busy II er just looked 
56 at the date of when I was supposed to be there 
57 RC umh 
58 Sara and I thought, oh eight, I'll be there for that date 
59 but I didn't look to see what department. 
60 1 didn't read every single thing on the paper 
61 RC right 
62 Sara all I did was just look, for, yknow, I saw the date, that 
63 1 have to be there and, and eryknow well I thought right 
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64 that's good enough for me er because er I mean 
65 -+ what more is there to er (. ) know, y' know, until I get there 
66 so of course the day came (. ) I went down, 
67 1 was in the wrong department. 
68 So he didn't send me to the right place 
Firstly, Sara establishes her role in events by accounting (line 55) for her own 
part in ending up in the wrong department, because she is busy and (line 60) 
stresses she "didn't read every single thing". She sets up the event in such a 
way that she is able to say "of course ... I was in the wrong department" (lines 66- 
67); she reports (reconstructs) her reasoning processes at the time (lines 63-65), 
accounting for her own actions as rationally grounded. One way for speakers to 
avoid imputation about their agency is to place the blame for any bad news 
elsewhere (Maynard, 1998) and in this instance, Sara directly attributes the 
blame to her GP, (line 68) "he didn't send me to the right place". Despite the 
doctor sending her to "er a specialist", Sara knows that when she arrives in 
gynaecology, she had been sent (albeit to a women's department) to the wrong 
department. However, she says that the doctor there does agree to see her 
(lines 88-89 below). 
Extract 5: 1.3 Sara 15/05 "it may be nothing" 
88 she says but do you want me to have a look at you (. ) 
89 So I says, I don't mind. So she examined me down there as well 
90 and er she says er, you're fine, nothing to worry about 
91 and then she says I'll have a look at your lump and she did and 
92 she says I should go back to your doctor immediately and tell 
93 him to get you to the right department as soon as possible 
94 it may not be anything, it may be something, she says, 
95 but lumps are not supposed to be () there you take them out 
96 RC u:: mh 
Sara's recruitment of what the doctor in gynaecology says (lines 92-95) works to 
corroborate and objectify Sara's worries and complaint, confirming that it is her 
GP who is responsible for sending her to the wrong department, that it is indeed 
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the wrong department, and that her lump is something potentially serious; she 
should to go back to her doctor "immediately" and get sent to the right 
department "as soon as possible" (lines 92-93). These extreme formulations 
point up the urgency, and therefore also the potential seriousness of her 
condition, and along with that, the potential seriousness of the delay that has 
already occurred. Voicing all of this via the gynaecologist, Sara is able to 
objectify her complaint while distancing herself from the making of it. 
Sara is again given reassurance and whilst "it may be anything, it may be 
something" (line 94) and again, nothing specific is said about breast cancer. 
Instead, the doctor says, "lumps are not supposed to be there you take them 
out" (line 95). The implication here is that whether they are benign or malignant, 
they need taking out, but we know, in retrospect, that Sara's lump is malignant. 
But still Sara reports (lines 100-102 below) a lack of urgency in taking her lump 
seriously by indicating the passage of time again (see also extract 5: 1.6 lines 
146-148). Further, the 'right' department remains unnamed, but of course turns 
out to be oncology, as was well known at the time of the interview, when Sara's 
story was told. The retrospective nature of the interviews is not just a feature 
reflecting their accuracy, but permits the nature of events to be told against a 
ready-made shared understanding of significant features of how things turned 
out; most obviously, that the person indeed had cancer. 
Extract 5: 1.4 Sara 15/06 "three months had gone already" 
97 Sara so I had to go back to him, and ask him (. ) to send me to the 
98 right department 
99 -+ RC how long had you waited? 
100 Sara this was, well about three months had gone already from 
101 my first appointment, (. ) then er I went to him and er (1.0) 
102 a week had passed and I happened to be there again for 
103 er, I think it was for Jason, something to do with his asthma and 
104 umh I asked the Nurse, did Dr D send off my letter to the right 
105 department and she looked up and says 
106 oh no it's still here (. ) it's not gone yet 
107 Chloe [((gasps)) 
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108 RC [((gasps)) 
109 Sara She says I'll get it off as soon as possible 
110 RC So there was no sense of urgency at this stage? 
Ill Sara So there was no urgency there at all (. ) for it 
112 the only time the urgency (. ) ha: ppened was when I went p-qa-ýin- 
In the above extract, Sara constructs a further sense of delay and RC's question 
(line 99) asking how long Sara had waited clearly displays receipt of Sara's 
account of undue delay. It is interesting to note that up until this point in the 
story, neither Chloe nor RC have said anything explicit, but have merely used 
'continuers" such as 'right' or 'umh' for her to go on with her story. The next 
event Sara reports is a routine visit to her GP for her son Jason, and we hear 
(line 103) that her letter for a new appointment has still not been sent. Again, 
Sara does not explicitly make anything of this, and expresses no sense of 
urgency on her own part either. 
Yet, for the recipients the delay complaint is becoming more and more clearly 
hearable. In lines 107-108 RC and Chloe both react with gasps (of 
astonishment) and it is RC (line 110) who questions whether there was any 
sense of urgency, and Sara simply agrees, in deadpan fashion: "there was no 
sense of urgency there at all" (line 111). Given the contrast with the 
gynaecologisfs expressed urgency, and with the known eventual diagnosis of 
cancer, the accusatory finger clearly points now at Sara's GP. Yet on eventually 
reaching the right department, Sara's problems continue. 
Extract 5: 1.5 Sara 15/07 "it's probably nothing to worry about" 
114 (( ... )) and they tried to do a biopsy and 
115 they couldn't because it was too hard, and he couldn't get in 
116 and then it was bleeding and so an- and so I thought 
117 right well I know what that is anyway 
118 1- 1 didn't need, anybody else to tell me what was wrong hhh 
4 Continuers such as 'uh huh' 'umh' 'right' are a feature of interview talk which signify a request 
to the person speaking to continue with an elaboration of their prior turn. Additionally they 
acknowledge the receipt of what has already been said but demonstrate that they should continue 
(See Jefferson (1984b) and Schegloff (1982) on the use of continuers). 
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119 but umh still (. ) you've got to wait for confirmation 
120 You need that little bit of thing saying 
121 Oh well (. ) it's probably nothing y'know 
122 RC umh 
123 Sara so even he himself says, umh 
124 I'm sorry I can't get the- er any sort of er umh (2.0) 
125 RC is this the consultant? 
126 Sara not the tissue, the liquid, 
127 he was trying to draw some fluid out of it 
128 RC umh 
129 Sara he couldn't get any fluid out, there was blood coming 
130 this is er the specialist 
131 RC uh huh 
132 Sara but he says I tell you what, he says umh, it's probably 
133 nothing to worry about, he says I don't think it's any er 
134 (. ) malignant umh tissue that's here hhh he says 
135 but I'll make an appointment 
It is now some three months since Sara discovered her lump, and she now 
describes the difficulties that ensued when "they tried to do a biopsy" (lines 114- 
116). Sara reports how she drew her own conclusions, in the form of what she 
purportedly realised at the time, using active thinking (lines 116 -121) "so I 
thought (. ) right well I know what that is anyway", and how she did not need 
anyone to tell her. In spite of being in the hands of medical experts, their role is to 
delay a discovery that Sara herself reaches before them. Note, however, that 
Sara does not simply declare herself a better doctor than they are; her 
knowledge is of a different kind. Even though she 'knows', she counters any 
possibility of hubris or naivety by alluding (line 120) to the possibility that she 
could be wrong, and leaves the technical vocabulary to the consultant: "I don't 
think it's any er (. ) malignant umh tissue that's here hhh he says" (lines 133- 
134). 
Again, of course, we are told this against the background of knowing that 
judgement to be false, along with the doctor's normative reassurance, "it's 
probably nothing to worry about" (lines 132-133). In the light of it being wrong, 
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this reassurance now sounds empty and conventional. He talks like friends do 
(or husbands, see Dee extract 5: 2.2) providing reassurance, saying what they 
think is the best thing to say in the circumstances, rather than what may be best 
medical judgement. A source of problems for doctors therefore, as well as being 
a resource, is that they also talk like everyone else: they are people as well as 
medical experts. But on this occasion for the first time, a cancer term is explicitly 
used, if only to deny it: "I don't think it's any er (. ) malignant umh tissue" (line 
134), which also invokes the specialist as a cancer specialist. Even now, a 
sense of further delay arises because rather than promising immediate action, 
the next move is "I'll make an appointment" (line 135). 
The following three extracts (5: 1.6-5: 1.8) show the continuation of this narrative, 
but I will only highlight the features relevant to the theme of complaint. In extract 
5: 1.6, Sara again alludes to the amount of time that has passed, but now there is 
a sense of urgency. 
Extract 5: 1.6 Sara 15/08 -"A sense of urgency" 
139 (( ... ) then umh (. ) I went 
140 again (. ) the next week to (. ) for Jason to have another 
141 check up with his asthma but I mean they don't do check ups 
142 on asthma every five minutes(. ) 
143 RC Umh 
144 Sara So y'know there's a space in betwee:: n and while he was the:: re 
145 the nu: rse (. ) said to me who does- who was doing the asthma 
146 and the check up (. ) hows your lump coming on Sara? 
147 So I says oh it's gro::: wing nicely (. 1) so she sa: (hh)y:: s 
148 hhh ha ha ha can I (hh) ha: (hh)ve a lo: ok 
149 hh ha ha ha (. ) hhh ha so she says can I have a look 
150 so I says yes of course so she took one look at it 
151 so she says oh I better let Kevin come in and have a 
152 look at this (1.0) so in comes the doctor and he 
153 has a look at it and the next thing I know they've forgotten Jason 
154 was there for his asthma, and he was on the phone trying to get 
155 to the doctor, (. ) then he was on the phone trying to get to 
156 pathology to see if they had the resu: lts of this er stuff that they'd 
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157 tried to get out of me (. ) pathology wouldn't give him any news at 
158 all of what's going on, the, the doctor, the consultant was in 
159 theatre so he couldn't get through to him and hh he's 
160 flinging around like a whatsit, y'know, hh so (. ) 
161 he <called me in the o: ffice at the end of the day because he 
162 just couldn't get through> to the hospital or to- to the pathology 
163 de: partment (. ) so he says pathology wouldn't tell me er anything 
164 about er the er results and he says what I can make of it 
165 them y'know it has- it has got to be ca:: ncer (. ) 
166 because if it wa: s hhh clea: r and it was nothing they'd 
167 probably say to me well oh everything's fine 
168 but they wouldn't let me know anything so 
169 all I can presume it is (. ). hhh 
170 RC umh 
Sara is visiting her GP With her son Jason for his asthma check up and the nurse 
(note, not the GP) asks (line 146) "how's your lump coming on Sara? " Sara 
treats this with a sense of irony and laughingly says, "oh it's gro::: wing nicely" 
which indicates that it is no longer a 'little thing'. What is interesting is how Sara 
constructs what is now hearably a sense of urgency (linesl52-160). As with the 
gynaecologist in extract 5: 1.3, the urgency is produced as the nurse's rather than 
Sara's herself: note in particular "she took one look at it" (line'150) and the 
actively voiced "Oh" etc., (line 151). Sara lists one quick action after another, 
until describing her GP as (line 159) "flinging around like a whatsit, YknoW" and 
then the crescendo of activity calms down again as Sara is called into her GP's 
office. 
Stories of how someone receives their cancer diagnosis seem far from simple. 
Sara has endured a considerable and avoidable delay, there were difficulties in 
doing the biopsy and then, further delay is implied in trying to get hold of the 
results, which eventually produce the news. Sara's GP, who initially sent her to 
the wrong department, provided erroneous reassurance and delayed making her 
revised appointment, now begins to act more decisively. In quoting his version of 
events, he appears to be at the mercy of an unco-operative pathology 
department, yet doing his best to find the facts and tell Sara the blunt truth. 
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Deliverers of bad news seek to avoid blame (Maynard 1998), and Sara's account 
of her GP reflects that practice on his part. 
One elaborate way of presenting bad news is to cast it as a "logical sequence of 
progressive events that leads to an inevitable conclusion" (Clark and LaBeff, 
1982: 376) which is how Sara has constructed this account. But the results here 
are not presented as conclusive, because her GP says "what I can make of 
it.... it has got to be cancer" (lines 164-5). Although it is known that Sara was 
ultimately diagnosed and treated for breast cancer, it is interesting that 
throughout her story she provides for an alternative possibility, alive up until the 
definitive diagnosis, that they still could be wrong. There is a sense of collusion 
between her, the GP and the hospital, to put off 'D Day, the day of diagnosis. 
Sara's account of receiving the news, that she has cancer, is the culmination of 
what has gone before in her narrative; it is a long narrative, constructed in a way 
that distances her involvement in the frenzy of the "to-ing and fro-ing" that she 
describes happened in trying to get the results. 
It is only in extract 5: 1.7 that Sara produces an acceptance of what this 
protracted route to her diagnosis means, and attends to this by talking about her 
son (lines 173-83). 
Extract 5: 1.7 Sara 15109 "it was so:: la:: Id back" 
171 -ý Sara y'know and he:: (hh)s got this box of tissu(hhh)es 
172 the(hhh)re)( kno(hhh)w hh ha ha ha hah hah hah hhhh 
173 and I tho(hh)ught o(hhh)h m(hh)y Go(hhh)d 
174 Ja:: (hh)so(hh)n [hah hah hah hah hah hah 
175 Chloe [ha ha ha 
176 Sara I said hhh wh(hh)ose go:: (hh)ing to lo(hhhh)ok a(hh)fter 
177 Jaso(hh)n hh hah hah hah ha hh o:: h hh de(hh)ar. hhh 
178 and just the:: n that was the only ti:: me I ha:: d a little 
179 we: ep and a cry and what have you y'know 
180 RC Umh 
181 Sara hhh because I thought to myself (. ) what er y'know I- 
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182 the thought of not being able to look after Jason 
183 to see him grow up (. ). hh he says (. ) 
184 o: h don't worry about it you'll live jgL. na enough to see 
185 Jason grow up to be a fi: ne you:: ng man he says 
186 we'll get rid of that y'know (. ) it was so:: la:: id back it [was 
187 RC (umh 
188 Sara so:: (. ) o:: ka:: y (. ) y'know so ca: sual (. ) 
189 -* oh it's omly La: **ncer y'know. hh ha ha ha hhh 
The confirmation that this is bad news is that (line 171) her GP has "got this box 
of tissu(hhh)es" in anticipation of her tears. Sara's concerns for herself are 
expressed as concerns about what her illness and possible death will mean for 
her son Jason, and then the tears follow that. The possibility that she might die 
is indirectly invoked by "not being able to look after Jason (. ) to see him grow up" 
(line 182). 5 Yet even now, the GP again provides reassurance and it was "so:: 
laid back ... yknow so ca: sual (. 
) oh it's o:: niy ca::: ncer yknow" (lines 184-9). This 
Ocasual" delivery works to downplay any major concerns or worry and at the 
same time discounts any potential problems that the protracted route to delay 
could have implied. 
The extract contains a lot of laughter, which helps to manage talking about the 
awful news for hearers, but also displays that Sara is not dwelling on this in an 
indulgent or self-pitying fashion, but that she is looking on the bright side, and 
'coping' with these awful events. The laughter also contributes to her identity 
(built across much of her complaint-relevant stories) as someone who is not by 
nature a complainer or a moaner. (See Chapter 7 for more detailed analysis on 
the use of laughter in 'troubles talk'). 
In extract 5: 1.8, Sara does some specific stake management along these lines, 
not only for herself, but also on behalf of the medical profession. 
5A common feature in participants accounts is their concern for others, particularly family (see 
Chapter 6, extract 6: 3.1 and Chapter 8, extract 8: 4.1). 
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Extract 5: 1.8 Sara 15/10 "anybody can make a mistake" 
190 but he did say to me that er umh if there was a prob- 
191 if I ever I feel I need to talk to him or (. ) for anything at all 
192 he says (. ) he'll be the: re for [me 
193 RC [umh umh 
194 Sara just come to him (. ) 
195 RC Oh that's good 
196 -> Sara Yes (. ) Oh he is a very nice doctor (. ) he Is really nice 
197 and I wouldn't change him 
198 RC This is the doctor at the hospital or er the GP 
199 Sara No this is my GP (. ) y'know the o(hh)ne who sent me to the 
200 wro(hhh)ng pla(hh)ce in the fi(hhh)rst pla: (hh)ce 
201 y'kno(hh)w but I wouldn't change him for the world 
202 be: cause er umh (. ) he is really (1.0) anybody (1.0) 
202 can o:: verlook something or make a mistake(. ) 
204 RC sure 
205 Sara and this is how I look at it 
Throughout her narrative Sara has pointed the finger at her GP for sending her to 
the wrong place, treating her problem lightly, and delaying getting it dealt with. 
But in the end we are left with an image of a conscientious, kind doctor doing his 
best for her. In fact she blames no one, and declares her doctor "a very nice 
doctor", and she "wouldn't change him for the world". He is fallible only in so far 
as anybody is: "anybody (1.0) can o:: verlook something or make a mistake ... and 
this is how I look at it" (line 202). The last few words, "this is how I look at it" are 
particularly interesting however, in that they allow for the doctor's failings to 
remain perhaps objective and culpable, while his blamelessness is framed as a 
matter of Sara's own attitude, perspective, or generosity of spirit, of how she 
prefers to think. 
Sara does not make direct and explicit complaints, but the complainable nature 
of the events told are hearable in how she describes them. One of the things she 
achieves is that she is managing and negotiating her identity as someone who is 
not bitter nor angry, not the sort of person disposed to complain, and gives all 
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sorts of reasons why, that she is normal, and "looking on the bright side". At the 
beginning of her interview, Sara also managed some identity business by 
constructing herself as a rational, understandable, responsible person, doing the 
right thing and not to blame for the events that followed. It is interesting how her 
stories and descriptions of the medical personnel enables her not to talk or dwell 
too much on the awfulness of having cancer. Rather, she talks about lumps as 
"growing nicely", and uses laughter to fend off or manage any problem of story 
recipients engaging in expressions of sympathy, while managing to construct her 
story in such a way that the hearers rarely take a verbally explicit turn. 
5: 2 Complainable behaviour: Whose fault Is It anyway? 
In contrast to Sara (extracts 5: 1.1-5: 1.8), Dee presents a rather different account 
of delay and of hearing her diagnosis. It is not worked up in the same episodic 
way as Sara's, but what is interesting is how the amount of time that constitutes 
delay becomes defined for Dee, and how she manages the bad news. Dee also 
sets up a contrast between her GP and the oncologist. The dominating theme 
throughout extracts 5: 2.1-5: 2.4 is the complainable behaviour of the oncologist, 
which is set against receiving her diagnosis. 
Extract 5: 2.1 Dee 08/0212 "it's bloody awful news" 
1 -+ Dee I had a very good GP (1.0). hh umh and I had an appointment 
2 to see the oncologist in eight days after surgery (1.0) 
3 and we had the most horrendous meeting (2.0) umh (1.0) 
4 1 think his words were something like, 
5 Twell we've got the histology back DEE, 
6 it's really bloody awful newsl (. ) and I said fine, 
7 he said er >you need chemotherapy, plus radiotherapy and the 
8 chances of you being here in two years are fifty per cent 
9 and I think that's generous< (2.0) and would we- would we like a 
10 wig (1.0) and this is all sort of thrown at you within about (. ) eight 
11 minutes (2.0) 
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Dee sets up a contrast here (lines 1-3), which is a useful device in talking about 
troubles, which accomplishes two things for her. She contrasts her GP, who is 
"very good", with a "horrendous meeting" with her oncologist, which provides a 
preliminary gloss (what narrative analyst William Labov, (1972) calls an 
"abstract"), on the complaint story that follows. What it also provides (as for 
Sara) is an alternative narrative frame, in that talking about encounters with the 
medical profession avoids talking about and managing the receipt of the bad 
news itself, and the difficulties that accompany talking about cancer. The 
contrast with her GP also serves to particularise Dee's complaint as specific to 
the oncologist and his behaviour, rather than any kind of general reaction on her 
part to the diagnosis itself. When people are on the receiving end of bad news, 
there is sometimes a tendency to blame the messenger (Maynard, 1998). Dee 
further manages any impression that she may be doing that by providing details 
of the oncologist's behaviour. 
Her reporting of the news delivery (lines 5-6) is captured in a tentative voicing of 
his words to her: "Well we've got the histology back" (line 4). The technical 
medical term gives way to a common sense interpretation of what it equates with, 
"really bloody awful news". Dee's narrated receipt of this bad news pre- 
announcement is minimal: "fine". She continues her account (lines 7-9) focusing 
on the delivery of what is hearably an abrupt, matter of fact list of what the 
oncologist threw at her "within about eight minutes", (line 10) concerning her 
treatment programme and the prognosis ending with, "the chances of you being 
here in two years are fifty percent" (line 8). What Dee reports here, of course, 
takes much less than that eight minutes, but the inference is that he was 
bombarding her with rather brutal, factual information, with scant concern for her 
feelings. 
Again, it is interesting what Dee does not say. She does not report anything that 
relates to herself on a personal level, nor does she elaborate on her reaction. 
That is part of how we hear the oncologist's news delivery as so abrupt; it is 
provided in the form of a condensed list of awful things as if simply said to her, 
with no mention of Dee's reactions along the way. It is RC's reaction (extract 
5: 2.2 below, line 12) that pursues Dee's feelings, picking up the complaint via the 
153 
possible absence of anyone else (given the oncologist's inadequacy) to be there 
for Dee. RC asks whether Dee was hearing all this on her own. 
Extract 5: 2.2 Dee 08/03 "you'll be alright" 
12 RC were you- did you have someone with you? 
13 Dee I had my husband with me 
14 RC umh 
15 Dee who continuously said >you'll be afright which er angered me 
16 because how did he bloody know I was going to be alright, 
17 they didn't know [that was my, my, that made me very cross< 
18 RC [umh, umh, umh 
19 Dee because he didn't validate my illness (0.5))(know he said 
20 oh well it will all be alright, well it's not what I wanted to hear, 
21 >even though he probably meant it in the best possible way< 
RC's question serves to distract Dee, momentarily, from her focus on the 
oncologist. Dee says "I had my husband with me" (line 13). But this sets up 
another complaint. Dee answers that, presumably during the eight minute 
barrage of information, her husband was producing the normative response of 
reassurance to someone who has been given some awful news, that "you'll be 
alright" (line 15). But in contrast to a medical professional telling Dee this news 
(cf. Sara in extract 5: 1.6) Dee is "angered" and her husband is held accountable 
for this: "how did he bloody know" because referring to the medics, that "they" 
didn't know (line 17). 
Dee's account accentuates the difficulties for anyone, partners or medics, of 
knowing what to say to someone when they have been given such devastating 
news. Co-parti ci pants, or news recipients, normatively offer reassurance, that 
everything will be all fight. But Dee (lines 17-19) makes it very clear why she is 
cross, in that "he didn't validate my illness" and that "it's not what I wanted to 
hear" (line 20). She is invoking familiar therapy talk here with the use of 'validate', 
which prescribes that, in order to manage a trouble more successfully, there is a 
need for other people to recognise and acknowledge the reality and legitimacy of 
a person's trouble, before starting to deny or counter it. Dee claims that her 
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husband was not dealing with her problem, even though for possibly laudable 
motives, those of trying to provide hope and to say the 'right' thing. 
It is a difficult problem for her husband (or anyone else) to know what to say, 
which Dee does acknowledge by displaying her understanding that he "meant it 
in the best possible way" (line 21). Doctors, family, and friends invariably say "it 
will be alright", "you'll be fine" but this is not always what the PWC wants to hear. 
Dee's expressed anger (lines 15-17) and complaint (line 19) leave open the 
possibility that such reassuring reactions are designed more to manage the other 
person's interactional difficulties (whether a friend, husband, or medical 
professional delivering the diagnosis) rather than the PWC's. This is a theme I 
will return to in Chapter 6, category entitlement and the complainable nature of 
other people's ostensibly helpful reassurances. 
Under the circumstances, Dee's husband's response is deemed inadequate, 
considering that she has been given such a prognosis, but what do you say? 
Dee exclaims it was not what she wanted to hear and she needed validation at 
this time. But on other occasions, participants do want to be told that everything 
is all right, they want to be treated normally (See Chapters 6,7 and 8). It is not 
just friends and family who do not know what to say; medical professionals, other 
people with cancer (and interviewers) are subject to the same kinds of normative 
difficulties. 
Dee resumes her story about the horrendous meeting (extract 5: 2.3) and 
describes the behaviour of the oncologist, implying that he has his own difficulties 
in managing the delivery of such news. 
Extract 5: 2.3 Doe 08/04 "I'm shell-shocked" 
22 so I looked at the consultant and I said, well I lost all my hair in a 
23 RTA in 1978 (. ) when I had my plate fitted (. ) and I didn't wear a 
24 wig (. ) a wig is not an issue for me I'm quite prepared to have my 
25 head chopped off and have it under my arm if I'm going to live 
26 (. )Aso he so(hh)rt of hh looked and said (. ) I'll go and get you the 
27 brochures on chemotherapy and radiotherapy (. ) so he did, and 
iss 
28 went out (. ) and came back and he (. ) tossed them across the 
29 room and left- and he left the door open (2.0) and er he started 
30 to sort of say er >well any questions< and I said, look I think you 
31 know (. ) we're not- you've either had a bad morning and 
32 I'm shell-shocked 
33 RC umh 
34 Dee and I probably need to see (. ) a different oncologist because you 
35 and I are probably not going to get on 
In lines 26-31, Dee produces further details elaborating on her gloss that it was a 
horrendous meeting. She, constructs the oncologist's actions as being 
unreasonable and uncaring; he "tossed" the brochures, and "left the door open" 
producing a notion that he did not want to stay around; the open door tells of his 
intentions, serving as a non-verbal invitation for Dee to depart, or at least a 
rejection of the kind of privacy in which he might talk to her in a more personal or 
caring fashion. What Dee's discourse does is to place the emphasis on the 
inability of the oncologist managing this bad news, rather than on Dee herself. 
His direct, unsympathetic manner is produced as a criticism, of what he is not 
providing. However, Dee manages to display her own reasonableness under 
these extreme circumstances, by providing an excuse for his behaviour, that he 
may have "had a bad morning", but she then directly describes herself (line 32) 
as, understandably, "shell-shocked". This is offered as a challenge to him at the 
time (not just now, in retrospect). What follows (lines 36-49, see Appendix E) is 
an account of how she negotiated the basis for any future meeting and in extract 
5: 2.4, Dee goes on to describe what happened at her next meeting. 
Extract 5: 2.4 Dee 08/05 "he had his entourage with him, as they do" 
50 Dee hhhh so we agreed that we'd meet at the CRI 
51 [at radiotherapy (2.0) 
52 RC [umh 
53 Dee and er we did (. ) and he had his entourage with him, as they do 
54 (. ) and er I can remember it vividly >1 sat down and he sat down< 
55 he said (1.0) Tright, how are we todayý as if it was all my fault, 
56 you see, so I said, I'm better (. ) but I said 
57 I've had a dreadful week I said (. ) having my diagnosis was 
156 
58 nothing compared to the trauma of having your behaviour (. ) 
59 1 said I find it very unacceptable I don't consider I'm asking for 
60 anything out of the ordinary but I wanted to be treated like a 
61 piece of human flesh, not just er a you know another number 
62 (2.0) oh he said, I'm very sorry DEE (. ) he said *1 didn't realise 1 
63 upset you so much* and his staff were visibly shocked 
63 1 didn't know why at the time but they all sort of went 
64 ((non verbal action - Dee gives astonished look)) 
65 RC it does sound unusual 
Although Dee has provided grounds for finding her oncologist unreasonable, 
what is interesting in extract 5: 2.4 is how she presents herself in such a way that 
she was not the one being unreasonable and warrants the grounds for her 
complaint. Their meeting takes place in a public place, the radiotherapy 
department where "he had his entourage with him, as they do" (line 53). The 
script formulation of 'as they do' attends to this as being a normal occurrence; 
consultants are invariably surrounded by others (see also extract 5: 2.5). 
Who is to blame for the horrendous meeting is being specifically attended to now 
in how Dee reports his manner of speaking "how are we today" which for Dee 
also construes that he is inferring "it was all my fault" (line 55). Then, in no 
uncertain terms, (lines 57 - 62) Dee sets up a contrast to how she has been 
feeling in relation to how he had behaved previously, that it's "very unacceptable" 
(line 59) and how she does and does not want to be treated "not just er a you 
know another number" (line 61 )6 . This not only builds the effects of 
the presence 
of the entourage, but of being treated as an object rather than "human" and 
consequently, has a deindividuating effect. What RC points to, as sounding 
"unusual" line 66 is the response that Dee says she received from the oncologist. 
She not only gets an apology "I'm very sorry DEE" (lines 62-63), but it is also a 
public apology. Dee says that "his staff were visibly shocked" (lines 63). His 
apology makes her complaint not only believable but also credible; he is making 
a public apology, in front of his entourage, which validates Dee's cause for 
6 Being treated as a number, an object on a production line is a common feature of participants' 
discourse, though not specifically addressed in my thesis but see Chapter 8, extract 8: 4.1. 
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complaint. The entourage in Dee's narrative functions like a Greek chorus, 
providing reactions that tell the listener what it all means. Dee says she does not 
know why at the time, nor does she go on to explain it in verbal detail, but the 
inference here is that oncologists (or members of the medical profession) are not 
known for making public apologies. Again, the breach of a norm provides for 
Dee's complaint as well grounded and, if I may use the term, validated. 
Dee's complaint, unlike Sara's (extracts 5: 1.1-5: 1.8) and Angie's (extracts 4: 4.2- 
4: 4.3) is explicit and direct, as well as being carefully grounded in her narrative. 
Making direct complaints to the consultant responsible for your treatment, and 
therefore your life, can be controversial and threatening. Managing this is a 
delicate and complex matter but Dee presents herself as someone who is 
reasonable and is prepared to negotiate this relationship. At the same time, her 
story demonstrates that she is in control of how she wants to be treated. Despite 
how she was feeling ("shell-shocked" and "having a dreadful week") she 
manages to assert control and deflect the impact of the awful news onto the 
"trauma" of the oncologist's behaviour in delivering it. 
This is a common feature in my data, whereby participants tell long detailed 
stories in which complaints about medical professionals are either explicit or 
implicit and invite recipients to respond to this event, rather than to the diagnosis 
itself and all its connotations. This is presumably an interactional design feature 
of such stories, that they provide recipients with something else to respond and 
affiliate to, rather than the diagnosis itself. Again, I will comment on that kind of 
recipient-orientation at various points when examining features such as laughter. 
Angie's story is a stark contrast to those of Sara and Dee. She does not express 
or display any 'knowing' awareness of her illness, even in retrospect. As noted 
earlier, it was eighteen months before she was eventually given her cancer 
diagnosis, but her story of the receipt of the news is still hearably a complainable 
matter. Again, it is an account imbued with the difficulties that people have in 
talking about, relaying, and receiving the news of a cancer diagnosis. 
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Extract 5: 2.5 Angle 12/04 "oh we've had the results of the test" 
137 RC er, so how do you remember how he told you, 
138 1 mean how, I mean, you, how you actually heard 
139 the news from him? 
140 Angie oh yes well, no I didn't hear from the er umh [surgeon 
141 RC [what did he say? 
142 Angie I heard from the houseman who came up to my bed and said 
143 oh we've had the results of the test (1.0) so I said oh yes 
144 umh yeah you've got lymphoma 
144 ((very softly spoken, almost like muttering)) 
145 er I said er pardon ha ha, and he said umh, 
146 you've got lymphoma it was er lymphoma or something 
147 RC they actually told you that it was lymphoma? 
148 Angie yes, he just said it in a very laid back way 
149 and [I said oh right 
150 RC [right did you know what it was? 
151 Angie and then I thought (. )Twell I don't know what lympho(hhhh)ma is 
152 so I said well what's lymphoma? l 
153 and he looked acutely embarrassed 
154 and I can't remember what he said (. ) 
155 but I got the message it was a form of cancer and he walked off 
156 (. ) that was it (2.0) so I lay there thinking (. ) heavens 
157 and then I think I got a bit weepy about it 
158 so a nurse came and talked to me and explained it 
159 and really she (1.0) 1 mean the doctor was no help 
160 neither use nor ornament (1.0) umh (1.0) 
161 but then the surgeon came and saw me (. ) 
162 sometime later and explained what would happen 
163 and that I'd have to go to the lymphoma clinic 
164 and all that sort of thing (1.0) 
RC (lines 137-139) specifically addresses how Angie heard the news. And like 
Sara and Dee, Angie uses a contrast between one medical practitioner and 
another, in this instance the surgeon (who she later presents as a reasonable 
person) and the houseman. Again, this deflects from any notion that Angie's 
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reactions might be simply due to the bad news itself, or else an indiscriminate or 
irrational shooting of the messenger. She establishes that the news is delivered 
in a public place (line 142). Again as in Dee's story, Angie's response to the 
houseman's pre-announcement "we've had the results" is to produce a simple - 
acknowledgement of "oh yes", which orients to the yet-to-be-delivered nature of 
that news. It is of interest in its own right, though I will not pursue it here, that 
stories that reproduce dialogues may reproduce some functional features of 
actual recorded dialogues, reinforcing the notion that those features are indeed 
significant to participants, even though they would be unable to articulate what 
they are. 
Angle goes on (using active voicing) to say that he tells her "you've got 
lymphoma" (line 144) which she says very softly. This also appears to be a 
representation of how he said it, because it seems she did not hear him; she 
says (line 146) "pardon" and the houseman repeats that "you've got lymphoma". 
Angie's "or something" nicely displays what she goes on to say, her lack of 
understanding of what that was. Angie provides no recognition or awareness of 
the houseman's announcement, such that RC questions whether they actually 
told her it was lymphoma, which Angie confirms. It is interesting because, like 
Sara, Angie reports that it was said in a "very laid back way" (line 148), which 
again Angie simply acknowledges. It appears that she is colluding with the 
doctors discomfort, and could let the doctor get way with not telling her any 
more. 
What is at stake here is that by asking him questions, she might get an answer 
that she did not want to hear. But at this point, RC asks, "did you know what it 
was? " (line 150) because not only has the houseman delivered a diagnosis 
(according to her story) in a laid back way, but he has also used a medical 
description, which it appears that Angie did not understand at the time because 
she had to ask, "what's lympho(hhh)ma? " (line 152). Angie then describes the 
houseman's apparent inability in providing an answer, because she describes his 
reaction: "he looked acutely embarrassed", implying difficulty on his part in talking 
explicitly about cancer. It is also hearable that his delivery of the news was done 
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quickly, and that "he walked ofr' leaving her to "lay there thinking (. ) heavens" 
and I got a bit weepy" (lines 156-157). 
By describing the houseman's difficulties Angie also manages to avoid any 
response from her story recipient (RC) as to why Angie was perhaps not more 
insistent on getting the information she wanted. The houseman has delivered his 
bad news, in an uncomfortable manner, and has walked off and left her to deal 
with the emotional consequences. It is the nurse who is credited (line 159) with 
explaining it to her. Again this contrast points up how inept the houseman was, 
and she makes a direct complaint here (lines 159-160), about his inability to 
provide what she needed at the time; he was "no help, neither use nor 
ornament". Drew and Holt (1988) showed that proverbial, idiomatic and other 
figurative expressions are frequently used in making complaints, and do so in a 
way that does not invite their being unpicked or questioned in next turns. (Note 
the absence of response or pursuit in line 160). 
After the initial bad news is broken, Angie's brief descriptions of her encounter 
with the nurse and later the surgeon (lines 161-164) are produced in a more 
positive fashion. It is again interesting to see how other people are recruited into 
the account to deal with (or not deal with) the accompanying problems of the 
diagnosis. A common feature of these accounts is that participants do not dwell 
on how they felt, nor account explicitly for why they did not pursue the medical 
people to provide them with the information they need. The discourse is focused 
more on what others, in particular the medical people, said and did at the time, 
and attends mainly to their incompetence or their inability to talk about the 
implications of the diagnosis of cancer. 
Finally, I want to include two extracts, both taken from an interview with Bee, 
which also display 'blaming the messenger' for the news, though in contrast to 
Angie, Bee says she "knew" it was cancer. At the time of the interview 
(conducted along with her friend Jan) Bee had received two cancer diagnoses, 
the first having resulted in a hysterectomy, and later she was diagnosed with 
breast cancer. 
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In extract 5: 2.6, Bee focuses on how she received the news of her breast cancer 
diagnosis and in extract 5: 2.7, she recalls what happened when she had a 
hysterectomy operation. Again, as with Dee's accounts, these events are 
presented as hearably complainable matters, not so much concerning delay, but 
they demonstrate how the medical profession are reported as having difficulties 
in breaking bad news. Again, these narratives of events with the medical 
profession provide an opportunity for story recipients to attend to the issues they 
hear as complainable, and help deflect from any pursuit of personal interaction or 
accountability on the part of the PWC. 
Extract 5: 2.6 Bee 13/01 N am afraid I've got to tell you" 
5 Bee I forget how long I had to wait (. ) I saw the consult: ant 
6 and er within about three weeks I think 
7 before I got in there hh and I hh saw a hh ho: rrible hh 
8 registra:: r () hh ha a brutal registrar hh 
9 Jan 0:: h god 
10 Bee and er () there was actually a cancer nurse in the room 
11 (. ) with me () and I don't think he said much, 
12 1 think he said oh I'll just get some fluid off here 
13 and then we'll see what it !:: s (. ) tch so hhh I knew that it 
14 was- I knew again that it was cancer () 
15 so I had to go back again the next week and I saw the 
16 lady consultant, who was a decent old soul hh and er 
17 she said, she said er well I am afraid I've got to tell you 
18 that you've got cancer so I said yes I know. 
19 So she said who told you, how do you know hh hh ha 
20 1 said because hh ha ha because it's me: ha 
21 Jan Umh 
Although not the issue for this piece of analysis, the notion of delay is 
constructed (lines 5-7) and this is followed by Bee laughingly announcing that 
before that, she "saw a hh ho: rrible hh registrar:: r (. )" whom she describes not 
only as horrible, but "brutal. " Jan's receipt of this, *0:: h god" (line 9) clearly 
affiliates with Bee's description (Jan also has breast cancer). Bee's mention of 
the cancer nurse being present is done relevantly straight after Jan's reaction, in 
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a way that retains the notion of how horrible Bee's experience was: the (male) 
nurse present ("with me", line 11) was clearly no comfort, saying little and doing 
formal nursing duties. This is somewhat reminiscent of extract 5: 2.2 where, on 
hearing another horror story of diagnostic bad news delivery, RC asks "were you- 
did you have someone with you? " It is clearly a normatively expected feature of 
'coping' with such news, that one might benefit from having a friend or other 
person with them to help (and one recommended in the research literature). 
Again, it emerges as a robust feature across these accounts that there is 
generally a contrasting other member of the medical profession, whose 
deportment serves to point up the complained-of person as especially, and 
particularly, culpable. Bee's contrast against the brutal registrar is the "decent 
old soul" lady consultant (line 16) who, it turns out, is the ultimate bearer of the 
bad news. It is this lady consultant who, in Bee's narrative, prefaces the news 
with: "I am afraid I've got to tell you" (line 17), which is a polite way of saying that 
the bad news is something she cannot help telling, and a way of orienting to its 
nature for Bee, the PWC. 
Bee's depiction of this latter interaction is a friendly and co-operative one. She 
effectively helps the consultant to relay the news, by declaring it as not really 
news at all, but something already known (line 17). 1 have already shown an 
aspect of how participants use the concept of 'knowing' they have cancer in 
Chapter 4. When the consultant is reported to have said "who told you, how do 
you know", Bee just claims laughingly "because it's me: ". Again, as we have 
seen, the PWC's grounds for 'knowing' are not those of some kind of rival 
medical expertise, but rather, a different kind of personal knowing that people are 
'entitled to' (see Potter, 1996) on a common sense basis of personal experience. 
Extract 5: 2.7 is part of Bee's account of what happened when she was in hospital 
previously, at the time of her hysterectomy. 
Extract 5: 2.7 Bee 13/02 "1 was a demonstration model" 
47 Bee hhh so I turned up on Monday. hhh and I actually sa: w 
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48 the University (. ) lecturer (. ) that lectures that er 
49 Jan A professor was he? 
50 Bee No (. ) he wasn't hh but umh hh I was a demonstration 
51 model as I fo(hh)und out later (. ) hh [huh hhhh 
52 Jan [ha ha 
53 RC So he had some other students there did he? 
54 Bee Oh thou(. hh)sands hh be- because. hh ha ha I we(hh)nt 
55 ba(hh)ck hhhh and er ha (. ) and they said- they said to me 
56 o: h now I have seen you before hh you wouldn't 
57 hh ha reme: (hh)mbe(hh)r m(hh)e hh [ha ha ha 
58 Jan [ha 
59 Bee beca(hh)use hh ha ha ha so:: hh I knew th(hh)en 
60 [. hhh ha ha 
61 Jan [ye: s. hh ha ye:: s(. ) 
62 Bee I wasn't conscious you see (. ) and er oth: ers (. ) and when 
63 they came you see (. ) he came and hh he brought them 
64 all round my bed hh and I think he brought them (. ). hh 
65 to show (. ) er how (. ) to tell you that you've got cancer 
66 to be quite [honest 
67 RC [Oh that's' interesting 
68 Bee Yes 
87 RC So what sort of operation were they doing? 
88 Bee A hysterectomy 
89 RC Oh right, so that when you went back to the hospital 
90 Bee I knew by then I'd got cancer and I needed a hysterectomy 
91 RC Oh right 
92 Bee But they wouldn't say so until theyd operated on me 
93 and then he came in the next day with all these folks 
94 so he said (. ) oh (. ) he got one of the students 
95 to stand up and say, this lady has had a hysterectomy 
96 1 don't know whether he was talking to me or whether he 
97 said you had a hysterectomy yesterday (. ) umh and then 
98 Mr. K- that was the consultant (. ) he said (. ) we want you to er 
99 go on (. ) Provera (. ) that's some pills and then we would 
100-+ like you to have a month of radiotherapy and I said 
101 -+ oh it was cancer then (. ) and the whole of the students 
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102 -ý gasped you see 
103 RC so up until that point no one had told you what- 
104 Bee Well, no, they would not say it was cancer 
What is interesting about Bee's account here is that she is describing what 
happened after she had had her operation; it is a story of an attempt by the 
surgeon to communicate with her. The role of the lecturer provides the occasion 
for telling something she found out later, during another event altogether. Again, 
the medical practitioner is produced in various ways as treating Bee as an object, 
rather than an individual with feelings: she was "a demonstration model" (line 50- 
51), first shown to the students when unconscious and apparently uninformed 
(lines 56-62), and later at some point, she does not 
, 
know whether he was talking 
to her or to them (line 96). This also resonates with the metaphors of the 
medical model reviewed in Chapter 2, of the body as a machine that can be 
objectively repaired. Bee's account reflects the objectivity with which patients are 
often treated. 
Bee's account also has similarities to Dee's description of the oncologist and his 
entourage (extract 5: 2.4). When RC asks whether there were other students with 
him, Bee's response is ironically exaggerated: "oh thou(hh)sands", and she 
laughs through it (lines 54-58). Often narratives do not follow the strict temporal 
sequence of events (Young, 1987), and this happens here in that what she says 
is at first a little confusing. Bee has already given one account of how she 
received her diagnosis, and in this account, she is drawing on a previous 
occasion. She attends to the surgeon's difficulties, whilst on his rounds, of 
openly discussing her condition. Having established that she had previously 
been a "demonstration model", Bee makes a pre-announcement concerning why 
the consultant was currently there with his entourage (line 63-65), which sets the 
scene for her ironic account of what then happened (lines 93-95). The ironic 
nature of Bee's narration is interesting here, because it provides a way to tell her 
story of complainable experiences at the hands of the doctors, while at the same 
time displaying her own attitude as non-com plai ni ng, indeed as cheerfully making 
the best of things. 
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The irony continues with regard to the consultant's supposed purpose in being 
there, which was to demonstrate how properly to inform a patient they have 
cancer (line 65). In the event, in the story that follows, Bee is moved to say Uoh it 
was cancer then (. )" (line 101), to which "the whole of the students gasped you 
see" (again, "the whole of the students" formulates this in extreme terms, further 
pointing up the irony: see Edwards, 2000). Patients are on certain occasions, 
generally expected to be passive in the presence of someone from the medical 
profession. The gasped reaction from the students could signal either that Bee is 
actively engaging with the consultant rather than lying there passively, or else 
mentioning the hitherto skirted-round word "cancer", or else pointing up the 
consultant's having culpably left her in a sate of ignorance about her condition. In 
any case, what we are able to hear is a story of ironic complaint, of medical 
inadequacy at which Bee is now able to laugh at, embodying in that irony and 
laughter her positive, non-recriminatory way of 'coping' with it all. (See Chapter 7, 
extract 7: 2.4 for more detailed analysis of the use of laughter in this extract). 
Summary 
This chapter has looked firstly at how the notion of delay is produced as an 
accountable issue, and is worked up as a participant's concern ostensibly in two 
ways: either as them being personally accountable, or as an issue of 
accountability for the medical profession. On close examination of the accounts, 
however, it emerges that the interviewees consistently attend to their own 
rational accountability in what they found and did. The route to diagnosis is 
clearly not straightforward, and reaching an eventual cancer diagnosis can be full 
of complexities. This gives rise to, and scope for, a range of issues to be 
managed in narrating this sometimes protracted span of time from discovery to 
being given the bad news. 
The analysis also showed how accounts of delivering the bad news are closely 
tied to stories of delay. These accounts are invariably long, and are rhetorically 
constructed in a range of subtle ways as hearably complainable matters, while 
attending to the status of the teller as not personally disposed towards criticism 
or complaint. 
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In making what is hearably, and interactionally oriented to, as a complaint, 
participants routinely attend not only to the object they are complaining about, but 
also to their possible status as a complainer. They reflexively attend to the 
implication of their dispositional character, that they might be heard as just a 
'moaner', or as talking out of shock and despair at the diagnosis itself, by 
managing that kind of stake or interest. They present themselves as someone 
who is being reasonable and not overly complaining and looking for trouble. In 
most instances, the extracts chosen are taken from even longer accounts, which 
provide further opportunities for participants to attend to a perception of 
themselves as to what kind of person they are, and what they expect from others. 
One of the features of all these accounts is that participants present themselves 
as, basically, doing the right thing. The accounts are known in advance to be 
bad news stories; both RC and the participants know that the diagnosis is 
cancer. What is interesting is how the notion of a positive attitude, in other words 
doing being positive, permeates these accounts, and how telling stories about 
the medical profession provides participants with a way of managing the 
awfulness of (talking about) cancer itself (see Chapter 7). In this and other ways, 
the stories consistently orient to possible responses by the hearer. By producing 
their accounts in this way PWC make it easier for recipients to respond, because 
they can affiliate with the awfulness of the consultant or the registrar and they 
can affiliate with the story as a complaint, which diverts interactional attention, if 
any, onto the medical profession, rather than directly on the individual telling the 
story. The implied incompetence and culpability, along with the sometimes ironic 
nature of its narration also works to insulate the participants from reliving the 
badness of the bad news being told. It gives them something else to receive, 
and another story to tell. 
Having received their cancer diagnosis, the next stage in the trajectory of these 
narratives-in-interview was for participants to manage their identity as a PWC, 
and how this new identity was attended to in their social relationships. Chapter 6 
looks at accounts of the difficulties of talking to others, and in particular focuses 
on reports of what other people said to them, and the difficulties of knowing what 
to say. 
167 
Chapter 6 
Dilemmas of talking about troubles: 
The things people say 
Please do not trivialise 
My suffering 
You who are healthy 
You whose mortality is as yet 
Only dimly perceived - 
Please do not say 
"You will be just fine". 
I may well be - someday 
But I do not know ... You do not know ... Lois Tschetter Hjelmstad (1998) 
Introduction 
In Chapters 4 and 5, the analysis looked at the first issues participants attend to 
and have to cope with in the diagnostic trajectory. Before and during the time of 
diagnosis medical professionals and others are reported as saying, "you'll be 
alright", "there's nothing to worry about", and "it will be nothing". The next stage in 
the normative trajectory, despite being categodsed as someone with cancer, is to 
carry on life as much as possible as normal, and participants work to prevent 
others from treating them differently. One of the recurring topics of analysis 
throughout this thesis is how participants manage and display their 
understanding of the interactional difficulties they face in social situations. In 
Chapter 2,1 discussed how a cancer diagnosis carries 'cultural baggage' 
accompanied by prescriptive expectations from which other illnesses are exempt. 
So, when it is known that someone has cancer, social interaction can become 
problematic. 
As previously noted, talk around and about the topic of cancer is categorised as 
'troubles talk' and is a delicate and sensitive topic. The analytical concern of this 
chapter is with the problems that PWC encounter in their accounts of everyday 
conversations, the potential source of social support. What kinds of things do 
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people say to them, and how do PWC talk about and manage this? People, 
friends, family and the medical profession do want to say the 'fight thing' but what 
is the right thing? And what do you say to someone who has an illness that most 
people dread? 
In Chapter 2,1 also identified how cultural knowledge and the language of cancer 
is constructed as a normative backdrop for participants to draw on. I proposed 
that the language surrounding cancer is replete with attributions, which become 
issues of moral responsibility and accountability for the PWC. Descriptions such 
as 'brave', 'a hero' or 'courageous' are often invoked in talk about how people 
are expected to cope with illness. Attributes such as a 'fighting spirit' and a 
'positive attitude', part of cancer's culture, are assigned and prescribed as the 
appropriate way to cope, and are even suggested as offering better prognoses 
(Watson et al, 1999). 
Consequently a PWC, along with their potentially life threatening diagnosis, has 
to contend not only with the physical management of their illness and its 
symptoms, but they also have to deal with the problems of social interaction, the 
pervading culture of cancer, and the additional moral accountability this can 
place upon them. The PWC cancer must "bear their illness in ways that do not 
imply either that this burden is too heavy for them, or that bearing it makes them 
markedly different from the healthy" (Goffman 1963: 147). Radley (1993) 
suggests that it is a matter of maintaining an impression of oneself as being 
ordinary and being normal Oust like other people) against the background of 
evidence that one is clearly not. The categories 'normal' and 'abnormal' are 
characteristic features of language associated with people with chronic illness 
and are culturally constructed and intimately associated with the social, political 
and moral order (Lock, 2000). 
Illness calls upon people to account for both their condition and their handling of 
it in daily life, and to 'legitimise' their actions to avoid societal reproach (Radley, 
1993). The identity of someone who is ill can become overshadowed by the 
moral and value judgements that accompany the illness, which in turn pose a 
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challenge to their sense of what is important about themselves, and I suggest 
this introduces a number of new dilemmas for the PWC to manage. 
This chapter explores how people with a cancer diagnosis talk about the nature 
and difficulties of their everyday social interactions. The analysis focuses firstly 
on how participants account for how social interaction gets done in everyday 
conversation and, secondly, on how PWC deal with some of the dilemmas and 
complexities that arise. 
A regularly reported statistic, and one that was used recently in an advertising 
campaign for cancer research, informs us that one in three of the population will 
be diagnosed with cancer. It is therefore highly likely that most people will at 
some point come into close contact with someone who has cancer. If someone 
has cancer, or they have been close to someone with cancer, they might have 
some idea of how difficult conversations can sometimes be. But, regardless of 
any previous experience, knowing what to say to someone who has cancer often 
remains problematic. 
The Analysis 
The analysis offered here shows how this difficulty is addressed in participants' 
own accounts of it and how they use and respond to the everyday language of 
cancer. It appears that who says what, when and where contributes to whether 
what is said is deemed as appropriate support. Especially revealing is how 
participants report what they want and do not want people to say and how they 
produce their own expectations of how they want people to interact. This chapter 
aims to create an awareness that on certain occasions, some of the most 
straightforward kinds of everyday conversations can be problematic for those 
involved. 
The extracts chosen for analysis are examples of the main topics that were 
identified as concerns by the participants themselves. I have organised them into 
the following themes: 
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6: 1 Saying the right thing: "think Positive", "you're gonna be 
fine", "be brave" "fight it": Acceptance and rejection 
6: 2 Saying the wrong thing: sympathy and compliments 
6: 3 Putting on a brave face 
6: 4 Asking "How are you? " 
6: 1 Saying the right thing: "think positive", "you're gonna be fine", 
"be brave" "fight it": Acceptance and rejection 
In the following analysis, I look at how phrases such as 'think positive' or 'be 
positive' are produced in talk. There is a recurring pattern in 'troubles talk', that 
participants often present contrast stories. They first present a negative scenario, 
and then follow it with an upgraded positive scenario (see extract 6: 1.1 and 6: 2.1 
below and Chapter 7, extracts 7: 1.2-7: 2.6). 
Extract 6: 1.1 Andy 17/02 "think positive" 
11 Andy I can't remember us breaking down (11.0) er a lot (2.0) 
12 1 think I had aa little weep over it 
13 and I think you probably did at some time 
14 Pam yeah I think that we both did but 
15 Andy but (2.0) umh (. ) I think (4.0) the thing that encouraged me 
16 most I mean y'know we- we asked Mr Brown y'know 
17 what the prog- )(know what was it going likely to be like y'know 
18 RC umh 
19 Andy and he said, well he said, 1, if I have to operate I'll do my 
20 best he says and er, if you think positive he said, 
21 that'll help the job along he says but 
22 if you don't think positive there's no hope for either of us 
23 y'know and he more or less sort of (1.0) instilled into me 
24 that I'd got to think positive and I think (2.0) umh (2.0) 
25 we both took that attitude then 
26 Pam umh 
27 Andy didn't we, this is something we're gonna beat y' know and er 
28 Pam no good feeling sorry for yourself 
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29 Andy 
30 Pam 
31 Andy 
32 Pam 
33 
34 
no that's right, you cant Uust go back home and sit there and 
[you've got to get on with it hopefully 
and yknow (. ) not worry about it (. ) I mean 
and we're both (2.0) we're connected With our church quite a 
bit and we both believe in- in prayer 
RC uh huh 
36 Pam and umh it was just one of those things that we thought (. ) 
37 right then we'll pray about it and umh hopefully (. ) things will- 
38 will turn out all right y'know (. ) 
Extract 6: 1.1 introduces 'think positive'; one of the canonical scripts in the 
language of cancer. 'Think positive' is not a singular item; on its own it is merely 
an empty idiom. What is interesting is how Andy and Pam effectively construct 
their notion of its meaning indexically, and place it in context. 
Andy and Pam are talking about what happened shortly after they had been told 
Andy had cancer and they were feeling a bit drained. There is an interesting use 
of metaphor here resonating with the medical model and the machine metaphor, 
"I can't remember us breaking down" (line 11). But on this occasion it is indexed 
to emotions rather than anything physical in that Andy says, "I think I had a little 
weep over it" (line 12). The expression Na little weep" tells of their reaction to the 
seriousness of the diagnosis, while at the same time playing it down as not in any 
way overwhelming, and as something manageable. Indeed, as such it is 
apparently not even clearly remembered, "I can't remember" and "I think" (lines 
11-12). 
Jefferson (1980,1984a, 1984b, 1988) noted that a central feature of 'troubles 
talk' was the tension between attending to the trouble while also attending to 
'business as usual'. She found that there is a "trajectory which starts out 
attending to business as usual, moves gradually towards an attention to the 
trouble and then moves back to an attending to business as usual" (Jefferson, 
1988: 419). In interviews with PWC the nature of the talk is inevitably indexed to 
'troubles talk' throughout, and so there are other dimensions to Jefferson's 
notion, in that there is a tendency for PWC to contrast negative and positive 
situations in order to move from troubles (as with complaining and blaming and 
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praising and blaming discussed in Chapter 5). Rather than simply first saying 
what was bad and then moving to something more positive, Andy's initial 
description (lines 11-13) of the bad time is already constructed in ways that 
define it as not so bad as it might have been, anticipating the more 'positive' 
approach that they went on to adopt. 
In one of his unpublished lectures (April 9,1976, p. 9, in Jefferson, 1984a) Sacks 
proposed that 'embarrassing' and 'controversial' topics pose a particular sort of 
problem for conversation. He suggests that to get off them and to go anywhere 
else from them, the speaker has to specifically do 'getting off of them'. He 
proposes that a prototypical way of doing this is to produce something that 
specifically marks a new topic. In this instance, Pam's use of "but" (line 14) 
signals a shift in topic towards a contrast to the trouble. Andy moves on not only 
from the trouble talk but also contrasts this with something more positive, "the 
thing that encouraged me most" (line 15) which introduces his report of Mr 
Brown's response to being asked "what the prog-" (prognosis) was "likely to be" 
(line 17). 
Mr Brown is voiced as indicating that it should be a collaborative effort, that "if I 
have to operate I'll do my best", (lines 19-20) which Andy does not elaborate on, 
but voices Mr Brown's solution to the problem by saying, "if you think 
positive ... that'll help the job along" (lines 20-21). This effectively places personal 
responsibility onto Andy, for the trajectory and outcome of his illness. Mr Brown 
is telling Andy to 'think positive', which attends to the abnormality of Andy's 
trouble, that he has cancer. It is a normative and instructive notion related to the 
constructive process of helping the prognosis along, where "a positive patient is 
far easier to care for than a depressed or angry one" (de Raeve, 1997: 250). But 
the exhortation to 'think positive' represents illness as a moral problem. Being 
told to 'think positive' makes it an accountable matter for Andy and his prognosis, 
given that Mr Brown is voiced as saying, in extreme terms, "if you don't think 
positive there's no hope for either of us" (line 22). This makes 'thinking positive' 
a far more consequential matter than it being merely a good way of 
psychologically 'coping' with illness. 
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Andy presents a sequential narrative here to unpack the gloss (Jefferson, 1985a) 
of 'think positive', (or in Wittgenstein's terms, the rule that needs to be applied). 
Andy then says "we both took that attitude then" (line 25) and defines the illness 
as something that "we're gonna beat" (line 27). The invocation of "we" here, for 
an illness that is physically his alone, nicely defines the 'coping' and beating of it 
as something social, a matter of how he and his wife, and whoever else, will 
together deal with it, based on adopting a positive attitude. The contrast to an 
active stance of 'think positive' would be a passive stance, to think negative. 
Pam unpacks this gloss a little more by saying that it is "no good feeling sorry for 
yourself" (line 28), and Andy provides his own version of that: "you can't just go 
back home and sit there ... not worry about it (. )" (lines 29 and 31). The word 
"just" figures again, as so often in moral accounts, to define an action 
contrastively against what might better have been done. The use of "sit there" is 
also interesting. It is a canonical posture for doing nothing, used metaphorically 
as well as literally, and doing nothing in this instance is clearly the wrong 
(negative) thing to do. It is connected with worrying about it and being negative 
and goes against the instructions of Mr Brown, that Andy has to 'think positive'. 
Pam then produces another dimension to the gloss, by introducing something 
they actively believe and take part in: "we're connected with our church .... we 
both believe in prayer" (lines 32-33). This is also produced as a contrast to sifting 
down doing nothing. Pam's linking being positive with prayer not only offers 
prayer itself as an active instance of positive thinking, but recruits the agency of 
God on their side, revoking the non-agency of sitting doing nothing and merely 
worrying about it. 
So in extract 6: 1.1, Andy and Pam both work to construct what being told to 'think 
positive' means to them, and it is something that they embrace and accept. The 
credibility of this instruction is also made category' relevant, in that it is the 
"Knowledge is culturally and normatively linked to categories of actors in a variety of different 
ways. Certain categories of actors are treated as entitled to know particular sorts of things, and 
their reports and descriptions may thus be given special credence. At its simplest, a person visits 
the doctor because s/he is expected know something about illness. S/he is in a category of people 
who are treated as entitled to have such knowledge; s/he knows about illness by virtue of the fact 
that s/he is a doctor. That is, we assume that his/her category membership is a product of training, 
knowledge and so oif '(Potter, 1996: 114). 
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consultant, Mr Brown, who has defined this action or attitude as a contributing 
factor to the success of the operation, and to Andys eventual prognosiS. 2 
Telling a person to 'think positive', or'be positive' is the more credible if it is done 
on some basis of knowledge and experience. Ann's account (extract 6: 1.2 
below) of 'be positive' contrasts people's different entitlements to say such 
things. It may be acceptable for the medical profession to say them, but on 
occasions, when it is 'everybody saying it, with the sense of anyone, whoever, 
and routinely, then this can be heard as a platitude. Sometimes those who say it 
are not credited with having the knowledge to say it because they may not know 
what they are talking about (see also extract 6: 1.3). The basis of accepting or 
rejecting advice is dependent on the advice giver. They have to be recognised 
by the recipient as being credible and entitled to offer it in the first place. To offer 
advice you have to be in a position to give it, such that certain felicity conditionS3 
have to prevail. 
Using the terms 'think positive' or'be positive' are appropriate to say when things 
are bad. When it is related to cancer, it is done in the social context of the 
culture of cancer whereby it is an appropriate and morally desirable reaction to 
illness. Its normative status is shown in Kitzinger's (2000) finding that 'think 
positive' (or 'be positive') was never subject to overt question or explicit 
challenge. Rather, any resistance was signalled through silence and token 
agreements (such that accountability is evaded), or through the production of 
competing idioms. However, as in extracts 6: 1.1 and 6: 1.2, 'think/be positive' is 
treated as something to be unpacked, or elaborated, and participants themselves 
provide the contextual meaning. 
2 Being told to 'think positive' and 'be positive' are passive and active stances and participants 
unpack their relevance in both direct and indirect ways. How doing being positive gets done is an 
analytical feature in Chapter 7. 
3 "There must exist an accepted conventional procedure having a certain conventional affect and 
ftuther, the particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be appropriate for the 
invocation of the particular procedure. The procedure must be executed by all participants both (i) 
correctly and (ii) completely. Often (i) the persons must have certain thoughts, intentions etc., 
which are specified in the procedure, (ii) the procedure specifies certain conduct which must be 
adhered to" (Potter and Wetherell, 1987: 16-17), following John Austin's philosophy of speech 
acts). 
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Ann is in her early forties, married, and at the time of the interview was working 
for a local company. She was diagnosed with breast'cancer. 
Extract 6: 1.2 Ann 09/01 "what do they mean, be positive? " 
63 Ann anyone that can control it, inwardly and outwardly (. ) 
64 they'll they'll come through better 
65 RC yeah 
66 Ann I'm sure they will, you you've got to be positive 
67 everybody kept saying to me you must be positive 
68 and I used to think what do they mean, be positive? 
69 how on earth can you be positive with something 
70 that- but then when you come through it you realise 
71 that you- y'know that you're gonna go forward in life 
72 I'm not going to sit back and have it hit me again in another 
73 five years with not having done something with my life (1.0) 
74 I've done a lot with my life even since I've been diagnosed in 
75 two years 
Ann questions "how on earth can you be positive with something that-" (lines 69- 
70). She does not complete the expression "something that-", but we know that 
"it" is cancer, and this is a cut-off description of what having cancer can mean. 
For Ann, the sense and value of being positive are something you realise on the 
basis of experience -"when you come through it" (line 70). Sheunpacksbeing 
positive as "you're gonna go forward in life" (line 71), and contrasts it with what 
she is not going to do (cf. Andy and Pam), "sit back and have it hit me again" 
(line 72). 'Be positive' is elaborated as something you do when you are in 
trouble, that it is an active stance, contrasted against sitting around doing 
nothing, being passive. Again, there is the sense of not giving up on life, and of 
carrying on doing normal things. Ann says that she has "done a lot with my life 
ever since I've been diagnosed", which exemplifies her being positive. Note how 
it also provides the relevance for her opening lines, "anyone that can control it, 
inwardly and outwardly (. ) they'll they'll come through better (lines 63-64). Ann is 
orienting to both the notions of 'thinking' and of doing being positive here; and 
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again there is the link between positive attitudes and positive medical outcomes 
(cf. Chapter 7, extracts 7: 1.1-7: 1.5). 
As noted earlier, who says what and when produces varied accounts. The 
identity of the agents who produce descriptions can be worked on to build or 
undermine their credibility. Issues of stake or interest can be invoked in an 
attempt to undermine claims and accounts, and they can also be resisted. 
"Descriptions can also be given authority by emphasising or building up category 
memberships which imply particular knowledge entitlements, and the way these 
too may be undermined. The twin themes of stake and category entitlement are 
pervasive features of everyday reasoning about facts and descriptions. The 
facticity of an account can be enhanced through working up category 
entitlements; it can be weakened by emphasising the personal or institutional 
stake of the author's account" (Potter, 1996: 122). 
The expectations of being positive offered by people in categories other than a 
PWC can present an additional burden and further difficulties, and the PWC can 
resist or reject these notions (see also extract 6: 1.5). In extracts 6: 1.3 and 6: 1.4, 
RC asks what happens "when you don't feel positive" and the responses are 
taken up in different ways. 
RC asks whether Ann remembers anything when people were telling her to be 
positive (lines 80-86). Again, who is entitled to provide reassurance or advice is a 
source of concern for Ann. 
Extract 6: 1.3 Ann 09/02 "well shut up" 
80 RC but what about when you don't feel positive, I mean 
81 do you have [or when- or when you perhaps did feel er- not feel 
82 -> Ann [very rarely happens 
83 RC positive when you were going through it I mean 
84 Ann umh 
85 RC do you remember anything about that (. ) about- and people were 
86 telling you to be positive or 
87 Ann well (1.0) 1 think when people oh it's early days 
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88 that used to really (. ) get up my nose, I used to think well shut up 
89 because you've not had it 
90 RC umh 
Ann's initial response (in overlap) is that not feeling positive was something that 
"very rarely happens" (line 82), which of course is not only a report of, but also an 
instance of, that positive attitude. It endorses her earlier stance of being positive 
and active in extract 6: 1.2. She does not directly address her response to RC's 
initial question, but instead takes up the topic of "people" saying the wrong thing 
to her. She also makes the stage of her illness relevant, in that people used to 
say, "oh it's early days". She takes issue with this and rejects it as a platitude, 
saying "well shut up because you've not had it" (line 88). Again, this is an 
invocation of knowledge entitlements, an absence of appropriate felicity 
conditions. It suggests that those people were not entitled to say such a thing 
because they did not have the required experience. The very general category 
"people" is rhetorically useful here, in that it does not specify anyone in particular, 
and so is not easily challenged. 
Although whoever was saying these things was probably trying to be helpful and 
reassuring, Ann clearly rejects that as inappropriate. Indeed it "used to get up my 
nose" (line 88), which is another idiomatic expression, countering the common 
sense appeal of 'be positive' (cf. Kitzinger, 2000, on 'resisting an idiom'). Earlier 
Ann said that not feeling positive was something she rarely experienced. This at 
least minimally acknowledges RCs implication that it is not always possible to 
'be positive', that it is not plausibly a constant state to be in. This can produce 
other dilemmas, as Dee deals with in extract 6: 1.4, where any notion of not being 
positive becomes a matter of accountability. 
Extract 6: 1.4 08/06 "1 should be posItive" 
1 RC its like one of the things that umh Zoe's talked about in our 
2 conversations is that y'know if you don't feel like being 
3 positive one day 
4 Dee urnh 
5 RC y'know-- 
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6 Dee =1 should feel positive, I'm going to be- I should be positive and 
7 then you start feeling [guilty, you start feeling worse 
8 RC [yes 
9 RC I mean it's the er [the impo: sition= 
10 Dee [yes =posed on you (1.0) its pressure 
11 RC absolutely 
12 Dee it's real pressure 
Other peoples' expectations for PWC to be positive can sometimes can be 
problematic (see also extract 6: 1.5). It makes PWC morally and interactionally 
accountable, and this is visible in how in their interview stories they attend to this 
possibility that they are deviating from normative expectations. Although people 
rarely reject the notion of thinking positive there are occasions "when participants 
talk about positive thinking in ways that can be read as resistant ... and attempt to 
limit its applicability or to challenge its assumptions" (Wilkinson and Kitzinger, 
2000: 808). 
However, what I have discovered in my data is that participants report that the 
moral expectations associated with such idioms can produce feelings of guilt or 
make matters worse. In extract 6: 1.5, RC refers to a conversation she has had 
with Zoe, a friend of Dee's, about what happens "if you don't feel like being 
positive one day" (1-3). Dee attends to this as something that she 'should' do. 
Although she does not make her response specific to RC's question, she attends 
to this as a moral expectation hearable as Dee voicing what she says to herself, 
"I should be positive" (line 6). The use of "should" sets up a dilemma, that it is 
something that has a moral requirement and the implication is that if Dee is not 
positive, there are other consequences, "then you start feeling guilty, you start 
feeling worse" (line 7). Dee connects not being able to be positive with feelings of 
guilt and feeling worse and RC suggests that this moral expectation is an 
"imposition" (line 9). Interestingly Dee completes this sentence for RC saying, 
"posed on you (1.0) it's pressure" (line 10). Pressure is associated with tension, 
with stress and strain, of being pushed into something and Dee then strengthens 
this in that "it's real pressure" (line 12). Consequently, the expectation of being 
positive can be considered as an additional moral burden to carry. 
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It appears that the call for being positive raises a number of difficulties. How it is 
used, and what it means to different people, varies contextually. When it is 
voiced, by whom, and on what basis of entitlement, are major considerations in 
whether it is viewed as being helpful and supportive, or else rejected as 
inappropriate and even harmful. In Chapter 71 will explore how the notion of 
being positive is produced and referred to in talk and in particular the analysis 
examines how PWC produce accounts that attend to what I term, doing being 
positive. 
PWC not only have to be accountable for formulations of the notion of 'thinking 
positive', but they are also accountable to 'fight it', the canonical script 
encompassed in the 'heroic' model. War and military metaphors pervade the 
language of cancer, where descriptions of PWC as being 'brave', 'courageous' 
and a 'fightee draw on a deeply embedded cultural discourse of defeating threats 
to one's life. Contrasting descriptions such as 'coward', or just 'not brave' are 
also ways of moralising illness, opening up the possibility of having to account for 
being ill and how one deals with it. The analysis shows that "fighting it' is also an 
idiomatic expression that participants elaborate (unpack) and formulate, in ways 
that give it specific meaning and contextual relevance. In extract 6: 1.5 Zoe, like 
Dee in extract 6: 1.4, attends to the moral pressure that such expectations can 
present. It is taken from a long extract where the issues of control, 'coping' and 
'fighting'the disease are talked about (See Appendix E for a full transcript). 
Zoe is in her early forties, married, with a teenage daughter. She was diagnosed 
with breast cancer and had a mastectomy. At the time of the interview, Zoe was 
writing an undergraduate dissertation on positive attitudes to cancer. 
Extract 6: 1.5 Zoe 07/01 "1 don't believe that you fight the disease" 
11 Zoe I- I think most people when they go, when- as- as they go 
12 through their lives experience sort of some form of (1.0) er 
13 depression be it mild or be it (. ) chronic or whatever 
14 RC umh 
15 Zoe hh thinking o::: h god (2.0) 
16 RC uh huh (1.0) 
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17 Zoe I'm not going to carry on and all the rest of it but 
18 when your life is threatened hh what amazed me was just just 
19 how much you swing the other way (. ) 
20 1 suppose it comes back to control doesn't it? 
21 RC umh umh (1.0) 
22 Zoe you er, sort of er, you fight bloody tooth and nail (4.0) 
23 RC yeah (1.0) 
24 Zoe for the control 
25 RC yeah 
26 Zoe I don't- I don't believe that you fight the disease, 
27 1 think that's absolute crap, but you- you er 
28 fight for the control and you- you fight (3.0) 
In lines 11-13, Zoe constructs an interesting contrast here by comparing 
responses to a cancer diagnosis with the kinds of everyday depression that 
people normally go through in life. The point of interest here is that Zoe is 
unpacking what 'fighting' means to her. She does this by drawing an ironic 
contrast. People are ordinarily likely to respond with bouts of depression when 
faced with life's usual vicissitudes. This, though ranging from "mild" to "chronic" 
(line 13), is scripted as more or less routine and normal (via descriptions such as 
"most people", "as they go through their lives", and the generalising expressions 
"or whatever" and "and all the rest of it", lines 13 and 17). Yet when faced with 
something extraordinary and serious, something really threatening such as 
cancer (line 18), people can (and do) react positively. Again, this is scripted up 
as a general reaction, as what "you" do (lines 19,22,26-28). The contrast is 
heightened by the irony of it, and its unexpectedness, Zoe was "amazed" (line 
18). Zoe's style of talk is very forceful, using extreme and dramatic idioms and 
metaphors, as in "you fight bloody tooth and nail" (line 22), again invoking the 
notion of physical combat. But what is interesting is that Zoe's formulation of 
'fighting' is about control. She rejects the idea expressed by Andy and others, 
that "you fight the disease" (line 26). The object of the fight is not the disease 
itself, but you "fight for the control" (28). Her rejection of its direct medical 
relevance is vehement and extreme ("absolute crap", line 27). She further 
defines what the 'fighting' is about for her in extract 6: 1.6 where she produces 
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another formulation of what she refers to as "this fighting stuff", which is to say, 
this talk about 'fighting' that PWC are encouraged to adopt. 
Extract 6: 1.6 Zoe 07102 11 It's what people expect" 
83 Zoe this is what it is, this is what it comes down to (1.0) 
84 the coping stuff 
85 RC if you're in control of things then= 
86 -+ Zoe =Its not about coping with the disease, its about coping with you 
87 RC yeah 
88 -+ Zoe full stop, this is- this is partly why this- this fighting stuff and this- 
89 this heroic image and er this er (0.5) you know (1.0) brave bit 
90 makes me so cross because it Is just absolute total bollocks 
91 RC umh 
92 Zoe I think it's rubbish (0.5) 
93 RC umh 
94 Zoe and it's rammed down your throat (0.5) and I don't care what 
95 anybody says, there is an expectation that that is the way you 
96 should be, it's what people expect 
97 RC yeah, and I think that's er-- 
98 Zoe =and I think that's where the strain comes in on the er individual 
99 coping, because, you're trying to do that for (. ) other people and 
100 for you 
This extract is full of the language of cancer. Zoe talks about the 'fighting stuff, 
the 'heroic image', and the 'brave bit', which are ways of formulating these things 
as morally social expectations and ways of talking (explicitly so, in lines 94-95). 
The interesting thing is how and why she resists these ascriptions. She also 
invokes the notion of 'coping', unpacking this in a similar way to her formulation 
of 'fighting' the disease. She provides her version of what 'coping' is, that it is not 
"about coping with the disease", again the object is disease, she makes the 
distinction emphasising that 'coping' is "about coping with you (line86). Heruse 
of "full stop" (line 88) nicely indicates that this is not debatable, and that it is the 
end of any list of things that have to be coped with. Zoe links this with what she 
has talked about earlier, "this fighting stuff and this- this heroic image" and this 
"brave bit" (lines 88-90). Her rejection of these as ideas is expressed in terms of 
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her emotional reactions to them (they make her "so cross"), and through the use 
of idiomatic and extreme expressions, it is "absolute total bollocks" and "rubbish". 
One interesting thing here is that the forceful rhetoric of Zoe's account could itself 
be heard as 'fighting talk', because she is resisting and rejecting these 
prescriptive notions so strongly, indeed making the strength of her rejection a 
very hearable, performative feature of her talk. But she then provides a warrant 
for why she is rejecting this cultural script, because "it's rammed down your 
throat" (line 94). Again Zoe chooses an extreme, graphic, idiomatic metaphor, 
where ramming something down a person's throat is an image of involuntarily 
being forced to swallow something you do not want. The vehemence of her 
reaction only matches the forcefulness of how all this 'fighting' and 'coping' talk is 
thrust upon her. She is also challenging the status quo, orienting to what she 
opposes as being perhaps a majority view; she does not *care what anybody 
says" (lines 94-95). The 'anybody' is a generalised other, regardless of who they 
may be, who might be expected to disagree with her, yet whose opinions she 
continues to oppose. 
The key to Zoe's pointed remarks is that "there is an expectation that that is the 
way you should be (. ) it's what people expect (. )" (lines 95-96). She is claiming 
that it is other people who force the moral responsibility of this 'fighting stuff on to 
her, that it has become a normative expectation, such that Zoe is accountable for 
rejecting it. These normative expectations are formulated as something that has 
to be done for other people's sake, but at the same time, living up to them places 
an additional burden of 'coping' on "yqg", the PWC generally, and of course on 
Zoe herself. Accountability is distributed on a personal and a generalised level, 
but what is hearable is that these expectations are unreasonable and 
problematic. They contribute additional problems that have to be managed, 
apart from the illness. Indeed, Zoe's strong separation of these psychological 
and social matters, from those of the disease itself, helps to isolate them as 
avoidable and unnecessary. 
Extract 6: 1.7 is taken from Jan's detailed narrative account of going to get the 
results of her biopsy. 
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Extract 6: 1.7 Jan 14/02 "I'm not brave" 
1 Jan you're not going on your own Jan (. ) you're to go with Ann 
2 and Ann said I'm going wi(hh)th you hh Ja(hh)n ha ha ha 
3 and she came with me hh umh and er 
4 RC Were you glad of that? 
5 Jan Yes (0.5) 1 think I wa:: s (. ) I think I wa: s umh (. ) you like to think 
6 you're brave (. ) but I'm not brave I'm a terrible coward really 
In Chapter 51 suggested that one of the normatively expected features of 
receiving bad news, is that there might be some benefit in having a friend or 
other person present to support them. Jan herself links that notion to one of the 
topics of this chapter, in that going alone or going with someone to get her results 
relates to being brave. Again, it is a generalised, normative requirement: Uyou 
like to think you're brave* (lines 5-6). In contrast to that normative idea, Jan 
herself is "a terrible coward really". The "really" provides for a nice contrast, not 
only between Jan and other brave people, but between Jan as a real person and 
some possibly ideal expectation of how people should be. 
We have no basis here, of course, for taking Jan's self-avowal as "a terrible 
coward" at face value, as an accurate description of her. Disclaiming heroism 
and bravery is a common and recognisable display; it can be part of what being 
brave is about (see also extracts 6: 1.7,6: 3.1-6: 3.2). If someone were to go 
around talking about how brave they were, this could be interpreted as boasting 
or bragging (cf. Mulkay (1985) on ceremonial discourses of Nobel prize winners 
and Pomerantz (1978; 1984c, on compliments). What Jan is providing for us is 
not so much herself as a cowardly exception to the usual pattern of brave people, 
but rather, an expression of the troublesome nature of expectations that are hard 
to live up to. 
Extracts 6: 1.1-6: 1.7 looked at how the prescriptive language of having to think 
and be positive, 'fighting' and brave, were oriented to in accounts of interactions 
with the medical profession, and a category such as 'people' or'everyone'. I now 
want to look at other things people are reported as saying, which participants 
formulate as being the wrong thing to say. Again PWC are placed in a position of 
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accountability in reporting these difficult interactions, and attend to presenting 
their identity as a reporter, as someone who is not being unreasonable or overly 
critical. 
6: 2 Saying the wrong thing: compliments and sympathy 
When someone's cancer diagnosis becomes public knowledge, everyday social 
interactions with others can become difficult because people may struggle to 
know what to say. The following analysis shows how PWC talked about their 
conversations with healthy people. 
The first three extracts (6: 2.1-6: 2.3) are taken from a long account which focuses 
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on the difficulties of saying the right or the wrong thing. Although there are lots 
of things going on in these extracts, my interest is how Ann talks about the kinds 
of talk she does and does not want to hear. 
Prior to the beginning of extract 6: 2.1, Ann has been praising how supportive her 
friends have been throughout her illness. But in extract 6: 2.1, she sets up a stark 
contrast concerning what is, for her, an inappropriate response to her illness. 
Contrasts and oppositions are discursive practices, and such formulations are 
not "just a matter of deploying ready-made conceptual resources that are built 
into semantic categories, but something people can do flexibly and inventively, 
for just about any set of objects or events" (Edwards, 1997: 237; Smith, 1978). 
One of the interesting contrasts in the following extract is the interplay of positive 
and negative accounts (See also extract 6: 6.1. and 7: 1.2-7: 2.6). 
Extract 6: 2.1 Ann 09/03 "there's always the o: ne" 
1 Ann yeah, everyone was absolutely wonderful 
2 RC yeah (. ) I mean (1.0) 
3 Ann I mean I haven't got brothers and sisters (1.0) but (1.0) 
41 couldn't speak highly enough of the friends that I've got 
5 you know they- they (. ) the-there's always the o: ne that you get 
4 See Appendix E for a full extract. 
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6 that rings you up and says 
7 To::: h dear what are you going to do o:::: h dea:: r what arel 
8 and that is the last thing that you want 
9 RC yes, yeah 
10 Ann and (0.2) 1 er (. ) in the end I had to tell this lady er don't- 
11 please don't phone me again because (. ) 
12 1 didn't want to hear it (. ) she was so De .. gative 
13 [1 couldn't believe it you know 
14 RC [umh 
15 Ann oh well (. ) what are you going to do y'know 
16 you've got this (0.5) er terrible disease and er (. )yknow 
17 Toh I'm so sorry I'm sorry for you andl 
18 RC umh 
19 -ý Ann Tbut you want people to- that are positive at the side of you 
20 you don't want negative peoplel 
Ann begins by saying, "everyone was absolutely wonderful" (line 1), and these 
are presumably friends rather than relatives, given that she does not have 
"brothers and sisters" (line 3). Note the extreme case formulations (ECFs) here, 
"everyone" and "absolutely". It is a feature of ECFs that they are produced in 
contexts where rhetorical contrasts are being made (Pomerantz, 1986), and in 
ways that can signal a speaker's strong investment in what they are saying 
(Edwards, 2000). The contrast case is soon apparent. Some of the rhetorical 
work done by Ann's powerful prior endorsement of her friends is to demonstrate 
that her attitude to the contrasting individual, whose expressions of sympathy she 
rather strongly rejected (line 11), was not due to any lack of appreciation on her 
part of the kinds of help and succour that people may offer. It isolates the 
rejected caller as the sole problem. Indeed, the 'sole' nature of that person is 
explicit, "there's always the ome" (line 5). Here the ECF "always" defines such a 
person, however isolated, as nevertheless emblematic and recognisable via 
some kind of folk wisdom, invoked by this idiomatic formula. 
There is some interesting detail in Ann's depiction of the troublesome caller 
(named Joan). It could conceivably be a healthy acquaintance, expressing 
concern as to what Ann is going to do, an enquiry into what kind of treatment she 
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may be having, or whether she was going to carry on working. But Ann provides 
a different impression through how she performs the quotations. The actively 
voiced "o::: h dear what are you going to do" (line 7) is defined as "the last thing 
you want" (line 8). The extended "o::: h" helps emphasise that the 'oh' is marking 
something other than merely a change of state token (Heritage, 1984b), but 
some kind of exaggerated, moaning, expression of sympathy. The combination 
of 'oh dear invokes doom and gloom. Further, Ann's response was just that, a 
response, something she "had to" do, and even then not immediately, but "in the 
end" (lines 11-12), implying her having put up with it for some time. 
The caller's crime was to be "so ne::: gative", which of course is the precise 
opposite of positive. Ann also treats Joan's words as being unbelievable, in that 
her friend, under the circumstances, was not providing her with a positive 
response. Ann is posing the notion that it is not only the PWC who should 'be 
positive' but others should be too. Ann could have presented the nature of the 
caller as someone who is trying to validate her illness (see Dee extract 5: 2.2) but 
Joan's words are taken negatively. Ann's 's voicing of Joan's words: "what are 
you going to do y'know", and "you've got this (0.5) er terrible disease" (lines 16- 
17), display Joan as stating the obvious and implying that there is nothing 
imaginable to be done about it. Note the two uses of "y'know" here (lines 16 and 
17), in which Ann presents Joan's talk as talk of a recognisable kind for the 
listening RC, it was that kind of stuff, negative, unhelpful and discouraging. 
There is an interesting footing change (lines 19-20) marking what she says next 
as a normative requirement: "you want people to- that are positive" versus "you 
don't want negative people". Ann is attending to the normative response that 
anyone else would want. She adamantly rejects people saying, "oh I'm sorry for 
you" on the grounds that it is negative and is clearly not the 'right thing' to say, 
particularly at this time. Ann categorises such talk as being negative and 
unhelpful, where a direct, unmodified expression of pity, or stating the 
'terdb! eness' of the disease, is deemed inappropriate talk from a friend. 
Although (extract 6: 2.1) Ann began by saying "everyone was absolutely 
wonderful" and then reveals that there is "always the ome", the exception to the 
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rule in what follows (prior to extract 6: 2.2). She also talks about people who 
ucrossed the road" to avoid speaking to her, or "couldn't face" her, so it appears 
that not everyone was wonderful. One of the noticeable features in these 
accounts is that they are variable and often contradictory, but they do attend to 
different matters of accountability. The "everyone", given the range of exceptions 
to that "everyone", has to be heard functionally, as an ECF doing ECF business 
of the kind analysed here, rather than being, say, Ann's mentally computed and 
inconsistent assessment of how many people were helpful. 
In extract 6: 2.2 Ann makes it clear what she does and does not want people to 
say to say to her. 
Extract 6: 2.2 Ann 09/03 "they haven't got a clue" 
60 RC but it's like, I know from my own experience when I say things 
61 you know, talking about my brother or my friend hh er y' know 
62 some people know )(know how to say, or to respond or say you 
63 know or can er speak to you but other people are er er y' know, 
64 there's just, [they haven't got a clue what to say 
65 Ann [well they annoy me a bit really because I think well 
66 1- 1- 
67 RC well they can't help it though can they? 
68 Ann no, this is what I say but that it- it gets, it does get at you 
69 RC yeah 
70 Ann that people are like that I mean when I'd got this Joan on the 
71 phone saying To:: h dear, oh dear what are you going to dol 
72 hh hhhh you know, Twell I'm I'm gonna IN4 
73 RC umh 
74 Ann you know thafs the first thing I'm gonna do, I'm going to live= 
75 RC =yeah= 
76 Ann =fan- and I'll be Wright you know, but why should I be the one 
77 telling her that I'm gonna be alright 
78 she should be the one telling m4 
79 RC yeah 
80 Ann where's the suivort? 
81 RC yeah 
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82 Ann you know, no support from them 
RC is empathising and aligning with Ann by talking about her own experiences of 
talking to people (lines 60-64). She does this, first by grounding her views on the 
matter in personal experience (RC therefore knows what she is talking about, 
and can independently contribute to the discussion), and secondly by 
generalising, or 'scripting', from that experience. These are not just personal 
observations, but patterns and rules: "it's like", "when I say things", "you know", 
and so on. RC suggests that people find it difficult to know what to say because, 
"they haven't got a clue what to say" (line 64) which is a no blaming formulation, 
they can not help it. Ann's "well" response (line 65) marks the start of at least a 
partial disagreement; she is less understanding and forgiving, because "they 
annoy me a bit really " (line 65), which displays that there is something wrong 
and she is critical of 'people's' inability to say the right thing. The suffix "a bit 
really" is a nice orientation to, or acknowledgement of, the validity of what RC 
has said. Although Ann produces a minimal 'no' an agreement she reiterates 
that it is a problem for her in that "it does get at you" (line 68). Again, note how 
this formulation of her experience casts it in general terms, as RC did, as a 
recognisable pattern or rule; "it does get at you" rather than, say, "it did get to 
me". Ann's reformulation of Joan's hopeless "oh dear what you are going to do" 
(line 71) provides Ann with the opportunity of asserting a contrary positive 
stance: "I'm gonna live" (line 72). 
A point of interest here is that Ann is working up a definition of what appropriate 
support is (lines 70-80). Despite Joan's negativity, she repeats "I'm gonna live", 
(line 74). She is giving this priority over everything because it is "the first thing" 
she's going to do, (line 74) a first reaction, that could and should have been 
Joan's reaction, but (complainably) was not. It provides an interesting direct 
contrast with extract 6: 2.1, where Ann says "it's the last thing you want" (e. g. pity, 
doom and gloom), along with the footing change in the defiant assertiveness of 
"I'm going to live"... "I'll be alright". Ann's complaint about Joan also works 
reflexively to display the kind of person Ann herself is, that she is 'coping', 
'positive', and in control. Ann's positive personal identity is handled not merely 
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by direct narrative or descriptive talk about herself, which might risk boastfulness, 
but somewhat incidentally, by way of complaining about Joan. 
Ann now attends to the notion of support and how this is performed in talk. Note 
the interesting reversal of expectations here, in contrast to extracts 6: 1.4 and 
6: 1.7. Rather than the expectation being placed on Ann, she is placing the 
accountability on to others. For Ann it is not about her having to reassure others 
that she's "gonna be alright", but rather, she places this moral responsibility on 
to Joan by saying she "should be the one telling me". The implication is that 
support is equated with the things people say, and if they do not say you are 
agonna be alright", Ann exclaims, "where's the support? " (line 80). Ann has 
made a distinction between what she defines as being supportive, casting this in 
terms of what other people 'should' say to you in times of trouble, and what 
people such as Joan might take to be support, but is not. Support includes being 
positive, and not leaving the PWC to have to assert it for themselves. 
Who says what, and when it is said, is an interesting feature of whether what is 
said by others is deemed appropriate or inappropriate. In extract 6: 2.3, Ann 
presents the time of Joan's call as relevant, that it was at the time before her 
operation. 
Extract 6: 2.3 Ann 09/05 "you're gonna be fine (. ) don't worry about It" 
6 RC well I mean you've mentioned the lady who- who was negative to 
7 you (2.0) basically you didn't communicate with her 
8 Ann well I couldn't, I- I wasn't In er, in er sit- I wasn't in the position 
9 that I felt that 1 (1.0) 1 was quite tearful at that particular time 
10 because I'd just recently been diagnosed with a serious Illness 
11 RC yeah 
12 Ann and I couldn't (. ) I couldn't be bothered with her 
13 1 just didn't want to know, I didn't want this woman telling me 
14 oh I'm so sorry (. ) I'm so sorry (. ) I wanted someone to say (. ) 
15 Ann (. ) you're gonna be fine (. ) don't worry about it (. ) you're 
16 going in you're gonna have your operation (. ) you will get over it 
17 RC umh 
190 
18 Ann that's what I wanted to hear and any woman that's going in for an 
19 operation an- and er got that kind of illness, 
19 I'm sure they would agree with me 
21 RC yeah did you, I mean er [in the people that you spoke to 
22 Ann [I try- I try to carry myself not to carry. 
23 someone along [with me 
24 RC [yes, yes 
25 Ann an- and this is what she was trying to do 
In extract 6: 2.3, Ann reveals that the timing of Joan's doom and gloom reaction 
was just before her operation (to remove the breast lump). Again, Ann positions 
her response of what she did and did not want people to do and say. RC is 
fishing (Pomerantz, 1980) for Ann to tell her more, and sets up an accountable 
issue for Ann, "basically you didn't communicate with her" (line 7). This is 
potentially hearable as an overreaction on Ann's part; the fact that RC is putting it 
to her in this way for comment, implies that there is some further accounting to 
be done on Ann's part. Ann responds with an inability account, (cf. Drew, 1984) 
that at the time she "wasn't in the position". She was also "quite tearful" (lines 8 
and 9), "she couldn't be bothered with her" and "just didn't want to know" (line 
12). So Ann's reaction to Joan is eventually presented as a function both of 
Joan's insensitivity, and also of its bad timing, including the state that Ann herself 
was in at that time, when what she needed was 'support' of the form typified in 
lines 14-16. Again, note how Ann works this up not only as a personal 
requirement on her own part, but as something recognisable and general, 
something that "any woman* would require (lines 18-20). This is a recurrent 
pattern in these data, the orientation towards personal experience, complaints, 
viewpoints and preferences, as being both grounded in experience, while also 
recognisably general. 
What Ann achieves in this account is to claim that she it not going to be a victim 
of her suffering, and attends to the social moral order as being accountable, 
being ill, but being stoical about it. She might have what some consider a "terrible 
disease" but by contrasting the negative and positive nature of support, she also 
displays that she is 'coping' and being positive. In suggesting that "any woman 
that's going in for an operation an- and er got that kind of illness I'm sure they 
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would agree with me" (lines 18-19), Ann warrants her wanting people to say the 
right thing as nothing out of the ordinary, while at the same time she asserts her 
own identity as being someone who is independent, who tries to "carry myself" 
(line 22). 
Again, contradiction of that kind is not uncommon in participants' accounts, but is 
best analysed as doing different kinds of rhetorical and interactional business 
(Potter and Wetherell, 1987). Although Ann expects people to be supportive, 
and to tell her she's "gonna be fine", at the same time she tries to carry herself. 
"Carry" implies that there is a load to carry, a burden additional to the disease 
itself, and that carrying anything for anyone else is not what she wants (or 
expects) to have to do. This also reflects that having to deal with the negative 
responses of people such as Joan is a burden because she says she does not 
want to carry others. 
Often PWC do not look ill, especially if they are not receiving chemotherapy. ' 
This can give rise to disjunctions between what people normatively imagine 
cancer patients to look like, and how they actually look. Such disjunctions are 
complicated by the further normative considerations that come into play when 
people pass comment on each others appearance. Prior to extract 6: 2.4, Dee 
has been talking about putting on a brave face, because it is what people want to 
see (see extract 6: 3.2), and has also said that when people ask how you are, 
that they do not really want to know, "they want you to say I'm fine" (see extract 
6: 3.3). So, what Dee is producing here is an ironic take on what can happen in 
such circumstances. 
Extract 6: 2.4 Dee 08/09 "good god Dee you wouldn't think you'd had cancer" 
24 Dee if you happen to say, I mean- people- the one thing that (. ) 
25 -4 primarily irritated me above all else, not the be positive by people 
26 but er, I didn't look (. ) particularly unLALell during the time I was 
27 having my treatment 
28 RC umh 
5 The cultural expectation is that people do not look well if they have cancer. 
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29 Dee and I'd pop into work (. ) or I'd pop into various places 
30 to keep in touch with people (. ) hh and the thing they would say, 
31 was (. ) they used to stand ba(hh)ck and sa(hh)y 
32 good god Dee you wouldn't think you'd had cancer 
33 you look so::: we::: Il 
34 RC umh 
35 Dee and I said but it isn't my face that I have the problem with 
36 RC umh (. ) 
37 -+ Dee go(hh)d I was so:: i:: rritated at people and then 
38 "and you haven't lost all your hair yeto (0.5) because I didn't 
39 RC umh 
40 Dee and I just thought, oh fox goo:: dness sake 
41 I'm so irritated by this response 
She refers to the notion of 'be positive' (line 25) but this is not what "irritated me 
above all else" (line 25). She says that she "didn't look (. ) particularly unwell" 
during her treatment and this posed problems for her; the emphasis on "look" is 
contrastive, against the underlying reality of her illness (looks can be deceptive). 
Again, as we saw with Ann, people were not saying what Dee wanted to hear. 
"They would say ... good God Dee you wouldn't think you'd had cancer you look 
so::: we::: Il" (line 32). Here, the emphasis on "so::: we::: Il" denotes deliberated 
talk. Dee's reported response to this is to say that "it isn't my face that I have the 
problem with" (line 35). 1 find this interesting because it flushes out what putting 
on a brave face can do. Although she does not draw on the description of a 
brave face, she does make 'face' the issue of contention, in that that is not her 
problem. What her friends are doing are complimenting her on how well she 
looks, but Dee finds this difficult to accept. Of course, it is not known how Dee 
responded to them at the time, only what she reports here. However, Pomerantz 
(1984c) has noted that people do seem to have difficulty in accepting 
compliments6 and in this instance complimenting Dee on how well she looks, 
6 Pomerantz (1984c) proposes that compliment responses are subject to two separate and 
conflicting sets of constraints. Firstly that there is the general constraint or expectation that 
evaluations expressed by an initial speaker should be accepted and agreed by the recipient. 
Positive evaluation of recipients by first speakers is regularly followed by appreciation tokens, 
such as, 'well, thank you', which tend to imply agreement with the initial speaker's evaluation and 
which often lead directly to the production of agreement components and has defined this as the 
'preferred' action turn shape. The disagreement format is defined as a 'dispreferred' action. 
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under the Circumstances, is not the response she wants. She does not go on to 
elaborate what she would like them to say, but as we saw in extract 5: 2.1, Dee 
has previously expressed that she wanted people (e. g. her husband) to 'validate' 
her illness, rather than produce platitudes. What she reports here is that again 
this lack of validation or directness about her problem is clearly not what she 
wants to hear. 
So, participants produce accounts of people saying the wrong thing, and of what 
they want people to say, and clearly, people do struggle to say the right thing. 
What is right for one person is not necessarily right for someone else. Some want 
recognition of their illness, whereas others have ways of avoiding talking about it. 
Some resist and others embrace the notion of being positive and adopting a 
'fighting spirit'. How PWC report their social relationships and how they evaluate 
them can be variable and contradictory. Yet on analysis, in the context of its 
production, whatever they say makes sense, as a functional way of telling and 
reporting, managing interactions, and handling complaints and identity. 
6: 3 Pufting on a brave face 
I have briefly noted occasions when the category 'brave' is invoked as an 
expectation for how a PWC should respond to their illness, and how this is often 
discounted (extracts 6: 2.6-6: 2.7). The penultimate analytical section of this 
chapter looks at two extracts showing how'putting on a brave face'7 is oriented 
to and what this can accomplish. The analysis also shows that the use of 'brave' 
can be constructed with different meanings. Both extracts also include the 
routine question of asking someone "How are you? " which will be analysed in 
more detail in section 6: 4. 
Extract 6: 3.1 Sue 03/01 "you try to be a bit brave" 
1 RC so you didn't really talk about it very much to anybody 
2 do you think that would have helped 
3 being able to talk about it (. ) 
7 The specific notion of 'putting on a brave face' is formulated in extract 6: 3.2. 
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4 Sue Yeah, I think it probably would have done, I mean 
5 1 wouldn't have approached anybody to talk to 
6 RC umh (0.5) you wouldn't have approached anybody? 
7 Sue no, 'cause when you're that young, you- you- 
8 you try to be a bit brave and independent and you're, 
9 you're just making relationships with people, you're making new 
10 friendships you don't (2.0) 1 wasn't- I say I'm not the sort who 
11 would go and burden anybody with my problems 
12 RC umh 
13 Sue I mean if I felt that they were Interested well fine, I might tell them 
14 about how I was feeling, but nobody actually comes up to you 
15 and says (. ) how are you feeling ab(hhh)out it 
Sometimes it is understandable that a PWC will resist talking to others for fear of 
receiving inappropriate responses. In extract 6: 3.1 RC is pursing the topic of 
talking aboutit' (meaning cancer) and whether doing so is helpful to Sue, and of 
course this is set against the background that talking about cancer is difficult for 
all concerned because of all its 'cultural baggage' and expectations. Sue is a 
mother in her mid forties and was diagnosed with Hodgkinsons disease in her 
teenage years and skin cancer in her early twenties. 
Clearly, those whom PWC find they are able to talk to is not straightforward. 
Some people want to communicate, whereas others do not. In Sue's case 
however she says that "I wouldn't have approached anybody to talk to" (line 5). 
RC reiterates this back to her and is 'fishing' (Pomerantz, 1980) for Sue to tell her 
more and Sue produces an account of why she did not approach people to talk 
to. What this extract brings together is the difficulties of talking and a way of 
countering any potential difficulties and Sue says, "you try to be a bit brave and 
independent" (line 8). If others see a 'brave face' this can fend off any 
inappropriate sympathy responses, but it can also work to deflect anyone asking 
how a PWC feels. 
Sue is attending to the problems, especially whilst young, of "making 
relationships with people" and produces some identity work here in saying "I'm 
not the sort who would go and burden anybody with my problems" (line 11). 
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Again, note the orientation towards locating personal experiences and 
dispositions as part of (or as exceptional to) a normative, generalisable pattern. 
Sue's actions are not just one-offs, but grounded in her nature, as "not the sort 
who". Similarly, her response to RC's questioning of her actions (line 6) is cast in 
terms of the generalised "you" (lines 7-9). This is a standard way of managing 
accountability, locating one's own actions as those that anybody might do in the 
circumstances (cf. Edwards, 1995). Sue acknowledges the difficulties of talking 
about problems, and associates this with not wanting to be a burden to 
"anybody". However, she might tell them about how she was feeling, but this is 
conditional: "if I felt that they were interested", the implication being that people 
might make normatively polite inquiries without really wanting to hear truthful or 
detailed stories. Indeed, people tend to avoid eliciting those stories: "nobody 
actually comes up to you and asks how are you feeling ab(hhh)out it" (lines 14- 
15). The implication is that if people know you have got serious problems (such 
as knowing you have cancer) they do not 'actually ask you about it. Indeed the 
word 'cancer is not used throughout this extract, and is notably absent in most of 
these discussions of what people talk about. Having cancer, on Sue's account, 
can place a person somewhat beyond the usual routine or polite inquiries into 
how they are, and a 'brave face' can be part of managing that. Indeed, the very 
notion of a brave face, rather than just bravery, signals the importance for 
participants of how they are seen, understood, and interacted with. The notion of 
interactional management, rather than simply being brave, is very much a 
participants' category. 
In extract 6: 3.2, RC and Dee collaboratively produce the formulation of a "brave 
face". 
Extract 6: 3.2 Dee 08/08 "he put on such a brave face" 
Dee and ten years ago RC (. ) I didn't know anybody really who'd 
2 been touched by cancer, apart from my neighbour 
3 RC umh 
4 Dee that was all 
5 RC and umh I mean, similarly, I mean I- I er only remembered 
6 yesterday by seeing- it was an actor friend actually- 
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7 1 saw his picture in er er a paper somewhere about him 
8 and it clicked in my mind that (1.0) go:: d yes his Wife died of 
9 spinal cancer about (1.0) 
((telephone rings and answer machine picks up)) 
10 it would be (. ) about ten years, well maybe not quite as long ago 
11 as that, and I thought, I knew what it was but I had no more 
12 concept of what it was, I had (0.5) no idea what he was going 
13 through and one of the things was (. ) that because he put on 
14 such a [brave face 
15 Dee [brave face he put on the world the face that people want 
16 to see did he? 
17 RC that's right 
Dee is revealing that "ten years ago" she "didn't know anybody really who'd 
been touched by cancer" (lines 1-2). The mentioning of the word cancer is a rare 
occurrence in my data. This triggers a memory for RC who goes on to tell Dee 
about a friend, from years ago, whose wife had terminal cancer at the time and 
he was caring for her. Interestingly, it is an event, which also occurred ten years 
before, and at the time, RC "had no idea what he was going through". RC's not 
knowing what her friend was going through at the time is in essence partly 
disguised by the absence of not showing any sign of trouble, "because he put on 
such a brave face" (lines 13-14). Dee not only overlaps with this description but 
goes on to complete the sentence and again produces the normative expectation 
that a brave face is "the face that people want to see". 
Bravery here is a matter of 'face', formulated as something stoic and protective, 
that can be "put on", as a form of disguise for other people so they do not have to 
engage in 'troubles talk'. There is an unspoken collusion between PWC and the 
people they interact with, where bravery is a normatively required performance. 
RC's reporting that she was ignorant of her friend's suffering is attributed to that 
performance. The implication here is that a brave face is put on, both for the 
sufferer as a sign of 'coping' and not burdening people, and for the people they 
interact with, who prefer to see them as being 'fine', because it makes interaction 
easier. This is something that Dee elaborates in extract 6: 3.3 below, (which 
reiterates Sue's claim in extract 6: 3.1). 
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Extract 6: 3.3 08109 "they don't really want to know how you are" 
12 RC I had (0.5) no idea what he was going through 
13 and one of the things was (. ) that because he put on 
14 such a [brave face 
15 Dee [brave face he put on the world did he? 
16 RC that's right 
17 Dee because y'know when people say to you how are you? 
18 they don't really want to know how you are 
19 RC most people don't, that's right 
20 Dee if you ((answering machine plays)) 
21 oh sorry I just thought it was my husband umh 
22 they want you to say I'm fine, thank you, I'm great 
23 RC yes 
Dee continues by providing an explanation connecting how 'putting on a brave 
face'works when it is combined with people routinely asking "how are you? " This 
was a theme noted earlier in this chapter, of how cancer can disrupt what would 
normally be polite inquiries into how people are. Dee makes a generalised 
statement, that "they don't really want to know how you are" (line 18). Dee's 
implication, that it is all 'people', is then softened by RC's moderated agreement 
amost people don't" (line 19); this fits Edwards's (2000) analysis of how the 
softening of extreme descriptions serves to protect their truth value. Dee 
produces her motivation for saying this, (interrupted by the answering machine 
playing) that other people want you to provide a preferred, trouble free response, 
to say "I'm fine thank you, I'm great" (line 22) in order to prevent or avoid 
difficulties in talking about serious problems. So the idea of putting on a brave 
face can work to deflect from inviting or responding to talk about troubles, and 
this is not only an analyst's observation about it, but also an idea that participants 
themselves construct and use. 
The final analytical section of this chapter follows up the specific theme of the 
problems involved in being asked the everyday question, "How are you? " 
(HAY? ). 
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6: 4 Everyday conversation: Asking "How are you? ": 
Everyone has to liel 
In extracts 6: 3.1 and 6: 3.3.1 introduced the issue of asking "How are you? " which 
was also linked to putting on a brave face. The final part of this chapter 
addresses how this everyday convention becomes problematic. 
Harvey Sacks's (1975) fascinating paper, in which he characterises the actions 
that greetings such as asking "How are you? "(HAY? ) performa, was given the 
rather extraordinary title, "Everyone has to lie". According to Sacks, an initial 
HAY? is merely a greeting; it is not heard as a factual enquiry about the recipient, 
but rather a normative everyday social requirement. It is a casual enquiry that 
does not actually involve people in making an assessment about one another's 
condition. In other words, they are not expected to report, factually, how they 
are, but are expected to produce what is termed a preferred, minimal response, 
such as 'fine', even if the facts may be to the contrary. Sacks suggests that such 
factual announcements are clearly done, but they are generally "held off" until the 
greeting sequence is completed, and at least a first topic is underway. 9 
Sacks argues that this sense of conversational appropriateness, asking HAY? at 
the beginning of a conversation, results in his claim that initially "everyone has to 
lie. "10 But asking HAY? in what Sacks calls the 'initial position', can also produce 
what is termed a dispreferred response (we are dealing with norms here, not 
statistical pre pond era nces), such as 'absolutely awful', which in turn could make 
the conversation that follows prolonged and difficult. But the normative appraisal 
8 Sacks (1975) argues that the position of an utterance in the overall structure of an encounter can 
and does systematically influence the hearing or force that it will be given by a listener. Such is 
the case for the question "How are you? " and the response it engenders. 
' Schegloff (1968) suggested that greetings in casual conversation perform two basic functions: 
firstly they establish the identity of the speakers, and secondly, they re-align their states of 
knowledge relative to the encounter at hand. 
10Sacks suggests that it is only by reference to the sequential properties of talk in context that such 
an appreciation can be derived. In casual conversation, utterance positioning within greetings/ 
alignment sequences is unambiguous. The HAY? that follows an exchange of hellos between 
friends or acquaintances is clearly an affiliate of the greetings, and is typically not a topic- 
initiating utterance. On the other hand, the same question when it is used to begin the assessment 
phase of a clinical interview solicits or obliges a topically relevant response, a chief complaint, or 
reason for the visit (Diaz, 2000). 
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of such a question is that the person asking does not really want a truthful 
answer. Consequently, asking someone 'how are you? ' already somewhat 
ambiguous in what it seeks, becomes even more so when asking a PWC, and 
takes on different dimensions. Being the recipient of a simple HAY? can raise 
more complicated and problematic concerns for the PWC. If asked this by 
someone known to know about the cancer, it may be heard as not merely a 
casual greeting. 
As previously noted, how a PWC responds to what other people say will depend 
on who is doing the asking, when and where. So, I want to add another 
dimension to a HAY? question's everyday ambiguous agenda. When HAY? 
arises in conversation where one or both of the people involved are ill, or, more 
particularly, they have cancer, being asked, or asking this question can pose a 
number of dilemmas. Do they tell the truth? Or do they lie? As throughout this 
thesis, I am dealing here not with actual recorded greetings, but with how these 
are reported, and oriented to as problematical in various ways, in participants' 
narrative accounts. 
Extract 6: 4.1 Dee 08/10 "It's a natural reaction" 
32 Dee and I was sitting in clinic and thinking the only person I haven't 
33 seen recently is Sandra and a person grabbed my arm and said 
34 Dee (. ) I said d'y'know I was just thinking about you 
35 it's strange, it's eerie (. ) and I went to say and I did say 
36 how are you? and I looked at her and as the words came out 
37 1 thought oh what a silly thing to say you can -see what she's 
like 
38 (. ) ((voice lowers to a whisper)) 
39 but y'know (. ) it's a natural reaction 
40 RC umh, umh 
Extract 6: 4.1 is taken from a long narrative where Dee is talking about how she 
met up with her friend Sandra in the oncology clinic (see also extract 7: 1.2) 
having not seen her for some time. There are lots of interesting things going on 
in this extract but I only want to draw attention to a couple of points. 
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Firstly, the positioning of Dee's asking HAY? (line 36). She has set up the story 
in such a way that her initial speech act to Sandra is to produce a normal 
conventional greeting, "How are you? " Dee is not asking this question as if it was 
a natural question to ask someone who has cancer, but as something that is the 
normal thing to do, and says "it's a natural reaction" (line 39). But what follows is 
interesting because having automatically asked the routine question, without 
thinking, Dee immediately conveys the difficulties of asking such a question by 
saying, "oh what a silly thing to say" (. )" (line 37) and the change of awareness is 
signalled by'oh. She recognises how inappropriate it was for her to ask Sandra 
such a question (in the clinic) because "as the words came out" (line 36), it was a 
silly thing to say, because "you can see what she's like" (line 37). 
Dee's appeal to how "you can see what she's like" implies that the function of a 
HAY? is to elicit factual information, such that seeing what someone is like 
makes such an enquiry redundant. In fact, there Is a detail In Dee's story which 
may not be incidental in that regard. Prior to the reported HAY?, Dee tells that 
her initial utterance was something else: "I said d'y'know I was just thinking about 
you it's strange, it's eerie" (lines 34-35), and the subsequent HAY? is marked as 
indeed subsequent to that via "and I went to say and I did say... " (line 35). 
So Dee's account leaves it open that her HAY? to Sandra was not her initial 
words, but something with sufficient delay to be heard as possibly a serious, 
factual enquiry. The difficulty that Dee is narrating is therefore nicely tied to the 
details of her account, and made hearable in those details. On this particular 
occasion, asking Sandra (someone with cancer) HAY? is not just treated as an 
initial normative greeting; it is quickly transformed into a literal meaningful enquiry 
where Dee really does want to know how Sandra is. " Although Dee's HAY? was 
glossed as a routine form of greeting, a "natural reaction" (line 39), her HAY? 
was also available as a literal and genuine enquiry as to how Sandra was. On 
11 At the time of writing up this chapter, I happened to watch "Parkinson" on BBCl. He was 
interviewing George Best and he produced the normal "how are you? " greeting as Best arrived on 
the set, and then immediately said, "asking you how are you really means something doesn't if'. 
The relevance here is that George Best had recently been through a well reported series of serious 
Problems and illnesses and almost died. Parkinson attended to the notion that asking HAY? of 
such a person, in such known circumstances, is liable to be taken in more than one way. 
201 
this particular occasion, Dee could see that for herself (line 37). Greeting persons 
with mutually known serious problems can, on occasions, mean that not 
everyone has to lie. Indeed it can also produce a dispreferred, or 'bad news 
response', which is exactly what follows: 
Extract 6: 4.2: Dee 08/11 "you look very unwell" 
41 Dee and she said "I'm very ill*, umh yeah you look very unwell 
42 (. ) and I said, what's the problem? 
43 she said I've got metastatic lung cancer (1.0) 
44 and we sat (. ) for about half an hour 
Sandra's reported response to Dee's HAY? is "I'm very illo" and when Dee 
responds with "you look very unwell", and asks her what the problem is, the 
response given is news of the worst kind. Sandra announces that she has got 
metastatic lung cancer. 12 The nature of this response requires more than 
politeness, and indeed it treats the prior enquiry as serious and factual. Dee then 
goes on to say how she then spent "about half an hour" (line 44) talking to 
Sandra who, she reveals later, was very upset. So on occasions, partly as a 
function of the precise positioning of a HAY? in a conversation, but also the 
function of known actual problems people may have, where asking someone how 
they are produces a serious factual report, and perhaps 'a bad news response. 
Consequently, the continuing conversation becomes an elaboration of those 
problems, a spate of 'troubles talW, which may then be difficult to manage, 
whichever side of the teller-recipient relationship you are on. 
In extract 6: 4.1, Dee's asking turned out to be both a casual greeting and a literal 
enquiry. What I find additionally interesting here is that Dee is not only analysing 
her own use and implications of asking "how are you? " but she is also managing 
12 Metastasis is a secondary turnour, a further cancer that has grown when a fragment of the 
primary turnour detached itself and made its way to some distant part of the body (the process is 
called metastasising). A metastasis almost always has all or most of the characteristics of the 
primary tumour. Hence, if a person has breast cancer and it metastasises to the lung, the 
secondary metastases will behave like cancer of the breast (and have a high chance of responding 
to chemotherapy for example) rather than like primary cancer of the lung (Buckman, 1996: 448). 
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this interaction from her viewpoint as a member of the same category, because 
both Sandra and Dee have cancer. 
Responses to being asked a HAY? type question can vary according to who is 
asking the question and where it is asked. It can provoke a number of reactions 
from bad news and tears to anger and frustration. It will also depend on whether 
the recipient chooses to tell the truth or to 'lie'. 
In extract 6: 4.3, the category memberships are different. Jo, who has cancer, is 
recounting what happened at one of her check-ups with her oncologist. Jo is 
telling how she responded to being asked "how are you feeling? " and in doing so, 
she directly addresses the issue of its functional ambiguity. 
Extract 6: 4.3 Jo/02/02 "do you want the honest truth? " 
I JO and then on one of my check ups with the oncologist (2.0) 
2 she said to me well how are you doing and asked me all 
3 these banal questions 
4 RC like what? 
5 -+ Jo Well, how do you feel? well I said, do you want the honest truth 
6 or do you just want the bog standard answer that everyone 
7 here gives you she said well y'know she said well 
8 I'd hope you'd tell me the truth I said well, I feel dreadful 
9 RC uh huh 
10 JO I feel absolutely dreadful I said but I don't feel as bad as I did 
11 when I was taking the tamoxifen and then I had to recount the 
12 -+ whole story to her about how I'd stopped and y'know 
13 RC umhumh 
The event described above took place in a clinical setting and research shows 
that in such settings, HAY? is used both casually and clinically (Coupland, 
Coupland and Robinson, 1992; Diaz, 2000). 13 We do not know the exact 
13 In a clinical setting the asking of HAY can also be ambiguous and Diaz (2000) has noted that in 
the clinical enviroranent whilst the casual use of 'how are you' (HAY? ) is preserved. Its clinical 
use of assessing the patient's condition is also relevant. A straightforward HAY? at the beginning 
of the encounter opens up the possibility to take it up in either way. Frankel (1995) offers a range 
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sequence of the HAY? question here, only how Jo recounts it, but note how Jo 
expresses her concerns of what she says happened. She reports the oncologist 
asking "well how are you doing" (line 2) as if it was a casual type of enquiry. But 
she says that the oncologist followed this enquiry by asking a series of what she 
terms "banal questions" (line 3). RC asks Jo to elaborate, 'like whaff (line 4). 
Jo's response produces another HAY? style question, but this time is it is the 
rather more specific, "how do you feel? " (line 5). Asking how someone feels 
does not sound particularly banal, and earlier in the interview, Jo has said that 
she was suffering considerable pain at the time of this visit. In this context, the 
question would appear to be a credible one for the oncologist to ask. How Jo 
attends to this conventional kind of question and everyday cultural politeness Is 
interesting because she alludes to this enquiry as a casual one that does not 
invite a truthful answer, rather than one of a clinical nature. 
Jo then challenges the question by saying, 'do you want the bog standard 
answer that everyone here gives you? " (lines 6-7) which directly addresses, the 
oncologist's 'true' purpose of asking the question; the categories "bog standard" 
and *everyone" invoke the routine, 'everyone has to lie' greetings analysed by 
Sacks. The use of 'everyone' is used 'summatively', and sets up a possible 
difference by highlighting whether Jo should be like everyone else and conform 
to traditional responses and lie, or whether she should be 'truthful' and say what 
Is going on. In doing this, she Is implying that when people ask such questions, 
regardless of their category membership, whether they are friend, family, or as In 
this instance, a member of the medical professional, they may not really want to 
know the answer. Jo invokes the concept of truth telling and lies and implies that 
the "bog standard answer that everyone here gives you" is a lie; In other words 
does the oncologistwant Jo to conform and do what 'everyone' else does? 
Note that regardless of whether it is a casual or clinical enquiry, for Jo, the issue 
is whether or not to say how she really feels and at the same time she 
of possible responses to a HAY? in clinical interviews, such that the clinical use can be delayed 
until the casual take-up is completed. The HAY? token is cornmonly introduced at the beginning 
of the consultation, often managing to establish the evaluation of the patient's condition as the first 
relevant activity. This sequential position opens HAY? to ambiguity, as general interest for a 
newcomer to an encounter is also appropriate in greetings. 
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demonstrates her awareness that the oncologist may not actually want a truthful 
response to her question. 
Asking HAY? in the context of 'troubles talk' can produce different and difficult 
responses. Jo could have just said, 'okay fine' and moved on. On the other 
hand, she could tell the 'truth' and respond to the question as a meaningful literal 
enquiry, receiving the oncologist's question as seeking a 'truthful' response. Jo's 
report of the oncologist's reaction clarifies the kind of answer, "well I'd hope you'd 
tell me the truth" (line 8). 
One of the justifications or explanations for not telling the truth could be that it is 
likely that when asking someone who has a chronic illness how they are, they 
might tell you (see extract 6: 4.1). As was shown in extracts 6: 3.1 and 6: 3.3, 
when people ask 'how are you? ' participants claim those asking do not really 
want to know the answer, but are just being polite. 
The consequences of Jo giving a truthful answer suggest that it is unlikely that 
there is going to be a short response enabling the conversation to move on to 
other things. Jo says I feel absolutely dreadful" (line 10) which is accompanied 
by her saying that she then had to go on and recount "the whole story" (line 12) 
of how she had stopped taking tamoxifen. 14 
So, the response to a HAY? question is invariably complex for those involved 
and there are always exceptions to the standard rules of asking HAY? questions. 
Recipients themselves might want to treat it as a casual, rather than a literal 
enquiry and move on to less troubled talk. Jo's account of this conversation, in 
terms of routine and factual HAY? questions provides the occasion for her telling 
how she was in some detail. Having made it a serious enquiry, she then "had to" 
go into all the details. Given how bad she was feeling, it may well be that what 
Jo is reporting here are the interactional moves she made so as to be in a 
position to tell those details, even to her oncologist, in the face of what ought 
normatively to be a mere greetings exchange. Even in conversations with an 
" Tamoxifen is a hormonal medication used in the treatment of breast cancer. 
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oncologist, the telling of awful details in response to a 'HAYT question can 
become an interactionally difficult and accountable matter. 
In extract 6: 4.4, Zoe, who at the time had recently finished chemotherapy, has 
been talking about relationships with friends and family. In this extract she is 
recounting a conversation she had with her mother. 
Extract 6: 4.4 Zoo 07103 "1 don't like it" 
I Zoe 
2 
4 
5 
but I- I er. hhh when she used to come and ask me stuff y'know, 
I mean (. ) when I'd had chemotherapy she'd phone up an' say 
how are you? I'd go fine hh y'know and then she'd say 
Have you been sick? how many times? get off 
RC umh 
6 -4 Zoe I don't like it 
7 RC umh, well talking about those kind of details is not (. ) particularly 
8 helpful then? 
9 Zoe no 
Prior to the beginning of this extract, Zoe has been talking about her relationship 
with her mother and RC has asked whether her mother asks her how she is to 
which Zoe responded "she asks me all the while". She goes on to account for 
her reaction to this. Zoe says that her mother "used to come and ask me stuff" 
(lines 1 and 2) and goes on to account for a time when she had "had 
chemotherapy". Zoe's reported response to her mother's classic HAY? enquiry, 
"fine" (line 3) is a minimal, conventional response; it is a preferred, 'no problem' 
response which usually enables normal conversation to continue. However 
Oserious' her mother's HAY? may have been, Zoe's reaction was to treat it as the 
casual kind; "I'd go fine" (line 3), where the expression *I'd go" formulates it as a 
routine action, and the response "fine" is precisely the canonical one. 
However, on this occasion the interaction does not remain routine, because Zoe 
reports that 'she' (her mother) continues to question her about her troubles: 
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"Have you been sick? "5 How many times? " (line 4) which Zoe responds to rather 
dismissively with "get off" (line 4), in other words, stop. She follows this with "I 
don't like it" (line 6). 
In contrast to other participants' concerns, or to other occasions, Zoe's complaint 
is not about having to deal with routine enquiries from people who do not want to 
know how you are, but with serious, factual enquiries from someone who resists 
Zoe's own efforts ("I'd go fine") to treat it as a routine greeting. Although she 
does agree with RC's enquiry that asking these kinds of questions are not helpful 
(lines 7-8), just prior to this extract, Zoe has produced a form of justification for 
her reaction. She has displayed concerns for her mother, and explained that she 
does not want to talk about it because she wants to avoid worrying her. So, 
discouraging her mother from asking her such questions is motivated by 
attending to her mother's problems. As shown in other extracts, it also reflexively 
presents Zoe as independent and not wanting to be accountable to her mother 
for her troubles (Jefferson, 1980,1984a, 1985b, 1988; Sacks, 1976, in Jefferson 
1984a). 
Participants often provide explanations and justifications for'lying' and not saying 
how they really are, such as, that they do not want to trouble people, or be a 
burden (see extract 6: 3.1). They also say they do not want people to really know 
how they are, because if they tell someone how they really are, this might make 
it difficult for them to know what to say, or they might worry. Again, this highlights 
PWC's concerns for others. So, in certain situations, it is much easier to say 
'fine' or'okay' and follow the conventions of a casual HAY? question, rather than 
take them as genuine inquiries. It also enables the PWC to deviate from any 
, troubles talk' about how they are and to 'get ofr the difficult topic (Jefferson 
1988). 
In extract 6: 4.5, Jo reveals yet another view of HAY? during a second interview 
conducted after she had been given a terminal diagnosis. This time she is 
chastising the health professionals for not asking how are you? 
15 One of the generally known side effects of chemotherapy is sickness. 
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Extract 6: 4.5 Jo/02/03 "Fragile - handle with care" 
28 -+ Jo 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
I'm not walWing around with doom and gloom on my face 
so I don't want to see it (1.0) 
they may be feeling sorry for me or whatever, 
it's not necessary (2.0) y'know, 
I er prefer to see a happy smiling face and they can say 
oh how are you ((up tone in voice)) that's fine 
RC uh huh 
Jo y'know just because I'm dying doesn't mean to say 
they can't ask me that question (3.0) 
Although Jo does not invoke the notion of putting on a brave face, she does say 
that she is "not walking around with doom and gloom" (line 28) on her face. But 
she makes it clear that it is not necessary for people to feel sorry for her (line 30) 
(cf. Ann extracts 6: 2.1-6: 2.3). Jo prefers "a happy smiling face" (line 32) and 
regardless of the ambiguities and contradictions she voiced in extract 6: 4.3, she 
voices that "they can say oh how are you". In fact, rather than this being 
'regardless' of such considerations, it is an acknowledgement of them. It is 
precisely in the face of such ambiguities and interpersonal difficulties that Jo 
asserts that she is above them, able to deal with them and not threatened by 
them. She says: "just because I'm dying doesn't mean to say they can't ask me 
that question" (lines 35-36). In saying that she wants people to be cheerful 
around her, and that she wants to be asked how she is, she orients to the 
expectable difficulties of doing that. On this occasion, the support she is asking 
for is to be treated as 'normal', not that she is someone who is dying, though of 
course the understood basis is that she is indeed dying, and everyone knows it. 
Her proclamation of this is working towards easing the social interaction around 
her at this difficult time and again, attends to her identity as someone who is 
being positive about her illness, and wanting others to be so too. However, how 
she would respond is not something she provides for in this account. 
One of the purposes of analysing asking HAY? has been to get a better 
understanding of what the concerns are for PWC when they are asked such 
everyday but potentially difficult questions. Clearly, the differences between a 
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casual enquiry, a genuine, concerned enquiry, and a clinical enquiry require 
different management for those concerned. Whether it is a PWC to a PWC, 
oncologist to a PWC, mother to daughter, spouse to partner, whatever the 
relationship, what appears to be a simple everyday conversational question is full 
of complexities and pitfalls. Yet, as Jo implies (extract 6: 4.5) people should not 
go round with doom and gloom on their faces, or be routinely overprotective and 
only'handle with care', the question can still be asked. 
This extract summarises the complexities of knowing what to say and when and 
how the PWC produces variable and sometimes contradictory accounts. But 
what the analysis reveals is that people with or without cancer are full of 
normative expectations, and that there are sets of normative rules which both 
they and others attend to. 
The rules for asking everyday HAY? greetings are the same whether it is 
someone with or without cancer. But the analysis points out that others need to 
be aware of the sensitivities and ambiguities such a question can raise with 
someone who has cancer (or any other serious illness). PWC and their family 
and friends are likely to have variable needs and concerns. Sometimes, they do 
want to be asked HAY? and sometimes not. The same variability applies to 
acknowledging (and validating) their illness and as shown with Jo, there are 
times when it is important for people to exhibit cheerfulness. Introducing 
negative states such as doom and gloom might involve the PWC having to take 
on this additional burden of managing other peoples' interactional problems. 
This idea will be discussed, together with other themes, in the conclusion. 
Summary 
Chapter 6 has focused on the how PWC recall and produce some of the 
difficulties encountered in social interactions with friends, family and the medical 
profession. It has looked at how the cultural language of cancer is invoked and 
worked up to formulate its meaning for them. On occasions the expectations 
placed upon them are stressed as being "rammed down their throats", or that 
others are not entitled to say such things. Its contribution to this thesis is that the 
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PWC, in addition to having to manage their illness, is constantly placed into 
difficult social situations where invariably, THEY are the ones who have to 
display understanding and manage other peoples' reactions to their illness. They 
also display that they do not want to be treated with pity, nor do they want people 
to feel sorry for them. Accounts construct this as being un-supportive, and when 
they express concerns for worrying others or being a burden they account for 
how puffing on a brave face can fend off difficulties of talking about their troubles. 
They also attend to issues of identity in presenting themselves as being positive, 
and rather than talk about the expectations continually being placed on them, 
they convey their expectations of others and how they want them to respond. 
In Chapter 7, the analytical focus is on how PWC narrate stories which are 
hearable as what I term doing being positive accounts. The focus is on how 
doing being normal and laughter and humour are employed to fend off recipients 
offering unwanted sympathy or engaging in talking about their troubles and how 
laughter and humour also manages the potentiality of being heard as a self 
pitying or a complainer. 
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Chapter 7 
Moral accountability: Doing being positive 
Introduction 
In Chapter 2,1 outlined how PWC are expected to cope and live with their illness. 
According to psychological theory and the influential self-health approach to 
cancer (considered by many as controversial), recovery depends upon the 
patients' attitude towards their illness. Many of these approaches, such as that 
of Louise Hay, rely heavily on a subjectivist philosophy. She expresses a view of 
health and illness as the unqualified truth of existence and suggests that "no 
person, no place, and no thing has any power over us ... we create our 
experiences, our reality and everyone in it" (Hay, 1988: 7). Similarly Simonton, 
Matthews-Simonton and Creighton suggest that "we all participate in our own 
health through our beliefs, our feelings and attitudes towards life and that we 
each have a responsibility to change negative thought patterns because they can 
directly affect our bodily health" (Simonton et al, 1978: 32). This places the power 
of recovery in the hands of the individual and "if you follow the imperative to take 
responsibility for your disease and recognise that you are the one in charge 
... [then] you will 
feel empowered" (Charles, 1990: 7). 
I have also discussed that certain rules of 'coping' are promoted such as 
adopting a 'positive attitude' and a 'fighting spirit'. Additionally these 'coping' 
attitudes are endorsed as being morally desirable reactions to negative events. 
Cultural and common sense notions of managing illness in the Western world 
also suggest that we should not talk about or dwell on our illness, that we adopt a 
stiff upper lip, put on a brave face, and 'think positive'. A practical problem for the 
PWC, within the moral order of illness, is to avoid denying the reality of their 
illness, while at the same time avoid being seen as self-pitying, pitiful or not 
coping. 
In Chapter 6,1 focused on how these moral ascriptions are taken up, and the 
analysis looked at PWC's accounts of the things people said to them. The 
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analysis revealed how when PWC are told to 'think positive' and to 'be positive' 
or asked "How are you? ", that who was saying these words, and when they were 
said, was relevant to whether such 'advice' or concern was accepted or rejected. 
It generally depended on whether or not the source was treated as credible and 
entitled to give such advice or express such concerns. 
In their analysis of breast cancer patients who directly reported that they were 
'thinking positive', Wilkinson and Kitzinger (2000) argued that the participants 
voiced the claims in part to protect themselves against accusations of complicity 
in the onset and the progression of their cancer. They proposed that self- 
descriptions, such as 'I think positive' are partly designed to counter any such 
notions that the PWC may be responsible, if not for the onset of their own 
disease, at least for its progression (cf. de Raeve, 1997; Rittenberg, 1995; Gray 
and Doan, 1990). However, rather than look at participants' self descriptions of 'I 
think positive', this chapter aims to show how doing being positive is a 
participants' concern in much of their talk, and how this is discursively 
accomplished. Participants do not always make explicit claims that they are 
thinking positively or adopting a 'fighting spirit' (as defined in questionnaires such 
as the MAC: Watson et al., 1988) and, unlike in Chapter 6, in this chapter 
participants (with the exception of Gen extracts 7: 1.6-7: 1.8) do not directly voice 
the words "be positive" or "fight it". What they do is tell stories that display them 
doing being positive. 
The idea of PWC being positive and how accountable they are for this 
prescriptive approach to their illness is a pervasive feature throughout this thesis. 
This chapter aims to emphasise some of the dilemmas this produces for a 
person with cancer and I will show how they attend to these dilemmas as 
potentially accountable issues. I show how PWC produce individual meanings 
of the notions of doing being positive and adopting a 'fighting spirit'. 
Edwards (1997) suggests that speakers' concerns with accountability are often 
managed at two levels of narration. The first is in the current interaction and the 
second is within the past event being recounted. Speakers also regularly attend 
to issues of moral accountability in their talk and this often occurs when multiple 
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and opposing versions are possible. Speakers have a rhetorical stake in the 
version of the story they tell and they present their versions in order to counter 
alternative accounts or other versions (Antaki, l 994; Billig, 1997). 1 will also show 
how their stories are rhetorically designed to construct a plausible, credible self 
or identity (cf. Antaki and Widdicombe, 1998) which counters any potential view 
of themselves as passive, pitiful, self-pitying or not'coping'. 
The Analysis 
The analysis is divided into two parts: 
7: 1 Doing being normal 
7: 2 Seriously funny: Looking on the bright side 
In the first part, (extracts 7: 1.1-7: 1.8) the analysis focuses on the construction of 
doing being normaL The second part (extracts 7: 2.1-7: 2.6) looks at how doing 
being positive is accomplished by invoking laughter, irony and humour. 
7: 1 Doing being normal 
So far, the stories analysed have been about discovery accounts, diagnostic 
delay and what other people said during the early stages of illness. In this 
chapter, we continue the narrative trajectory of illness, to stories about how PWC 
continue with their everyday lives and visits to the hospital. 
In order to convey the relationships across a sequence of stories and accounts, I 
am going to present 5 extracts taken from a long narrative given by Dee which is 
centred on her friend Sandra. It is an account of how Dee unpacks the gloss of 
doing being positive and is a detailed and representative example (that is, in 
terms of the kinds of accountability it manages) found in my data. 
In extract 7: 1.1, Dee, is giving an account about a friend of hers, Sandra. They 
are both members of a local cancer self-help support group. 
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Extract 7: 1.1 Dee 08/12: "1 could do the wee: kly Sainsburys" 
1 Dee she's tackling it the second time round much better 
2 than she tackled it the first, it's strange isn't it? 
3 RC umh 
4 -+ Dee she was the one out of all of us who (0.2) 
5 gave up walking her dogs (. ) 
6 didn't go down the garden because she couldn't 
7 get that far (0.2) stopped shopping (0.1) 
8 didn't go out in her car (0.1) 
9 didn't go out to dinner (. ) 
10 she §LoRped living really in the terms she had before 
11 during the treatment 
12 RC uh huh 
13 Dee the re(hhh)st of us sta(hh)ggered ro(hh)und the water works 
14 y'know with two dogs that were raring to go 
15 and you'd think oh hhh dear I can't go any more 
16 1 carried on doing my shopping, 
17 that was very important to me (. ) 
18 the one thing that's very important to me is 
19 that I could do the wee: kly [Sainsburys; 
20 RC [Yes 
21 -4 Dee now isn't that silly but it was very important 
22 RC yeah absolutely 
23 Dee it's norm- the only se- sense of normality 
24 RC yes 
Dee's rhetorical question, that "it's strange isn't it? " (line 2) defines Sandra's 
"tackling it the second time round much better" (line 1) as something out of the 
ordinary, especially as getting cancer for the second time is even worse news. ' 
Dee puts forward the idea that Sandra's reaction is unusual, but at this point, she 
does not elaborate why this should be strange. 
1A second cancer diagnosis is an indication that the initial treatment has failed. If the cancer had 
only invaded adjacent tissues, it would be curable (by surgery) in the vast majority of cases and 
there would not be a second time round. The significance of second time round, and what makes 
cancer so threatening and dangerous is that it (the cancer) has spread to other parts of the body 
and formed secondary cancers there. Dee also has secondary cancer. 
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The first time someone is given a cancer diagnosis, they are not likely to know 
what this entails; they are entering previously unknown territory and a whole new 
range of experiences. However they may draw on lay and culturally available 
knowledge about cancer and it is also likely they will have encountered the 
cultural metaphors and all the dreaded accounts of the disease. 
Getting cancer for the second time is generally (and medically) understood as 
being far more serious and life threatening. It has its own individual meaning and 
it is a very different phenomenon to be managed. Dee says that "she's tackling 
it ... much 
better" (line 1), which attends to the notion that the second time round 
brings with it the lived experience of the first diagnosis, and its strangeness is 
that she is tackling it better the second time round. 
Dee then determines the significance of it being strange in the form of a contrast 
account. She begins by separating Sandra out as having been different from the 
rest of the group all along, saying "she was the one out of all of us" (line 4). 
Firstly, "all of us", is an ECF that maximises the number of people that Sandra is 
contrasted with. It implies that "all" are members of the same group of women 
with a cancer diagnosis and they have something in common. Proportional ECFs 
(Pomerantz, 1986) are normally used to indicate that any individual members of 
that category are not responsible for the state of affairs, that responsibility is to 
be attributed elsewhere. 2 But the use of 'all' (line 4) separates Sandra as 
different, while also providing Dee, as she now tells the story, with a warrant to 
pick Sandra out. Setting Sandra up as different, as not fitting in with "the rest of 
us", is also a way of emphasising the strangeness (line 2) that makes Sandra's 
story worth telling. 
One analytically interesting feature is how Dee describes Sandra as different 
(lines 5-9). She does this in the form of a five-part list of some of the ordinary 
mundane activities that Sandra failed to engage in. The sheer ordinariness of 
those activities constructs Sandra as an extreme case at the end of the 
2 ECFs have been linked to normative accountability and 'consensus formulations' in discursive 
psychology (Edwards and Potter, 1992) and are also applied to the behaviour of single or singled- 
out groups or individuals where they can pathologise or ironise, as well as normalise the way 
people behave (Edwards, 1994; 1995; 2000; Hutchby, 1992; cf. Smith 1978) 
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continuum, a person different from 'all of us". She gave up "walking her dogs, " 
"didn't go down the garden, " "stopped shopping, " "didn't go out in her car, " and 
"didn't go out to dinner, " (lines 5-9). The essence of this is formulated in line 10, 
"she stopped living really". The point being made here is that the notion of 
Sandra's tackling it better the second time round also defines the negative way 
she acted the first time round, as being wrong, inappropriate, and unusual. 
Sandra's inadequacy in dealing with her illness, is therefore constructed as a 
series of negatives or absences, that is, what she failed to do. What is also 
inferentially available is that Dee knew Sandra before she had cancer, enabling 
Dee to report that "she stopped living really in the terms she had before" (line 
10). This provides a further contrast in terms of the sort of life Sandra lived 
before, implying that prior to her cancer she was actively engaged in a normal 
social life. 
Having set up Sandra as not carrying out 'normal activities' Dee provides a 
generalised account of what "the re(hhh)st of us" did. They "sta(hh)ggered 
ro(hh)und the water works' (lines 13-14). The laughter occurring within this 
description indicates that this is a possibly amusing description, conjuring up 
comical images of them not being able to walk normally. 'Staggered' is a word 
often applied to people who have had too much to drink; in this instance it 
indicates the lack of mobility and energy often attributed to the severe side 
effects of the treatment regime. Its presentation as comical is a reflexive display 
of making light of it, of not wallowing in the misery of it. The inference "you'd 
think" (line 15) is that anyone else would not "go on any more" (line 15) but that 
the "re(hh)st of us" did, which again emphasises the contrasting actions. 
Rather than elaborate what else the 'rest' did, Dee now personalises her 
account, describing her own actions (lines 16-20), which are offered as getting on 
with ordinary, normal, routine activities. Note the series of details that provide a 
precise counterpoint to Sandra, going shopping, walking dogs, going out in the 
car. Sacks (1984) suggested that when people report events, they attend to the 
ordinariness or extraordinariness of what happened. In lines 16-25 what is 
interesting is that the very ordinariness of Dee's reported actions are constructing 
normality, a sense of what doing being normal is. Again, by way of the contrast 
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with Sandra, Dee can also be heard as doing being positive. She is 'coping' with, 
rather than succumbing to her illness. Participants do not often directly voice that 
they are 'coping', but rather, their descriptions, narratives and contrasts orient to 
that notion. Dee contrastively celebrates being able to do the ordinary things; that 
she "carried on doing my shopping" (line 16) and that it was "very important" 
(line 18) that she "could do the wee: kly SainsburyS"3 (line 19). The emphasis on 
being able to "do" the "wee: kly Sainsburys" specifies this as a definite, 
recognisable and routine action. The phrase "the wee: kly Sainsburys" (in which 
both "weekly" and the definite article "the" are important) is emblematic of 
normality, of a routine and normal life. 
Pomerantz (1984a) suggests that a routine way of agreeing with people is to 
provide an upgraded second assessmene which is what RC provides (in 
overlap), with "yes" (line 20), upgraded to "yeah absolutely" (line 22). What Dee 
is making important and relevant here is the routine nature of the activity, rather 
than, say, that she needed to go and get food, which provided her with "the only 
se-sense of normality" (line 23). The explicit use of "normality" has a heightened 
sense in this context which stands in contrast to Sandra, who "stopped shopping" 
(line 7). 
Everyday mundane activities are a pertinent feature of Dee's (and others') 
constructions of doing being positive. Participants regularly invoke descriptions of 
normal routine activities and say that this is their way of maintaining some degree 
of control and being 'normal'. 
This importance of the mundane is highlighted when the ordinary thing is 
something that would usually (normally) be taken to be onerous or bad. For 
3 Sainsburys is a British supermarket chain. 
4 Pomerantz suggests that different types of agreements are produced with second assessments. 
One type of agreement is the upgrade. "An upgraded agreement is an assessment of the referent 
assessed in the prior that incorporates upgraded evaluation terms relative to the prior. Two 
common techniques for upgrading evaluations are: (1) a stronger evaluative term than the prior, 
given graded sets of descriptors, is selected and (2) an intensifier modifying the prior evaluative 
descriptor is included" (Pomerantz, 1984a: 65). 
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example, one participant claimed that having a common cold made her feel 
normal again. 5 
The telling of routine activities is also a way of displaying and making light of an 
affliction by adopting, as far as possible, the behaviour appropriate to a healthy 
person. So, by recounting the ordinary normal positive things, Dee and "all of us" 
are 'coping' positively with extraordinariness, with being severely ill. Jefferson 
(1 984c) and Wooffitt (1992) have also shown how the pursuit of ordinariness is a 
routine feature of the reporting of a wide range of unusual or dubious 
experiences. In the case of a PWC, it is also a way of bringing off being positive. 
Descriptions can be given authority by emphasising or building up category 
memberships, which imply particular knowledge entitlements (Potter, 1996). 
Another feature of descriptive accounts is that they can also construct actions or 
events as normal or abnormal. In extract 7: 1.1, Dee is engaged in constructing 
herself and "all of us" as doing normal activities and Sandra is constructed as 
being anomalous. In "K is mentally ill", Dorothy Smith (1978) addressed the 
issue of how descriptions can present some actions as abnormal and notes that 
what counts as normal is indexical. In other words, it is not sufficient to simply 
describe an action, which will be consensually recognised as abnormal or weird 
but any notion of abnormality has to be constructed in discourse (Potter, 1996). 
As with Ks abnormality, Sandra's abnormality is worked up principally using a 
contrast structure. Smith's study focuses on how accounts work both to 
describe the activity, and provide cues to understand it as abnormal or bizarre. 6 
One notable feature of everyday event descriptions is how they make inferentially 
available particular dispositional states of the actors; their moral character, 
5 Sacks (1984) discusses the notion of ordinariness as a concerted, interactional accomplishment. 
He notes how being ordinary is a recurrent pattern of social life: "it is almost everybody's business 
to be occupationally ordinary, that people take on the job of keeping everything utterly mundane; 
that no matter what happens, pretty much everybody is engaged in finding only how it is that what 
is going on is usual, with every effort possible" (Sacks, 1984: 419). 
6 In addition to Smith's study, recent CA studies have yielded considerable information about the 
character and use of contrast structures in a variety of discursive circumstances: in political 
discourse (Atkinson, 1984a and b; Heritage and Greatbatch, 1986) and in selling techniques (Pinch 
and Clark, 1986). In these forms of language use, inferences about the preferability of one item 
are exposed and easily available from the contrast. 
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personality, or state of mind (Smith, 1978, Edwards, 1994; Edwards, 1995). 
Dee's account is potentially hearable as judgmental in that it could be inferred 
that if Sandra had behaved differently the first time round, she might not be 
experiencing secondary cancer now. In extract 7: 1.2, Dee works on this 
possibility. 
Extract 7: 1.2 Dee 08113 "Sandra did nothing" 
25 Dee I wash my own car still (1.0) 
26 and I drove all the while (1.0) 
27 Sandra did nothing, she sort of (2.0) let the disease (2.0) 
28 dictate to her really I suppose In a way hhh umh 
29 and I met her (. ) after about six months 
30 1 hadn't seen her for about six months- 
31 1 met her in the clinic at County a year and a bit ago 
32 Dee and I was sitting in clinic and thinking the only person I haven't 
33 seen recently is Sandra and a person grabbed my arm and said 
34 Dee (. ) I said d'y'know I was just thinking about you 
35 it's strange, it's eerie (. ) and I went to say and I did say 
36 how are you? and I looked at her and as the words came out 
37 1 thought oh what a silly thing to say you can see what she's like 
38 (. ) ((voice lowers to a whisper)) 
39 but yknow (. ) it's a natural reaction 
40 RC umh, umh 
Extract 7: 1.2 is a continuation of Dee's story about her friend Sandra (Note that 
part of this extract was analysed in Chapter 6, extract 6: 4.1). One of the features 
of the everyday use of the category 'friend' is its implications of positive feelings 
and loyalty; friends are people you stick by and support. They are not people 
you are likely to be critical of or attack; so how does Dee manage the issue of 
stake and her frIendshi p? 7 
' "Stake inoculation works to build up the credibility or factuality of the description by heading off 
the discounting work of stake attribution. In situations where descriptions might be undermined as 
interested, stake inoculation presents a counter-interest" (Potter, 1996: 128). 
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Participants also have a problem of avoiding making available a prejudiced or 
biased identity and in Dee's case, being seen as judgmental. Potter (1996) 
suggests that people need to make their evaluations appear to be natural and 
obvious features of the world rather than reflections of their own psychology; they 
need to accomplish an out-there-ness. 
Accounts which merely appear to be describing the world as it is are generally 
taken to be more persuasive than accounts motivated by the special interests or 
psychological disposition of the speaker (Smith, 1978, Potter and Wetherell, 
1988). The psychological concept of motivation can be re-conceptualised as a 
participant's rather than an analyst's concern (Horton-Salway, 1998; cf. Mills, 
1940). The construction of a particular identity, in this case Dee, as Sandra's 
friend, and also someone with cancer provides grounds for being able to talk 
about Sandra's response to her illness. Dee depicts herself as being someone 
who is concerned about her friend. 
Dee continues to build and sustain the contrast with further examples of the 
ability to do ordinary things (despite having cancer). However, she does present 
this with a cautious and pensive delivery. "I wash my own car still (1.0)" and "I 
drove all the while (1.0)" (lines 25-26) and again contrasts her actions with 
Sandra who (again in extreme terms) "did nothing" (line 27)". It is unlikely that 
Sandra literally did nothing, but again the use of this ECF maximises the 
rhetorical contrast and supports the action Dee is engaged in, of putting Sandra 
in a different category to "all of us". 
What is at stake for Dee is to be seen as sympathetic and sensitive towards her 
friend's state, while nevertheless criticising her. Dee manages this by deliberating 
before delivering her assessment of Sandra, indicating her sensitivity. This helps 
to avoid being heard as simply making disparaging comments about her friend. 
Similarly, by proposing that Sandra failed to resist her illness but rather "she sort 
of (2.0) let the disease (2.0) dictate to her" (lines 27-28), Dee is also hedging her 
8 Dee describes herself as being active and Sandra as passive. In the MAC questionnaire (Watson 
et al, 1988), Dee's actions in lines 4,18, and 32 would be classified as adopting a 'fighting spirit' 
whereas Sandra would be classified as being helpless/hopeless. 
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comments by saying 'sort of, and I suppose'. Long pauses occurring in talk 
about difficult and sensitive issues have been noted to signal acknowledgement 
that it can be difficult to know what to say (Per5kyl5,1995); here, Dee's two 
second pauses (line 27) act as reaction tokens signalling her sensitivity to what 
she is saying (See also extracts 7: 1.6. -7: 1.8). 
By attributing the disease with control and power Sandra is constructed 
negatively, as being someone who is not adopting a 'fighting spirit'; that she is 
giving in to the disease. 9 As previously noted being positive and adopting a 
'fighting spirit' are idiomatic expressions of an attitude recommended by medical 
professionals and psychologists closely linked to mortality and morbidity. The 
problem with such assertions is that they load a lot of responsibility for illness 
and prognosis on to the sick individual. So saying that Sandra "did nothing" and 
"let the disease dictate to her" are statements with a potentially moralistic ring, 
but Dee works to manage this possible interpretation. As with Smith's (1978) "K 
is mentally ill" study, what Dee is saying about Sandra includes much that could 
be treated as being critical and therefore as reflective upon Dee herself as a 
somewhat unsympathetic narrator, rather than telling us about Sandra. Dee's 
approval of Sandra's new attitude following her relapse is also a way of dispelling 
any such inferences about Dee. 
Dee goes on to provide a first person narrative (lines 29-40) and a sequentially 
different account of Sandra, orienting to "tackling it the second time round a bit 
better" (extract 7: 1.1, line 1). Dee sets the context of this meeting: "she hadn't 
seen her (Sandra) for about six months" (line 30) which provides an opportunity 
for Dee to produce a contrasting account of how Sandra had been before the 
second diagnosis. They met in the clinic, "a year and a bit ago" (line 31). Dee 
describes when, where and how their meeting occurred and again invokes the 
strangeness of the situation. She says she was "sitting in clinic and thinking the 
only person I haven't seen recently is Sandra" (line 32) and just as she was 
thinking, "a person grabbed my arm" (line 33). Dee reiterates that she had just 
been thinking of Sandra and again notes that "it's strange, it's eerie" (line 35). 
The references to "strange" and "eerie" are an indication of something being out 
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of the ordinary. They emphasise the strangeness of Dee sitting and thinking 
about Sandra, who then appears. "O Their use in this context helps work up the 
narrative of Sandra's different approach to her illness and also to something as 
being unusual, possibly inexplicable because in Sandra's case Dee is providing 
an account that something unexpected and unexplainable is occurring. Dee is 
not normalising her account as in Wooffitt's (1992) accounts of paranormal tales 
that attract 'normalising' devices such as I was just doing X when Y' or Sara's 
account of discussing her pea sized lump, (see Chapter 4 extract 4: 1.1) Dee is 
giving this account as being something unexplainable, where it contributes to her 
contrastive narrative of Nit's strange isn't it? " (extract 7: 1.1 line 2). 11 
Dee says how she greeted Sandra, by asking "how are you? " (see detailed 
analysis chapter 6, extract 6: 4.1). As was noted in chapter 6, the use of routine 
everyday enquiries of this kind usually assumes that you are well and that you 
are leading an ordinary, normal life, and will have nothing serious or detailed to 
report. However, for people who are ill, such everyday questions can be 
problematic. Nevertheless Dee, because she also has cancer, has the 
knowledge and experience that entitle her to talk to someone else with cancer. It 
is also likely easier for her to ask this, but it might pose more interactional 
problems for someone without cancer. 
Entitlement to experience is a topic that Sacks (1992) discussed in his lectures. 
He presented a story told about coming across a horrific auto-accident where 
people were laid out and covered over on the pavement. He emphasised that 
the teller and the recipient of the story have differential 'rights' to feelings about 
' On the MAC scale, Sandra would be classified as being helpless and hopeless. 
'0 This phenomenon is one many of us may be familiar with; when we are thinking of someone 
and the telephone rings; a familiar response is 'oh, I was just thinking about you'. Whatever its 
status as an event that actually happens, it is also a nice way of re-establishing the reciprocity of a 
relationship that the person being called, or approached, might otherwise be remiss in allowing to 
havelapsed. 
11 Note that throughout extracts 7: 1.1 and 7: 1.2, Dee (and others, see extract 6: 1.1) produces an 
Gactive-passive' contrast. It is the passivity of having cancer, getting treatment, the possibility of 
dying, versus the agentive, active nature of 'coping', doing being positive and doing normal 
things. But, it is not easy, note how the agency of the latter is also built by the amount of effort it 
takes, like the "staggering' around the water works (extract 7: 1.1, line 13), it is an effort, a strain 
and a struggle against adversity to make the best of it. 
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the accident. He states that the storyteller has a specific entitlement to feel 
awful, to cry, to have their day ruined in a way that the recipient does not: 
"If you call up a friend of yours who is unaffiliated with the event you're reporting, 
Le. someone who doesn't turn out to be the cousin of, the aunt of, the person 
who was killed in the accident, but just a somebody you call up and tell about an 
awful experience, then if they become as disturbed as you, or more, something 
peculiar is going on, and you might even feel wronged - though that might seem 
to be an odd thing to feel". 
(Sacks, 1992: 1,242-8) 
Sacks points out that it is the witness who has the entitlement to these feelings. 
Potter (1996) developed the 'entitlement to experience' theme by linking it to the 
idea of category entitlement; that is, the idea that certain categories of people, in 
certain contexts, are treated as knowledgeable (Whalen and Zimmerman, 1990). 
He suggests that in practice, category entitlements can obviate the need to ask 
how the person knows. Simply being a member of some category, such as a 
doctor, a tennis player or health professional, or as in this analysis, a person with 
cancer, is treated as sufficient to account for, and warrant, their knowledge of a 
specific domain. 12 
In extract 7: 1.3, Dee recounts Sandra's response and Dee's category of 
entitlement to knowledge about cancer is made evident. 
Extract 7: 1.3 Dee 08/14 "she's just been wonderful this time" 
41 -ý Dee and she said I'm very ill" urnh yeah you look very unwell 
42 (. ) and I said (. ) what's the problem? 
43 she said I've got metastatic lung cancer (1.0) 
44 and we sat (. ) for about half an hour 
45 because the consultant was so far behind and you 
46 could see the people in the clinic becoming yM unhappy 
47 about two patients sitting discussing (. ) one patient's 
48 terminal disease (. ) they were so uncomfortable 
" The nature, boundaries and implication of both categories and their entitlements can be 
reworked in a whole range of ways (Gilbert and Mulkay, 1984: Ch. 6; Potter, 1988; Shuman, 
1992; Yearley, 1984). Additionally, while some categories are especially visible, or given official 
credentials, others are highly localised and negotiable (Jayyusi, 1984). 
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49 RC umh 
50 Dee and I said look Sandra I said this is causing a few problems 
51 in clinic I said why don't we go to the coffee shop and 
52 say to them we're in the coffee shop how long do you think we 
53 will be before we're needed 
54 RC umhumh 
55 Dee and we did that in the end (1.0) umh (2.0) 
56 and she was so feisty and she's been (. ) I mean Zoe will tell you 
57 she doesn't know her very well (. ) she's met her once but 
58 she's just been wonderful this time and 
59 1 wonder sometimes if she could have input so much 
60 effort the first time what would have happened? (2.0) 
61 RC umh 
The rhetorical construction setting the context for this story in extract 7: 1.1 is 
unpacked in extract 7: 1.3. Dee voices Sandra's response to being asked "how 
are you" which is delivered in a quiet, soft voice, "Trn very ill" (line 41) followed 
by Dee's agreement "umh yeah you look very unwell". Such a direct response of 
agreement under the circumstances of Sandra's illness may, in another context, 
seem highly inappropriate, especially coming from a friend. Pomerantz (1984a) 
found that the major exception to agreement being normatively 'preferred' is 
when the initial assessment is self-deprecating. However, this further highlights 
the significance in these special circumstances of asking "how are you? ", of who 
asks it and when, and the likelihood of getting a bad news announcement in 
response. Dee has been displaying her friendship with Sandra and that she is 
someone with certain experience and knowledge entitlements. Having already 
asked Sandra how she is, she asks her "what's the problem? " (line 42) and 
voices Sandra's response: "I've got metastatic lung cancer (1.0)" (line 43). The 
one-second pause is an opportunity for RC to enquire what this might mean or 
entail, but she does not take this up. Neither does Dee exclaim, react or 
comment on this bad news announcement. This displays that particular 
knowledge has been assumed by Dee and RC, that they both understand the 
meaning of 'metastatic' and that it equates with very bad news. 
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We of course do not know exactly how this reported conversation occurred; we 
only have Dee's account of it. But active voicing can be used to warrant the 
factual status of claims and ward off the possibility of sceptical responses 
(Hutchby and Wooffitt, 1998). In this instance Dee's voicing of Sandra's 
response (softly spoken) is an indicator of their intimacy and demonstrates an 
alignment of sensitivity and understanding of the gravity of Sandra's situation. 
The outcome of this bad news revelation is that they "sat for about half an hour" 
(line 44), an opportunity created by the consultant being so far behind. But they 
are not sitting in silence. Dee highlights an interesting quandary (lines 46-51) 
attending to timing and place and the potential difficulties of asking someone 
who looks so ill, how they are. People in the clinic, i. e. other PWC, are likely to be 
at different stages of their disease and are probably there to receive some form 
of treatment or to be given results of tests. Dee "could see the people in the clinic 
becoming very unhappy" (line 46) indicating the difficulties of talking about "one 
patient's terminal disease" (line 48) even amongst PWC, is clearly not something 
which is comfortable. It is evident that people with cancer can also find 
conversations about terminal illness difficult to manage and Dee's orientation to 
this sensitivity is displayed by her suggesting "we go to the coffee shop" (line 51). 
The revelation that Sandra's cancer is now almost definitely terminal adds to the 
strangeness of Sandra tackling it "much better" the second time round (extract 
7: 1.1, lines 1-2). Having not seen Sandra for six months, Dee says, "she was so 
13 feisty" (line 56) and "she's just been wonderful this time" (line 58). Dee also 
corroborates this by suggesting that it is not only she who noticed this, but there 
are corroborating witnesses: I mean Zoe will tell you", (line 56). This is a sharp 
contrast to the previous construction of Sandra as someone who was passive 
and who had "stopped living". Dee now establishes Sandra as being active. 
This contrast has implications for what Dee says next (lines 59-60) and attends 
to the notion of the meaning and implications of doing being positive. 
13 See Chapter 8 for how PWC talk about death and dying. 
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Although Dee says that Sandra has "just been wonderful this time", she 
"'wonders" (a mental state expression 14) whether "she could have input so much 
effort the first time what would have happened? " (lines 59-60). Mental state 
expressions perform an evaluation of actions, and also deal with an actor- 
narrator's accountability. Such expressions help create a sense of conveying 
genuine personal experiences and, as is apparent in Dee's account, they also 
attend to interactional concerns, in the telling, especially when this is something 
that needs to be managed with delicacy (Edwards, 1997). This state of 
"wondering" enables Dee to raise thoughts and possibilities without implying 
endorsement of them. The unspoken implication is that that Sandra could be 
somewhat accountable for her relapse, by not having responded so wonderfully 
in the first place. 15 
Dee is drawing on the idea that adopting a particular attitude may have an effect 
on your illness, in either a positive or negative direction (see Hay, 1988,1989; 
Simonton et al, 1978; Watson et al, 1988). Throughout her account she has 
contrasted the notions of herself as doing being positive and Sandra's inactive 
stance, and she is invoking their existence now by producing a notion that this 
can have potentially crucial consequences. This is a notion that Dee refers to 
again later in this conversation (see extracts 7: 1.4 and 7: 1.5 below) where she 
makes this "wondering" more explicit. 
14 "Mental states, including knowledge and belief and claims to remember or forget, feature in 
stories as an intrinsic part of the actions recounted, as well as performing evaluations of those 
actions, and dealing with an actor-narrator's accountability. Mental state descriptions feature in 
how narrators attend to factual authenticity, and create a sense of conveying genuine personal 
experiences. In doing all of that (rather than as some separate business) they also attend to 
interactional concerns in the telling, and this can be something very delicately managed" 
(Edwards, 1997: 282-283). 
" The normative reaction is to make light of one's affliction, to carry on as usual, and as far as 
possible to adopt the behaviour appropriate to a healthy person, in other words, to do "being 
positive". While this type of reaction may have some adaptive value for the individual sufferer, it 
is likely that its greatest significance lies in facilitating the way in which the healthy accommodate 
the disabled. As Freidson (1970) notes, in contrast to acute illness, chronic disabilities are 
awarded permanent legitimisation. At the same time, this is conditional on sufferers making an 
effort to 'improve' themselves, and make themselves socially acceptable by minimising the 
demands s/he makes on other people. In other words, social stereotypes concerning the 
appropriate reactions to long-term and incurable illness limit the amount of 'deviant' behaviour 
that is tolerated among the chronically ill (Pollock, 1993). 
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Dee's account does not end at this point. There is more to be told and more 
work to be done to account for this rather delicately introduced moral ascription, 
that Sandra may have been somewhat responsible for her relapse. Dee 
describes a distinct change in Sandra's approach to her illness. 
Extract 7: 1.4 Dee: 88/15 541-800 "would it have made any difference" 
62 Dee she's so, I mean I take my hat off to her this time 
63 1 don't know how she keeps going (. ) and she does (1.0) 
64 th- this is the third time that she's lost her hair (. ) hhh 
65 -+ Dee umh but I often wonder to myself if she'd kicked in like feisty like 
66 now before, would it have made any difference 
67 isn't it strange? (1.0) 
68 RC umh 
69 Dee because she did actually give up (1.0) not give up but 
70 she just stopped living 
71 RC but was she very poorly umh? 
72 Dee no I don't think she was as poorly as the rest of us really 
73 she just thought that that's how she should behave (2.0) 
74 and er (1.0) it used to annoy me because I used to want to 
75 shake her and say "come onO 
76 I'd say where have you been this week? 
77 you know you meet in chemotherapy (. ) 
78 where oh where have you been this week? 
79 Ooh I've not been able to go anywhereO 
80 1 said have you not been shopping? (1.0) 
81 *No, I can't drive, she said I just can't- I can't driveO 
82 1 said you could go to Fosse Park 16 you could park outside 
83 (1.0) ha ha because if I was fed up I'd get in the car 
84 go to Fosse Park for half an hour it sounds silly but that's my 
85 form of therapy 
86 RC umh 
87 Dee just have a won- a wonder round and I still walked my dogs 
16 Fosse Park is a local shopping centre. 
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In extract 7: 1.4, Dee now wonders "if she'd kicked in like feisty like now before, 
would it have made any difference" (lines 65- 66) which she completes with a 
rhetorical question 'isn't it strange? ' (67). The expression "I often wonder to 
myself" conveys these thoughts as sensitive, as private and tentative, not the 
kind of thing that Dee would be publicly asserting. Dee reiterates in extreme 
terms, that Sandra "just stopped living" (line 70). RC attends to the possibility 
that Sandra's past passivity could be due to her being especially ill, "very poorly", 
which Dee denies (line 72). Instead, she suggests that Sandra assumed "that 
that's how she should behave" (line 73). This contrasts with what Dee has 
established as the normally recognised and expected way to behave, which is to 
be positive. 
Indeed Dee expresses annoyance at Sandra's passivity (line 74), that she 
wanted to "shake her and say Ocome onO" (line 75). But Dee avoids any 
implication of lacking empathy, by encouraging Sandra to be active: "where have 
you been this week" (line 76). Note how the mundane activity of shopping 
features again, something that Dee has already said gives her a "sense of 
normality (line 23). She asks, "have you not been shopping? " (line 80). Dee 
reiterates the importance of the mundane and announces that "that's my (. ) form 
of therapy", followed by "I still walked my dogs" (line 87). Dee continues to 
construct being active and doing ordinary things as a constructive way of 'coping' 
with her illness. Again, this way of talking about Sandra could be heard as a 
criticism of someone who, after all, is probably (at this point) dying of cancer. 
Yet, it is not cast as an explicit criticism of Sandra, nor as a certainty, but as 
Dee's "wondering". 
In extract, 7: 1.5, RC explores the possibility of some explanation for Sandra's 
response to her illness and Dee provides further grounds for why Sandra did not 
tackle her illness so well the first time by introducing the role Sandra's husband 
played. 
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Extract 7: 1.5 Dee 08/16 "she just became (1.0) totally gnempowered by the 
disease" 
88 IRC so, what, what was it about her then that you think 
89 stopped her from doing anything 
90 [any ideas about that 
91 Dee [I think she just became (1.0) totally iLnempowered by the 
92 disease (1.0) it overtook her whole reason for living (1.0) 
93 and she had a- the strange thing is she had a husband like (1.0) 
94 perhaps who would have suited me in a way but I suppose it 
95 it wouldn't have done because I'm not that sort of person (. ) 
96 she had a husband who made it very easy 
97 for her to negate her responsibilities 
98 RC right 
99 Dee he took over the shopping, he took over the chores 
100 he took over everything, he would drive her to every 
101 appointment (. ) so she- so the NEED for her to do these things 
102 RC right 
103 Dee was taken care of, so that made her, it made it very easy for 
104 her- he would walk her dogs- their dogs 
RC asks Dee what "stopped her from doing anything" (line 89). Dee's response is 
to say that she "became (1.0) totally ILnempowered by the disease (1.0) it 
overtook her whole reason for living (1.0)" which also invokes the notion of the 
loss of control. Rather than personalise her account to Sandra, Dee introduces 
Sandra's husband and implicates his actions as a contributory factor to her 
inactivity. However, Dee would not want to be heard as accusing Sandra's 
husband of having contributed to her illness and counters this with some 
sensitivity by saying that he "would have suited me in a way" (line 94) but then 
discounts this by claiming that she is "not that sort of person". Dee is doing some 
identity management here in that she is implying that she is an independent and 
responsible person, because "not being that sort of person" is indexed to 
Sandra's husband "who made it very easy for her to negate her responsibilities. " 
This is a rather strong accusation implying that Sandra is not to blame for 
"negating her responsibilities". However, Dee has already provided reasons for 
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this in that Sandra was "totally ILnempowered". This makes available the 
contrasting options for PWC, that they can allow the disease to take over and 
remove any sense of responsibility, or they can be empowered, be in control and 
'get feisty. 
Dee is providing two versions of how to manage cancer. Potentially alternative 
versions of a social reality might be relevant in two ways. The first is where the 
analyst might be able to imagine how an account could have been different. The 
second (and more empirically tractable) is where the participants themselves 
attend to those alternatives (Horton-Salway, 1998). 
Dee describes what Sandra's' husband did to "negate her responsibilities". Not 
only was Sandra "unempowered" by the disease, but she was also 
"unempowered" by her husband's actions, in that "he took over everything" (line 
100), all the mundane activities, "the shopping", "the chores" (line 99) that Dee 
has earlier claimed provided her with a sense of normality (extract 7: 1.1). In 
doing this, she presents Sandra as not having any choice, that it was not her fault 
because "the NEED for her to do these things was taken care of" (lines 101 and 
103) by her husband. Dee is careful not to overtly blame Sandra for her condition 
and she manages this by introducing Sandra's husband who is described as 
taking the responsibility away from Sandra. This also provides an additional 
explanation of Dee's state of "wondering" about Sandra's first response in 
contrast to the second time around. 
Dee's initial description of Sandra could be compared with one of the most 
contentious areas of cancer research, that there Is a relationship between 
personality type and a predisposition to cancer. Hans Eysenck and others have 
suggested there is a cancer-prone personality (Type C). This personality type 
has certain characteristics: reacting to stress with either helplessness or 
hopelessness; being passive, appeasing and repressing their emotional 
reactions (Eysenck, 1990; 1994). 17 It is not that we might suppose Dee to be 
17 Eysenck (1990) quotes a turn of the century doctor, Sir William Osler, who wrote in 1906: "It is 
many times more important to know what patient has the disease than what kind of disease the 
patient has. " 
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familiar with Eysenck's theories, rather that both Dee and Eysenck (and others) 
are drawing on ideas about relationships between psychological states and 
medical conditions, that are part of both medical and common sense discourse. 
In this case, common sense discourse has the advantage, given that Sandra's 
response was not fixed and consistent as personality theory would predict, but (in 
Dee's account) varied sharply between first diagnosis and relapse. Second time 
around, despite being given an even more serious diagnosis, Sandra is 
apparently positive, 'feisty, and 'coping' much better. 
Clearly these are issues not just for analysts, but are displayed as participants' 
concerns. We do not actually know whether or not Sandra has gone through a 
change of personality or attitude: we only have Dee's account. But the 
interesting thing is Dee's account of all this and how she provides a 'before and 
after story' as a way of constructing the importance and possibility for anyone, no 
matter whom, of adopting a positive attitude: "if she had done things differently, 
what would have happened? " 
As previously noted, the stage of someone's illness will produce variable 
accounts. Being positive can be very difficult, as Gen reports in extract 7: 1.6- 
7: 1.8. Unlike Dee's account, Gen directl invokes the words 'positive attitude' 
and 'fighting spirit' and, throughout the extracts, she is constantly being 
accountable to these moral prescriptions. 
At the time of the interview, Gen was in her mid forties, married and had an 
eleven-year-old daughter. She was also extremely poorly and at times found it 
difficult to talk. Gen was originally diagnosed with breast cancer and had a full 
mastectomy but later she received a terminal diagnosis because the cancer 
metastasised to her bones, her lungs, and eventually her kidneys. She died in 
1997. 
Throughout this interview, Gen talked about the importance of having a positive 
attitude on numerous occasions. I have chosen these three extracts out of many 
possible choices to show how much a participants' concern this is, (even for 
someone in such an extreme state of ill health), and to highlight the dilemmas for 
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someone who is in severe pain and struggling to perform just the minimum of 
everyday activities. 
Extract 7: 1.6 Gen 11/01 "1 don't have a positive attitude" 
6 Gen 
7 RC 
8 
Gen 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
RC 
Gen 
"I don't have a positive attitudeo 
you don't have a positive attitude, no (1.0) 
but you have had one 
*If I had a positive attitude I could (. ) I'd probably recover 
(1.0) 1 can't do it (5.0) just (. ) the odd glimmer (. ) I get the odd 
glimmer (3.0) hhhhh and then somebody stamps on the ol' 
fingers and back we go down the hole" (3.0) 
right 
always (. ) I thought last week last week I thought I'm not 
going to let it happen this time but it did (6.0) it's very 
frustrating (2.0) 
Not being able to be positive is a concern Gen often addresses and holds herself 
accountable for. In extract 7: 1.6, she is denying that she has a positive attitude 
(line 6). RC reiterates Gen's claim but displays some previous knowledge of Gen 
that she has had a positive attitude. Gen's response to this attends to the idea 
proposed by some researchers and therapists that a positive attitude aids 
recovery (Hay, 1988; Simonton et al 1978). 
Gen is expressing her belief in this doctrine, in that she equates a positive 
attitude with recovery (line 9). Her account for not being positive is not that she 
rejects the advisability of it, but that she is unable to comply: she "can't do it". 
She does get the "odd glimmer", that sometimes she can be positive, but then 
dramatically, "somebody stamps on the old fingers and back we go down the 
hole" (lines 11-12). 
The implication here is that every time she manages to do something positive, 
something else happens. The "back down the hole" denotes that this occurs 
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frequently, and the image of a hole conjures up a notion of despair and 
hopelessness, that she is in the dark, and possibly falling. " 
In extract 7: 1.7, Gen addresses the issue of variability, of not being able to be 
positive and the difficulties for her of trying to do normal things. 
Extract 7: 1.7 Gen 11/02 "I've been very negative this week" 
I RC I mean how do you feel about things now? 
2 -+ Gen I've been very negative this week (1.0) terrible 
3 but last week was a lot better 
4 RC umh 
5 Gen I ca- find it very hard to answer these, once I got started on 
6 my tapestry I was feeling qui(hh)te ple(hh)ased with 
7 myse(hh)lf (4.0) 
8 RC so that cheered you up? (4.0) 
9 Gen I think it was the idea that I had a positive thought that had 
10 cheered me up really 
11 RC umh hhh 
12 Gen rather than, like you're, like other people you know 
13 staring at the television or whatever 
14 RC yeah 
15 Gen I wanted to do something more creative 
16 RC yeah 
17 Gen which I thought was positive and that cheered me up 
18 rather than the actual activity (3.0) 
19 Gen what is difficult is to get a positive life for you rather than cheer 
20 yourself up 
21 RC umh (1.0) 
22 Gen not to have impossible goals (1.0) like me, to jump in the car 
"Jefferson (1989) claimed that the 'standard maximum silence' after which a speaker will resume 
talking is about one second. Note that silences or long pauses normally denote difficulties and 
sensitivities in knowing what to say or they are used by interviewers in a more strategic fashion. 
As Houtkoop-Steenstra (2000: 39) notes "just like continuers, silences may be used as an 
alternative to an explicit request for more talk or a different answee,. However, throughout this 
interview Gen is not feeling at all well and many of the pauses are in part because she is finding it 
physically difficult to talk at times. 
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23 and park outside CWC19 and climb up all the stairs and all that 
24 1 mean it's impossible (5.0) 
25 RC umh (4.0) 
26 -+ Gen but I did manage to go round two fetes last weekend 
27 RC well exactly 
28 Gen but then I've been poorly ever since so what do you do? 
29 RC and- and you went to the seaside? 
30 Gen oh yes, the second time was a lot better than the first 
31 RC yes, so 
32 Gen didn't feel half as bad that day (2.0) could have do(hh)ne without 
33 the kids 
34 RC ha ha ha (2.0) well it er, I mean I er 
35 Gen but it is possible to- to lighten the mood, it is possible 
36 RC yeah (2.0) 
37 Gen but it doesn't happen often 
Gen is accounting for not being positive, which of course is an orientation to 
&positive' as the normatively expected and desirable way to be. It is not her 
condition that is described as "terrible" (line 2), but her attitude: she has "been 
very negative this week", but "was a lot better" the week before. Doing small 
things is the key, getting "started on my tapestry", but again there is the 
normative orientation: it was not that activity per se, but positivity itself that 
cheered her up: "it was the idea that I had a positive thought" (line 9). The nature 
of what counts as positive is produced by way of a contrast with the passivity of 
"other people you know" that stare at the television. In contrast, Gen "wanted to 
do something more creative" (line 15) and again it was the thought of being able 
to do it rather than the actual activity that cheered her up. At this point (line 18) 
positivity is interrupted by Gen not feeling well and needing to rest. 
I have already noted that 'inability accounts' are routine ways of orienting to 
normative requirements, when those requirements are not met, such as when 
declining an invitation (Drew, 1984). In this and other ways, being positive is 
treated by Gen as something morally required of her. She constructs what being 
positive is for her, and it is about getting "a positive life for you" (line 19) and "not 
19 Gen is referring to the offices of Coping with Cancer, (CWC) a self help support Group. 
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to have impossible goals" (line 20). She goes on to describe the recognisably 
mundane activities of getting in the car, and climbing some stairs, but for her at 
this point these things are "impossible" (line 21). Having managed (as an 
instance of being positive) to "go round two fetes", any further exertions along 
those lines have been prevented by being "poorly ever since". 
RC co-operates in Gen's self-depiction, as inclined to be positive if only she 
could, by inviting a further instance of it: "and you went to the seaside? " (line 29) 
which reminds Gen that "the second time was a lot better than the first" (line 30). 
The reference to the "kids" (line 33) also implies that it would have been even 
better if the "kids" had not been there, which also displays Gen's difficulties in 
achieving her goals. So, from moving from an avowal of being very negative, at 
the beginning of the extract, Gen goes on to account for the extent of her efforts 
and constraints. Positivity is strongly endorsed, in that the only reason Gen is 
not positive is that she cannot be. 
In extract 7: 1.8, Gen deals with being accountable in terms of what kind of 
person she is. 
Extract 7: 1.8 Gen 11/03 "there must be a fighting spirit in there somewhere" 
1 RC but I mean in the time I've known you I think your positive 
2 attitude has been absolutely incredible 
3 Gen this is a joke (2.0) 
4 RC well 
5 Gen I'm the most negative person everyone's ever met they're 
6 always telling me (2.0) 
7 RC I've never found you like that 
8 Gen in fa(hhh)ct er Claudia, Claudia says to me that 
9 IRC [I've found you negative at times but I mean to say, aren't we all 
10 Gen [she thinks it's absolutely amazing 
11 RC who says to you? 
12 Gen my homeopath, Claudia 
13 RC oh 
14 Gen somebody as negative as I am (1.0) has lasted this long (1.0) 
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15 that shows there must be a fighting spirit in there somewhere 
16 (1.0) 
17 RC well I don't see you like that at all (2.0) 
18 Gen but you only see the front (. ) or did, when I had one (8.0) 
RC is again providing support and encouragement by upgrading Gen's positive 
attitude in extreme terms, as "absolutely incredible" (line 2). However Gen 
counters this with extremity in the opposite direction: declaring it as "a joke", and 
describing herself as "most negative person everyone's ever met" and (using a 
further ECF), that "they're always telling me". The disagreement between RC 
and Gen is basically supportive of Gen, in that what RC is doing is the 
normatively 'preferred' thing to do with self-deprecations, to deny them. Again, 
this hinges on positivity being normatively preferred. The argument continues as 
an exchange of ECFs, with RC asserting that she has "never" found Gen like 
that. Gen recruits a corroborating witness, Claudia (lines 8 and 10), whose own 
version is produced as extreme ("absolutely amazing", line 10), and RC again 
uses extreme expressions on her side: "aren't we all" (line 9). 
Although Gen is constructing herself here as non-positive in the extreme, the 
important feature for our purposes is that this is done in a way that strongly 
orients to positivity being what is normatively and properly required. Indeed, RC's 
efforts to resist Gen's negative versions of herself are orientations of the same 
kind. In recruiting Claudia to her side, Gen subscribes to the notion that a 
positive attitude is important to recovery: Claudia's view being that it is amazing 
Gen has "lasted this long", where the sheer fact that she has done so must 
indicate "a fighting spirit in there somewhere" (line 15). So in the very course of 
defining herself as negative in the extreme, and even as having put up a "front" 
(line 18), Gen manages to powerfully endorse the importance and value of being 
positive and at the same time introduces a sense of irony here, "but you only see 
the front (. ) or did, when I had one" which points to the reality that she has had a 
full mastectomy. 
In fact, Gen was the only one of my participants who continually produced 
accountability for her inability to have a positive attitude and I have included 
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these extracts here to emphasise how some participants might struggle with this, 
especially at times of feeling very ill. 
The above analysis has emphasised how the cultural expectations of PWC being 
in control, of 'coping', 'fighting' and doing being positive are accomplished as 
participants' concerns. My analysis shows how Dee actively attends to the 
expectation of being positive, while at the same time, she also attends to the 
danger of being heard as judgmental, an object of pity, or as someone who 
cannot cope. In extracts 7: 1.6-7: 1.8, Gen displays that being positive is 
something variable for her, and she struggles to maintain a positive attitude and 
directly makes the link between a positive attitude and recovery. This analysis 
has shown that doing being positive is not always possible, and that the moral 
judgements overtly and covertly displayed by others, add an additional burden for 
the PWC to manage. 
Doing being positive is handled in talk as an accountable matter, and is 
constructed using the contrasts of the active-passive stance, of taking an active 
role and continuing to do mundane activities, or of succumbing to it and doing 
nothing. The analysis produces an interesting contrast to the notion that being 
positive, is simply good psychological advice; it can be counter productive. In 
doing being positive, participants have to explain, make excuses, justify and deal 
with the issues of blame and moral accountability that accompany it. They have 
to manage the dilemmas it produces, of not being seen or heard as someone 
who is being negative, to be pitied or not'coping'. 
In part two of this chapter, the analysis looks at how laughter and humour are 
used as another resource that participants draw on to display doing being 
positive in difficult situations. 
7: 2 Seriously funny: Looking on the bright side 
Laughter and humour are integral parts of everyday life but are not usually topics 
associated with potentially life-threatening illnesses such as cancer. However in 
237 
this section, the analysis shows how participants display doing being positive, by 
invoking laughter and humour. 
Traditional psychological research and folk theories of laughter and humour claim 
that laughter is a discharge mechanism for the release of emotions (Koestler, 
1964; Morreall, 1983); that it is an emotional release that helps to reduce tension 
(Freud, 1905,1966); that it can act as a defence mechanism that provides an 
outlet for escaping from negative feelings such as anger (Fay, 1983), and that it 
offers a diversion and a distraction (Erdman, 1993). Some traditional studies 
have noted the overall benefits of laughter and humour when talking about 
troubles and illness (e. g., Coser, 1959,1960; Ruxton, 1988; Smith-Dupr6,1992). 
However, until Jefferson (1979) pioneered the study of the organisation of 
laughter in conversational interaction, laughter had merely been noted as having 
occurred, and traditional theories were applied to explaining it. Jefferson 
proposed that close attention to precisely how and where laughter occurs reveals 
it as a systematic activity that can be studied in its own right, and as an 
interactional resource. Subsequently a number of studies have identified 
laughter and humour as useful interactional tools in problematic situations (e. g. 
Chapman, 1996; du Pr6,1996; Glenn, 1989,1995; Haakana, 2001; Holt, 1993, 
Jefferson, 1979,1983,1984b, 1985b; 1988, Jefferson, Sacks and Schegloff, 
1987). 
Laughter can signal many things; it is not always connected to humour and quite 
often, nothing particularly funny or humorous is going on. Laughter and humour 
are not necessarily only ways of managing emotions, but they are resources for 
managing a number of issues. A lot of laughter emerges from on-going 
interaction much of which is in the form of social play, expressed in vernacular 
terms such as kidding, punning and joking, and typically are not thought of as 
being associated with narratives about potentially life threatening illnesses. 
However, it is also possible for people to use laughter and humour toward more 
serious goals. Costain, Schou and Hewison (1998,1999) noted that the humour 
in a community cancer clinic often focused upon serious issues, and that 
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humorous remarks and banter provided an opportunity for serious issues to be 
aired, without the speakers being heard as making a direct complaint. Mulkay 
(1988) suggests that one way participants can incorporate potentially disruptive 
elements within their discourse, without actually causing disruption, is to present 
them in a humorous or ironic way. Similarly, forbidden topics and meanings can 
be introduced in a safe, indirect way (Crawford, 1995). 
Jefferson (1988) found that people recounting 'trouble' stories make light of the 
trouble and often joke and laugh in the telling. Holt's (1993) conversational study 
suggests that talk about death announcements involves collaboration by both 
speakers, and that when speakers are giving bad news they often take a positive 
stance towards that news and end up evaluating bad news positively, or'look on 
the bright side'. In a study on conversational laughter (Chapman, 1996, the 
author of this thesis) showed that laughter in talk about cancer is organised in 
some interactional detail, and oriented to managing potential interactional 
dilemmas. 
In a CA study of recorded conversations between PWC and the medical 
profession in a breast care centre, du Pr6 (1998) analysed what she terms 
'laughter-coated complaints'. She found that laughter-coated complaints are 
frequent, identifiable episodes in which a 'complaint' is mutually managed as 
something to laugh about. She suggests that cues emerge about why some 
complaints are managed as serious and some as 'laughables'. Note however 
that Du Pr6's data was obtained in a medical setting. She notes that such 
institutional settings involve what she terms 'benevolent hurting' or 'for your own 
good' discomforts, and demonstrated that 'complaints' were managed in a playful 
rather than serious way, which gave rise to many "complaining-with-out-rea//Y- 
complaining behaviours" (du Pr6,1998: 167, italics in original). 
Although some of the CA studies have looked at how laughter manages 
interactional difficulties, and can be used to 'coat' complaints in the medical 
setting, I suggest that the use of laughter and humour are even more complex 
than this and perform a number of additional functions. The following analysis 
brings together the notions of doing being positive and the use of laughter and 
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humour. I show that their use is designed not only to manage problematic issues 
surrounding talk about sensitive issues for both the PWC and the recipient, but 
can also head off a number of potentially problematic issues such as: not to be 
seen as self pitying; being seen as someone who is in control, that they are 
'coping', and despite their pain, discomfort and problems they are not overtly 
making a complaint. I also look at how the rhetorical construction of the narrative 
attends to presenting a plausible, credible self or identity; of 'being normal', and 
how potentially alternative interpretations are countered. The analysis shows how 
laughter and humour not only manage the identity of the PWC as looking on the 
bright side (doing being positive), but also help manage the delivery of potentially 
hearable complaints (see also Chapter 5 on complaining and blaming) 
What is laughable or funny in illness narratives often occurs when a topic that 
may encroach on forbidden or taboo territory is talked about. So, the issue for 
participants becomes how they manage to talk about awful situations without 
recipients constantly being placed in an embarrassing or awkward situation 
where they are unable to adequately respond, beyond saying 'oh my god', 'how 
dreadful', or 'poor you' which, as shown in Chapter 6, could be received as 
unwelcome responses. 
My data also shows there are three kinds of interactional laughter. The first kind 
is when participants report events and invoke laughter (see extracts 7: 2.1-7: 2.3). 
The second is when participants are reporting events where laughter occurred, 
and is again going on in the telling (extract 7: 2.4). The third kind of interactional 
laughter is when participants talk about and construct their own meanings of 
what laughter is doing for them (extract 7: 2.5). 
The Analysis 
Extracts 7: 2.1-7: 2.3 are from Sara's narrative about a day in radiotherapy. I want 
to focus on how Sara manages two moral difficulties in making what sound like 
complaints. Firstly, she works against being seen as the sort of person who is 
self-pitying; and secondly, in extracts 7: 2.2. and 7: 2.3, despite being burnt as 
part of the treatment, she shows how she is not a person disposed to 
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complaining. Throughout this narrative, Sara actively voices her thoughts, 
feelings and emotions several times. They could be hearable as self-pitying, or 
as the adoption of a complaining attitude, but on each occasion, she works 
against these possible reflexive interpretations about herself. 
Extract 7: 2.1 Sara 15/19 "one da: y (. ) when I went to radiotherapy" 
1 Sara So er umh (. ) yeah (. ) I- I er- work helped me a lot (. ) 
2 being able to go back out to work y'know 
3 but at- at times I did feel a bit low and felt a bit down 
4 and I thought to myself (0.2) hhh 
5 oh why should I feel like this when you know er 
6 these- these nurses and they are fighting so hard 
7 y'know especially (. ) one da: y (. ) when I went to radiotherapy and 
8 1 was lying there to have my treatment and y1know 
9 how they put you in these positions and although the treatment 
10 only takes abo(hh)ut a couple o(hh)f seco(hh)nds 
11 you've got to take about [((inaudible)) 
12 RC [umh it takes it about fifteen minutes 
13 for them to get you In the right spot (. ) yeah 
14 Sara hhh hah ha ha ha 
((inaudible through low murmuring laughter by Chloe, Sara and RC)) 
I have previously shown how participants may talk about doing normal activities 
as a way of managing their illness (see Chapter 6) and Sara begins by saying 
that what helped her a lot was "being able to go back out to work" (line 2). But 
she then contrasts this: "at times I did feel a bit low and felt a bit down" (line 3). 
Although as someone with cancer it might be acceptable and legitimate for her to 
say how 'down' or how 'low` she was feeling, there is a social expectation that 
sufferers are not supposed to wallow or dwell on their suffering and participants 
attend to this when talking about it. if Sara describes herself as someone who is 
in a terrible, pitiful position, she risks being heard as self-pitying. Instead, she 
ofients to this possibility and manages her account to avoid being categorised in 
that way. 
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She does this by providing an alternative explanation to distract from dwelling on 
her feelings. She tells how she thought, questioning herself: "why should I feel 
like this? " (line 4). This is a dialogical formulation of Sara's thinking, as if there 
are two people there, one asking the other what to do. Whatever else such talk 
about what she 'thought' might do, it serves to display her as challenging her own 
feelings and behaviour. In doing so, she manages to shift the focus of attention 
from herself to the nurses, by way of introducing a contrast account. She plays 
down her own problems by empathising with (and 'fighting') the nurses' cause, 
implying that they are the ones with problems to contend with, because they uare 
fighting so hard" (line 6). 20 This works against any interpretation or judgement 
recipients that might make of Sara as self-pitying. Although she might feel that as 
someone with cancer, she is entitled to feel self-pitying, this is not how she 
presents herself. 
To warrant this shift in attention, Sara recounts a story about one day when she 
went to radiotherapy (lines 7-8). She describes a series of events about the 
treatment setting-up process where it is the nurses who have the problems in 
putting them (the PWC) in the right position: "y'know they put you in these 
positions" (line 9), and appeals to common knowledge of this being difficult. Note 
also how Sara changes footing from "I" to "ther (lines 8-9), which helps display a 
sense of distance from the account of her being low or down, and further deflects 
any artifice or subjectivity on her part (Goffman 1979,1981). It is also interesting 
that the footing indicates Sara as being passive: *1 was lying there to have my 
treatment" (line 8) and that it is the nurses who are active, because "they have to 
put you in these positions" (line 9) which also helps build the rhetorical contrast of 
the nurses who were "fighting so hard". 
Radiotherapy treatment is not a comfortable experience and as will be shown in 
extract 7: 2.2, it can result in the skin being burnt. What is at stake in the telling of 
this account is that Sara could again be heard as self-pitying. But, in telling how 
20 Sara is a nurse by profession so she could also be showing empathy for other members of her 
profession who are trying to do theirjobs well. 
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"the treatment only takes abo(hh)ut a couple o(hh)f seco(hh)ndSn, 21 the 
introduction of laughter particles22 within the talk suggests that the force of what 
she is saying is not to be taken too seriously. The use of the word 'about' to 
describe the amount of time it takes for the treatment is imprecise, and its 
vagueness helps make the unpleasant fact about radiotherapy treatment less 
obvious (Wodak, 1989). RC displays some knowledge of how this process is 
performed and orients to the nurses' task saying "it takes it about fifteen minutes 
for them to get you in the right spot" (lines 12-13) which causes Sara to laugh 
(line 14). What is said next is not clear because Sara's laughter has acted as a 
trigger for Chloe and RC who align with this scenario as being laughable and join 
in with laughter. 
Sara's laughter has provided a cue to indicate to Chloe and RC how they should 
appropriately respond. At the same time, Sara adopts a position that blocks any 
requirement for expressions of empathy, or awkward receipts of horror stories. It 
is presented as nothing much to make a fuss about, nothing to feel particularly 
pitiful or self-pitiful about, because the treatment itself only takes a couple of 
seconds. The laughter serves to deflect from this being anything to be 
concerned about. Again, the emphasis is on how it is problematic for the nurses, 
rather than for Sara herself. 
So although Sara began by describing herself as "feeling a bit low and a bit 
down", rather than dwell on this potentially self-pitying state, she manages the 
receipts and reactions of Chloe and RC in two ways. First, she diverts attention 
toward the nurses' difficulties, and second, she starts to establish the treatment 
process as laughable. Sara manages to construct her own identity, as someone 
who is not self-pitying or complaining, by constructing and comparing herself with 
'others', in this case the nurses, while she herself remains looking on the bright 
side. 
" It is interesting to note that participants often state the seemingly very brief moments of some 
treatment or medical test, but this is always indexical to the story. See also extract 7: 2.5. 22 When laughter is signalled within speech it described as laughter particles and these are noted in 
the transcription by h's in round brackets. Voiced laughter itself is noted as ha ha hah hah or he 
heh heh (Jefferson, 1988). 
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In extract 7: 2.2, Sara continues her story by describing the effects of the 
radiotherapy treatment. 
Extract 7: 2.2 Sara 15/20 "wh(hh)at am I getting all worked up for? " 
29 -4 Sara and jqa ýin I was being bu:: mt I was er er my skin 
30 was all pee: ling and burnt up as well and I er umh 
31 1 looked at myself and I thought (. ) o::: hh (0.2) 
32 1 never once think (0.2) or say (. ) well 
33 oh why did it have to happen to me: (. ) 
34 that never went through my mind 
35 RC right 
36 Sara all- my aim wa:: s (. 2) where do I go from here 
37 [to get it better. hhh 
38 RC [yeah yeah 
39 Sara and I looked and I thought to myself 
40 *o: hhh my go: sh* er oh:: I was feeling so down hhh 
41 and er I was rea(hh)dy to hh break down hhh 
42 and I looked at the poor nurses going back and forth 
43 trying to get it in- the right- e: xa: ctly ri:: ght (. ) 
44 y' know before they can do anything and then 
45 they've got this thing- this on the er- this thing so they 
46 they can see exactly what's [happening on like a 
47 RC [umh 
48 Sara television thing y' know hhh and I thought to myself 
49 wh(hh)at am I getting all worked up for? 
Sara now introduces another contender for complaint and self-pity. She tells us 
how as a result of the treatment, her skin was being burnt and "was all pee: ling 
and burnt up as well" (lines 29-30). Although Sara does hesitate I er umh" (line 
30), giving Chloe or RC an opportunity to enter the conversation and indicate 
some empathy for her situation, or to express how awful this must be for Sara, 
neither respond to this awful news. 
Rather than continuing with any direct complaint about being burnt, Sara 
reformulates her interest in this account by attending to any reading of her being 
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heard as a complainer, by producing what Potter (1996) refers to as a stake 
inoculation. Although her skin is being burnt and peeling she manages to imply 
that Chloe and RC should not hear her as feeling sorry for herself, nor that they 
should feel sorry for her. They should think about those poor nurses. Sara is 
reproducing the same rhetorical narrative of active thinking here as in extract 
7: 2.1, lines 3-4, of how you cope with your own accountability and is presenting 
herself as a moral individual, but in a slightly different way. 
She does this by directly countering such notions by saying, I looked at myself 
and I thought (. ) o::: hh (0.2)" (line 31). One possible continuation here is that 
Sara is going to say how awful she looked, and to display how sorry she felt for 
herself, but instead, she changes direction, implying that the future starts now. 
She displays one of the features of doing being positive, which is not to dwell on 
problems and difficulties. What she does say is "I never once think or say well oh 
why did it have to happen to me" and "that never went through my mind" (lines 
32-34) dispelling any notion of being prone to self pity. " 
At the same time Sara manages to dismiss a fundamental question often raised 
by people with cancer, "why me? ", claiming that it is something that she has (in 
extreme, absolute terms) "never' thought. Sara confirms this by providing an 
upbeat positive stance that "all- my aim wa:: s (. 2) where do I go from here (. ) to 
get it better hhh" (lines 36-37). Again, the use of the ECF "all" maximises her 
position, and in contrast to "never", the distance between how she actually was 
and how she might have been. So despite her having cancer and being burnt, 
she does not invite pity, but instead she is the one who is doing being 
responsible, and doing being positive, directing herself unambiguously and totally 
to getting better, and to not feeling sorry for herself. 
Even though Sara "looked and thought to myself *o: hhh my go: sh* er oh:: I was 
feeling so down hhh" and that she was 're(hh)ady to break down hhh" (lines 39- 
41), she again does not dwell on these feelings or invite pity; there are even 
23 Sara attends to what Kleinman (1988) suggests is the problem of illness as suffering that raises 
two fundamental questions for the person who is sick and the social group: Why me? (the 
question of bafflement) and What can be done? (the question of order and control). See also Bury; 
1982; Gotay, 1985) 
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laughter particles in line 41 to head this off. 24 Instead, she produces another 
contrastive account of "the poor nurses going back and forth" (line 42). This 
offers the "poor" nurses as the ones deserving of sympathy; they are the ones 
who are, in the particulars of Sara's account, going through difficulties, and again 
this shifts attention away from Sara herself and plays down her own sufferings. 
She builds up their problem, that they have to be precise in "trying to get it in- the 
right- e: xa: ctly right" (line 43) "before they can do anything" (line 44). The 
imprecision of 'anything' allows Sara to imply lots of things without being explicit 
(Gastil, 1992) which also helps build on the difficulty of the task. Again, 
"anything" is not only vague but also an ECF, maximising the range of problems 
the nurses face, in having to get it emphatically "e: xa: ctly" right, in which the 
ue: xa: ctly" is being produced as a repair to her initial utterance uright" (line 43). 
These details show Sara's production of maximal contrasts as a worked-up or 
worked-at rhetorical feature of her talk. 
Sara is able to further emphasise the difficulties of the task for the nurses by 
being almost dismissive of herself, as she "thought to myself, wh(hh)at am I 
getting all worked up for? " (line 49). The use of dialogical formulations, or active 
thinking, "I thought o::: hh" (line 31) or "I thought to myself... " (line 48) display 
how she was thinking at the time, how it actually was for her, rather than, say, 
interpretations she might be making now, post hoc, in the telling. Again, of 
course, what is being analysed is the current telling; there is no simple window 
here to what Sara actually thought at the time. These are interactional and 
rhetorical features of how narrative accounts are produced. 
The rhetorical constructions produced in extracts 7: 2.1 and 7: 2.2 build a strong 
case for the nurses, and the significance of their getting it ue: xa: ctly right", which 
becomes apparent in extract 7: 2.4. Despite reporting that she felt a bit low, Sara 
contrasts this with the nurses' problems, produced in some detail and with 
various contrastive and maximising devices, and producing a positive take on 
anything that could possibly be hearable as self-pitying. She has also managed 
to avoid overtly complaining about her skin being bumt. 
24 The use of "break down" resonates with the medical model, of something mechanical that needs 
repair and can be easily fixed. 
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However, it may yet be that not overtly complaining is the most effective way to 
make a complaint. By focusing on the nurses, conjuring up empathy for them 
and saying positive things about them, Sara effectively disarms any notion that 
she is disposed toward complaining. Yet at the same time, she is providing 
some hearable grounds for complaint, where a complaint is presumably all the 
more credible when it comes from someone not disposed to complaining (stake 
management again: cf. Edwards and Potter, 1992; Potter, 1996). The last thing 
you want if you are making a complaint is for the hearer to focus on you and think 
that you are a complainer; that you have got an interest or something at stake, a 
disposition or an axe to grind. What Sara manages to do here is to talk about 
something that is hearably complainable without indexing herself as a 
complainer. 
The effect of her discourse is that Sara is not overtly complaining, although her 
narrative is full of complainable things. I suggest that the way she manages this 
is far more effective than if she did overtly complain. Making direct complaints 
would set her up as somebody who is emotionally involved, who is possibly not 
being objective and is looking for complainable matters. This would have the 
effect of indexing her dispositionally as a complainer, rendering any actual 
complaint the less credible. Sara is managing two sets of identities and motives 
at the same time; the identity of the actors in the narrated events (including 
herself), and the identity at issue, here and now, for herself as an 'interested' 
teller of events. 
In extract 7: 2.3, which is a direct continuation of 7: 2.2, Sara provides another 
hearably complainable account of the effects of burning. However, this time, 
instead of deflecting attention to the nurses, the issue of skin colour comes to the 
fore, and again the humour and laughter permeating the account display Sara as 
not someone disposed to complain. 
Extract 7: 2.3 Sara 15/21 "with us It's different" 
50 -+ Sara and with us it's different because with you when they mark 
51 your skin (0.5) hh you're white (. ) hh the- the black marks are 
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52 going to stay very well for a lo: ng time but My skin was beginning 
53 to get dar: ker and darker fro: m the treatment 
54 so it was getting near enough the same colour as the pencil 
55 tha(h)t th(h)ey ma(hh)[rked me with 
56 Chloe [ha ha ha ha ha ha ha 
57 Sara s(hh)o of course they had to work do(hh)uble ha: rd to make sure 
58 that those marks (were still there 
59 RC [Couldn't they have used some: th(hh)ing like a 
60 ye(h[h)llow pencil or something? 
61 Chloe [ha ha ha ha ha ha ha [ha ha 
62 Sara [. hh ha ha ha ye:: s that's 
63 wha(hh)t I sa(hh)id to the(hh)m [. hh why didn't they use Tippex? 
64 Chloe [ha ha ha ha hah hah hah 
65 Sara why didn't they use TIPPEX I said to them ye: (hhh)s 
66 couldn't you use some Tippex hhh ha ha hah hah y' know 
67 Chloe hah [hah hah hah 
68 RC [gosh (. ) how extraordinary (. ) [I never thought about that 
69 Sara [yeah, yeah 
70 Chloe ((Inaudible)) 
71 Sara and you know and that pu(hh)lled me out again 
72 thinking o:: h these poor nurses 
Sara continues to avoid making any direct criticism, blame or complaint about the 
nurses or the treatment, and there are a number of important features in this 
extract, which show how she does this. She refers to 'us' (line 50) indicating 
Sara and Chloe's racial category membership: "with us it's different". Sara 
constructs her own (and Chloe's) black identity by contrast to RC: "when they 
mark your skin (0.5) hh you're white (. ) hh the- the black marks are going to stay 
very well for a long time" (lines 51-52). Sara has raised a potentially 
controversial and sensitive issue, relevant to treatment and its effects: skin colour 
and the difference between RC being white and 'us' being black. Despite RC not 
herself being a PWC nor having her skin marked in this way, she serves here as 
a co-opted representative of the group of white cancer patients, via "with you" 
(line 50). 
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Neither Sara nor Chloe explicitly talk about being black, but it is reflected in the 
contrast between skin colour and emphasises how being black is relevantly 
different: 
52 Sara (( ... )) but My skin was beginning 
53 to get dar: ker and darker fro: m the treatment 
54 so it was getting near enough the same colour as the pencil 
55 tha(h)t th(h)ey ma(hh)[rked me with 
This again could be hearable as an incipient complaint, or where someone could 
say that because she is black, she is expressing a feeling of being victimised. 
But again, she manages any such possible judgement by introducing laughter 
particles (line 55) signalling that however awful this might sound, it is nothing to 
be serious about. 
Clearly, it would be inappropriate to laugh at or in the face of another's tragedy, 
but Chloe has some entitlement to join in here. She has already been identified 
as a member of the same group as Sara, as someone with cancer and black. 
Chloe aligns with Sara's description by beginning to laugh, joining in with and 
overlapping Sara's description (line 56). Note that RC, who is relevantly white 
and does not have cancer, does not join in with the laughter at this point. As 
Sara continues, her talk is imbued with laughter particles, and again she talks 
about her difficult experiences in terms of the problems that the nurses have. 
Because of her skin getting darker, "they had to work dou(hh)ble ha: rd to make 
sure that those marks were still there" (lines 57-58). At this point RC asks: 
"couldn't they have used some: th(hh)ing like a ye(hh)llow pencil or something? " 
(lines 59-60). RC identifies the nurses as 'they' suggesting a different category 
membership but now orients to the irony by introducing laughter particles into her 
talk, affiliating with the laughter that first Sara and then Chloe have produced. 
RC's practical suggestion about what to do with black skin receives laughter 
responses from both Chloe and Sara (lines 61ff) such that any potentially 
delicate race issue, or complaint on those grounds, is headed off by laughter and 
irony. Sara follows RC's suggestion with agreement and builds on the irony of the 
situation, and the words are again imbued with laughter: "ye:: s that's wha(hht) I 
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sa(hh)id to the(hh)m hh why didn't they use Tippex? " (a white correcting fluid 
used by typists) (lines 62-63). Again, this invokes even more laughter from both 
Chloe and Sara. Sara is reconstructing a painful past event here in the present, 
as something laughable now. 
Once the laughter has subsided RC remarks "gosh (. ) how extraordinary (. ) I 
never thought about that" (line 68). Her suggestion that the nurses might use a 
yellow pencil also categorises the nurses as possibly being white, like RC, and 
implies that 'they had not thought of this either. So, despite her own troubles, 
Sara identifies with those of the nurses, of them having to use a dark pencil on 
her burnt, dark skin, and how much harder it made it for them. Any notion of 
Sara being self pitying or complaining is again contrasted with the nurse's 
struggle. The sympathy is focused on them rather than Sara herself, who if 
anything was cheered up by their comical plight: "that pu(hh)lled me out again, 
thinking o:: h these poor nurses" (lines 71-72). 
In extracts 7: 2.1-7: 2.3, Sara could be categorised as a victim on two accounts. 
First, she has cancer and is being burnt (possibly to an unnecessary extent) by 
the radiotherapy treatment; and second, that being West Indian disadvantaged 
her, the black pencil used to mark the point of radiation treatment being 
appropriate for a person with white skin, and failing to show up properly on hers. 
However, through the way she tells the story, including the precise location of her 
laughter, Sara emerges as someone being positive in the face of adversity. 
Sara manages the sensitive issue of race without invoking any form of prejudice 
or victimisation, while her use of laughter and irony indicate to the other 
participants how they should hear the story and appropriately respond to it. 
Although she does not indicate that she was laughing at the time (beyond 
suggesting the use of Tippex, lines 65-66), clearly in the telling the Irony 
produces the scene as laughable. (See extracts 7: 2.5 and 7: 2.6 and Chapter 8 
for other uses of laughter as a resource participants draw on in difficult 
situations). 
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The potential problems of accountability, of blaming or complaining are complex. 
Sara manages rhetorically and persuasively to talk about and account for 
potentially troubling events, without being categorised as someone who is a 
pitiful victim of her circumstances, who is self-pitying or a complainer. One way 
Sara accomplishes disarming the notion or perception that she may be 
complaining is to disguise any hearably complainable account by introducing 
laughter and humour. This effectively indicates that these are not matters to be 
concerned about or to be taken seriously, while nevertheless she provides details 
that suggest avoidable discomfort and adversity. She also deflects attention 
away from her own circumstances by constructing comparative accounts of 
others (the nurses) who she implies have more to struggle with and complain 
about. 
The laughter and irony throughout enables Sara to 'have her cake and eat it'. It 
manages interactional difficulty for the speaker in the current telling, providing the 
hearer with a way of responding to a tale of troubles. Secondly, it manages the 
indexicality of the speaker, as a long-suffering but cheerful 'coper with events. 
Rather than being disposed to complaining, on the contrary, she can laugh it off, 
praise and sympathise with the nurses, see the humour and play down her own 
suffering. Irony and humour make her story tellable while managing its otherwise 
available repercussions on both teller and recipients. Additionally this helps with 
the storys factual credibility because it is not just a moaners gripe, but a story 
from someone not disposed to complain. So the irony can, ironically, reinforce 
rather than undermine the story's facticity. 
There is also an underlying moral theme throughout these extracts, which Sara 
attends to throughout: that is, she is heard as someone who is managing and 
'coping'with her illness by doing being positive and looking on the bright side. 
In extract 7: 2.4, laughter is a prominent feature of Bee's encounter with the 
medical profession at the time of receiving the news of their diagnosis. 
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Extract 7: 2.4 Bee 13/02 "1 was a demonstration model" 
47 Bee hhh so I turned up on Monday. hhh and I actually sa: w 
48 the University (. ) lecturer (. ) that lectures that er 
49 Jan A professor was he? 
50 Bee No (-) he wasn't hh but umh hh I was a demonstration 
51 model as I fo(hh)und out later (. ) hh [huh hhhh 
52 Jan [ha ha 
53 RC So he had some other students there did he? 
54 Bee Oh thou(. hh)sands hh be- because hh ha ha I we(hh)nt 
55 ba(hh)ck hhhh and er ha (. ) and they said- they said to me 
56 o: h now I have seen you before hh you wouldn't 
57 hh ha reme: (hh)mbe(hh)r m(hh)e hh [ha ha ha 
58 Jan [ha 
59 -+ Bee beca(hh)use hh ha ha ha so:: hh I knew th(hh)en (. ) 
60 [. hhh ha ha 
61 Jan [ye: s. hh ha ye:: s(. ) 
62 Bee I wasn't conscious you see (. )and er oth: ers (. ) and when 
63 they came you see (. ) he came and hh he brought them 
64 all round my bed hh and I think he brought them (. ). hh 
65 to show (. ) er how (. ) to tell you that you've got cancer 
Extract 7: 2.4 precedes Bee's account of receiving the bad news of her cancer 
diagnosis (see Chapter 5: 2.7). What is interesting here is how the use of 
laughter and humour deflect from this being simply a bad news story, and how 
Bee places herself in a position of control. She says that she found out that she 
was "a demonstration model", a term that Bee, and then Jan, laugh over (lines 
50-52). The impression produced is that Bee is not bitter or angry about being 
treated as such an object. In fact, she uses this notion to create the ironical 
scene she goes on to describe. She builds the image of the accompanying 
entourage as being a cast of "oh thou(. hh)sande and as she makes it clear later 
on, the purpose of the visit of the lecturer was to tell her the outcome of her 
operation. Bee's voicing of the lecturers words are full of laughter, "you wouldn't 
. hh ha reme: 
(hh)mbe(hh)r m(hh)e hh [ha ha ha" (lines 56-57). Bee is displaying 
the irony of the situation. The implication is that Bee was not supposed to know 
who he was or what he was there for. Her laughter throughout is also in 
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anticipation of what follows, and Bee says "I knew th(hh)en" (line 59) implying 
that she had inferred what he had come to say. She then goes on to warrant her 
knowing, and the irony of it, by saying "he brought them all round my bed hh 
and I think he brought them (. ) hh to show (. ) er how (. ) to tell you that you've 
got cancer" (lines 64-65). 
Bee is indicating that she knows about the difficulties the medical profession 
have in breaking bad news. It would be easy to depict the scene as 
devastatingly clumsy, depersonalising and insensitive, and of course, that 
possibility has to be available in the details of what Bee provides. Yet the 
combination of being a demonstration model, with "thou(. hh)sa nds" of students 
surrounding the person responsible for telling the news is cast as a laughable 
situation, especially as later on Bee maintains her control over the situation by 
pre-empting his news, by saying to him "oh it was cancer then" (see Chapter 5, 
extract 5: 2.7). 
Here the laughter and the presentation of a situation as comical are used to show 
that, despite being treated as an object, and in spite of the lecturers inability to 
break the news in anything like a sensitive or efficient manner, Bee is able to 
show a sense of control over the situation. Again the laughter displays Bee as 
managing the receipt of bad news by doing being positive, while again off-setting 
any difficult interactions from either Jan or RC. 
Sometimes participants laugh when they are telling their accounts, and 
sometimes they orient to it and make laughter a feature of their talk. Extract 7: 2.5 
displays an interplay of laughter between two situations, the one being reported 
and the situation of the reporting itself. The laughter is being performed as part 
of the current telling, but it is also being voiced as having occurred at the time of 
the reported events. In extract 7: 2.5 Jo is telling a story about when she was in 
hospital for her biopsy, and again, like radiotherapy treatment, an obviously 
unpleasant experience. 
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Extract 7: 2.5 Jo 02/03 "it was done In jovial mood" 
1 Jo hh I went into see the consultant he said right well obviously I'll 
2 make an examination now and he said I need to take a biopsy 
3 now and I said oh (0.2) how you're going to do that (. ) and 
4 he then produ(hh)ced hh this ve(hh)ry lo(hh)ng needle (. ). hhh 
5 syringe with this hh ha exce:: (hh)ptio(hh)nally lo(hh)ng hh 
6 needle and I said you(hh)'re no(hh)t sticking that into me 
7 he said what? (0.1) you're going to stick that Into me? 
8 does it. hh ha(h)ve to be th(hh)at long I mean 
9 1 just have this dread of needles hhh ((clears throat)) 
10 and he said oh no I promise 
11 RC Did you tell him that? 
12 JO Yes (. ) and he said (. ) I promise it won't hurt 
13 and I said I've heard that before (. ) 
14 1 says you'll fo(hh)rgive me hh if I doubt your wo: rd 
15 hh you know but we were lau(hh)gh- 
16 RC [ha ha 
17 Jo [well no(hh)t laughing but I mean It was done In jovial mood 
18 hhh anyway so I'm up on the couch (. ) stripped off again 
19 hh (. ) umh he examined he said er well yes okay (. ) 
20 I'll just- just do this oh he put some Vknow stuff on 
21 which presumably numbs (. ) the area somewhat (. ) and 
22 er I'm er like going er looking at the ceiling going 
23 oh ha ha ha ha ha (hh) (. ) y'know (hh) doing anything than 
24 to try and distract myself from the fact that I was going to be 
25 stuck with this needle hh 
26 RC Was there anyone else in the room? 
27 Jo No no just me (. ) er I said er well talk to me well say anything 
28 while you're doing it because I'm going to leap off the bed and go 
29 (. ) and he said oh come on it's not going to be that bad ha ha 
30 anyway o(hhh) it was (. ) ha ha that ba(hhh)d ha ha 
31 it hurt umh and it went on for a good three or four seconds 
32 1 mean know it sounds= 
33 RC =which is an eternity but it's an eternity 
34 JO But at the time it's an eternity 
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Jo has already seen the radiologist who has confirmed that she has a lump and 
the consultant has said that he needs to take a biopsy (line 2). Jo produces the 
notion that the length of the needle is excessively long. The laughter featured in 
this extract appears in the words as Jo speaks them (lines 4-6). But, clearly, this 
is not self evidently a laughing matter because Jo tells us that she has a 'dread 
of needles" (line 9). The alternative way to deal with this would be for her to get 
upset and recount other stories of her "dread of needles", but by using laughter 
Jo manages to lighten this revelation and heads off any requirement for 
sympathetic noises from RC (who is, after all, conducting a research interview). 
Jo reports asking "does it hh ha(h)ve to be th(hh)at long" (line 8) and then 
reveals that she has "this dread of needles"; so we are given both a serious and 
a jocular way of hearing Jo's plight. Both these elements, serious and jocular, 
are available in the description of the needle as excessive: "ve(hh)ry lo(hh)ng" 
and "exce:: (hh)ptio(hh)nally lo(hh)ng", both descriptions being laughed through in 
their production. 
Jo reports the consultant's response as making her a promise, "he said (. ) I 
promise it won't hurt". Jo's response is ironic, both in its jocular delivery and also 
in its orientation to the doctor's reassurance being unrealistic: "I've heard that 
before I says you'll fo(hh)rgive me hh if I doubt your wo: rd" (line 14). A contrast 
between quoted versions, and the reality they purport to describe, is a standard 
feature of irony (Wilson and Sperber, 1992). The ironic delivery manages a 
potentially problematic feature here, given that Jo is doubting the expert's 
reassurances, such that the laughter helps to avoid blaming the consultant for 
knowingly hurting her and providing false expectations. Not only is Jo describing 
this event and seeing the funny side of it now, she is also saying that although 
she was doubting the consultant's words, any potential criticism is again 
deflected because she reports that at the time "we were lau(hh)gh ... well no(hh)t 
laughing but I mean it was done in jovial mood" (lines 15 and 17). The mutually 
shared "jovial mood" and laughter works to ease not only the interaction with the 
consultant at the time, but also the retelling of this story to RC. Jo then describes 
how the consultant prepared her: 'he put some Yknow stuff which presumably 
numbs (. ) the area" (line 20). But Jo's dread of needles is described in visual 
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terms, a matter of seeing the size of it, so she describes herself as "looking at the 
ceiling going oh" (line 22) but then again produces laughter. It is not known 
whether she was laughing just so at the time, but again, in the telling, the 
laughter accentuates the scene as one that was laughable, because she was 
"doing anything ... to try and distract myself" in the anticipation of being "stuck with 
this needle hh" (lines 24-25). 
Jo then describes what it was like when the needle went in: 
27 JO (( ... )) er I said er well talk to me well say anything 
28 while you're doing it because I'm going to leap off the bed and go 
29 (. ) and he said oh come on it's not going to be that bad 
30 ha ha anyway o(hhh) it was (. ) ha ha that ba(hhh)d ha ha 
31 it hurt umh and it went on for a good three or four seconds 
Despite her reporting that the consultant said, I promise it won't hurt" (line 12) 
which she had doubted at the time, Jo then invites the consultant to contribute to 
her distraction and "talk to me". She produces an extreme description of her 
possible reactions, in that she is "going to leap off the bed and go" (line 28) which 
underlines her "dread of needles" and serious concerns about being hurt. 
Although the consultant provides reassurance that "it's not going to be that bad", 
this is soon displayed as mere reassurance rather than accurate description; but 
again Jo laughs off any potential that provides for criticism: "ha ha anyway o(hhh) 
it was (. ) ha ha that ba(hhh)d ha ha" (line 30). Clearly Jo was right all along, and 
the consultant wrong. Jo's laughter fends off what might otherwise be heard as a 
complaint about what was clearly a painful event for her, one that "went on for a 
good three or four seconds" (line 31). Although this does not sound on the face 
of it like a particularly long time, Jo starts to say that it was longer than it might 
sound (line 32). But, before she can finish, RC picks up her drift and provides it 
in the form of a heavily upgraded ECF: "It's an eternity", which Jo echoes. This 
final exchange nicely shows RC and Jo in harmony on both the seriousness of 
her painful experience, and also its ironic description. 
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The function of the "jovial mood", at the time of Jo's concern over the size of the 
needle, and the use of laughter in the telling of how bad it was, heads off any 
sympathetic or pitying responses from RC. It provides for RCs hearing of Jo's 
story as both serious and uncomplaining. It also enables Jo to make light of 
something that was traumatic at the time, rather than display herself as someone 
who is dwelling on her suffering. 
Another feature of laughter is that it is referred to explicitly as something 
participants do. In extract 7: 2.6, Amy is talking about the importance of laughter 
in the hospital environment. 
Extract 7: 2.6 Amy 04/02 "you la: ugh about It" 
1 -+ Amy I used to make the others laugh in hospital 
2 RC yeah 
3 Amy about the awful conditions 
4 RC so then and now 
5 Amy umh 
6 RC yeah 
7 Amy but people don't know how to take it, yknow 
8 some people think you ought to be sitting there looking miserable 
9 (. ) so when you sit there saying >1 burnt my bum on the 
10 radiator (. )< that's stupid (. ) y'know you've got a tiny little 
11 toilet there hh and you're having to wee in a jug and all the 
12 a:: wful degrading things that you go throughy' know but er 
13 RC umh 
14 Amy people think it's awful but when you're in there with others 
15 (. ) you la: ugh about it 
16 RC umh 
17 Amy because you do don't you, you're all in the same boat really 
18 RC yeah 
19 Amy and if you didn't you'd you'd probably be sitting there crying all 
20 the time so 
21 RC yeah, yeah 
22 Amy it depends who you've got in there with you really (1.0) 
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Amy's description of laughter includes various features of what I have been 
analysing here, based around its functional nature for PWC themselves, as a 
way of 'coping' with "awful conditions". There is also the thing it works against, 
the contrasted negativity of "sifting there looking miserable" (line 8) implying that 
'Isitting looking miserable" is an inappropriate and inactive response, and aligning 
laughter with being positive. Her example of the indignities of the treatment 
environment has a comical, almost slapstick quality of its own: "you sit there 
saying I burnt my bum on the radiator" (lines 9-10), where "you have to wee in a 
jug and all the awful degrading things that you go through" (lines 11 -12). 
Amy generalises what 'people' think (line 14) implying that these 'people' are not 
in the same category as Amy and invokes category membership here by saying 
that "when you're in there with others (. ) you laugh about it" (lines 14-15). Thus 
laughter is held to build relationships and support among sufferers, where 
laughing together and at each other's difficulties becomes a supportive act, 
"because ... you're all in the same boat really" (line 17). Again Amy attends to 
how laughter functions for her, as a contrast to misery, as positive rather than 
negative: "if you didn't you'd you'd probably be sifting there crying all the time* 
(lines 19-20). However, laughter is not universally applicable, always or for 
everyone: "it depends who you've got in there with you really" (line 22). 
So for Amy, laughter is a multifunctional resource which can be drawn on, for 
making others laugh, to cope with the physical indignities, and it is also a way of 
building relationships which can manage interactional difficulties with others "in 
the same boat". It is those kinds of normative notions of the functions of laughter 
that Jo, Bee, Sara and Chloe were orienting to in their production of laughter as a 
feature of situations and reports of them. Whereas Amy can offer a kind of folk 
theory of what laughter does, my analysis has added some richness to those 
ideas by examining some actual deployments of laughter and irony as a feature 
of talk itself and as a way of doing being positive. 
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Summary 
The analysis in this chapter has shown that participants attend to doing being 
positive, in two different ways. Firstly by doing being normal and secondly by 
looking on the bright side and invoking laughter, humour and irony into accounts 
of what could be potentially disruptive and interactionally difficult to manage. 
The cultural expectations placed on the PWC of being in control, of 'coping', 
'fighting' and doing being positive are accomplished as participants' concerns. 
Despite the variability in being able to be positive all the time, participants display 
their accountability to such expectations and attend to the moral judgements that 
are overtly and covertly displayed by others. The analysis also reveals an 
interesting contrast to the notion that being positive, is simply good psychological 
advice', it can be counter productive. In doing being positive, participants have to 
explain, make excuses, justify and deal with the issues of blame and moral 
accountability that accompany it. They also have to manage the dilemmas it 
produces, of not being seen or heard as someone to be pitied or not 'coping'. 
one way this is achieved is by using contrast structures of the active-passive 
stance, of taking an active role and continuing to do mundane, normal activities, 
rather than succumbing and doing nothing. 
Laughter and humour can be invoked to divert attention away from descriptions 
of awful situations, which might place recipients in the embarrassing or awkward 
situation of not knowing what to say or how to respond. It also helps to manage 
the delivery of potentially hearable complaints (see also Chapter 5 on 
complaining and blaming). Additionally laughter and humour are an interactional 
device for fending off difficult interactions. The analysis showed how three kinds 
of interactional laughter were displayed, whereby participants reported events 
and invoked; reported events where laughter occurred, and was also pervasive in 
current the telling and that participants talked about and construct their own 
meanings of what laughter is doing for them. 
Doing being normal and the functions of laughter and humour are participants' 
concerns, and accounts are constructed to display their meanings and function, 
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rather than those of the analyst. At the same time, the rhetorical construction of 
these accounts manages issues of identity and participants display that they are 
doing being positive and looking on the bright side rather than being seen as 
someone who is self-pitying, a complainer, or succumbing to their illness. 
In Chapter 8, the final analytical chapter, the topic of analysis is how participants 
talk about death and dying, and again, the notions of being positive and laughter 
and hurnour are recurrent features. 
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Chapter 8 
Death and Dying: Whose Dilemma? 
Introduction 
Alongside managing complaints and identifying themselves as doing being 
positive, another obvious domain of participants' concerns was the realisation 
that their life may be shortened, and that they might die. Part of cancer's horror Is 
its association with being given a 'death sentence' and, although current rates of 
survival are much higher, for many, cancer still equates with death. As noted in 
Chapter 2, talking about troubles such as death and dying is generally 
recognised as a sensitive and taboo topic. This final analytic chapter looks at 
how participants talked about death and dying. 
Most CA studies analysing talk about death and dying are comprised of 
institutional data obtained from doctor-patient communications and counselling 
sessions, and for the most part focus on how the delivery of bad news or death 
announcements are organised and produced by medical and counselling 
professionals. 
Lutfey and Maynard's (1998) study of breaking bad news in oncology examined 
how physicians and patients talk about death and dying without using those 
words, and examined how a terminal prognosis was 'unpacked'. They analysed 
how the role of talk and interaction is embedded in the processes of death and 
dying, a strategy attuned to Longhofers (1980) neglected argument that dying is 
a social process better understood in the context of interaction and 
communication than as the internal and inherently progressive stages described 
by Kubler-Ross (1970). They noted that whilst counsellors often seek to 
encourage their clients or patients to talk about dreaded issues, they found that 
physicians not only solicit specific kinds of talk from their patients, but also seek 
to inform them about their illness trajectories as a way of revealing the bad news. 
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Bor and Miller (1988), Bor, Miller, Goldman and Scher, (1993) and Per5kyld 
(1995) have examined how professionals counselling AIDS clients address 
"dreaded issues" such as death and dying, deterioration, pain, separation, and 
loss, with a view to providing a better understanding of the interactional 
difficulties counselling professionals face in asking future-oriented hypothetical 
questions. Silverman and Perdkyld's (1990,1995) work on AIDS counselling 
suggests that 'dreaded issues' talk trades off the hypothetical future possibilities, 
the serious things that may happen to the patient in the future. 
These studies have mostly focussed on the medical or health professional's 
instigation of the topic or how the news was delivered and responded to. Despite 
focusing on the interactional features of such talk in institutional settings, studies 
of how the PWC reports these events and talks about death and dying are 
hitherto absent from CA and DA research. 
The Analysis 
Throughout this thesis my analytical concerns have been with what and how 
PWC talk about their illness. Some of the issues being managed when they talk 
about how they received the bad news of a cancer diagnosis have already been 
discussed in Chapter 5. However, I now want to focus on a somewhat different 
set of concerns. The words 'death' or 'dying' appear at different stages 
throughout the interviews and mostly (with one exception) are in descriptions of 
events other than diagnostic accounts. This chapter focuses on when these 
topics arise, how participants manage the morbidity of a potential death 
sentence, and how they talk about their mortality. 
The topic of death and dying was always one that participants introduced 
themselves, rather than it being a question scheduled or raised by RC. It is 
interesting to note that participants attend predominantly to issues of life and 
living rather than death and dying per se; there is a noticeable lack of morbidity 
and confrontation with the process of dying, but rather their talk attends to the old 
clich6 of 'carpe diem', and (as we have seen) thinking positively and 
optimistically about living. When talking about the possibility of death and dying, 
262 
participants' concerns are managed not just in a positive way, but they also orient 
to a 'hypothetical future' (PerSkyld, 1995). The talk is not done in any direct or 
'head on' way but rather it is conducted in generalised terms, idiomatically, or as 
something laughable. On occasions, it is introduced as a device to formulate or 
rhetorically construct an aspect connected with some other concern. Thus talk 
about death and dying is framed as being a motivation for life. 
The analysis explores the following themes: 
8: 1. Other peoples' dilemmas and the canonical script 
8: 2. Resisting doom and gloom 
8: 3 Life goes on: Negotiating living 
8: 4. Anticipating death 
8: 5. A deviant case: "Am I go(hh)ing to di:: e? " 
8: 1 Other people's dilemmas and the canonical script 
In extracts 8: 1-8: 4, the analysis reveals another set of participants' concerns to 
be managed when the topic of death and dying occur in the talk. In the four 
extracts analysed, two are reflexive accounts of Interactions with and about the 
medical profession, and two relate to 'people' who represent the generalised 
'other. 
Extract 8: 1.1 is taken from the beginning of the interview with Jan and Bee. RC 
has just been talking about her brother who had been given a terminal cancer 
diagnosis. 
Extract 8: 1.1 Jan 14 03/31.5 "a pot- po- potential hhhh de(hh)ath sent(hhh)ence" 
10 RC (( ... )) he's in his early fifties he's got a wife and three kids and I 
11 was with him when the consultant broke the news to him 
12 Jan But how do you break the news to somebody (. ) realising 
13 that to them it's just one in thousands 
14 RC umh 
15 Bee It's difficult Isn't it 
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16 RC It's difficult for them, as well as the person that they are having to 
17 tell 
18 Jan Yes, that's right 
19 Bee Oh it is 
20 -+ Jan hhh well I mean hhh how can you tell someone that er 
21 you've got er- got er a pot- po- potential hhhh 
22 de(hh)ath sent(hhh)ence. hh ha ha ha which hh is 
23 what people equa(hh)te with ca(hh)ncer hh isn't hh it? 
24 Bee Ye:: s 
25 Jan rightly or wrongly 
26 RC Yes 
27 Bee I think they hold back ever such a lot 
28 Jan u:: mh (0.1) 
29 RC So you think they hold back? 
30 Bee Ye::: s (. ) they wait for you to prompt them (0.2) 
Jan's response to RC's story about her brother is to pick up on the doctors' 
difficulties: "how do you break the news to somebody" (line 12). The category 
"somebody" is already generalised and impersonal, Jan extends this theme with 
"realising that to them it's just one in thousands" (lines 12-13). This casts it as a 
general problem for doctors, even though the frequency and generality of having 
to deliver bad news make it part of their everyday experience. Bee, RC and Jan 
concur (lines 14-19). 
It is in this context of agreeing about doctors' generalised difficulties that Jan 
introduces the topic of death (lines 20-23). She introduces it, therefore, not as a 
matter of any particular person's actual death, but as a cultural idiom (for a 
generalised "you", line 20) that need not be grounded in reality. The term 'death 
sentence' is itself idiomatic, a metaphor derived from courtrooms and criminal 
punishment. Jan produces it with further irony via some precisely located 
interpolated laughter (line 22), coupled with the disclaimer that it is "what people 
equa(hh)te with ca(hh)ncer hh isn't hh it? " (line 23), followed by "rightly or 
wrongly" (line 25). So, "death" is introduced in an occasioned, generalised, and 
ironic manner, and with regard to problems for the doctor rather than patient. 
Note how the metaphor "death sentence" exaggerates (again, as part of the 
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irony) the doctors responsibility. Judges, who pass real death sentences, are 
not just telling but deciding that someone will die. In fact, the idea that doctors 
are giving a death sentence is somewhat of a contradiction, in that they are 
supposedly there to save lives, not to pronounce death. So, the idiom of a Udeath 
sentence" enhances the taks topic, the problematic nature of telling people they 
have got cancer. 
The way Jan talks of death also handles reflexive implications for herself. By in 
part disclaiming this cultural script, of telling someone they have cancer and it 
being a death sentence, she can, whilst orienting to this, position herself as being 
outside of the category of either someone who thinks like that, or as someone 
who may die of cancer. By thus orienting to the expected cultural script that 
accompanies the receipt of a cancer diagnosis, and to the difficulties for the 
medical profession in telling someone they have cancer, Jan manages to resist 
talking about her own personal and specific experiences or associations of 
cancer and death. At the same time, her ironic delivery and laughter works 
against any potential uptake of talking about death as a serious topic for this 
interaction. (See Chapter 7 for other uses of laughter when talking about 
sensitive issues). 
Indeed, rather than continue the talk about death and dying, Bee's uptake on this 
is to say how the doctors manage their difficulty of presenting bad news. She 
says, "they hold back" and "they wait for you to prompt them" (lines 27and 30). 
Note that both Jan and Bee treat death as relevant and on the minds of the 
doctors; not just absent or unconsidered. The implication is that it is actively 
repressed. By holding back, this places the agency and responsibility onto the 
patient to ask any further questions. Bee is commenting on the reluctance of the 
doctors to talk freely when giving a diagnosis, and that they wait to be prompted 
rather than offer information. 
This is a reversal of the expectation of the patient being a passive agent in the 
medical encounter and leaves agency and control actively with the PWC (see 
extract 5: 2.7). If they do not take active agency and 'prompt' the doctors with 
questions when they are given the diagnosis, the implication is that they are not 
265 
likely to be informed about their diagnosis and likely prognosis, or specifically, its 
death relevance. Interestingly, Bee's observation is supported by the work of 
Lutfey and Maynard (1998), who suggest that resistance or acceptance of 
delicate topics is an interactional achievement. So, if it is the PWC who is left to 
prompt the doctor to talk, then this is one way in which both the doctor and the 
PWC can display reluctance or resist talking about death. 
A considerable amount of research has looked at the difficulties that arise in 
doctor-patient communication when delivering bad news from the viewpoint of 
the medical profession (see Chapter 2). Doka (1993) suggests that the 
increasing recognition, that not talking about dying has negative effects and that 
dying people need and want to talk about their condition, has produced a 
significant change in medical practice. He suggests that most physicians are 
now much more open in their communication with dying individuals and their 
families. He suggests that even though physicians do not generally volunteer or 
initiate discussions of prognosis, they will respond honestly to patients' 
questions. 
It has been reported that telling someone they have cancer is problematic for 
doctors because of the anticipated suffering this is likely to cause the person who 
is receiving the news (Gordon and Paci, 1997). ' This Is also a common sense 
expectation that Jo alludes to in extract 8: 1.2. Lutfey and Maynard similarly found 
that the delicate topic of a PWC's terminal illness was approached with caution 
not just by physicians, but by patients and their families. 
What is of particular interest in this analysis is how participants show their 
awareness of these problems, and orient to the difficulties experienced by the 
1A doctor explaining why he never explicitly communicated the diagnosis of cancer to a patient 
said: "Without a doubt, there is difficulty on my part, and I think for everyone, in giving a 
sentence. I have difficulty in making someone suffer, in causing someone sorrow, a dispiacere, 
that I can cause when I tell him ... [The patient] can understand everything, but I didn't say it, I didn't give it precisely the official stamp ... The patient wants to have the confirmation [of the diagnosis] ... But this confirmation is difficult to give, because it closes everything, closes all 
possibility, hopes, hope to participate in life, in everything. If he knows there is no more hope ... it 
removes all possibility of living a period more serene, more tranquil, from a person in the very 
moment when he needs that instead of knowing the truth" (Gordon and Paci, 1997: 1439). 
266 
doctors. Sometimes they produce explanations as to what is occurring or is 
being managed when the doctor does not engage in interaction and 'holds back'. 
As has been shown throughout, one way participants manage to head off 
delicate and sensitive issues relating to themselves, is to invoke the difficulties of 
the medical profession or of others who are engaged in social interaction (see 
also Chapter 7). 
Jan's ironic, idiomatic invocation of cancers association with death prefaced her 
going on to tell the story of her own struggle and identity as someone who was 
not necessarily going to accept that clich6 as true, but rather, she could then 
display a positive stance. One interesting feature is that Jan does not talk in any 
direct way about herself dying, (unlike in extract 8: 5.1) nor of what it would be 
like. She shows her concern for others and talks about death and dying in 
general, emblematic and idiomatic terms. In this way, she is able to voice 
general concerns about death and dying rather than attending to her own 
problem of having cancer and the possibility of her own eventual death; it could 
be understood therefore as another way of doing being positive. 
Talking about other people's problems, and invoking cultural scripts, are devices 
that participants use to generalise what is or may be happening to them. In 
extract 8: 1.2, Jo, who has been given a terminal diagnosis, also talks about the 
difficulties for the doctor and formulates why it is difficult for them. 
Extract 8: 1.2 Jo 02104 "it's a very difficult job for a doctor" 
1 RC umh, what about umh, do you think the medical profession 
2 as a whole understands your needs er since you've had your 
3 diagnosis (3.0) 
4 JO I think they're getting better (2.0) 
5 RC umh 
6 -+ Jo it's a very difficult job for a doctor still [to have to tell a patient 
7 RC [umh 
8 JO that she's dying (2-0) y'know that they can't do anything 
9 because it goes against their whole (. ) cre: dos Isn't it 
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10 RC umh 
11 -+ JO you know, to being a doctor is to save lives 
RC asks Jo whether "the medical profession as a whole" understands Jo's 
needs. This is a generalised way of asking the question, one that avoids a 
requirement to cite specific individuals. Jo takes a few seconds before replying 
that "they're getting better" (line 4), which takes up the generalised mode of 
talking, and nicely alludes to complainable matters that at this point have been 
previously discussed between RC and Jo, while managing to say something 
positive. By displaying an understanding of the difficult *position" doctors are in, 
that they "can't do anything" (line 8), Jo can point to what is wrong without overtly 
blaming or complaining; situational accounts ("position"), and inability accounts 
("can't do anything") are standard discursive ways of avoiding attributing agency 
and blame to people (Edwards and Potter, 1992). Jo goes on to provide an 
explanation of what makes it especially difficult for them: "because it goes 
against their whole cre: dos" (line 9). This appeals to common knowledge and the 
standard definition of what doctors do, where, over and above any difficulties that 
the general public might have in delivering such announcements, "being a doctor 
is to save lives" (line 11). For a doctor, announcing someone's impending death 
can be regarded as a failure (Stacey 1997). Any doctor making such an 
announcement may have to work at being merely one of Goffman's (1979) 
&animators' of the message, rather than being responsible for it. 
By voicing the doctors problem of telling a patient that she is dying, Jo, like Jan 
and Bee, is also invoking the cultural script of cancer equating with death, but 
again, she does not directly address her own potential death. Instead, she refers 
to the difficulties that others, and people in general, face: "to tell a patient that 
she's dying", where the relevant category is "a patient" rather than any particular 
person, or even Jo herself. It is a problem for doctors per se, dealing with 
patients per se, which is what makes it understandable. Again, in displaying a 
recognition of doctors' difficulties, Jo also shows reflexively that she is an 
understanding person who can relate to other people's problems and not 
necessarily dwell on her own, despite her own problem, as the PWC in question, 
being obviously far worse than that of the person who only has to tell her about it. 
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Extract 8: 1.3 shows that, rather than the person with cancer having negative 
associations with their illness, it is again 'people', the generalised other, who 
adopt the negative clich6 that cancer equates with death. 
Extract 8: 1.3 Kim 05/01 "they think we'll lie down and die" 
1 Kim well the thing is er I mean er some people as soon as you 
2 mention the word cancer, they think we'll lie down and die, 
3 not me, you know hahh hahh ha 
4 no they'll have to catch me walking (. ) standing 
5 hahh hahh hahh hahh hahh 
Kim again uses the contrast of what'some people', a proportion of the population 
at large, think, irrespective of whether or not it is true. The expression 'some 
people think" serves as a preface to denial; it sounds strange to imagine 
someone saying "some people think X... and they're rightl* Indeed Hutchby 
(1996) has examined cases where what other people "think" is formulated in 
contrast to a preferred version of what is actually the case. Kim also uses it as a 
device to resist such thinking, and by using laughter also displays that this 
thinking does not apply to her. Again, by talking about other people's ascriptions 
of cancer, it enables participants to introduce the topic at a 'safe' distance. 
Another device is to invoke the cultural cancer script. The reference to "some 
people" is a non-specific category, but one that does not necessarily include what 
everyone thinks and is therefore a softened rather than extreme generalisation, 
robust against exceptions to it (Edwards, 2000). It also implies that those people 
are not cancer sufferers, and enables Kim to construct a rhetorical position to 
contrast what might be expected of her. Her response to what some people 
might think reflects a denial of the association of cancer with death; it may be 
cultural knowledge, a common assumption, but it does not fit the facts as they 
apply to Kim. Kim thus contrasts herself against common expectations. She is 
not going to passively lie down and die, like a canonical cancer patient. She is 
going to be active and heroic, in the face of any such expectations: "they'll have 
to catch me walking, standing" (line 4). 
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Note also the use of idioms here that signal the humour and resist dwelling on 
the morbidity of death: "they'll have to catch" her. The use of laughter (lines 3 
and 5) also helps in the construction of the irony of lying down to die. "Lay down 
and die" is itself a cultural clich6, and contrasts with the comic scenario of Kim 
being pursued down the corridors of the hospital (lines 3 and 4) "they'll have to 
catch me". Kim is laying down the gauntlet, being defiant, heroic. The implication 
is that if Kim is active, this averts the passivity of what might happen if she lies 
down. Agency reverts to Kim (line 3). What she actually talks about is living, not 
dying, and by constructing this rhetorical opposition of agency, that she Is 
different from what "they think" and expect, she displays herself as someone who 
is doing being positive. 
In extract 8: 1.4, Ann also produces an account of what some people think and 
expect, and resists it as not relevant or acceptable to her. Like Jo In extract 
8: 1.2, Ann provides an explanation for the difficulties that 'people' have to 
manage when they encounter someone with cancer. 
Extract 8: 1.4 Ann 09/05 "there Is light at the end of the tunnel" 
47 IRC So (. ) why do you think er (. ) she found It er difficult then 
48 or she couldn't look at you or 
49 [why do you think she crossed the road? 
50 Ann [well I think because she er- its that Is sheer Ignorance of 
51 12e. ople with breast cancer, she- she doesn't realise, 
52 she probably thinks that when you've got breast cancer 
53 no matter how bad it is (. ) you're gonna die with it anyway 
54 so she couldn't fa:: ce me (. ) she trea:: ted it as if it was a- 
55 it was a bereavement (1.0) you know an- and umh er 
56 1 think it was just because of her Ignorance (. ) 
57 she didn't realise that yes there is light at the end of the tunnel 
58 IRC so er she didn't know what to say to you? 
59 Ann no, no she was embarrassed by it (3.0) 
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Another difficulty someone with cancer might face is how to manage the 
associated stigma 2 that often accompanies the disease. In this extract, Ann is 
recounting the behaviour of a neighbour. Prior to the beginning of the extract, 
Ann has just been talking about a particular friend who found it difficult to talk to 
her (see Chapter 6 extracts 6: 2.8 and 6: 2.9). 
RC asks Ann whether she has any explanation for her neighbour's avoidant 
behaviour "that she couldn't look at you" and asks why "she crossed the road? " 
(lines 47-49). Ann prefaces her response with "well I think" (line 50) indicating 
that she is about to say something that is speculative and possibly negative. 
Indeed the problem "is sheer ignorance of (. ) gftjople with breast cancer" (lines 
50-51). The term "sheer" defines the ignorance as profound or extreme. People 
without breast cancer are not privileged to know about the disease, such that 
their only resort is the cultural clich6 that having cancer means death, that "no 
matter how bad it is (. ) you're gonna die with it anyway" (line 53), which produces 
an inability to "fa:: ce me". In invoking ignorance rather than, say, lack of 
sympathy, Ann constructs the neighbour's reaction as normative, 
understandable, and not particularly blameworthy. The comparison to a 
"bereavement", another social scenario that provides for interactional difficulties, 
again directly invokes death. 
The use of the expression "light at the end of the tunnel" (line 57) is an uplifting 
metaphorical contrast to other idiomatic expressions we have seen (see Chapter 
6) that do not feature here, such as "doom and gloom" and going "back down the 
hole". The "light at the end of the tunnel" produces images of moving forward 
towards life and a future, a very positive image, by which Ann can resist the 
darker clich6s of cancer and death. RC acknowledges the gloss on other 
people's difficulties, by re-formulating Ann's inability account ("she couldn't face 
me", line 54) with one of her own: "she didn't know what to say to you? " (line 58). 
2 Matheison and Stam (1997) found that people spontaneously mentioned what they categorised as 
'stigma-related issues' during their interviews, despite the fact that a question about stigmas was 
never asked. As one patient commented, she felt as if she had 'leprosy' and was no longer "part of 
the human race". One woman recently diagnosed with breast cancer acknowledged that the issue 
of stigma (Matheison and Stam's term) finalised her decision not to tell her fhends she had cancer 
because she "couldn't have run out to my four best friends and said, I got it girls, I got the Big C'. 
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Ann then provides a further psychological gloss (in addition to ignorance) on the 
neighbour's problems: "she was embarrassed by it" (line 59). 
Ann, like Jo in extract 8: 1.2, is thus able to say what is wrong with her 
neighbour's reaction whilst at the same time not complaining or blaming her, at 
least overtly (there remains scope of course, though Ann does not develop it, for 
blaming people for being ignorant). As with the doctors, the neighbours get it 
wrong as well, but they do so normatively and understandably, and neither Jo nor 
Ann is disposed to blame them for it. 
The above analyses have shown how participants define the difficulties faced by 
the medical profession of giving a cancer diagnosis, and their use of a common 
sense cultural script of how 'some people' equate cancer with death. It shows 
how participants manage this cultural expectation, that cancer equals death, by 
using common sense and normative ideas rhetorically, as points of contrast for 
displaying themselves as different from normative expectations, and as disposed 
toward positive (optimistic, coping, resisting) thought and action. 
8: 2 Resisting doom and gloom 
In extract 8: 2.1, we see how participants can resist any inappropriate notion of 
doom and gloom by formulating and attending to how they would prefer 'people' 
to respond to them. There are a number of interesting features in the extract, 
which again build on the uses of a rhetorical contrast against how 'they, the 
medical professionals, might have behaved. Whereas in extract 8: 1.2 Jo was 
talking about the difficulties for the doctors in telling a patient she was dying, in 
extract 8: 2.1, whilst recognising this difficulty, she now formulates how she wants 
the medical profession to behave. 
Extract 8: 2.1 Jo 02105 "they could have been a bit more up-beat" 
12 Jo and it's very what Ive noticed is 
13 that the people that have had to deal with me Le. 
14 in oncology (1.0) and palliative care (2.0) 
15 umh I think they could have been a bit more up-beat (2-0) 
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16 RC uh huh 
17 -> JO it's been- they've been er sort of very down yknow, 
18 obviously it's not a pleasant job for them (1.0) 
19 RC umh 
20 Jo but theyve taken on that role 
21 RC umh 
22 Jo therefore deal with it (. ) handle that job (1.0) 
23 in a more positive up-beat manner 
24 1 don't want to go to these places and and 
25 er look at doom and gloom on their face= 
26 RC =right= 
27 Jo I'm not walking around with doom and gloom on my face 
28 so I don't want to see it (1.0) 
29 they may be feeling sorry for me or whatever, 
30 it's not necessary (2.0) yknow, 
31 1 er prefer to see a happy smiling face and they can say 
32 oh how are you ((brighter tone of voice)) that's fine 
33 RC uh huh 
34 Jo y'know just because I'm dying doesn't mean to say 
35 they can't ask me that question (3.0) 
At this stage, Jo has been given a terminal diagnosis, and announces that she 
has "noticed" something when she comes into contact with the "people" in 
oncology and palliative care that have to deal with her (lines 12-14). The term 
"noticed" conveys this as a casual observation of some kind, rather than, say, 
something that Jo was looking for, or wanting now to make a big fuss over. 
Despite the fact that she is dying, she suggests that "they could have been a bit 
more up-beat" (line 15). Jo's rather gently delivered complaint (the thing she has 
"noticed") employing the idiom "up-beat" (lines 15 and 23), contrasts with the 
more expected idiom for people dealing with death and dying, "doom and gloom" 
(line 25). Idioms may can be introduced into a conversation possibly ironically or 
as a piece of ventriloquism by the very person who later goes on to resist it 
(Kitzinger, 2000). Again, overt blaming is avoided, not only by Jo's merely 
Knoticing" these things, but also by her overt recognition that "obviously it's not a 
pleasant job for them" (line 18). She now formulates a positive suggestion, that 
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the medical profession who, having taken on their role and thus inherited more 
responsibility for their conduct than might be expected from, say, friends and 
neighbours, should "handle that job (1.0) in a more positive up-beat manner" and 
that they should "deal with it" (lines 22 and 23). 
What is interesting and ironical here is that Jo is countering the notion of positive 
thinking being the onus of the cancer patient herself, which was explored in 
Chapters 6 and 7. Here Jo is demanding that when she goes to 'these places" 
(line 24), meaning the hospital, that the medical profession set the tone by being 
positive too. She explicitly does not want to see them with "doom and gloom on 
their face" (line 25). As Kitzinger (2000) suggests, the use of idiomatic terms in 
the formulation of a complaint can represent their egregious character more 
powerfully than circumstantial detail can. Idioms are often designed to close a 
complaint sequence (Drew and Holt, 1988). However, it appears that they can 
not only open and close a complaint sequence but they can also be resisted and 
countered, and may even be produced as idioms, precisely in order to be 
discounted as clich6s, or as "what people think" (cf. Kim in extract 8: 1.3). 
If we include negative descriptions of peoples' actions as 'complaints', even 
when the speaker is working to display themselves as not wanting to be critical 
(see also Chapters 5 and 7), then complaints also appear throughout PWC's 
accounts when the topic of death and dying is invoked. Complaints made to RC 
about the medical profession are best understood as what Sacks (1992) called 
'safe' complaints, being made in a conversation where some affiliation could be 
assumed. 3 
3 Sacks has made numerous references to complaints and has defined the notion of complaints as 
'safe' and 'unsafe. ' A 'safe' complaint "is formulated as such a thing as any member of that 
category could say about that other. The 'safe' phenomena, according to Sacks "would have 
different characteristics depending on how the given population were to be fonnulated... 'Unsafe' 
complaints occur when co-members formulate a complaint, which other co-members do not make. 
Since speakers occupy multiple category positions, an unsafe complaint can easily occur in 
instances when the listener is 'too knowledgeable' concerning the topic of complaint. To guard 
against possible objections and challenges from co-members, who hear complaints as unsafe, 
complainants may actively engage in stake management" (Sacks, 1992: 597-600). 
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As noted in Chapter 5, many complaints do not merely reflect peoples' true 
attitudes towards the object or person in question, but rather, work to elicit 
particular interpersonal reactions from others, such as sympathy or approval. 
Parsons (1951) suggested that when someone is ill they may complain about 
their state of ill health, not because they actually feel sick but because the 'sick 
role 94 allows them to achieve secondary gains, such as the avoidance of aversive 
events or sympathy from others (see also Leary and Miller, 1986; Smith, Snyder 
and Perkins, 1983). 
Kowalski suggests that a more appropriate conceptualisation of a complaint is 
that it is "an expression of dissatisfaction, whether subjectively experienced or 
not, which has a purpose, to vent emotions or achieve intrapsychic goals, 
interpersonal goals or both" (Kowalski, 1996: 180). Such psychological- 
motivational explanations are beyond the remit of discourse analysis (Edwards, 
1997), but they help point to the functional and interpersonal nature of complaints 
as something other then merely the expression of a speaker's single best 
judgement. 
Jo's complaint is connected with the perceived inadequacies of the medical 
profession, and she is saying that she does not want them to feel sorry for her. 
Throughout this extract Jo is building a critical account of their interaction, whilst 
at the same time she provides a contrast account whereby she acknowledges 
that "if s not a pleasant job for them" (line 18). Sacks notes that the construct "a 
piece of praise plus 'but', plus something else may be routinely employed to do 
complaining" (Sacks, 1992: 360). However, in this instance, this construct is 
reversed and Jo proffers a complaint before expressing an understanding of their 
difficulties, which may signal praise. However, her display of understanding 
helps rather than undermines the force of the complaint. It works by reflexively 
displaying that Jo is objective, considerate, and reluctant to complain. 
4 The best known outside sociological approach to illness is Parsons' "sick role" originally 
formulated in 1951, expanded in 1952 (Parsons and Fox) and reiterated in 1975. The'sickrole' 
is defined as a person's inability to satisfactorily carry out his or her normal roles so that a period 
of relief from everyday duties is allowed. 
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In doing this she manages not only to make a complaint about the interaction that 
occurs between the medical profession and herself, but by continually building a 
rhetorical contrast against what we might call the 'biological reality' of the 
situation, Jo is also able to position herself as doing being positive. She is "not 
walking around with doom and gloom on my face" (line 27) and she does not 
want to see "doom and gloom" even though "they may be feeling sorry" (line 29) 
for her. She dismisses this and makes a claim for normality. (This is particularly 
noticeable in a further complaint in lines 31-35. See also Chapter 6 extract 6: 4.5). 
Jo continues by saying she prefers "to see a happy smiling face" and that "they 
can say oh how are you" (lines 31 and 32). She implores that, "just" because 
she is dying, this is not sufficient grounds for them to treat her differently, not to 
greet her or to ask her the normative greeting of 'how are you? " She does not 
talk about her dying; what she is making topical is how people should say "hello" 
to her, and that they should ask her how she is, as they normally would with 
anyone else. In defining the type of support she requires, Jo defines appropriate 
behaviour, that people should maintain a cheerful and optimistic demeanour. 
The object of her complaint is the medical profession's inability to address her in 
a normal way. Through making 'safe' complaints, talking about the failings of 
the medical profession to RC, and in a hedged and merely "noticing" manner, Jo 
is able to construct herself as someone who is different from normative 
expectations. The focus of attention is more on the medical profession than on 
herself, such that she manages to keep the topic of dying at arm's length. By 
talking about her troubles as being the interactional ones of dealing with other 
people's reactions, rather than dying itself, she manages to divert attention from 
talk about dying, and dying becomes incidental to the account. The rhetorical 
construction of her account reflexively produces an identity for Jo, that despite 
the knowledge that she is dying, she is someone who is doing being positive, via 
requiring positivity from others. 
8: 3 Life goes on: Negotiating living 
Extracts 8: 3.1 and 8: 3.2 look at two different concerns when the prospect of 
death is invoked. Jo describes herself in terms of a general, normative 
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disposition in people to react in various ways, while Dee focuses on uncertainty. 
Both Jo and Dee talk about options they could take, but it is clear that the 
choices are difficult ones to make, where giving up or saying no to a harrowing 
regime of treatment are presented as conflicting with the values placed on life 
and living. Although both use idiomatic expressions of cancer equating with 
death, by talking about the "fight to live" and "I'm not going to let this beat me", 
they also negotiate alternatives and rhetorically construct their position as making 
informed choices, that they are in control of their lives, not the cancer. (cf. 
Chapter 7, extracts 7: 1.2-7: 1.5 when Sandra is reported as being unempowered 
and overtaken by the disease). Death is not talked about directly, but only 
alluded to via talk about living and living longer, and in terms of how, despite the 
possibility of life being shortened, the potential accompanying morbidity can be 
resisted. 
In extract 8: 3.1 Dee, who has secondary cancer, displays that there is a lot to 
consider. 
Extract 8: 3.1 "the fight to live Is huge Isn't It? " 
47 Dee I think the first time you're (2.0) you're in such a state 
48 that you- you go through blindly in a way 
49 RC umh 
50 Dee the momentum takes you, do y'know what I mean? 
51 RC umh and then you don't know 
52 [what's coming and you don't know what to expect 
53 Dee [and you have no knowledge of what's coming 
54 and you- you don't know the er- you don't know what's ahead 
55 RC umh 
56 Dee it's a good job we don't, but the second time (1.0) 
57 you think, because I always said I wouldn't have chemotherapy 
58 again that was my (1.0) because I was asked at the last 
59 chemotherapy by Sam, would you have chemotherapy again if 
60 there was a five per cent chance that you would live longer (. ) 
61 and I said no there'd have to be a twenty per cent chance and 
62 then I Mmay consider it (2.0) but now, I wouldn't say no, 
63 1 don't know, I don't think I would 
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64 RC right 
65 Dee I'm not sure hhhh hahh the jurys still o(hh)ut 
66 RC yeah, yeah 
67 Dee but the fight to live is huge isn't it? 
68 IRC well yeah (3.0) 
69 Dee y'know, we're all sort of- don't realise how much (. ) we 
70 value (. ) living until there's a possibility that you're not going to 
71 live much longer 
72 RC and er- and er I don't think, y'know, like you say 
73 the jury's still out, I mean I don't think you can predict 
Throughout this extract, Dee makes the point that there are difficult options to be 
considered, but expresses these in terms of choosing treatment. Dee has 
already experienced chemotherapy and is therefore in a position to make an 
informed choice; however, she is not morbid about it, she does not explain the 
physical discomforts of suffering, but talks about her concerns the second time 
round. She is able to contrast her previous knowledge, which she describes as 
not being able to see what is going to happen "you go through blindly in a way" 
(line 48). This implies that you can not see what is going to happen and that you 
do not have any control over the unknown, and "the momentum takes you" (line 
50). The generalised 'you' denotes that it would be the same for anyone in the 
same situation (cf. Chapter 7, extracts 7: 1.1-7: 1.5). Throughout the extract, Dee 
relates her own experiences in terms of what anyone can be expected to do and 
feel. She went through it as anyone would. 
RC aligns with this by highlighting the situation of anyone experiencing these 
things for the first time: "you don't know what's coming" (lines 51-52). Dee picks 
up RC's words and repeats or paraphrases them almost in overlap (lines 52-54), 
which is a way of acknowledging that RC is effectively voicing Dee's own views 
on the matter. The slight alteration from RC's "what to expect" to Dee's "what's 
ahead" nicely does that work, signalling close agreement while also displaying 
that these are Dee's own thoughts, not just RC's being echoed. 
This focus on blindness or ignorance, on one's first time through the treatment 
process, sets up a contrast with Dee's current situation, of going through it all a 
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second time. There is an accountable matter here which is that, having been 
through the treatment and now knowing how awful it is, and indeed having 
consistently "always said" previously (line 57) that she would not undergo it 
again, Dee is now going through it all again. The account provided is that "the 
fight to live is huge" (line 67), and that this is something that is experienced only, 
or especially, when one's life is threatened (lines 69-71). Again, the account is a 
generalised one, a description of the human condition, "the fight to live". In 
accounting for her own particular experiences in terms of what anyone might 
experience, Dee effectively defines her own actions as not requiring any further 
explanation (cf. Sacks, 1992, on "everyone carries a gun", and Edwards, 1994, 
on the normalising functions of 'script formulations'). Dee's choice of whether to 
have further treatment is not merely a personal one, but one that anyone who 
had been through her experiences might be expected to make. 
Having been offered a "five per cent chance" to live longer (line 60) she Initially 
says no, "there'd have to be a 20% chance" (line 61) before she would consider 
this, but like Jo "you don't come to decisions ovemighf (see extract 8: 3.2a 
below). Dee is hedging about whether she would or would not say no, indicating 
that there is a constant dialogical negotiation going on. She has presented a 
hesitant account of what she would do, that it is still under evaluation. Note how 
she brings in a notion of the court room scenario, as with a 'death sentence' (see 
extract 8: 1.1. ) by laughingly saying, "I'm not sure hhhh hahh the jurys still 
o(hh)ut" (line 65). 
The introduction of a jury resonates with evaluation, judgement, and consensus, 
that the decision is not just a personal one on her part. What decision Dee might 
take in the future is unclear, but she has opened up some scope here for going 
either way on it. The dilemma for Dee is that if she says no to treatment, there is 
a possible implication of giving up, not fighting, not being positive, and perhaps of 
being labelled unco-operative, and a'bad patient'. 
However, Dee offsets any such interpretation by seeking and obtaining 
collaboration from RC ("isn't it? ", line 67; cf. "d'you know what I mean? ", line 50, 
and the overlapped agreement noted in lines 52-54), and also by the 
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generalising expressions she uses throughout the extract (the uses of "you", and 
of formulae such as "the fight to live"). The "fight" to live, rather than merely, say 
the will to live, emphasises the powerful nature of the forces at play here, where 
even an awful and already-experienced treatment regime can accountably be 
undertaken a second time, in spite of earlier denials. Again, it is not death or 
dying that is being directly talked about, but concerns about treatment options, 
chances, and their relationship to living and living longer. Even the expression 
"you're not going to live much longer" (lines 70-71), is a way of talking about 
death in terms of life. Dee confronts the prospect of death by talking about the 
limitations on, and prospects for, carrying on living. 
Extracts 8: 3.2a and 8: 3.2b display many of the key concepts and devices that 
have been discussed throughout this thesis. They combine the notions of doing 
being normal and doing being positive, using devices such as rhetorical contrasts 
and a familiar language of cancer and an emphasis on the 'dghf attitudes 
concerning how to live with a cancer diagnosis, which Jo glosses as "a frame of 
mind". 
What is particularly interesting is how Jo leads us into talking about dying, and 
how she provides a sense of negotiating over time, and of how decisions are 
reached. 
Extract 8: 3.2a Jo 02/07a "if there Isn't black you don't know what white Is like" 
11 Jo I mean as for me (2.0) and I don't think I'm anything (2.0) unique 
12 (. ) at all but the people I've met (2.0) 
13 that are in the same position or worse 
14 RC umh 
15 Jo far worse have been so up and umh er positive and I've not met 
16 anyone, I've not met a single person that has been on the down 
17 side to it but er you know (. ) all of us (. ) y` know, well we all go to 
18 bed at certain times of the night when you can't sleep 
19 you sit there and you think about things 
20 RC umh (1.0) 
21 Jo that's normal, I mean its quite natural to sit there and think 
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22 oh well what if and what if and yknow 
23 RC umh 
24 Jo you're not necessarily being down and you're not 
25 necessarily worrying overly about it but (2.0) you know 
26 things will go through your mind (. ) you'd be stupid not to think of 
27 RC umh 
28 Jo the possible down sides to life (1.0) but you have to think of 
29 those to then judge what you are going to do or what you- er 
30 you know you have to think of (. ) 
31 I'm not going to be miserable (. ) I'm not going to let this beat me 
32 RC umh 
33 -+ Jo you have to think those things to then be a hundred per cent 
34 positive about what you are going to do 
35 RC yeah, right 
36 Jo d'you see what I mean 
37 RC yeah, yeah 
38 -* Jo it's like if there isn't black you don't know what [white is 
39 RC [it's like a 
40 perspective on something 
41 Jo totally 
42 RC yeah 
43 Jo y'know, but thinking these things and mulling them over 
44 and y'know, it takes time 
45 RC umh 
46 Jo you- you er don't come to these decisions overnight (1.0) 
47 and anyone that says they do is lying 
48 RC umh 
Given the general requirement to be "positive" (line 15), Jo emphasises that she 
is just like everyone else, including people in a worse situation (presumably both 
terminal and suffering a lot of pain). Positive is universal, something for extreme 
case formulations: "all the people", "not... anyone", "not met a single person", *all 
of us", "we all" (lines 12-17) and later "a hundred percent positive" (line 34). As 
Pomerantz (1986) noted, and as we have seen in earlier chapters, extreme 
descriptions are used when rhetorical contrasts are being made. In this case, Jo 
is at pains to emphasise the strong positivity that she and others universally 
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maintain, in spite of the fact that they do not actually always feel positive. There 
are negative times too, which are also universal, things that "we all" (line 17) go 
through, as a generalised "you" (lines 18-19), thoughts that are both "normal" and 
"natural" (line 21). These are not just different from positive thoughts, but the 
very opposite, encoded by the conventional opposites "black" and "white" (line 
38). The way that Jo accommodates this general negativity alongside a 
universal positivity is to include it as part of the same thing; without such negative 
thoughts, being positive would have no meaning. People need to have 
something to reject. 
Throughout the extract, Jo works at normalising her situation, (as someone with 
a terminal diagnosis) that she is no different from anyone else. Thinking about 
things is something everyone else does as well, so she is the same as them. 
She then personalises her account saying what she is not going to do "be 
miserable" and draws on the canonical script, that she is "not going to let this 
beat me" (line 31). She is actively voicing her thinking and dialogical argument, 
that "you have to think those things to then be a hundred per cent positive about 
what you are going to do" (lines 33-34). 
The detail "we all go bed at certain times of the night" (lines 17-18), when these 
negative thoughts occur, is interesting, in that it invokes a time when a person is 
alone with their thoughts, away from the daily routines where positive things are 
routinely done (e. g. shopping, taking the dog for a walk, see Chapter 7), and 
away from other people. Being positive is an effort of daily life and putting on a 
brave face is a kind of social duty, such that the time for negativity is when one is 
out of sight and alone, in bed at night, when dark thoughts can come crowding in. 
In the expression, "you don't come to these decisions overnight" (line 46), the 
term "overnight" now has a richness beyond its usual conventional meaning. 
By dealing with positive and negative feelings in this way, as part of the same 
general and universal experience, Jo is able to strongly endorse the requirement 
for being positive, whilst at the same time she shows that it is something difficult 
that takes time. In Jo's construction, there is no white without black, no up 
without down, such that any dark thoughts that may occur are not merely 
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exceptions to being positive, but a key part of it. One important issue that Jo is 
dealing with here is the notion that being positive might be seen as just a sham, 
even a lie (line 47), especially as it is not possible to be positive all the time, or 
immediately, and that everyone will have negative thoughts when 
(emblematically) they are alone at night. Jo's version makes room for the 
darkest of thoughts, and the enormous difficulties of being positive when 
terminally ill, as part and parcel of endorsing the virtues of positive thinking. (cf. 
Chapter 7, extracts 7: 1.6-7: 1.8). Rather than positivity being something that 
anyone can quickly adopt, it is something that has to be forged in time, by way of 
some bad experiences. 
In the second half of this extract, Jo continues to display her process of dialogical 
negotiation and generalises about normal life expectancy, this time raising 
explicitly the prospect of death. 
Extract 8: 3.2b Jo 02/07b "It's a frame of mind" 
49 Jo y'know I mean it's- it's the biggest thing that can ever happen to 
50 anyone (2.0) y'know we're all, we're born, we live and we die 
51 but you know the bit in between living and dying is 
52 normally sort of seventy or eighty years= 
53 RC =yes, it Is now isn't it 
54 Jo umh, and then when you're told that half way through that period 
55 (. ) no it's not going to happen you have to sit back and think 
56 well okay what am I actually going to do with what's left 
57 RC umh (2.0) 
58 Jo y'know, so you're not necessarily- I would not say 
59 I've been worrying about it (. ) I've been thinking about it 
60 RC umh 
61 Jo I've been thinking, what's the best thing to do 
62 RC umh 
63 JO for everyone concerned but (5.0) it's a frame of mind isn't it 
64 it's the attitude (. ) it's the character and the personality (. ) 
65 it's very easy to tip the scale and be morose about it and 
66 give in and give up and say ah well I'm going to die 
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67 well that's it I might as well die o:: h yknow (. ) 
68 let's give up on living it's very easy to be that way (3.0) 
69 but it's a(hh)lso(hh) just as easy to say well fuck em all yknow, 
70 (1.0) do you see what I'm getting at? 
71 RC umh, yeah, I was go[ing to say 
72 Jo [personality plays (2.0) the biggest role 
73 in it (. ) the biggest 
Jo displays a philosophical approach to life and death, (lines 49-52) that it is 
something that happens: "We're all, we're born, we live and we die", but this is 
based on the normality of life expectancy "of seventy or eighty years". She then 
indirectly addresses that she has been given a terminal diagnosis having been 
told "half way through that period (. ) no ifs not going to happen" (lines 54-55). 
Her response to this is not doom and gloom, but she says again, that "you have 
to sit back and think" (line 55). It is not the 'sit back and think' of doing nothing, 
but it is one of being constructive and active: "well what am I actually going to do 
with what's left" (line 56). She is making a feature of 'thinking' and being positive, 
in contrast to the negativity of worrying (line 59) and activates her thinking 
"what's the best thing to do" (line 61). Theoretically, worry has been defined as 
uncontrollable, unwanted and an aversive 'cognitive' activity that is associated 
with anxiety, negative thoughts and a sense of emotional discomfort (Borkovec 
and Lyonfields, 1992). But worry can also have a number of purposes, such as 
generating ways of avoiding aversive events, aiding preparation and motivating 
change (Borkovec, 1994). Here (line 59) Jo cites "worrying" as a rejected, 
negative gloss on what she is really doing, which is, more positively, "thinking" 
about things. 
For Jo, "worrying" connotes negativity and succumbing to death. In contrast, by 
"thinking" about it, she is being agentive and rational (rather than emotional: cf. 
Edwards, 1997 on the rhetorical uses of emotion words including "worry"), that 
she is endeavouring to work something out, to be positive, to make some 
decisions. Worrying is seen as a passive and negative emotion, whereas thinking 
represents the opposite: active, positive and cognitive, rationally in control, rather 
than succumbing to emotions. 
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Again, concern for others is a consideration: Jo links what to do "for everyone 
concerned" (line 63); it is not about what she has to do for herself, but about its 
effects on 'everyone'. Again, her own dilemma (line 61) is worked through In a 
generalised manner, indicating that what follows could be a response that can be 
applied to anyone. She says: "it's a frame of mind isn't it", which she unpacks 
further as "the attitude", and "it's the character and the personality" (lines 63 and 
64). In speaking in general terms applicable to anybody, Jo avoids talking 
specifically about her own dying. "A frame of mind" is idiomatic and dispositional, 
and the voiced words "ah well I'm going to die [etc. ]" (line 66) are offered, not as 
her own actual thoughts, but as a version of what anyone might say or think if not 
being positive about death. 
Again, however, it is not death per se about which one (anyone) has to be 
positive, but rather, the life that remains: what she is "going to do with what's left" 
(line 56). Jo then offers a strongly worded version of the options available. She 
highlights that there is a fine line of balance, "if s very easy to tip the scale", "be 
morose", "give in and give up" (lines 65-66). The last agentive act Is to give up 
agency completely, "I'm going to die well that's it I might as well die" (line 67). 
The implication here is that dying is a process, that it is something that is going to 
happen to you, rather than something which is actively done as a consequence 
of an action, and therefore there is nothing to be done about it. She offers a 
further option whereby she could succumb and give in, "it's very easy to be that 
way" (line 68). But, although giving up might be easy, she then counters this by 
presenting yet another contrast, "it's just as easy to say the opposite and say 
fuck em all yknow" (line. 69). 
What Jo is explicating here is that there are two main options she has to deal 
with. Firstly that the problem is a physical one; she is dying and can do nothing 
about it, which leads to the notion that she may as well just be passive and let it 
happen, give up responsibility and lose agency. This resonates with the 
discussion earlier in this chapter, concerning first reactions and what other 
people might think about what happens when you have cancer, that you lose 
agency, that you just "lie down and die", "it's a death sentence". Jo acknowledges 
that, but does so as a platform for promoting an alternative, that she can do 
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something about it. Jo's second option is that, regardless of what anyone else 
may think, she has a choice, to reject the "very easy" path of no resistance, and 
the cultural "death sentence" script allocated to cancer, by saying "fuck em all", 
which of course is a contrasting script for resistance. So, her illness and 
impending death throw up two contrasting moral ways of being, two recognisable 
kinds of action, reaction and ways of being. 
Interestingly Jo is treating agency as optional. She highlights her options in 
relation to how she thinks about it, that some kind of personality disposition is the 
key factor: "personality plays the biggest role" (line 72). So even agentively, 
resisting passivity and making the choice to be positive is reliant on what kind of 
person you may already be. Jo identifies herself as the kind of person who does 
not give in (cf. Chapter 7, extracts 7: 2.1-7: 2,4). 
What both of these extracts (8: 3.1 and 8: 3.2) show is that being positive about 
life when you are terminally ill is not just a simple option that can be 
recommended to people. It requires experience, coming to terms with things, a 
period of time involving bad times and the ability, and disposition, to resist what 
may at first seem hopeless. There is a continual negotiation of the past, the 
present and the 'hypothetical future'. Jo draws on and challenges numerous 
cultural scripts and presents herself as someone who is being very philosophical 
(in the idiomatic sense) about her illness, and retains the agency to live. Sadly, 
but in line with all that she acknowledged and knew, Jo died on 20th July 1998. 
8: 4 AnticipatIng death 
Another way participants talked about death and dying was to speculate about 'if 
it happens', and how they are going to manage it. 
In extract 8: 4.1, Amy is accounting for what happened when it was discovered 
she had cancer. The issues at stake here are about not having long to live. In 
Chapter 4,1 analysed another extract from Amy's interview in which she revealed 
that it took her doctors a considerable time before they actually reached a 
diagnosis of cancer. She gave this interview some months after her operation, 
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so not only was Amys diagnosis delayed, but the prognosis she was eventually 
given was also wrong. 
Extract 8: 4.1 Amy 04/03 "1 want to go on my own" 
I RC umh (3.0) who was the first person you told after you knew 
2 (. ) about your diagnosis 
3 -+ Amy I don't know because I think my husband told everybody 
4 RC yes, [they told- they told him (. ) you knew afterwards didn't you 
5 Amy [it was different for me ((inaudible)) 
6 yeah it wasn't like, y'know you usually go Into a room 
7 you're shocked (. ) you go home and ring your mum or 
8 somebody (. ) I was just in hospital and everybody hh 
9 my husband had to go in and tell everyone 
10 and he was the worst, he had to drive home (1.0) 
11 and then tell everybody (1.0) an' everyone was ringing him up 
12 so it was awful really for him 
13 RC umh 
14 Amy I mean I still think he had it worse than I did (even now 
15 RC [do you know 
16 what he told people? 
17 Amy I think he just said, she's umh (. ) had this operation (. ) and 
18 they've found out it's cancer and she hasn't got long to live (2.0) 
19 that was it, that's what they told him, had him in a room, 
20 1 mean he rung up he had an ((Inaudible)) he said can I come 
21 and see her and she said fine ((inaudible)) she had a sister 
22 ((inaudible)) would you like to come and see her - 
23 oh you'd better come in, we've been trying to get hold of you 
24 and he said oh my god yknow and he went In and they just said 
25 er (. ) we've found (. ) she's got cancer (. ) it's widespread and we 
26 don't think she's got very long to live, 
27 she might last the night or she might last a couple of weeks 
28 and we'll try and get her into LOROS (2.0) 
29 and that was it 
30 RC wow 
31 Amy well- well it was me I think in the end that said 
32 can I go to LOROS because I'd heard how nice it was 
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33 RC umh 
34 Amy I know now it's not brilliant but (. ) I just didn't want to be a 
35 burden to everybody else (2.0) y'know go home I mean now 
36 RC umh 
37 Amy now I've been in hospital I've been next to people who've 
38 g Lied, every time I went in somebody died, you think (. ) I think 
39 I'd rather stay at ho(hh)me (. ) you've got no dignity there 
40 nothing 
41 RC umh 
42 Amy but then you don't want to be a burden to your family 
43 you think (. ) would they cope but then theyd be there anyway 
44 wouldn't they so 
45 RC yeah, yeah 
46 Amy I often thought about that y'know (. ) if it happens 
47 .1 want to go on my own (. ) they'd find me in the corridor 
48 trying to get out of there hhh hah ha ha 
49 RC umh hhh ha ha ha ha 
50 Amy get in the laundry basket 
51 RC umh 
52 Amy hh ha ha it's an awful place 
53 RC yeah 
54 Amy I mean you're just a number really 
Amy describes how awful it was for her husband having heard the news and that 
he had to tell 'everyone' (lines 1-14). There is nothing positive in this extract; all 
hope and optimism are absent, and the implication is that nothing more can be 
done. It is Amys account of what her husband was told, what he heard and what 
he said, so that rather than her talking about her own death, the words are voiced 
as what they (someone at the hospital) and her husband had said, and had to 
deal with. She focuses on how he was the one who was placed in the position of 
having to "tell everybody" and "everyone was ringing him up" (line 11). So rather 
than it being awful for Amy, "it was awful really for him" (line 12) because "he 
had it worse than I did" (line 14). 
The implication here is that having to tell people the news is an awful thing for 
anyone to have to do, and unlike in most of the data I have, Amy was the only 
288 
participant who did not have to break the news to family and friends. Reporting 
the news through the accounts of others, and saying that her husband had to do 
the telling, helps distance Amy from talking directly about the issue of her dying. 
It also enables her to say how awful things were without this being a complaint 
on her own behalf; it was her husband who bore the brunt of it, and our 
sympathies should lie with him: "I mean I still think he had it worse than I did" 
(line 14). 
Amy found out about her fatal prognosis after her husband did, so throughout this 
extract, she voices what her husband said and what he was told. Note again 
how, rather than saying that she was going to die, this is voiced in terms of living: 
"we don't think she's got very long to live" (line 26: cf. extract 8: 3.1). Amy voices 
that they told her husband that "she might last the night or she might last a 
couple of weeks" (line 27). Reporting her husband's account provides Amy with a 
way of talking about the bad news of not having long to live. The suggestion to 
try and get her into LOROS (line 28) is also an indication of her not having long 
to live. LOROS is a hospice, that PWC often choose as a place to die. 5 
Amy now becomes agentive in the dilemma of where she wants to go (line 32) 
and in so doing indirectly acknowledges her own Imminent death, and the 
hopelessness of the news and her situation. She has heard that LOROS is 
'Anice", (line 32) which is a strange choice of words to describe a place where 
people go to die, but this is contextual (and contrastive) to what she then goes on 
to say. She then brings us up to date with her current knowledge that "I know 
now it's not brilliant" (line 34). But it appears that at the time, this would have 
solved not only the dilemma of going home and being a burden to everybody 
else, but of being in the hospital. 
Amy is reflecting here on events that occurred a year before this interview, using 
subsequent experiences to provide a contrastive sense of prior ones. She goes 
on to justify her choice of going to LOROS by producing an account of what it is 
I It has been suggested that once patients are referred to a hospice they must surely have a full 
insight into their diagnosis and likely prognosis (Saunders and Baines 1983) and Amy has already 
provided the news that 'she may not last the nighf. ' 
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like to be in hospital. In hospital, she had "been next to people who've died every 
time" she went in (lines 37-38) and the emphasis on 'every time' is that 
"somebody ý Lied". Her preference now therefore is "to stay at home" (line 39), 
referring back to the hospital as a place without dignity. Amy has now 
contradicted her earlier choice of going to LOROS to avoid being a "burden to 
everybody else" (line 35), which displays the normative expectation that people 
should not want to create additional problems for family and friends. 
In going against what she had defined as her family's interests, In not being a 
burden on them, Amy reassures herself and RC that wherever she was, "they'd 
be there anyway" (line 43). Concern for others in times of trouble Is a common 
feature in PWC's accounts of receiving the bad news and of handling the 
immediately relevant concerns about death. They frequently produce accounts of 
a range of difficulties in terms of their concerns for others, rather than for 
themselves (see extracts 5: 1.7,6: 3.1,7: 1.3. -7: 1.5). Amy's concerns about her 
family have been negotiated and justified and she has overcome this dilemma, 
such that where she dies now becomes a reasoned choice for her. She has 
'soften thought about that" (line 46) and having considered these possible 
problems, Amy now attends to "if it happens" (line 46). This is the cue for a 
spate of irony and gentle laughter (lines 47-50), which deflects the tone away 
from any kind of indulgent morbidity. The scenario is like a comedy sketch: 
47 Amy I want to go on my own (. ) theyd find me in the corridor 
48 trying to get out of there hhh hah ha ha 
49 RC umh hhh ha ha ha ha 
50 Amy get in the laundry basket 
The final part of this extract produces a way of dealing with all of her dilemmas, 
that she will not be alongside people who die, that dignity will be assured, and 
that she will not be a burden on her family, because she would "get out of 
there ... hhh hah ha ha in the laundry basket", an extreme and laughable notion, in 
order to avoid being in an awful place, where "you're just a number really". RC is 
able to join in with the laughter (line 47) because of Amy's brief comic scenario. 
Throughout most of this extract RC has said very little other than brief 
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acknowledgements and agreements, which probably display the difficulties for 
recipients making any kind of response at all when the topic of the speaker's own 
death is raised. But the laughter here helps Amy get off, or manage, the 
interactional difficulties of such a severe 'troubles telling' (Jefferson, 1988). 
Again the contrast with the awfulness of the hospital, where people die and 
where you are "just a number" (line 54) deflects attention away from the topic of 
Amy's dying, onto the hospital environment, 6 so any response from RC can relate 
to that rather than to Amys death itself. 
8: 5 A deviant case: "Am I go(hh)lng to di:: e? " 
Whereas in extracts 8: 2.1 and 8: 3.1, participants attended to the possibility of 
dying by being "up-beat" or claiming "the fight to live is huge" and that they were 
"living not dying", extract 8: 5.1 is an unusual account in my data. Chloe talks 
about it "being an awful feeling" and asks the question "am I going to die? " It 
would seem that this is a very different way of talking about dying, but closer 
analysis reveals some interesting similarities in the talk and issues of concern 
which echo those already discussed. 
Chloe is in her early sixties and was born in the West Indies. She was diagnosed 
with breast cancer after attending a routine mammogram. 7 She lives alone and 
was not working at the time of the interview. She was interviewed with her friend 
Sara. 
Some months had passed since Chloe first received her breast cancer diagnosis 
and, at the time of this interview, she had already undergone radiotherapy 
treatment. What follows is Chloe's account of what she remembers when the 
doctor first gave her the diagnosis, and how she reacted. It is a rhetorically 
structured account, full of contrasts. 
6 Amy's description of being on the hospital ward is in stark contrast to when Sam and Chloe 
talked about their treatment in radiotherapy, (see Chapter 7, extract 7: 2.1) where they described 
the people, rather than the place, and it was just one big happy family. 
7 As part of a national screening programme in the U. K., women over 50 years of age are 
automatically invited to have a marnmograrn every two to three years. 
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Extract 8: 5.1: Chloe 16/01 "am I go(hh)ing to di:: e? " 
10 Chloe Yes, and then I waited two weeks for the results (. ) that was 
11 the lo: ngest two wee: ks of my life 
12 RC uh huh 
13 Chloe and when it came (2.0) 1 couldn't (2.0) until this day I still 
14 don't believe it (3.0) 
15 RC umh 
16 Chloe *1 keep thinking, oh It's someone else (. ) it's not me, 
17 y'know* 
18 RC umh 
19 Chloe it can't be, because I didn't feel no illness (. ) nothing (1.0) 
20 RC umh (1.0) 
21 --> Chloe so I couldn't believe it but then (2.0) they- they called me up the 
22 hospital (3.0) gave me a date, I can't - yes I think It was the er 
23 (0.5) when did I go er ((shuffling of paper as she looks through 
24 her diary)) the eighth yes I went to the hospital and the doctor 
25 and the nurse took me into this little room (2.0) hh 
26 and they sat me down and (3.0) and they took a biopsy (2.0) 
27 1 remember that and two weeks later I got another letter to come 
28 to see them (2.0) and I went up (2.0) 
29 ((voice level drops - very quiet)) 
30 "and they sat me down again and started to talk to me 
31 well it was as if I weren't here yknow 
32 1 couldn't believe it when he says (. ) it is (2.0) 
33 theyd got the results it is ca: ncer (1.0) it is (. ) ma: lignant (2.0) 
34 RC uh huh 
35 Chloe but it's as if I am fa:: r away still y'know- 
36 [I'm not- it's not registering what he's saying 
37 RC [umh 
38 RC You're not sort of connecting (. ) [with it at all 
39 Chloe [umh umh 
40 o: h it's an aw: ful feeling (1.0) but then I just Dust floods of tears 
41 RC [umh 
42 Chloe and all I could say to him (. ) am I go(hh)ing to di:: e? 
43 hh he he he he that's all I co(hh)uld sa: (hh)y ha ha ha y'know. 
44 RC What did he- how did he react to you? 
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45 Chloe Well he. hh (2.0) 1 think he: felt relieved that 1 (2.0) 
46 cri: ed [on y'know 
47 RC [uh huh 
48 Sara [showed emotion 
49 Chloe uh huh yes, because I remember him saying, well er'cause (1.0) 
50 they get scared if people just take it ca: sually y'know. 
51 RC they get scared? 
52 Chloe uh huh (3.0) 1 think, (1.0) er well that's what- er 
53 the impression, y'know 
Chloe had explained earlier that she had already attended the hospital for a 
routine mammogram and she is now reporting on what happened next when she 
received another letter asking her to go back and see them. She describes and 
sets the scene (lines 10-28). There is an element of complainable delay here in 
that for Chloe, waiting for the results was "the longest two wee: ks" of her life (line 
11). She begins to build her sense of disbelief on receiving the results which she 
reiterates three times (lines 14,21 and 32) throughout this extract which Is also 
expressed in her "thinking oh it's someone else (. ) it's not me" (line 16). She 
provides some grounds for that disbelief, in that she "didn't feel no illness (. ) 
nothing (1.0)" (line 19). 
In lines 22-26 Chloe describes what happened at the hospital, where they took a 
biopsy, but she provides no details of that. But she implies delay again, In that it 
was "two weeks later" (line 27) that she got another letter calling her to the 
hospital. 
At this point Chloe talks very quietly, and her presentation is slow and deliberate, 
something also reflected by her saying "well it was as if I weren't here y'knoW" 
(line 31). The image here is that what was happening was happening as if 
somewhere else, to someone else. The soft and deliberate delivery helps build 
the awful solemnity of the situation she has found herself in and also helps 
convey her disbelief at what is occurring. She says that she "couldn't believe it" 
(line 32) and what she could not believe was that the doctor has disclosed some 
information to her: "they'd got the results (. ) it is ca: ncer (1.0) it is (. ) maJignant 
(2.0)" (line 33). 
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It is not unusual for doctors to deliver a bad news diagnosis in such a pragmatic 
way. Research on doctors disclosing diagnostic information describes this as 
being delivered as a short, blunt announcement (Glaser, 1966; Taylor, 1988). 
This pragmatism is also a commonly reported basis for complaints made by 
patients, particularly people with cancer, about how the news is delivered to 
them, which in turn poses interactional difficulties for them (Cartwright and Seale, 
1990). 
Chloe's delivery of her version of events is brief although she does make 
reference to a 'preamble' (Taylor, 1988) when "they sat me down again and 
started to talk to me" (line 30). Chloe delivers the doctors news in the form of a 
three-part list, a rhetorically effective way of making an impact on recipients 
(Atkinson, 1984a; Heritage 1984a; Jefferson, 1990). 8 This listing is followed by a 
two-second pause. Normally such a pause would be an indication that RC or 
Sara (the other participants) might take up the next turn. Sara, who has probably 
heard Chloe talk about this on other occasions, does not say anything. However, 
as the information being imparted is sensitive and difficult to respond to, RC does 
not say anything either, but merely acknowledges Chloe's announcement (line 
28) and makes no comment at this point. As we noted earlier, direct 
announcements of serious illness or impending death can provide interactional 
difficulties for story recipients, such that tellers will generally manage those 
difficulties in various ways, such as by telling stories indirectly, or in terms of the 
reactions of others, or in generalised terms, or ironically. 
Participants often face a problem of urealisation" when receiving bad news 
(Maynard, 1996), and Chloe (lines 35-39) is managing this realisation with some 
8 Jefferson (1990) noted that it was very common for lists to be delivered with three parts or items. 
There are various features of the delivery of lists that indicate that three-partedness may often have 
a conventional or normative status and are frequently used to summarise some general class of 
things. Atkinson, (1984a) identified various rhetorical formats one of which was the three part list, 
which seemed to be particularly effective at eliciting audience applause, particularly in political 
speeches (Heritage, 1984a). 
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difficulty. 9 Her difficulty in receiving the news is expressed as feeling distant from 
the current proceedings. 
35 Chloe but it's as if I am fa:: r away still y'know- 
36 [I'm not- it's not registering what he's saying 
37 RC [umh 
38 RC You're not sort of connecting (. ) [with it at all 
39 Chloe [umhumh 
The doctor is not telling Chloe that she is going to die, nor that her illness Is 
terminal; rather, he announces that she has cancer and that it Is malignant. But 
as pointed out earlier in extracts 8: 1.1-8: 1.4, 'some people' often equate cancer 
with a death sentence. Chloe is managing the registration of this possibility. Her 
account differs from the extracts analysed earlier, where agency was attributed to 
the doctors delivering the news and some peoples' expectations. Here Chloe Is 
reporting the impact her diagnosis had on her, and she is referring to a specific 
occasion where the difficulty is attributed to herself alone. 
The talk is of a very sensitive nature, with Chloe openly displaying her feelings 
about the awfulness of receiving being a recipient of such bad news, and she 
describes how she responded and coped with this. She says "o: h it's an aw: ful 
feeling" and that she was in "just floods of tears" (line 40). Note how the actively 
voiced "oh" marks her narration as an experience being told as if re-lived. 
Although a normatively expectable reaction to receiving such bad news might be 
that participants would burst into tears, as Chloe reports she did, the fact Is that 
Chloe's account is unusual as this reaction has not been a commonly reported 
feature in my interview data. 10 
Chloe's response to hearing the combination of results, "it's ca: ncer (1.0) it is 
malignant" is then to say, "all I could say to him is am I go(hh)ing to di:: e? " (line 
9Kubler-Ross's (1970) stage theory of dying which has attained mythical status in the professional 
discourse on open awareness, construes the initial reaction as the beginning of a journey towards 
acceptance, but Chloe's initial reaction (line 26) is that 'she couldn't believe it'. 10 See Chapter 5 where participants' accounts of receiving the bad news focused on how the 
medical professional delivered the news and dealt with issues of identity, managing complaints 
and being positive. 
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42). Chloe's asking "am I go(hh)ing to di:: e? " is produced interactionally as 
something that is an accountable thing to do and say, as "all I could say". She 
orients to the potential difficulty for 'him' (the doctor) of her asking such a 
question and, in so doing, manages to display concern for the doctors feelings. 
Her repetition of "that's all I co(hh)uld sa: (hh)y" (line 43) is like an apology for 
being unable to say anything else at the time. Her use of the extreme case 
formulation 'all' is a potent way of expressing the awfulness of the difficulties she 
was experiencing at receiving the news. Her account for not saying anything 
else, is that it was all she could say. 
What is interesting here is that, even when narrating the hearing of bad news 
from the doctor, Chloe still displays a concern for how the doctor might respond, 
and she remains accountable for what she says to him. This piece of talk (lines 
32-43) delivers a number of actions at the same time; firstly, that the degree to 
which she says she was unable to do or say anything else is an indication that 
she has now realised and understood the severity and the significance of the 
diagnosis being offered to her. Secondly, she modestly displays her own lack of 
mastery of the situation, of the difficulty of believing it and how she cried. 
To counter any potentially difficult responses from Sara or RC, Chloe also 
introduces laughter (lines 42-43) and the account, as we have seen many times, 
begins to become ironical, a comedy melodrama (line 43) where she actually 
begins to laugh. Again, the laughter does a number of things, including enabling 
Chloe to disarm any potential thought that the hearer may consider her to be 
being melodramatic or self-pitying. 
Chloe is also the only one of my interviewees who actually raised the question 
(directly in this way, rather than how Amy did it in 8: 4.1) of "am I going to die? " 
But what is quite extraordinary here is that she begins to interpolate her talk with 
laughter (line 43). So again, Chloe attends to the possible recipient's concerns of 
talking about something so sensitive, by introducing laughter. This provides the 
recipient with a way of hearing and participating and in turn helps signify an end 
to this particular part of the bad news story. 
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Certain types of topic pose a particular closing problem for speakers, and "to get 
off them and go anywhere else from them, one has specifically to do 'getting out 
of them... (Sacks, 1984: 191). When 'exiting' from 'troubles talk', participants 
cannot (normatively) simply switch to other matters. Jefferson points out that 
"overwhelmingly, interactions treat troubles talk as a topic after which there is 
nothing more to be said" (Jefferson, 1988: 345). Chloe's introduction of laughter 
not only helps 'get ofF the delicacy of Chloe's "floods of tears" but also manages 
any possible interactional difficulties for the other participants. She has also 
managed to distance herself from the expression of her emotions by attending to 
the difficulty for the doctor, of how he might respond to her delicate question. 
Chloe recalls the doctor saying "they get scared if people just take it ca: sually 
y'know" (Ii ne 44). RC then 'mirrors' Chloe's telling about the doctors getting 
scared (line 45). 'Mirroring, ' 'echoing, ' and 'repeating, ' have been identified as 
types of repetition in the therapeutic relationship (Ferrara, 1994). Mirroring can 
be observed in many types of consultations where a thoughtful or attentive 
listener is actively pursuing the listener's role rather than demanding a next turn. 
For example, priests hear confessions, lawyers hear first-hand accounts, 
supervisors sound out advisees, chiefs or commanders hear news from the 
battlefront, detectives are interested in keeping a detainee talking (Ferrara, 
1994: 124). So, in interviews and in this particular extract, RC could be 
responding to the doctor's getting scared as being something interesting and 
worth expanding on for the interview's sake. (RC is interviewer as well as a 
surprised participant). What is hearable on the tape at this point is an element of 
questioning surprise in RC's voice, that 'they, the doctors, get scared, rather 
than the expectation that Chloe herself would be scared. It is hearable both as a 
question and also as a marker for encouragement for Chloe to go on and tell 
more. 
Chloe's reference to the doctors being "scared" also provides a way for her to 
distance herself again from her feelings and emotions by placing the focus back 
onto the doctor's problems. A common feature found throughout this thesis is 
that participants frequently head off any protracted talk about themselves by 
invoking their concerns for others, in this case the doctor. 
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One might think that asking the question, uam I going to die? " is a natural enough 
response to receiving a cancer diagnosis, but it was a rare occurrence in the 
accounts given in these interviews. Asking whether one is going to die is a 
difficult question to ask the medical profession and is one, as the literature 
reveals, that is not easy for them to respond to, either factually or interpersonally 
(Stacey, 1997). " As has been discussed, participants tend to report the 
difficulties for the medical profession when presenting a cancer diagnosis; 
medical professionals are people too, and equally have difficulties in talking 
about cancer, death and dying. 
Summary 
The analysis has shown that participants' talk about death and dying is mostly 
invoked by accounts of what other people are reported as saying or thinking, 
which resonates with the canonical script that a cancer diagnosis equates with 
death. When talking about the difficulties they had in coming to terms with their 
cancer diagnosis, they proclaim they are living, not dying, and display an 
optimism about the hypothetical future. Even death itself is typically broached, 
where it is broached, in terms of the limited life that remains. 
Again, concerns about death and dying are displayed as issues that PWC have 
to manage for others. Other peoples' expectations, that they are going to die are 
denied and rejected and participants' manage to resist the cultural belief of 
others (and their own initial reactions), that 'cancer equates with death'. 
instead, they talk about what they are going to do, and what they are not going 
to, which would be to just sit back and do nothing. They do this by using 
normative canonical contrasts (e. g. "black and white") and other idiomatic 
resources. Talk about morbidity and doom and gloom is avoided, and laughter is 
" Stacey overheard an exchange between a patient and a doctor on the chemotherapy ward and 
she commented on being struck by the incongruity between the personal terror of death on the one 
hand, and the professional reduction of mortality to an inevitable mundanity on the other T: Am I 
going to die, doctor? D: We all have to die sometime". She suggests that the refusal of doctors to 
engage with the patient on anything other than routine terms is typical of the ways in which biomedicine frequently responds to death so inadequately and also notes that "within a system that 
seeks to control life, death can only be recorded as a failure, and as such must be minimised in 
terms of its significance. " Stacey (1997: 27). 
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used in ways that manage any potentially difficult recipient responses, whilst at 
the same time, indexing the speaker as not being morbidly over concerned. Any 
uncertainty about the future is countered by presenting a determination to live. 
Talk about death and dying is managed in similar ways, therefore, to receiving 
the bad news and the difficulties of treatment, by maintaining an identity as a 
person with a positive attitude in the face of all difficulties, attending to being 
normal and living, not dying. This is handled through invoking the difficulties that 
other people face in interacting with them, and reflecting their concerns and 
problems, rather than dwelling on one's own. 
it appears from these accounts that participants' cultural knowledge and 
awareness of the difficulties of interaction are a continual concern which they 
seek to manage, regardless of whether the person they are interacting with or 
reporting about is a family member, a friend, a medical carer or a social science 
researcher. 
Chapter 9, the final chapter, summarises the findings of the analytical chapters 
and. I will discuss how these can contribute to our understanding of some of the 
problems PWC face, how a discourse analytical approach to talk about illness 
can reveal different ways of understanding that are beneficial, not only to people 
with cancer, but for those who are involved in their care and finally, make some 
suggestions for future research. 
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Chapter 9 
Conclusions 
This thesis has examined how people given a cancer diagnosis have to contend 
not only with managing a life threatening illness, with all its physical discomfort, 
fear and dread: they are also faced with presenting themselves as someone who 
is 'coping' with their illness. I have suggested that the dominant culture and 
language of cancer has been socially constructed and it provides for a 
prescriptive and normative moral order that informs how people with cancer are 
expected to respond. 
As noted in Chapter 2, the structure and analytical content of this thesis are in 
themselves a construction, and the extracts were selected to examine the 
difficulties of talking about cancer and to highlight the interactional problems 
PWC encounter with the medical profession, family, friends and colleagues. I 
have also addressed how, in addition to living with a disruptive and life 
threatening illness, the pervasive cultural knowledge and language of cancer 
produce a diversity of moral dilemmas for the person with cancer to manage. I 
proposed that medical and social scientists have constructed recommended 
'coping' strategies whereby the person with cancer is held morally responsible for 
the success of their treatment and recovery, and they have to manage that 
additional burden and its accompanying expectations when talking to others. 
The key analytical theme throughout, and one that has escaped attention in the 
health and illness research literature, is how PWC make sense of their 
experiences in the detail of talking about their illness, where the focus is on the 
difficulties and interactional problems of the people that Lhe encounter. I 
Throughout the illness trajectory, from discovery to at best a hopeful recovery, or 
at worst death, a PWC constantly faces managing the problems of other people 
and the analytical chapters examine how this was handled in their narrative 
accounts. 
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9: 1 Overview of the analysis 
As soon as a person enters the domain of the medical profession, they are firstly 
given a new identity and are categorised as a 'patient'. As such they are 
expected 'to be patient', and they are morally expected to "bear or endure trouble 
with composure, without discontent" (OED, 1994). At the same time, this 
categorisation places the onus and moral responsibility on the 'patient' who 
should not complain about their condition but who is expected to 'cope' by being 
positive and 'fighting'their illness. 
My concern throughout this thesis has not been with what did or did not happen 
at the time, but how PWC tell their stories now (in interview). Chapters 4 and 5 
looked at the first normative and accountable issues arising in the first stages in 
the trajectory of illness, the time when their identity as a healthy individual was 
transformed to that of a 'patient, or a person with cancer, and their encounters 
with the medical profession. The analysis of the diagnostic trajectory showed 
how, in discovery accounts, participants first displayed their accountability in 
doing being responsible by going to the doctor's on discovering a symptom. I 
also showed how they managed any notion of being irresponsible or delaying 
"doing the right thingn. Accounts of diagnostic delay and stories of receiving the 
'bad news' were intricately linked. I did not introduce the notion of diagnostic 
delay as a scheduled interview topic, but the analysis revealed how, in diagnostic 
accounts, this was produced as an accountable issue, worked up as a 
participant's concern, and managed with a view to not appearing to be unduly 
complaining. 
What was of particular interest in these accounts was who was hearably 
constructed as being accountable for diagnostic delay. This was achieved either 
by interviewees being personally accountable, or as an issue of accountability for 
the medical profession. Participants provided justifiable reasons for any personal 
involvement in a delayed diagnosis, and this justification was influenced by the 
contrast of "knowing" or "not knowing" that it was cancer. For example, if 
someone does not suspect that their symptoms are serious or indicative of 
cancer, they are less likely to take immediate action and more likely to attribute 
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their symptom to something else less threatening, and consequently are not held 
culpable for any delay. Any thought of 'knowing' that it was cancer, along with a 
delay, was accounted for by providing justifiable reasons of being overwhelmed 
by other dramatic life events. 
Throughout these accounts the doctor-patient relationship recurs as a topic, and 
despite the sometimes dismissive nature of the doctor, or of the PWC not being 
taken seriously, accounts were constructed that presented the story teller as 
identifying and complying with their role of being a 'patient', of someone who was 
"bearing it without complaint", "quietly awaiting the course or issue of events" 
and/or "exercising or possessing patience" (OED, 1994). ' 
Participants for the most part avoided any direct undermining or criticism of the 
medical profession, or expressing any failure of confidence in it. Their expected 
role of being a 'patient' as passive, compliant, and uncomplaining was displayed 
in a pattern of rhetorical moves whereby descriptions and agency are implied 
rather than overtly offered, in such a way that it was left for the hearer to draw the 
inferences that these stories are about culpable diagnostic delay, and something 
to complain about. The avoidance of making direct, explicit complaints is linked 
to the general normative requirement for being a 'good patient', and adopting a 
gpositive attitude'. 
I highlighted that the delay literature focused mostly on the issues surrounding 
the 'patient' being responsible for the delay in going to the doctor's. 14owever, my 
analysis revealed that diagnostic delay accounts are constructed differently. 
Contrary to the way the responsible agent is reported in the literature, the 
culpability for diagnostic delay in these accounts invariably resided with the 
medical profession. 
'Note that I am not taking these connotations of the word 'patient' from the literal version used in 
medicine. The broader definitions I use show an interesting and relevant etymology of the term, in 
which medical 'patients', and other words such as 'patient! (adjective), 'passive', etc., share the 
same roots and semantic associations. 
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A discursive analysis shows how PWC attend to these issues when narrating 
their experiences in the particular setting of an interview. When they are with 
members of the medical profession they are expected to be passive and conform 
to their role. Participants reported that they were subjected to difficult 
encounters, not having their symptoms taken seriously, or with any sense of 
urgency. Although many argue that doctor-patient communication has improved, 
and efforts to reduce delays in delivering a diagnosis have improved, it appears 
that diagnosis and communication about cancer still remain problematic in the 
medical environment, and participants' accounts continue to reinforce the 
problems the medical profession has in talking about cancer. 
We know that a cancer diagnosis is bad news. What is interesting is how the 
notion of a 'positive attitude', in other words doing being positive, permeates in 
different ways through these retrospective accounts. An additional feature is that 
by telling stories about the medical profession, participants are able to avoid 
describing the awfulness of receiving the bad news and talking about cancer 
itself. 
These stories also consistently oriented to any difficulties the hearer might be 
presented with. It is the PWC who takes it on themselves to make it easier for 
recipients to hear and respond, by providing something else for them to respond 
to, such as the awfulness of the consultant or the registrar. Interactional 
attention is diverted from the individual telling the story in such a way that 
respondents can instead affiliate with the story as complainable behaviour on the 
part of the medical profession, rather than focusing on the difficulties of the 
person with cancer. The implied incompetence and culpability, along with the 
sometimes ironic nature of the stories, also helps insulate participants from re- 
living the severity of receiving the bad news. Throughout the telling of these 
events, participants produced an identity of someone who was 'being positive' 
and 'coping' with their difficulties, and not someone who could be categorised as 
a complainer. 
Having discovered these stories as hearable matters for complaint (both at the 
time of hearing and in the process of analysis) I wanted to know why PWC did 
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not complain directly about the problems they experienced. In subsequent 
conversations with PWC (outside the interview situation), I asked why they did 
not complain directly about the way they were being treated. Their response was 
a 'preventative' and 'protective' one, of having to fend off other dilemmas. They 
told me that they feared upsetting their consultant in case this might result in not 
receiving the best possible treatment. Although it is not the topic of this thesis, 
this raises the issue of the Foucauldian view of power and the 'top down' 
asymmetry of the medical relationship. As is the case generally with ideological 
orders of life, such 'top down' structures can be held in place by the co-operative 
practices of the people on the receiving end. 
Having received a cancer diagnosis, participants are engaged in an ongoing 
discourse with the medical profession. They also have to relay the 'bad news' to 
family, friends and colleagues. Consequently, they become involved in the 
pervading culture and language of cancer, which in turn can become 
problematic, because other people may not know what to say. 
In Chapter 61 analysed how PWC accounted for the difficulties they encountered 
in social interactions with friends, family and the medical profession. Talking 
about troubles is full of complexities and contradictions, especially when they are 
laden with the cultural language of cancer. In contrast to the passive stance of 
being a 'patient' in the medical environment, outside, in their everyday social 
world, PWC are expected to be active in how they manage their illness. The 
expectation of 'thinking' or 'being' positive about their illness is not a constant 
state, and participants are placed in situations where they are held morally 
accountable for how they 'cope' positively with their illness, where not being 
positive becomes a matter of accountability. I showed how the expectations 
placed upon them are sometimes unwelcome and "rammed down their throats" 
and if they were not 'positive', this might have some dreadful, self-inflicted 
bearing on the success of their treatment. Category membership and 
entitlements were also relevant because who said what, when and where, was a 
consideration in whether it was considered right or wrong. Expressions of pity, or 
people implying they felt sorry for PWC, were constructed as being un- 
supportive. To counter such unwanted responses, participants 'put on a brave 
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face' to fend off the difficulties of talking about their troubles, avoiding being a 
worry or burden to others. Issues of identity were managed by PWC presenting 
themselves as 'being positive' and rather than the expectations of others being 
placed continually on them, they contrasted this by describing their own 
expectations of others and how ftej should respond. 
Any conversations with someone with cancer are problematic for all concerned 
and the moral ascriptions of cancer produce dilemmas to be countered and 
managed. A strong theme of this thesis is that PWC are constantly placed into 
difficult social situations where invariably they are the ones who have to display 
understanding, and manage other peoples' reactions to their illness. 
One of the key strategies for people with cancer is to work at maintaining their 
identity and, as Sacks (1984a) puts it, do being ordinary or, as I propose here, do 
being normal and do being positive. Rather than look at the things other people 
say about 'think positive' and 'fight it, Chapter 7 looked at how participants 
accomplished doing being positive. I examined the devices employed to fend off 
recipients producing unwanted sympathy, or engaging in talking about their 
troubles, and how the cultural expectations of being in control, of 'coping', 
'fighting' and being positive were accomplished in talk. The analysis revealed that 
being positive is not always possible, and moral judgements are overtly and 
covertly displayed by others, which burden the PWC with additional problems. 
As previously discussed, 'thinking' or 'being' positive is considered an important 
'coping' strategy that can impact on life expectancy. I have shown how the 
notion of being positive is a participant's concern which is handled as an 
accountable matter. Accounts are constructed using contrasts of the active- 
passive stance, of taking an active role and continuing to do mundane activities, 
or the consequences of succumbing to it and doing nothing. I suggested that this 
is an interesting contrast to the notion that 'being positive' is simply good 
psychological advice and that on occasions it can be counter productive. In 
order to acquiesce to the demands of being positive, participants have to explain, 
make excuses, justify and deal with the issues of blame and moral accountability 
that accompany it. At the same time, they have to manage a dilemma it 
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produces, of not allowing others to see or hear them as someone to be pitied, not 
coping, or complaining. 
Another device for managing this is to employ laughter and humour, which have 
a number of useful interactional functions. I showed how when a topic 
encroached on forbidden or taboo territory, laughter and humour were used as 
interactional devices that could avoid placing story recipients in embarrassing 
situations. This was achieved in three different ways. Firstly participants report 
events and invoke laughter; secondly participants report events where laughter 
occurred and goes on again in the telling; and finally, rather than the analysts' 
providing the meaning of laughter, the participants themselves might construct 
their own accounts of what laughter is doing for them. I suggested that the 
rhetorical construction of accounts when laughter is invoked does some identity 
work and can display the PWC as being positive and as someone who is 'looking 
on the bright side'. Again, laughter and humour help to manage the delivery of 
implied complaints, whereby the teller is not heard as being self-pitying, 
complaining or succumbing to their illness. At the same time, they avoid 
potentially difficult responses by recipients who could introduce their own 
problems into the talk. 
The final analytical chapter looked at how the canonical script, that a cancer 
diagnosis equates with death, featured in participants' talk. I showed how when 
describing the difficulties of coming to terms with their diagnosis, participants 
proclaimed that they were living, not dying, and displayed an optimism about the 
'hypothetical future', even when death was inevitable. They achieved this by 
invoking stories about what other people said. 
Again, concerns about death and dying are displayed as issues that PWC have 
to manage for others. Other peoples' immediate expectations, that they are 
inevitably going to die simply because of the initial diagnosis, are refuted. 
Instead, they talk about what they are going to do, and more importantly, what 
they are not going to do, which would be to sit back and do nothing. They 
produce normative canonical constructs (e. g. black and white), contrast 
structures and extreme case formulations, that rhetorically maximise these 
306 
opposed positions. Talk about morbidity and 'doom and gloom' is avoided, (that 
is, actively avoided rather than merely absent), and again laughter is invoked in 
ways that manage or forestall potentially difficult recipient responses. Any 
uncertainty about the future is countered by asserting a determination to live. 
Talk about death and dying is managed in similar ways to receiving bad news 
and the difficulties of treatment, by PWC maintaining their identity as people who 
are being positive, attending to being normal and living, rather than dying. This is 
rhetorically constructed by invoking the difficulties of other people interacting with 
them and their concerns and problems, rather than dwelling on their own. 
9: 2 In terms of the future: The next step 
When I began to write my conclusions I asked myself the classic question, well, 
having written this thesis, "So what? " What conclusions have I come to? What 
does my analysis contribute to our understanding of how people talk about 
cancer? How might it be applied outside of the academic world? What relevant 
contribution does it make for people with cancer, their family, friends, colleagues, 
and the medical profession? What does it contribute to my theoretical approach 
in the academic world? 
The cultural discourses of cancer have been socially (and medically) constructed. 
They are continually reinforced as they are replayed and displayed by people 
talking about cancer. Someone who is diagnosed with cancer is categorised as 
being different from the person they were before, and consequently people 
respond to them differently; a whole range of normative expectations come into 
play. 
The pervading culture and language that has been constructed around cancer 
produces both fear and dread, but at the same time, the language of the 
dominant coping strategy of the 'heroic model', and 'think positive' work to 
counter the equation that a cancer diagnosis is a death sentence. On the 
positive side, it constructs a language offering other people something 
constructive and supportive to say. However, being positive is a double-edged 
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sword, and I suggest that this constant imposition and reinforcement of the 
culture of cancer can be counter-productive and dispiriting. 
Throughout this thesis, I have suggested that the normative expectations this 
culture produces place additional burdens on the PWC. While I do not deny that 
for anyone experiencing a traumatic life event, being positive is preferable to 
being negative or feeling depressed, I propose that this produces moral 
dilemmas to be managed, especially as it entails, normatively, a bearing on 
recovery and survival. 
The continual dilemma for PWC is that they are placed in a situation whereby it is 
unacceptable for them to tell others when they are feeling down, or are not 
dcoping' or being positive, without some sense of guilt. When talking to others 
they display their concerns for the listener's difficulties while at the same time 
they are having to be accountable for not being positive, which makes their 
burden all the heavier. 
In terms of applying my findings to a wider arena, I suggest that everyone who 
becomes involved with someone with cancer (or any chronic illness) has to 
realise that it is not just medical and psychological problems that have to be 
faced. PWC have to manage the accompanying social interactional problems 
and work to maintain the identity of someone who is bearing their illness 
'patiently', without complaint and are being 'a good patient'. They often have to 
divert other people from introducing their own interactional problems and at the 
same time they have to avoid rejecting 'positive' advice and 'support' at times 
when they are inappropriate. They have to manage the interactional problems 
that their illness poses for others, and their inadequacies to cope with people with 
cancer, together with the moral restrictions on being able to admit that they are 
not coping. 
The principal findings of this thesis can be made available as supporting 
information for members of the medical profession and for counsellors and 
carers, and could be made available as parts of published information leaflets 
about cancer. 
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In terms of the future, the discursive approach that I have taken to analysing a 
variety of social interactions between PWC (or anyone who is seriously ill) and 
the medical profession; between PWC and their carers; and PWC and their 
social networks (families, friends, and colleagues) would provide rich sources for 
further research and discovery. 
9: 3 Discursive Psychology and Discourse Analysis 
Every theory and method reveals some things and conceals others, but the 
pragmatic question here is what can be learned from a discursive analytical 
perspective? 
Discourse is constructed to perform social actions and discourse analysis is 
concerned with how people construct accounts of their world in social interaction, 
with the upshot that these versions are produced both immediately and over 
time, as part of ideological practices (Edwards and Potter, 1992). 
A discursive analysis identifies some of the problems PWC face in their social 
relationships that are otherwise overlooked or under-analysed, and provides a 
different insight into our understanding of how people manage their illness and 
their relationships. What my analysis has shown is that it is not simply a matter 
of people without cancer learning a set of rules about how to talk and what to say 
to people who have cancer, but that we have to take account of a wide range of 
variability. It is more a matter of being sensitive to the ambiguities and the 
various needs of cancer patients and their families. They may sometimes want 
support, sometimes not, sometimes want their illness acknowledged and 
sometimes require people to act cheerfully. That is surely their privilege. 
The accounts throughout this thesis are retrospective and of course what actually 
occurred at the time of the events recounted is not known. My concern has been 
with how the nature and invocation of the culture and language of cancer and 
how when talking about cancer, PWC show that the medical profession and 
people in their social network constantly reinforce the prescriptive moral order of 
how to "do it right". 
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PWC are frequently faced with having to live up to other people's expectations of 
how they are expected to be. Hence, the moral implication of my friend Charles's 
question, the one I started with (see the Dedication, p. iv), "Am I doing it dght? " 
My answer is that there are no definitive rules for having cancer, for either the 
person with cancer or for those without. Rather, I suggest that we all need to 
recognise that people with cancer should not be made to feel as if they are 
continuously under pressure to conform to other people's normative and moral 
expectations. There is no 'right' or 'wrong' way, because people's needs are 
variable, across situations and occasions, and not just across persons. Again, 
that is surely their prerogative. 
The category entitlement, of who says what, when and where, and whether it is 
the tight or wrong thing to say, is inevitably part of the performative function of 
language, something variable, where accounts (or versions) are constructed in 
ways that perform different actions on and for their occasions. In the context of 
these kinds of considerations, a discourse analysis of the local contingencies and 
rhetorical orientations of talk is no less than a form of respect for the people 
talking. 
So, what this thesis is about is that, by analysing what and how people talk about 
managing the difficulties of having cancer, we can come to another view of a 
relatively unexplored topic of research. I believe that discourse analysis provides 
us with a novel and useful understanding of the moral dilemmas faced by anyone 
suffering from a life-threatening illness. 
This thesis began with my heightened interest and concern about the difficulties 
that people have in talking about cancer. The following extract, if I may introduce 
such a thing at this juncture in a set of 'conclusions', is taken from one of my first 
interviews, and it made a dramatic impression on me. I present it here, without 
analysis, as a piece of viva voce, and as a way of giving voice back, unanalysed 
to my participants, to show that people with cancer also have difficulties in 
knowing what to say to someone else with cancer; that is all I want to say about 
it. 
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39 Jan and do you remember the one night 
40 I'll never forget this we were talking about colours 
41 Bee Oh yes 
42 Jan talking about colours and what colours do for you. 
43 Yellow is the colour of sunshine y'know and that sort of thing 
44 and we had to close our eyes and think of a colour and 
45 what came to our mind without thinking too much about it 
46 and I always remember Lois () do you remember what she said? 
47 Bee I can only see black 
48 Jan I can only see black she said 
49 - and we all sat there in stunned silence 
50 because what could we say 
51 we couldn't say anything 
52 RC Yes, it's very difficult to know what to say 
There is no definitive answer to knowing what to say, or how to do it right, but I 
propose that by heightening awareness of the difficulties identified in this thesis, 
this research takes talking about cancer a 'positive' step forward. 
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APPENDIX A 
CONTACT TELEPHONE NUMBERS - HELPLINES 
National Organisations 
CANCERLINK 0800 132905 (Mon-Fri 9.30am to lpm; 2pm 
to 5pm) 
BACUP 
BREAST CANCER CARE 
TENOVUS CANCER 
INFORMATION CENTRE 
COPING WITH CANCER 
Leicester 
0171618 2121 or 0800 181199 
0500245345 
0800526527 
Local Organisations: 
0116 2230055 
HELEN WEBB MEMORIAL TRUST (Leicester) 
(Ovarian Cancer Group) 0116 2302495 
LEICESTER PALLIATIVE CARE TEAM 0116 2516229 
The Counselling Centre 
17 Princes Road West 
Leicester 0116 2558801 
The Samaritans 0345 909090 
INTERNET 
BACUP hftp: //medweb. bham. ac. uk/cancerhepfindex. html 
ONCOLOGY 
FORUM http: ltwww. oncology-forum. org/ 
Researcher 
Rosemary Chapman Dept of Social Sciences 
2 Turner Avenue Loughborough University 
Loughborough Epinal Way 
LE11 2DA Loughborough LEI 1 3TU 
01509 556273 01509 223365 
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APPENDIX B 
CONSENT FORM 
DATE: 
1, state that I am over 18 years of age and that 
I voluntarily agree to participate in a research project conducted by ROSEMARY 
CHAPMAN, a postgraduate researcher in the Social Sciences Department at 
Loughborough University. 
The specific task I will perform requires me to participate in an interview 
(approximately 11-11% hours) and I agree to the whole interview being tape- 
recorded. 
I acknowledge that Rosemary Chapman has explained the task to me fully; has 
informed me that I may withdraw from participation at any time without prejudice 
or penalty; has offered to answer any questions that I might have concerning the 
research procedure; has assured me that any information that I give will be used 
for research purposes only and will be kept strictly confidential and anonymous. I 
understand that some of the transcripts of the interview may be used in research 
documents and may be published in scientific journals. 
I have been provided with a list of contact HELPLINES. 
I understand that if I so wish I may have a copy of the taped interview and 
orttranscript. 
SIGNATURE OF RESEARCHER SIGNATURE OF PARTICIPANT 
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APPENDIX C 
Part 1: Unstructured part of Interview: 
Can you tell me something about your experiences since being given a cancer 
diagnosis. 
Part 2: Semi-structured Interview questionnaire 
The semi-structured interview questionnaires were used as a guide for asking 
questions and were not adhered to strictly. Many of these topics arose in Part 1. 
1. When your diagnosis was confirmed, did you feel that you received adequate 
emotional support from the hospital? 
YESMO 
2. Do you think the medical profession, as a whole understands your needs? 
neveror sometimes often always 
rarely or almost always 
3. When you were first given your diagnosis did they give you any information 
about organisations who could give you supporttinformation about your illness 
YESMO 
4. Did you follow any of these suggestions up YESMO 
5. After receiving your diagnosis, who was the first person you told? 
6. Do you thinking talking about your illness is helpful? YESMO 
7. How often do you talk about your illness? 
never sometimes often always 
rarely or almost always 
8. Who have you talked to about your illness apart from people in the medical 
profession? 
spouse 
friends 
Consultant 
Oncologist 
radiotherapist 
local cancer organisation 
family (who) 
GP 
MacMillan Nurse 
Chemotherapy nurse 
Breast care nurse 
LOROS 
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Counsellor Other 
9. Who have you found it easy to talk to? 
spouse 
friends 
Consultant 
Oncologist 
radiotherapist 
local cancer organisation 
Counsellor 
family (who) 
GP 
MacMillan Nurse 
Chemotherapy nurse 
Breast care nurse 
LOROS 
Other 
10. Do you find it easier to talk to people who have experienced cancer? 
neveror sometimes often always 
rarely or almost always 
1. Since your illness was diagnosed have your relationships changed in 
anyway? YESMO 
are they more difficult unchanged easier 
12. Have you found any of your friends, or family have found it difficult to talk to 
you about your cancer? YESMO 
neveror sometimes 
rarely 
often always 
or almost always 
13. Who found it the most difficult? 
spouse 
friends 
Consultant 
Oncologist 
radiotherapist 
local cancer organisation 
Counsellor 
family (who) 
GP 
MacMillan Nurse 
Chemotherapy nurse 
Breast care nurse 
LOROS 
Other 
14. What do you think made it difficult for them? 
15. How would you describe your quality of life before your illness was 
diagnosed? 
very good good average bad very 
bad 
16. How would you describe your quality of life now? 
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very good good average bad very 
bad 
Open-ended 
Do you think, since being given your diagnosis, your approach/attitude to life has 
changed in anyway? Yes/No 
Do you think you have changed? Yes/No 
In what ways have you and your life been affected since your diagnosis? 
Or 
How has having cancer changed or affected your life? 
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APPENDIX D 
Transcription Notation 
The transcription symbols used here were derived from those developed by Gail 
Jefferson (see Atkinson and Heritage, 1984, p ix-xvi). They reflect the 
requirements of analysing talk as a social activity rather than for example as an 
expression of ideas, phonetics or grammar. Note that many of the symbols are 
familiar as 'punctuation' marks but here they are re-defined to signify intonation 
or speech delivery, rather than grammar. 
A micropause, hearable but too short to measure 
(0.5) Numbers in round brackets measure pauses in seconds (e. g. 5 
tenths of a second. 
. hh A dot before an 'h' denotes an in-breath (inspiration). The more h's, the longer the in-breath. 
hh An 'h' denotes an out-breath (aspiration). The more h's, the longer 
the out-breath. 
Ha ha ha Laughter syllables with some attempt to capture 'colour 
Hah hah hah 
Go(h)d (h) denotes 'laughter' within words. The more (hh) the greater the 
word is interpolated with laughter 
[At] dental click 
ffe A description enclosed in double brackets indicates a non-speech 
sound 
cu- A dash denotes a sharp cut-off of a prior word or sound. 
lo: ng Colons show that the speaker has stretched the preceding letter 
or sound. The more colons the greater the extent of the stretching 
(guess) Material within brackets represents the transcribers guess at an 
unclear part of the tape. 
(Syll syll) Unclear speech rendered as approximations to number of 
syllables 
[a hospital] square brackets enclose contextual or explanatory information 
run= 'Equals' signs mark the immediate latching of successive talk, 
=on whether of one or more speakers, with no interval, thus the talk 
runs on 
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Twordýword Vertical arrows indicate a rising or failing intonational shift. 
They are placed before the onset of such a shift. Double arrows 
indicate very marked shifts. 
A horizontal arrow indicates a point of special analytical interest in 
the extract 
under Underlining indicates vocal emphasis; the extent of underlining 
within individual words locates emphasis, but also indicates how 
heavy it is 
CAPITALS Capital letters mark speech that is obviously louder than 
surrounding speech 
Osoft 11 Degree signs enclose obviously quieter speech that is noticeably 
quieter than the surrounding talk. (i. e. hearably produced as 
quieter, not just someone distant). Double degree signs indicate 
greater softness. 
> fast < 'Greater than' and 'less than' signs indicate that the talk they 
encompass was produced noticeably quicker 
<slow> or slower than the surrounding talk 
[talk over] Square brackets between adjacent lines or bracketing two lines of 
[overlap ] talk indicate the onset [ and end ] of overlapping talk. 
(( )) Material left out of the extract 
0 denotes a smiley voice 
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APPENDIX E 
Full extracts referred to In analytical chapters 
Sara 15 "A comedy of errors" 
I RC I just want to listen to what your experiences were 
2 Sara I mean er (. ) I was er (1.0) having a bath this morning 
3 and its something that always brings back memories 
4 to me (. ) because thafs where I found it (. ). hh 
5 as I was soaping my bo(hh)dy (. ). hh ha ha ha y'know 
6 my fingers just went over this little th(hh)ing (. ) 
7 just sli(hh)pped off of it and I thought (. ) oh (1.0) 
8 there's something the:: re (. ) y'know (. ) 
9 So I rubbed again and as I did- which- this is- er this is- 
10 1 think you can find out (. ) if you've got things on you 
II when you've got a so: apy bo: dy 
12 RC Uh huh 
13 Sara because your hand goes over it so smo: oth 
14 you can just feel every little (. ) y'know (. ) and then I did 
15 and thought oh >yes there is and it was just about the size 
16 of a pe: a (1.0)< at at er the- at the root of the breast (. ) 
17 and er umh and I got out the bath (. ) dried myself (. ) and 
18 what have you (. ) and I went to the bath- bedroom (. ) 
19 and >1 was fee: (hh)ling hh everywh(hh)ere no(hh)w 
20 you see> hh ha ha ha I am looking and I thought 
21 hh (. ) yes *there is a little thing the(hh)re* 
22 and so I thought straight away (. ) I couldn't care less 
23 whether it was beni: gn or ma: lignant (. ) 
24 1 am going straight to the doctor because (. ) I know from 
25 experience hhh that you don't put these things off (. ) y'know- 
26 and er I'm not going to be sort of bashful or shy 
27 say well (. ) I'm hh not going to the doctor with this y'know 
28 I'll- I'll wait and see what happens (. ) I didn't 
29 In the same we: ek I made an appointment 
30 as a matter of fact my husband came into the bed- 
31 walked into the bedroom (. ) and he says what are you doing? 
32 (. ) he says have you got something there y'know and I said 
33 yes it feels like a little lump so he says (. ) 
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34 well you'd better get to see the doctor then so 
35 and I says oh well I had thought y'know 
36 that's what I'd do anyway. 
37 RC umh 
38 Sara and I made my appointment for the same we: ek 
39 to go and se: e my doctor 
40 Sara and as I got there umh (1) he had a 
41 look at me (. ) and he couldn't find it 
42 1 mean it was that little 
43 RC umh 
44 Sara that he just couldn't find where it was and I had to take 
45 his finger and more or less guide it on to the spot y'know 
46 hh wh(hh)ere this li(hh)ttle th(hh)ing was and er 
47 he says oh yes there is there is a little thing there 
48 he says er but er (. ) I don't think it's anything to worry 
49 about but I'll still send you to see the er specialist 
50 RC umh 
51 Sara I'll make an appointment for you (. ) so I says () ri:: ght. 
52 RC umh.. hh 
53 Sara so er, (1) eventually an appointment was made and er a 
54 letter came through the door (. ) a few months after and 
55 er, (. ) knowing me, I'm usually so busy II er just looked 
56 at the date of when I was supposed to be there 
57 RC umh 
58 Sara and I thought, oh right, I'll be there for that date but 1 
59 didn't look to see what department. I didn't read every 
60 single thing on the paper 
61 RC right 
62 Sara all I did was just look, for, y'know, I saw the date, that 
63 1 have to be there and, and er y'know well I thought right 
64 that's good enough for me er because er I mean 
65 what more is there to er (. ) know, y' know, until I get there 
66 so of course the day came (. ) I went down, 
67 1 was in the wrong department. 
68 So he didn't send me to the right place (. ) so the doctor who was 
69 there and II er noticed it as well as I looked up I thought oh 
70 I'm not supposed to be here 
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71 RC [where was this? 
72 Sara [but this is where he sent me, where you go for umh, er a 
73 hysterectomy and so on y'know 
74 RC Oh 
75 Chole gynecology 
76 Sara gynecology, [gynecology department 
77 RC [right, right 
78 Sara and umh the doctor says to me, but I'll still look at you 
79 she says, because she called my name up you see, 
80 my name was called 
81 RC she was expecting you? 
82 Sara yes she was expecting me and my name was called 
83 so I thought well I'm there I might as well go 
84 so I explained to her, I says, look I'm er I'm not here for 
85 any gynecology, y'know er problem I says 
86 what I came in for is a lump in my breast (. ) at the side 
87 of my breast so she says well you're in the wrong department 
88 she says but do you want me to have a look at you (. ) 
89 So I says, I don't mind. So she examined me down there as well 
90 and er she says er, you're fine, nothing to worry about 
91 and then she says I'll have a look at your lump and she did and 
92 she says I should go back to your doctor immediately and tell 
93 him to get you to the right department as soon as possible 
94 it may not be anything, it may be something, she says, 
95 but lumps are not supposed to be (. ) there you take them out 
96 RC u:: mh 
97 Sara so I had to go back to him, and ask him (. ) to send me to the 
98 right department 
99 RC how long had you waited? 
100 Sara this was, well about three months had gone already from 
101 my first appointment, (. ) then er I went to him and er (1.0) 
102 a week had passed and I happened to be there again for 
103 er, I think it was for Jason, something to do with his asthma and 
104 umh I asked the Nurse, did Dr D send off my letter to the right 
105 department and she looked up and says oh no it's still here 
106 it's not gone yet 
107 Chloe [((gasps)) 
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108 RC [((gasps)) 
109 Sara She says I'll get it off as soon as possible 
110 RC So there was no sense of urgency at this stage? 
III Sara So there was no urgency there at all (. ) for it 
112 the only time the urgency (. ) ha: ppened was when I went 2ggin. 
113 In the meantime (. ) I had umh, a letter came from the right 
114 department then, for me to go and they tried to do a biopsy and 
115 they couldn't because it was too hard, and he couldn't get in and 
116 then it was bleeding and so an- and so I thought 
117 right well I know what that is anyway 
118 11 didn't need, anybody else to tell me what was wrong hhh 
119 but umh still (. ) you've got to wait for confirmation 
119 You need that little bit of thing saying oh well 
120 it's probably nothing y'know 
121 RC umh 
122 Sara so even he himself says, umh (. ) I'm sorry I can't get the- 
123 er any sort of er umh (2) 
124 RC is this the consultant? 
125 Sara not the tissue, the liquid, he was trying to draw some fluid out of 
126 it 
127 RC umh 
128 Sara he couldn't get any fluid out, there was blood coming 
129 this is er the specialist 
130 RC uh huh 
131 Sara but he says I tell you what, he says umh, it's probably 
132 nothing to worry about, he says I don't think it's any er 
133 (. ) malignant umh tissue that's here hhh he says 
134 but I'll make an appointment, he says can you come in at 
135 any time? y'know, at short notice, whenever, sort of 
136 like, er when they've got a bed? So I says, yes I can 
137 he says because lumps aren't supposed to be there y'know 
138 if they're there then we take them out 
139 so I said right (. ) fair enough. Then umh (. ) I went 
140 again (. ) the next week to (. ) for Jason to have another 
141 check up with his asthma but I mean they don't do check ups 
142 on asthma every five minutes(. ) 
143 RC Umh 
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144 Sara So y'know there's a space in betwee:: n and while he was the:: re 
145 the nu: rse (. ) said to me who does- who was doing the asthma 
146 and the check up (. ) how's your lump coming on Sara? 
147 So I says oh it's gro::: wing nicely (A) so she sa: (hh)y:: s 
148 hhh ha ha ha can I (hh) ha: (hh)ve a lo: ok 
149 hh ha ha ha (0. ) hhh ha so she says can I have a look 
150 so I says yes of course so she took one look at it 
151 so she says oh I better let Kevin come in and have a 
152 look at this (1.0) so in comes the doctor and he 
153 has a look at it and the next thing I know they've forgotten Jason 
154 was there for his asthma, and he was on the phone trying to get 
155 to the doctor, (. ) then he was on the phone trying to get to 
156 pathology to see if they had the resu: lts of this er stuff that they'd 
157 tried to get out of me (. ) pathology wouldn't give him any news at 
158 all of what's going on, the, the doctor, the consultant was in 
159 theatre so he couldn't get through to him and hh he's 
160 flinging around like a whatsit, y'know, hh so (. ) 
161 he <called me in the o: ffice at the end of the day because he 
162 just couldn't get through> to the hospital or to- to the pathology 
163 de: partment (. ) so he says pathology wouldn't tell me er anything 
164 about er the er results and he says what I can make of it 
165 them y'now it has- it has got to be ca:: ncer (. ) 
166 because if it wa: s. hhh clea: r and it was nothing they'd 
167 probably say to me well oh everything's fine 
168 but they wouldn't let me know anything so 
169 all I can presume it is (. ). hhh 
170 RC umh 
171 Sara y'know and he:: (hh)s got this box of tissu(hhh)es 
172 the(hhh)re y'kno(hhh)w hh ha ha ha hah hah hah hhhh 
173 and I tho(hh)ught o(hhh)h m(hh)y Go(hhh)d 
174 Ja:: (hh)so(hh)n [hah hah hah hah hah hah 
175 Chloe [ha ha ha 
176 Sara I said hhh wh(hh)ose go:: (hh)ing to lo(hhhh)ok a(hh)fter 
177 Jaso(hh)n hh hah hah hah ha hh o:: h hh de(hh)ar. hhh 
178 and just the:: n that was the only ti:: me I ha:: d a little 
179 we: ep and a cry and what have you y'know 
180 RC Umh 
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181 Sara hhh because I thought to myself (. ) what er y'know I- 
182 the thought of not being able to look after Jason 
183 to see him grow up (. ). hh he says (. ) 
184 o: h don't worry about it you'll live lgjn2 enough to see 
185 Jason grow up to be a fi-: ne you:: ng man he says 
186 we'll get rid of that y'know (. ) it was so:: la:: id back it [was 
187 RC [umh 
188 Sara so:: (. ) o:: ka:: y (. ) y'know so ca: sual 
189 oh it's o:: nly ga. **ncer y'know. hh ha ha ha. hhh 
190 but he did say to me that er umh if there was a prob- 
191 if I ever I feel I need to talk to him or (. ) for anything at all 
192 he says (. ) he'll be the: re for [me 
193 RC [umh umh 
194 Sara just come to him 
195 RC Oh that's good 
196 Sara Yes (. ) Oh he is a very nice doctor (. ) he is really nice 
197 and I wouldn't change him 
198 RC This is the doctor at the hospital or er the GP 
199 Sara No this is my GP (. ) y'know the o(hh)ne who sent me to the 
200 wro(hhh)ng pla(hh)ce in the fi(hhh)rst pla: (hh)ce 
201 y'kno(hh)w but I wouldn't change him for the world 
202 be: cause er umh (. ) he is really (1.0) anybody (1.0) 
203 can o:: verlook something or make a mistake(. ) 
204 RC sure 
205 Sara and this is how I look at it. I mean my husband, was 
206 going to say hh if anything happened to you I'll sue the doctor 
207 I'll do this and I'll do that I says, just ca:: Im down 
208 RC umh 
209 Sara y'know, I says (. ) people can't see whats in side of you 
210 RC umh 
211 Sara unless they do tests but he says but he shouldn't, y1know 
212 1 says umh, well yes we all should've (. ) done lots of 
213 things and everything happens for a reason I says just let it go 
214 and umh Dr D, like I said, I wouldn't change him for the world 
215 he's been very very good to me(. ) anyway he says to me (. ) if 1 
216 don't get a lett- if I don't hear from them to go in by Monday 
217 come back to him hh but fu(hh)nnily enou: (hh)gh Ah ha ha 
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218 wh(hh)en I go: t home I had a letter asking me if I could 
219 come in (. ) er a phone call in fact if am I free and I said 
220 yes and then a letter came on the Friday saying 
221 can I come in on the Mo: nday (. ) er to have this operation to 
222 remove this lump from my breast (. ) and er umh I went in 
223 and as I was lying th(hh)ere yknow I was sort of feeling 
224 oh hh ha ha I've got two big ones under m)r. (hh) a(hh)rm y'know 
225 and theyre be:: auties. hh ha ha hah hah hah hah hh 
226 so as the doctor came through to examine me: (. ) in the 
227 hospital I says oh by the way, I says (. ) I know they 
228 always check anyway (. ) they check your arm pit (. ) 
229 but I says oh there's two big ones under there two nice ones 
230 beneath there as well hh yknow hh ha hah and 
231 he says oh yes the(hh)re is and er I just sort of (. ) lie there 
232 waiting for them to er remove this er foreign thing hh ha ha 
232 that was inside of me(. ))( know but umh (. ) 
233 but that was only up until the operation so: rt of thing yknow 
234 RC umh 
Ann 09/01 "there's always the ome" 
I Ann you know they- they (. ) the-there's always the ome that you get 
2 that rings you up and says 
3 "-xo::: h dear what are you going to do o:::: h dea:: r what areF 
4 and that is the last thing that you want 
5 RC yes, yeah 
6 Ann and (0.2) 1 er (. ) in the end I had to tell this lady er don't- 
7 please don't phone me again because (. ) 
8 1 didn't want to hear it (. ) she was so rLe, -_---gative 
9 [1 couldn't believe it you know 
10 RC [umh 
11 Ann oh well (. ) what are you going to do you know 
12 you've got this (. 5) er terrible disease and er (. )yknow 
13 foh I'm so sorry I'm sorry for you andl 
14 RC umh 
15 Ann Tbut you want people to that are positive at the side of you 
16 you don't want negative peoplel 
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17 RC yeah, I was gonna ask you- actually its one of the questions 
18 Ann yeah 
19 RC er but whether any of your- your relationships have changed 
20 with you know family, friends or 
21 Ann u:: mh, [yes 
22 RC [you know whether some people have found it 
23 [difficult or moved away or 
24 Ann [oh yes people walk over the road er so that they- 
25 its like a bereavement= 
26 RC =you have experienced that? 
27 Ann yes (. ) I definitely have yes 
28 RC where people (. ) cross the road? 
29 Ann yes, they've crossed the road and umh 
30 RC people you know? 
31 Ann yes (0.5) they're talking- they're quite happy to talk to me now, 
32 but that was two years ago (0.5) and er at the time thi: s girl was, 
33 she lives round the corner from me and she was working with 
34 me at BG at Unkboy and she er umh (1.0) she just couldn't look 
35 at me when she ta:: Iked to me (1.0) and I said to one of the girls 
36 that work with her (. ) I said why is Dawn like she is? and 1- 1 
37 hadn't even thought about it- that it was because of what had 
38 gone on said, what- what Is wrong with her? I said I've not said 
39 anything to her (. ) she said TI think its because of your probleml 
40 (. ) I says what problem, I haven't got a probLem (. ) 
41 My problems GONE [hahh and that's why I remain positive is 
42 RC [umh 
43 Ann is because I- I er, its gone, its not there 
44 [1 haven't got cancer its gone 
45 RC [umh umhumh] 
46 So why do you think er she (. ) found it er difficult then 
47 or she couldn't look at you or 
48 [why do you think she crossed the road? 
49 Ann [well I think because she er- its that is sheer ignorance of 
50 people with breast cancer, she- she doesn't realise, 
51 she probably thinks that when you've got breast cancer 
52 no matter how bad it is, you're gonna die with it anyway 
53 so she couldn't face me (. ) she trea:: ted it as if it was a- its was 
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54 a bereavement (1 . 0) you know an- and umh er 
55 1 think it was just because of her ignorance (. ) 
56 she didn't realise that yes there is light at the end of the tunnel 
57 RC so er she didn't know what to say to you? 
58 Ann no, no she was embarrassed by it (3.0) 
59 RC umh I mean that is one of the er difficulties that a lot of people 
60 have, of not knowing what to say 
61 Ann umh 
62 RC but its like, I know from my own experience when I say things 
63 you know, talking about my brother or my friend hh er y' know 
64 some people know y, know how to say, or to respond or say you 
65 know or can er speak to you but other people are er er y' know, 
66 there's just, [they haven't got a clue what to say 
67 Ann [well they annoy me a bit really because I think well 
68 1- 1- 
69 RC well they can't help it though can they? 
70 Ann no, this is what I say but that it- it gets, it does get at you 
71 RC yeah 
72 Ann that people are like that I mean when I'd got this Jo on the phone 
73 saying To:: h dear, oh dear what are you going to dol 
74 hh hhhh you know, Twell I'm I'm gonna liveý 
75 RC umh 
76 Ann you know that's the first thing I'm gonna do, I'm going to live= 
77 RC =yeah= 
78 Ann =-': an- and I'll be alright you know, but why should I be the one 
79 telling her that I'm gonna be alright 
80 she should be the one telling MeT 
81 RC yeah 
82 Ann where's the support? 
83 RC yeah 
84 Ann you know, no support from them 
Ann 09102 
1 RC you just don't know what is around the corner 
2 Ann no, exactly I mean er (1.0) you ju: st (. ) don't know (2.0) 
3 but people do react very differently to you 
4 RC yeah, so people who- would you say that if people (1.0) 
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5 umh (2.0) well I mean you've mentioned the lady who- 
6 who was negative to you (2.0) 
7 basically you didn't communicate with her 
8 Ann well I couldn't, I- I wasn't in er, in er sit- I wasn't in the position 
9 that I felt that 1 (1.0) 1 was quite tearful at that particular time 
10 because I'd just recently been diagnosed with a serious illness 
11 RC yeah 
12 Ann and I couldn't (. ) I couldn't be bothered with her 
13 1 just didn't want to know, I didn't want this woman telling me 
14 oh I'm so sorry (. ) I'm so sorry (. ) I wanted someone to say (. ) 
15 Ann (. ) you're gonna be fine (. ) don't worry about it (. ) you're 
16 going in you're gonna have your operation (. ) you will get over it 
17 RC umh 
18 Ann that's what I wanted to hear and any woman that's going in for an 
19 operation an- and er got that kind of illness, 
20 I'm sure they would agree with me 
21 RC yeah did you, I mean er [in the people that you spoke to 
22 Ann [I try- I try to carry myself not to carry 
23 someone along [with me 
24 RC [yes, yes 
25 Ann an- and this is what she was trying to do 
Dee Extracts 7: 1 -7: 5 Dee 08 and Sandra 3A 343-358 
1 Dee she's tackling it the second time round 
2 much better than she tackled it the first, it's strange isn't it? 
3 RC umh 
4 Dee she was the one out of all of us who (. 2) 
5 gave up walking her dogs (. ) 
6 didn't go down the garden because she couldn't 
7 get that far, (2) stopped shopping (. 1) 
8 didn't go out in her car (1) 
9 didn't go out to dinner, 
10 she stopped living really In the terms she had before 
11 during the treatment 
12 RC uh huh 
13 Dee the re(hhh)st of us sta(hh)ggered ro(hh)und the water works 
14 you know with two dogs that were raring to go 
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15 and you'd think oh hhh dear I cant go any more 
16 1 carried on doing my shopping, 
17 that was very important to me (. ) 
18 the one thing that's very important to me is 
19 that I could do the wee: kly [Sainsburys 
21 RC [Yes 
22 Dee now isn't that silly but it was very important 
23 RC yeah absolutely 
24 Dee it's norm- the only se- sense of normality 
25 RC yes 
26 Dee I wash my own car still (1) and I drove all the while (1) 
27 Sandra did nothing, she sort of (2) let the disease (2) 
28 dictate to her really I suppose in a way hhh umh 
29 and I met her (. ) after about six months 
30 1 hadn't seen her for about six months- 
31 1 met her in the clinic at County a year and a bit ago 
32 Dee and I was sitting in clinic and thinking the only person I haven't 
33 seen recently is Sandra and a person grabbed my arm and said 
34 Dee (. ) I said d'y'know I was just thinking about you 
35 it's strange, it's eerie (. ) and I went to say and I did say 
36 how are you? and I looked at her and as the words came out 
37 1 thought oh what a silly thing to say you can see what she's like 
38 (. ) ((voice lowers to a whisper)) 
39 but yknow (. ) it's a natural reaction 
40 RC umh, umh 
41 Dee and she said "I'm very ill", umh yeah you look very unwell 
42 (. ) and I said, what's the problem? 
43 she said I've got metastatic lung cancer (1.0) 
44 and we sat (. ) for about half an hour 
45 because the consultant was so far behind 
46 and you could see the people in the clinic becoming yM 
47 unhappy about two patients sitting discussing (. ) one 
48 patient's terminal disease (. )Othey were so uncomfortable* 
49 RC umh 
50 Dee and I said look Sandra I said this is causing a few problems 
51 in clinic I said why don't we go to the coffee shop and 
52 say to them we're in the coffee shop how long do you think we 
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53 will be before we're needed 
54 RC umhumh 
55 Dee and we did that in the end (1.0) umh (2.0) 
56 and she was so feisty and she's been (. ) I mean Zoe will tell you 
57 she doesn't know her very well, she's met her once but 
58 she's just been wonderful this time and 
59 1 wonder sometimes if she couldn't have input so much 
60 effort the first time what would have happened? (2.0) 
61 RC umh 
62 Dee she's so, I mean I take my hat off to her this time I don't 
63 know how she keeps going (. ) and she does (1.0) 
64 th- this is the third time that she's lost her hair (. ) hhh 
65 Dee umh but I often wonder if she'd kicked in like feisty like 
66 now before, would it have made any difference, isn't it 
67 strange? (1.0) 
68 RC umh 
69 Dee because she did actually give up (1.0) not give up but 
70 she just stopped living 
71 RC but was she very poorly umh? 
72 Dee no I don't think she was as poorly as the rest of us really 
73 she just thought that that's how she should behave (2.0) 
74 and er (1.0) it used to annoy me because I used to want to 
75 shake her and say Ocome ono 
76 I'd say where have you been this week? 
77 you know you meet in chemotherapy (. ) 
78 where oh where have you been this week? 
79 "oh I've not been able to go anywhereO 
80 1 said have you not been shopping? (1.0) 
81 ONo, I cant drive, she said I just cant- I cant driveO 
82 1 said you could go to Fosse Park you could park outside 
83 (1.0) ha ha because if I was fed up Id get in the car 
84 go to Fosse Park for half an hour it sounds silly but that's my 
85 form of therapy 
86 RC umh 
87 Dee just have a won- a wonder round and I still walked my dogs 
88 RC so, what, what was it about her then you think 
89 that stopped her from doing anything 
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90 [any ideas about that 
91 Dee [I think she just became (1.0) totally unempowered by the 
92 disease (1.0) it overtook her whole reason for living (1.0) 
93 and she had a- the strange thing is she had a husband like (1.0) 
94 perhaps who would have suited me in a way 
95 but I suppose it wouldn't have done because I'm not that 
96 sort of person (. ) she had a husband who made it very easy 
97 for her to negate her responsibilities 
98 RC right 
99 Dee he took over the shopping, he took over the chores 
100 he took over everything, he would drive her to every 
101 appointment (. ) so she, so the NEED for her to do these things 
102 RC right 
103 Dee was taken care of, so that made her, it made it very easy for 
104 her- he would walk her dogs, their dogs 
105 RC yes 
106 Dee now if she had a husband who said oh come on 
107 were going up, wherever, you can walk half the way 
108 because I only used to walk half the way at one stage 
109 1 couldn't get round the reservoir 
108 RC umh 
109 Dee I'd go half ha ha the funny thing is the dogs were younger 
110 then and they could walk for ever, now I'm, I could walk 
ill for ever they're too old to walk ha ha its not fair 
112 RC ha ha ha ha 
113 Dee but she had somebody who made it very easy for her to do that 
114 RC right 
115 Dee she didn't do any gardening, she didn't do anything 
116 RC and what do you think moved her out of that? (1.0) 
117 Dee the realisation that she didn't have long (5.0) 
118 and the inordinate will to live (2.0) 
119 that she admits that she didn't know she'd got (3.0) 
120 RC (I wonder where it comes from) 
121 Dee I don't know 
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Zoo 07 
1 RC I mean how would you describe your quality of life before (. ) umh 
2 (. ) er you had your diagnosis? = 
3 Zoe =1 thought it was very good (. ) I thought it was 
4 you know, nothing particularly wrong with it but er I think you- 
5 you value your time more hh I've a lot less pati- I've a lot- 
6 I've absolutely flo patience with (. ) er, with er wasted time 
7 RC umh 
8 Zoe hhh umh (0.5) and that sort of stuff (. ) and you- you sort of look 
9 at things and I think you appreciate things (. ) and er (. ) the thing 
10 that's (. ) quite striking about the whole issue is that er (. ) 
11 1- 1 think most people when they go, when- as- as they go 
12 through their lives experience sort of some form of (1.0) er 
13 depression be it mild or be it (. ) chronic or whatever 
14 RC umh 
15 Zoe hh thinking o::: h god (2.0) 
16 RC uh huh (1.0) 
17 Zoe I'm not going to carry on and all the rest of it 
18 but when you're life is threatened hh what amazed me was just 
19 just how much you swing the other way (. ) I suppose it comes 
20 back to control doesn't it? 
21 RC umh umh (1.0) 
22 Zoe you er, sort of er, you fight bloody tooth and nail (4.0) 
23 RC yeah (1.0) 
24 Zoe for the control 
25 RC yeah 
26 Zoe I don't- I don't believe that you fight the disease, I think that's 
27 absolute crap, but you- you er fight for the control and you- you 
28 fight (3.0) 
29 RC can you tell me more about that? 
30 Zoe what? 
31 RC fighting the disease being crap (4.0) 
32 Zoe well what do you want to know? how do you- how do you- you 
33 well you tell me how you physically fight a disease, mentally? 
34 RC umh 
35 Zoe what do you class as fighting it? Denying it? (2.0) 
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36 RC denying it? (. ) did you say? 
37 Zoe do you think- do you think that maybe denying it is- 
38 is fighting it? (. ) 
39 RC well it depends what you- meaning you put on these words, 
40 [that are attached around it isn't it? 
41 Zoe [well this is what it is exactly, yeah yeah 
42 RC I mean, I think er what you said about er (. ) control (0.5) 1 think 
43 that's really very interesting because that's (0.5) er in relation to 
44 fighting you know, not fighting the dis- disease, but actually 
45 taking control (0.5) of- of yourself and your life is a very, very 
46 different way of er (. ) [looking at it 
47 Zoe [umh 
48 RC very different 
49 Zoe I am going to do this and I will -do 
this today 
50 RC yes 
51 Zoe sod the fact that I was po:: isoned yesterday (. ) I'm going to do it 
52 today 
53 RC yes 
54 Zoe but that isn't fighting the di:: se:: ase 
55 RC right 
56 Zoe no, its er, it pisses me off (. ) you know it does anyway 
57 RC yeah, but I mean, you think you know, its like, you know, you talk 
58 about, people talk about coping (0.5) 1 mean not just with cancer 
59 but I mean coping is a- is a word which is common in our 
60 vocabulary= 
61 Zoe =yeah well I don't like the word coping you see 
62 RC I don't like it very much but I'm also wondering about what does it 
63 mean? You're coping? = 
64 Zoe =1 don't know-- 
65 RC =or you're not coping= 
66 Zoe =1 haven't got the faintest idea 
67 RC And I think, I mean I feel its something to do with control 
68 because when it happens to me, when I'm oh I'm not coping with 
69 this it means I'm not in control 
70 Zoe umh 
71 RC hh and umh 
72 Zoe not necessarily of the situation but of yourself (3.0) 
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73 RC er ye::: s (2-0) yes (1.0) 1 mean it works both ways but I think (2.0) 
74 if I'm not coping, yeah I'm not er (. ) yeah its very much 
75 its an internal thing 
76 Zoe yeah 
77 RC its not (. ) what's going on out there or anything else, its how I'm 
78 actually dealing with things 
79 Zoe yeah, so, so you know, you're talking about self-control 
80 rather- rather than con- controlling something's that's objective 
81 that's out there, its the situation 
82 RC yeah yeah 
83 Zoe this is what it is, this is what it comes down to (1.0) the coping 
84 stuff 
85 RC if you're in control of things then= 
86 Zoe =its not about coping with the disease, its about coping with vou 
87 RC yeah 
88 Zoe full stop, this is- this is partly why this- this fighting stuff and this- 
89 this heroic image and er this er (0.5) you know (11.0) brave bit 
90 makes me so cross because it is just absolute total bollocks 
91 RC umh 
92 Zoe I think its rubbish (0.5) 
93 RC umh 
94 Zoe and its rammed down your throat (0.5) and I don't care what 
95 anybody says, there is an expectation that that is the way you 
96 should be, its what people expect 
97 RC yeah, and I think that's er-- 
98 Zoe =and I think that's where the strain comes in on the er individual 
99 coping, because, you're trying to do that for (. ) other people and 
100 for vou 
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